Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181626 May 30, 2011

SANTIAGO PAERA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City3 (RTC) finding petitioner Santiago Paera guilty of three counts of Grave Threats, in violation of
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera (petitioner)
allocated his constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting
distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring
barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of
complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioner’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing
water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme
and cut Indalecio’s access.

The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply
interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem
the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug.
It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by the parties.

According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards
Indalecio, shouting "Patyon tikaw!" (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his
wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank. Upon seeing petitioner,
Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag
babaye ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I don’t spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea
similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea,
petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente,
and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting "Bisag gulang ka, buk-on
nako imo ulo!" ("Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!").

According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring
why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but to take a
defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper.

Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial. Petitioner was the
defense’s lone witness.

The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC) found petitioner
guilty as charged, ordering petitioner to serve time and pay fine for each of the three counts. 4 The
MCTC found the prosecution evidence sufficient to prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article
282, noting that the Darongs’ persistent water tapping contrary to petitioner’s directive "must have
angered" petitioner, triggering his criminal behavior.5 The MCTC rejected petitioner’s defense of denial
as "self-serving and uncorroborated."6

Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

 The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter’s finding on petitioner’s motive. The RTC similarly
found unconvincing petitioner’s denial in light of the "clear, direct, and consistent" testimonies of the
Darongs and other prosecution witnesses.7

Hence, this appeal.

Abandoning his theory below, petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of the
"continued complex crime" of Grave Threats. Further, petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case
filed by Vicente as the latter’s failure to testify allegedly deprived him of his constitutional right to
confront witnesses. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is innocent of the charges for having acted in
defense of the property of strangers and in lawful performance of duty, justifying circumstances under
paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC.8

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in petitioner’s concession of
liability for the single count of the "continued complex crime" of Grave Threats. The OSG, however,
rejects petitioner’s prayer for the dismissal of Vicente’s complaint, arguing that petitioner’s guilt was
amply proven by the prosecution evidence, not to mention that petitioner failed to raise this issue
during trial. Further, the OSG finds the claim of defense of stranger unavailing for lack of unlawful
aggression on the part of the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG notes the absence of regularity in petitioner’s
performance of duty to justify his conduct.9

The Issue

The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative, deny the petition and affirm the RTC.

Due Process Mischief in Raising

New Issues on Appeal

Although uncommented, petitioner’s adoption of new theories for the first time before this Court has
not escaped our attention. Elementary principles of due process forbid this pernicious procedural
strategy - it not only catches off-guard the opposing party, it also denies judges the analytical benefit
uniform theorizing affords. Thus, courts generally refuse to pass upon freshly raised theories. 10 We
would have applied this rule here were it not for the fact that petitioner’s liberty is at stake and the
OSG partially views his cause with favor.

Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats

To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the case to the
concept of "continued crime" (delito continuado) which envisages a single crime committed through a
series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.11 To fix the penalty for his supposed single
continued crime, petitioner invokes the rule for complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC imposing
the penalty for the most serious crime, applied in its maximum period.

The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of continued and
complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime[.]" This
felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened." 12

Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner’s threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea and crack
open Vicente’s skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious
physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio,
Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at
different points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three
separate criminal liabilities.

Petitioner’s theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had "a single
mental resolution, a single impulse, and single intent"13 to threaten the Darongs assumes a vital fact:
that he had foreknowledge of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente’s presence near the water tank in the
morning of 8 April 1999. The records, however, belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio,
petitioner was as much surprised to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing petitioner when they
chanced upon each other near the water tank. Similarly, petitioner came across Diosetea as he was
chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly, petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while
running after Indalecio. Indeed, petitioner went to the water tank not to execute his "single intent" to
threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente but to investigate a suspected water tap. Not having known
in advance of the Darongs’ presence near the water tank at the time in question, petitioner could not
have formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came across each
of them.

The importance of foreknowledge of a vital fact to sustain a claim of "continued crime" undergirded
our ruling in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals.14 There, the accused, as here, conceded liability to a lesser
crime – one count of estafa, and not 124 as charged – theorizing that his conduct was animated by a
single fraudulent intent to divert deposits over a period of several months. We rejected the claim –

15 x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, petitioner’s intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm arose only
when he chanced upon each of his victims.

