Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority

Author(s): Martin E. Spencer

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1970), pp. 123-134
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Martin E. Spencer*

Weber on legitimate norms and authority

Weber's classificationof the types of legitimate authority has achieved
classical status in the literature of political-science and political
sociology, and yet, notwithstanding this attention and homage, the
entire subject appears tantalizingly incomplete. Some of the unclarified
questionsinclude the problem of democraticlegitimacy, the fundamental
nature of legitimacy, and most importantly, the ultimate significanceof
the nature of legitimate beliefs for the structureand function of political
institutions. In what follows we shall argue (I) that Weber's typology
of authority is supplemented in Weber's own writing by a typology of
legitimate normative orders; (2) that Weber's typology of social action
provides an insight into two fundamental postures of legitimacy, (3)
that to the existing three types of legitimate authority must be added a
fourth category that encompassesthe legitimacy of democratic institu-
tions, and (4) that the basic purpose of Weber's analysis is to demon-
strate that beliefs of legitimacy determine the structure of political
institutions and the dynamics of political life.

I. LEGITIMATE ORDERS AND LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY

One of the difficulties associated with Weber's discussion of authority

is the fact that elsewherehe provides an apparently unrelated discussion
of legitimacy concerned with 'orders'. Weber defines an 'order' as a
system of '... determinate maxims or rules...' towards which
behaviour is oriented (Weber, 1964; p. I24). By a legitimate order is
meant a normative system which is upheld by the belief in the actors of
its binding quality or rightness.Weber citesfourbases for the legitimacy
of such an order:
Legitimacy may be ascribed to an order by those acting subject to
it in the following ways:
(a) By tradition: a belief in the legitimacy of what has always
existed; (b) by virtue of affectual attitudes, especially emotional,
legitimizing the validity of what is newly revealed or a model to
imitate; (c) by virtue of a rational belief in its absolute value, thus
* Martin E. Spencer, B.S.M.A.PH.D. Associate Professorof Sociology, State University
College of New York at Oneonta
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Spencer Weberon legitimatenormsandauthority

lending it the validity of an absolute and final commitment; (d)

because it has been established in a manner which is recognized to
be legal. (Weber, 1964; p. I30.)

We ask then: What is the relationship between these factors and the
three formsof authority?What is the significanceofthe fact that charisma
is not mentioned and that an additional category of 'rational belief' in
absolute value is added?And finally, is it possibleto separate discussions
of the legitimacy of orders from the legitimacy of authority?
Weber in this treatment of legitimate orders and authority is dealing
with different aspects of a single phenomenon-the forms that underlie
all instances of ordered human interaction. In his treatment Weber
distinguishestwo fundamental components of this ordering: normsand
authority.The differencesbetween the two are obvious and fundamental.
Norms are rules of conduct towards which actors orient their behaviour
(Weber, 1964; pp. I24-5). Ordered interaction is achieved when a high
probability exists that a significant number of actors in a given context
will orient their behaviour to the same norms. The essenceof authority
is a relationship between two or more actors in which the commands of
certain actors are treated as binding by the others (Weber, 1954;
p. 328). Authority is thus a sphere of legitimate command and where
authority exists ordered interaction is also possible. Thus authority and
norms representpolar principles of social organization: In the one case
organization rests upon orientation to a rule or a principle; in the other
instance it is based upon compliance to commands. The significance of
legitimateorder and authority is, as Weber makes clear, that the most
stable ordering of conduct is achieved when the ordering principles are
held to be binding by the actors subject to them:
An order which is adhered to from motives of pure expediency is
generally much less stable than one upheld on a purely customary
basis through the fact that the correspondingbehaviour has become
habitual. The latter is much the most common type of subjective
attitude. But even this type of order is in turn much less stable than
an order which enjoys the prestige of being considered binding, or,
as it may be expressed, of 'legitimacy.' (Weber, 1964; P.
125.)
The critical question then becomes that of the exact relationship be-
tween the various types of authority and norms. We believe that the key
to the synthesisof the separate discussionsof the legitimacy of ordersand
authority lies in an explication of these relationships: the point being
that the types of authorityinvariablyexist in some relationshipto norms.
The total institutional structure underlying ordered interaction is always
some amalgam of norms and authority.
Charismatic authority, represented by the prophet is the purest form
of authority in that it claims the right to break through all existing
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Spencer Weberon legitimatenormsandauthority

