EVIDENCE ON NLRC RESEARCH

MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE

(MORESCO II), VS. CAGALAWAN, G.R. No. 175170, SEPTEMBER 5,
2012

When there is doubt between the evidence submitted

by the employer and that submitted by the employee,
the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
employee.

This is consistent with the rule that an employer’s cause

could only succeed on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.

Thus, MORESCO II cannot rely on the weakness of

Ortiz’s certification in order to give more credit to its
own evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated
declarations are not sufficient where the quantum of
evidence required to establish a fact is substantial
evidence, described as more than a mere scintilla.49
“The evidence must be real and substantial, and not
merely apparent.”

The belated submission of the said letter request

without any valid explanation casts doubt on its
credibility, specially so when the same is not a newly
discovered evidence. For one, the letter-request was
dated May 8, 2002 or a day before the memorandum
for Cagalawan’s transfer was issued. MORESCO II could
have easily presented the letter in the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter for serious examination. Why it
was not presented at the earliest opportunity is a
serious question which lends credence to Cagalawan’s
theory that it may have just been fabricated for the
purpose of appeal.

LOON vs. POWER MASTER, INC. G.R. No. 189404, December 11,
2013

In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of

procedure is not required. Time and again, we have allowed
evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the
NLRC in the interest of substantial justice.28 Thus, we have
consistently supported the rule that labor officials should use all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, in the interest of due process.29

However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of

reason and fair play. The liberality of procedural rules is
qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately
explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a
party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be
proven.30 The reason for these requirements is that the liberal
application of the rules before quasi-judicial agencies cannot
be used to perpetuate injustice and hamper the just resolution
of the case. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license
to disregard the rules of procedure.31

The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations

sought to be proven. Why the respondents’ photocopied and
computerized copies of documentary evidence were not
presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that
lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents
fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we
generally admit in evidence and give probative value to
photocopied documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the
adverse party to present the original documents for
inspection.35

It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals,

especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their
specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively
deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and
controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the
originals.

This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the
respondents’ failure to present the originals raises the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.36

It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRC’s proposition
that "[i]t is of common knowledge that there are many people
who use at least two or more different signatures."37 The NLRC
cannot take judicial notice that many people use at least two
signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners
themselves disown the signatures in the respondents’ assailed
documentary evidence.38

The NLRC’s position is unwarranted and is patently unsupported

by the law and jurisprudence.

As in illegal dismissal cases, the general rule is that the burden

rests on the defendant to prove payment rather than on the
plaintiff to prove non-payment of these money claims.41 The
rationale for this rule is that the pertinent personnel files,
payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents –
which will show that differentials, service incentive leave and
other claims of workers have been paid – are not in the
possession of the worker but are in the custody and control of
the employer.42

G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015 - PROTECTIVE

MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. CELSO
E. FUENTES.

More is required of the employer who must afford private

respondent his right to due process.

Granting it was so, respondents should have served a written

notice to complainant at his last known address to ascertain
whether he is still interested to continue his job.
It also found petitioner's claim that respondent had "vanished"
to be "ridiculous, at best, a sham defense."71
-----------------------

Azcor Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor

Relations Commission,

A delay of merely four (4) months in instituting

an illegal dismissal case is more than sufficient
compliance with the prescriptive period. It may
betray an unlettered man's lack of awareness
of his rights as a lowly worker but, certainly, he
must not be penalized for his tarrying.125