Indeed, petitioner’s theory holds water only if the facts are altered – that is, he threatened Indalecio,
Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time. Had this been true, then petitioner’s
liability for one count of Grave Threats would have rested on the same basis grounding our rulings
that the taking of six roosters16 or 13 cows17found at the same place and taken at the same time
results in the commission of only one count of theft because –

[t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only of one
which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the
roosters [and heads of cattle] in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two
crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct
appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.18 (Emphasis in the original)

Having disposed of petitioner’s theory on the nature of his offense, we see no reason to extensively
pass upon his use of the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty scheme. It suffices to
state that under Article 48 of the RPC, complex crimes encompass either (1) an act which constitutes
two or more grave or less grave offenses; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another19 and petitioner neither performed a single act resulting in less or less grave
crimes nor committed an offense as a means of consummating another.

The Prosecution Proved the Commission

of Grave Threats Against Vicente

We find no reversible error in the RTC’s affirmance of the MCTC’s ruling, holding petitioner liable for
Grave Threats against Vicente. The prosecution’s evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Indalecio,
Diosetea and two other corroborating witnesses,20 indisputably show petitioner threatening Vicente
with death.21 Vicente’s inability to take the stand, for documented medical reason,22 does not detract
from the veracity and strength of the prosecution evidence. Petitioner’s claim of denial of his
constitutional right to confront witnesses is untenable as he had every opportunity to cross-examine
the four prosecution witnesses. No law requires the presentation of the private complainant as
condition for finding guilt for Grave Threats, especially if, as here, there were other victims and
witnesses who attested to its commission against the non-testifying complainant. Significantly,
petitioner did not raise Vicente’s non-appearance as an issue during the trial, indicating that he saw
nothing significant in the latter’s absence.

No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioner’s

Commission of Grave Threats

There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s claim of having acted to "defend[] and protect[] the water
rights of his constituents" in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay.23 The defense of
stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC, which negates criminal liability of –

[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.1avvphi1

requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and
resentment.24 None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of
aggression against third parties’ rights when petitioner successively threatened them with bodily
harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary, peaceful acts – Indalecio was standing near the
water tank, Diosetea was walking towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden
a few meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the reasonableness of
the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the
records more than support the conclusion that petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the
Darongs’ repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme, causing him to lose perspective and
angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.

Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph
of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office.25 Arguably, petitioner acted in the
performance of his duty to "ensure delivery of basic services"26 when he barred the Darongs’ access to
the communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he
successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for
violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of his office lay before
petitioner27 and his resort to any of them would have spared him from criminal liability. His failure to
do so places his actions outside of the ambit of criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to
know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of
violence or threats of violence.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 November 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Dated 28 November 2007, penned by Judge Arlene Catherine A. Dato.

3 Branch 39.
4 The dispositive portion of the MCTC’s ruling provides (Rollo, p. 171):

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Santiago Paera GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Threats under paragraph 2, Article 282
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in all the above-entitled cases, and the Court
hereby sentences him the penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4)
months of arresto mayor and FINE of Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00) for each case.

5 Id. at 170.

6 Id. at 171.

7 Id. at 39.

8 Id. at 21-28.

9 Id. at 190-200.

10Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461, 30
April 2010, 619 SCRA 609.

11Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214,
224, citing Padilla, Criminal Law 53-54 (1988).

12 People v. Villanueva, Nos. 3133-3144-R, 27 February 1950, 48 O.G. 1376 (No. 4), 1381.

13 Rollo, p. 22.

14 160-A Phil. 962 (1975).

15 Id. at 971.

16 People v. Jaranilla, 154 Phil. 516 (1974). See also People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 (1926)
(involving conviction for one count of theft for the taking of two roosters).

17 People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 (1939).

18 Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14 at 970 (internal citations omitted).

19Article
48 provides: "Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period."

20 Pedro Salvoro and Roberto Pontonilla.

21 Rollo, p. 169.

22
The prosecution presented in evidence the certification of Dr. Fe V. Tagimacruz, municipal
health officer of Valencia, Negros Oriental, attesting that Vicente suffered from Alzheimer’s
disease (id.).

23 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

24The first two requisites correspond to the first two requirements under the first paragraph of
the provision.