normative structures. As such, charismatic authority precipitates

charismatically-certified norms, e.g., sacred law as revealed by the
prophets (Weber, 1964; p. 361). In the stage of the 'routinization' of
charisma, charismatic authority becomes encrusted in sacred norms
which govern its allocation, as in the proceduresfor resolving the prob-
lem of succession.These norms can be understood as having their legiti-
mate basis in (b) of Weber's categories cited above, i.e., in affectual
attitudes. The relationship between the system of authority and the
normative order in charismatic authority thus follows a characteristic
development. To begin with, charismatic authority is substantially
unbounded by norms. The prophet, so long as he retains his charisma,
can destroy old norms and create new ones. In time, the workings of
charismatic authority leaves a residue of sacred norms produced by the
word or deed of the prophet. These charismaticallycertifiednormslimit
the authority of successors to the original charismatic leader. The
movement is then from a system of virtually pure authority to a system
of authority with an admixture of constraining norms. Charismatic
authority produces norms whose legitimacy is ascribedto '. .. affectual
attitudes . . . legitimizing the validity of what is newly revealed. .. .'
In the case of traditional authority the relationship between norms
and authority is reversed. Where in charismatic authority the leader
generatesnorms, in traditional authority, the normsgenerate the leader.
The bearer of authority-the king-or the hereditary chief depends
on traditional norms for his authority. He claims a legitimate right to
the throne by virtue of the traditions which define succession. The
legitimacy of traditional authority thus rests upon the legitimacy of
traditional norms. The same traditional norms constrict the sphere of
traditional authority in a way unknown to charismatic authority. The
traditional leader is limited by custom in the range of his edicts.
In legal-rational authority a similar dependent relationshipis found.
The authority derives from legal norms. The bureaucrat derives his
authority from the legal norms defining the sphere of jurisdiction of his
office. The legitimacy of legal-rational authority thus flows from the
legitimacy of legal-rational norms, and just as the sphere of traditional
authority is bounded by traditional norms, the sphere of legal-rational
authority is bounded by legal norms. The essential difference is that
legal norms and legal rational authority can be shaped and modified
with a facility unknown to traditional authority. It is important to
emphasize here that this legal rational authority restsupon normswhose
legitimacy is ascribed to the fact that they have '. . . been established
in a manner which is recognized to be legal', i.e., (d) of Weber's cate-
gories referred to above.
For the three forms of authority, we then find three sets of relation-
ships to norms. Charismatic authority sweeps aside old norms and
generates charismatically-certified new norms (i.e., '... norms
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Spencer Weberon legitimatenormsandauthority

legitimated by... virtue of affectual attitudes .. .'). Traditional autho-

rityis legitimated by traditional normsand is additionally circumscribed
by them. Legal rational authorityrestsupon legal normsand is also con-
tained by them. Thus the three types of authority are related to three
of the four categories of legitimacy underlying norms. As for the
remaining category of normative legitimacy-that deriving from a
'... rational belief in its absolute value ...' we shall have to use a
different route of approach to trace its relationship to authority.

II. BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS LEGITIMACY

The essence of legitimacy, whether it be of norms or authority, is the

sense of duty, obligation, or 'oughtness' towards rules, principles or
commands. What is the fundamental nature of these attitudes?Weber
provides us with four categories of normative legitimacy and three
categoriesof legitimate authority: are we then to conclude that there are
seven fundamental postures of legitimacy, or can they be distilled to
more basic forms? Parsons has argued that the root of legitimacy lies
in charisma (Parsons, 1968; pp. 658-69). We shall argue that the seven
Weberian categories can be reduced to two basic forms of legitimacy.
The basic attitudes of legitimacy can be stated in terms of Weber's
typology of social action (wert-rational, zweck-rational, traditional,
and affectual action). Before attempting this, for the sake of brevity and
clarity we quote in full Weber's description of the four categories:
Social action, like other forms of action, may be classified in the
following four types according to its mode of orientation: (I) in terms
of rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends (zweck-
rational), that is, through expectations as to the behaviour of objects
in the external situation and of other human individuals, making use
of these expectations as 'conditions' or 'means' for the successful
attainment of the actor's own rationally chosen ends; (2) in terms of
rational orientation to an absolute value (wert-rational);involving a
conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic,
religious, or other form of behaviour, entirely for its own sake and
independently of any prospect of external success; (3) in terms of
affectual orientation, especially emotional, determined by the
specific affects and states of feeling of the actor; (4) traditionally
oriented through the habituation of long practice. (Weber, 1964,
p. II5.)
The category of zweck-rational, or purpose-rational action can be
immediately dismissed as a basis of legitimacy, because in this instance
the norm or authority is accepted, not out of a feeling of rightness, but
out of the rational calculation that submission is in the interests of the
concerned party. A criminal who hesitates to violate certain laws out of
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Spencer Weberon legitimatenormsandauthority