25 People v. Pajenado, 161 Phil. 234 (1976).

26 Republic Act No. 7160, Section 389(b)(12).

27Among others, petitioner could have given the Darongs a final warning or, dispensing with
such, immediately sought injunctive relief from the courts.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 171511 March 4, 2009

RONNIE CALUAG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated December 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 28707 and its Resolution2 dated February 15, 2006, denying reconsideration. The appellate
court had affirmed the Decision3 dated August 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas
City, Branch 198, in Criminal Case No. 04-0183-84, which affirmed the Joint Decision4 dated January
28, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 79, in Criminal Cases Nos.
47358 and 47381 finding petitioner Ronnie Caluag and Jesus Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries
and Ronnie Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate Informations5 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 47381 and
47358, respectively, were filed against Caluag and Sentillas. The Information in Criminal Case No.
47381 charged Caluag and Sentillas with slight physical injuries committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together,
and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of NESTOR PURCEL
DENIDO, by then and there mauling him, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which required
medical attendance for less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary
labor for the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358 charged Caluag with grave threats committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March 2000, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by personal resentment which
he entertained against one JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously threaten said JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO with the infliction on her person of a harm amounting
to a crime, by then and there poking his gun at her forehead and uttering the following words in
tagalog, to wit:

"Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?"

thereby causing said complainant to be threatened.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the spouses Nestor and Julia Denido, as
witnesses. Their version of the facts are as follows:

In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o’clock8 in the afternoon, Nestor learned that two of his
guests from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at
the store owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people including his own
son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and replied, "Bakit kasama ka ba roon?," and
immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by Caluag and
Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they did
not listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00
p.m., Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.9

Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way to their
barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near her house. Caluag
confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo
ito?"10 Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she
reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.11

For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and Sentillas; and the barbecue vendor Pablo
Barrameda, Jr. as witnesses. According to them, in the afternoon of March 19, 2000 at around 6
o’clock in the evening, Caluag was on his way home with his three-year old son when Nestor, drunk
and unruly, blocked his way and asked him, "Pare, galit ka ba sa akin?" He answered in the negative
but Nestor persisted in his questioning and would not allow him to pass through. Annoyed, he told
Nestor, "Hindi nga! Ang kulit kulit mo!" Nestor then boxed him on his face which caused him to fall
down. Caluag first assured himself of the safety of his son and then punched Nestor back. As people
around pacified them, he was led to the store owned by the son of Sentillas. Nestor pursued him and
punched him again. As he retaliated, some bystanders separated them. Nestor then shouted, "Putang
ina mo, Pare! Gago ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong niloko!" Thereafter, an unidentified man from
the crowd armed with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded and pacified the
man. Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at Julia.12

In a Joint Decision dated January 28, 2004, the MeTC found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of slight
physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The MeTC relied on Nestor’s testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny that he was drunk at the
time of the incident while Caluag admitted that he got annoyed by Nestor’s attitude. The MeTC
concluded that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their tempers due to Nestor’s unruly behavior. On
the other hand, the MeTC noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the
barangay. While she had intended to report the mauling of her husband, as he instructed her, what
she reported instead was what happened to her. With such straightforward and seemingly natural
course of events, the MeTC was convinced that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia.

The decretal portion of the joint decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds and declares accused RONNIE
CALUAG AND JESUS S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Slight Physical
Injuries under Criminal Case No. 47381, and sentences them to pay [a] fine of ₱200.00 each. The two
(2) accused are also censured to be more complaisant and well-bred in dealing with people.

The Court also finds accused RONNIE CALUAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave
Threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, under Criminal Case No. 47358, and
sentences him to suffer two (2) months imprisonment [and to] pay [a] fine of ₱200.00.

Criminal Case No. 47382, as earlier explained, is ordered dismissed being merely a duplication of
Criminal Case No. 47358.

SO ORDERED.13

Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the joint decision of the MeTC.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC on December 9, 2005. The appellate
court noted that the MeTC gave credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia because they were in
accord with the natural course of things. Likewise, petitioner’s negative assertions cannot prevail over
the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The appellate court disregarded the purported
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nestor and Julia since these refer to collateral matters and not to
the essential details of the incident.1avvphi1

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals:

I.

… MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND
WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION;

II.
… ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE [MeTC] WHICH MADE INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS
IN ITS JOINT DECISION THAT ARE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH
ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;

III.

… ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT.14

Simply, the issue is: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction of slight physical
injuries and of grave threats?

Petitioner contends that he was able to present Barrameda, an independent and impartial witness,
who supported his version of events and debunked those of Nestor and Julia. Contrary to the findings
of the lower courts that petitioner offered mere denials, Barrameda’s testimony is actually a positive
statement that should have been given full credit. Petitioner also argues that although the lower
courts acknowledged that Nestor was drunk and troublesome at the time of the incident, they chose to
believe his testimony rather than petitioner’s. Petitioner adds that there is no basis for the lower
courts to conclude that he lost his temper because of Nestor’s unruly behavior. Petitioner maintains
that just because Julia immediately reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not
necessarily mean that it actually happened. Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did poke a
gun at Julia, the crime committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code.15

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the MeTC did not err in
giving credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The MeTC found that the positive assertions of
Nestor and Julia, their straightforward manner of testifying, and the seemingly natural course of
events, constituted the more plausible and credible version. The MeTC also noted that Julia did not
waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities immediately after it
happened. The OSG also agrees with the MeTC that petitioner lost his temper, given the unruly
behavior of Nestor.

We find the petition with insufficient merit and accordingly sustain petitioner’s conviction.

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner raises questions of fact. Certainly, such matters
mainly require a calibration of the evidence or a determination of the credibility of the witnesses
presented by the parties and the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.16

The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court in
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 under which this petition is filed. It is not the Court’s
function under Rule 45 to review, examine and evaluate or weigh once again the probative value of
the evidence presented.17

Moreover, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon
this Court. It is not the function of this Court to weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the
Court of Appeals for these are deemed final and conclusive and may no longer be reviewed on
appeal.18

A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted where the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is
unsupported by the evidence on record. Nevertheless, we find that there is no ground to apply the
exception in the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals are in full
accord with those of the MeTC and the RTC. This Court will not assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, both testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to the appeal particularly where,
as in this case, the findings of the MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals completely coincide. 19

Even if the Court relaxes the abovecited general rule and resolves the petition on the merits, we still
find no reversible error in the appellate court’s ruling.

As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the testimonies of Nestor and Julia were
more in accord with the natural course of things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas
lost control of their temper as Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed by Nestor’s unruly
behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also happened since Julia did not waste time in reporting
it to the barangay authorities. Instead of reporting the mauling of her husband, she reported what
happened to her in her hurry, excitement and confusion. Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor
and Julia that petitioner committed the acts complained of undermined his negative assertions. The
fact that Barrameda testified in petitioner’s behalf cannot be given more weight than the
straightforward and credible statements of Nestor and Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to
concoct stories to pin down petitioner on any criminal act, hence their testimonies deserve full faith
and credit.

The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner guilty of grave threats under
Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer two months of imprisonment
and to pay a fine of ₱200. We find no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the MeTC and
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats (Article 282), light
threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285). These provisions state:

Art. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person,
honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to
commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition,
even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not
have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.

If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period.

2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been
made subject to a condition.

Art. 283. Light threats. — Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner
expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Art. 285. Other light threats. — The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall
threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-
defense.

2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not
constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not persist in the idea
involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within
the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.

3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a felony.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by
a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always
accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime
and there is no condition.

The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to the
barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier at around 4:00 o’clock
in the afternoon. On her way there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while
at the same time saying "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"20 Considering what transpired earlier
between petitioner and Julia’s husband, petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly
enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person. Actions speak louder than
words. Taken in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go against
the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by petitioner’s accompanying act.

Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave
threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not
subject to a condition.

Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, "shall threaten
another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel", since it presupposes that the threat to
commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not
constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on one hand, and light and other
light threats on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision dated December 9, 2005 and
the Resolution dated February 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 are
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO* PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated member of Second Division pursuant to Special Order No. 580 in place of
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, who was earlier designated as an additional
member per Special Order No. 571 but will take no part being then the Solicitor General.
1 Rollo, pp. 46-57. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate

Justices Eliezer R. Delos Santos and Josefina Guevara-Salonga concurring.

2 Id. at 68.
3 Records, pp. 256-261. Penned by Judge Erlinda Nicolas-Alvaro.
4 Id. at 71-79. Penned by Judge Pio M. Pasia.
5 Id. at 1-2.
6 Id. at 2.
7 Id. at 1.
8 Time as stated during cross-examination. In the Sinumpaang Salaysay, the time of the

incident is stated as "bandang 7:30 ng gabi."

9 Id. at 4 and 140.
10 TSN, November 19, 2001, p. 5; Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit A), records, p. 25.
11 Id. at 3 and 86.
12 Id. at 8-10 and 184.
13 Id. at 79.
14 Rollo, p. 24.
15 Id. at 27.
16 Lamis v. Ong, G.R. No. 148923, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 510, 517.
17 Lorenzo v. People, G.R. No. 152335, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 462, 469.
18 Changco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, March 20, 2002, 379 SCRA 590, 593-594.
19 Id. at 594.
20 Exhibit A, Records, p. 25.