fear of the penalty of capture orients himself in this way to laws which
he does not recognize as legitimate.
The category of traditional action can also be discardedas a potential
basis of legitimacy since, as Weber points out, this action is habitual,
automatic and unreflective ('.. . it is very often a matter of almost
automatic reaction to habitual stimuli which guide behaviour in a
course which has been repeatedly followed', Weber, 1964, p. ii6). It is
clear that the sense of 'oughtness'essential to legitimacy is absent here.
This leaves the categoriesof affectual and wert-rationalaction and we
shall argue that all forms of legitimacy can be subsumed under these
categories.
Affectual action involves some emotional posture, whether this be
positive attachment, awe, fear or reverence, and it is readily apparent
that such elements are found in the orientation to traditional and charis-
matic norms and authority. Thus an affectual orientation underlies
four of the seven categories (traditional authority, traditional norms,
charismatic authority and affectually legitimated norms).
The question of wert-rational legitimacy is somewhat less accessible,
since here we have a sense of obligation which is ultimately rational in
nature. Consider the example of certain typical legal norms, e.g., tax
laws. We recognize that a complex spectrum of attitudes exists towards
such legislation and that many obey these laws on the basis of self-
interest (to avoid punishment) rather than out of a sense of obligation.
For those who recognize the legitimacy of the laws, however, the nature
of that legitimacy is based on the 'legality' of the laws, i.e., that they
were passed in the duly accepted manner. The idea of 'legality' is here
the basic value against which the legitimacy of the law is measured-
thus its wert-rational character. The law is not the object of reverence
or awe; the temper of its legitimacy is a sober judgment of rightness'
owing to its relationship to the fundamental value of correct legal
procedure.
Weber's category of legitimate norms involving a rational belief in
the absolute value of the norm also falls within this principle of wert-
rational legitimacy and in addition has an interesting and profound
relation to the 'ordinary'legal normsjust mentioned. The example that
Weber provides for this category is that of 'natural law' and we may
understand it to apply to all categories of 'higher law' and morally-
relevant law. Certain laws, such as those relating to family life, capital
punishment, sexual behaviour, and other salient moral issues are accep-
ted not on the basis of their legality, but because they express moral
principles which are held as absolute values in themselves. A useful
example of this type of legitimacy is found in civil rights legislation. In
addition to the purely formal legal legitimacy just cited is the legitimacy
based on the principle of social equality that these laws serve. If we
contrast the attitudes towards traffic laws and laws structuring equal
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franchise the difference is immediately apparent. In the one case the

legitimacy derives from the pure legality of the laws, in the other case it
flows from the principle of equality that the laws implement.
These different bases of legitimacy of legal norms are treated by
Weber in his legal sociology in terms of formal and substantive ration-
ality (Weber, 1954, ch. VIII). Formal rationality refersto the internal
consistency of a body of law; substantive rationality refers to the
relationship of law to some external criterion of justice or value. In
the one case the rightness of a law is judged in terms of its 'legality',
its formal appropriatenessin terms of existing legal principles, i.e., its
procedural correctness. In the other case the rightness of the law is
judged in terms of its implementation of a specific extra-legal value,
e.g., equality, freedom, or conceptions of morality, patriotism, honour,
etc. Our argument is that Weber's principle of formal rationality is a
principle of legitimacy equivalent to the fourth category of normative
legitimacy (recognizingnormsas legitimate because they have '. .. been
established in a manner which is recognized to be legal') and that the
principle of substantive rationality is equivalent to the third principle
of normative legitimacy (recognizing a norm as legitimate '. .. by
virtue of a rational belief in its absolute value . .'). In both instances
the character of legitimacy is that of a rational commitment. We
logically include in this category legal-rational authority because of its
derivation from rational legal norms as cited above.
Despite what has been said thus far the full distinction between what
we have called affectual and wert-rational legitimacy may still be
obscure. We are fortunate, however, in having available a unique
experimental demonstrationof these categories in Piaget's study of the
attitudes of children towards the rules of the game of marbles (Piaget,
196o0,ch. I). From our point of view this is a study of the legitimacy of
those rules and Piaget's results fall strikingly close to the two funda-
mental postures of legitimacy based upon Weber's categories of social
action. Piaget finds an early and late stage in the development of these
attitudes. The morality of constraint, the first stage, appears to corres-
pond to affectual legitimacy. The rule is considered to have eternally
existed, is immutable and is charged with reverence. The similarity to
traditions and sacred law is of course clear. In the second stage, the
morality of co-operation, the attitude towards rules is no longer tinged
with awe and reverence. The rules are respected insofar as they are
oriented to a sense of reciprocity and justice. The rules can be changed
to satisfy this basis of legitimacy. Thus in this second form the attitude
towards the rules bears the character of a wert-rational orientation.
Our position then, in distinction to Parsons, who finds charisma as
the single generating principle of all varieties of legitimacy, is that there
are two basic attitudes of legitimacy: a legitimacy based in feeling
(affectual) and a legitimacy based in reason (wert-rational). This
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dichotomy is reflected in the two stages of attitudes towards rules in the

work of Piaget-the moralities of constraint and co-operation. The
Weberian categories of legitimacy towards norms and authority can
also be grouped under these headings: charismaticauthority, traditional
authority, sacred laws and traditional norms are all rooted in the
legitimacy of feeling: legal rational authority, legal rational norms and
higher law based on absolute values are different varieties of a legiti-
macy based on reason.
III. THE FOURTH TYPE OF AUTHORITY

A major problem in the Weberian typology of authority is the difficulty

of conceptualizing the patterns of legitimacy of democratic political
institutions. For example, how are we to understand the nature of the
authority of the president of the United States? Shall we say that his
authority is of the legal-rational type? If so, then the sphere of his
authority is demarcated by the constitution, and the laws passed since,
and his right to exercisethat authorityis certified by the legal proprieties
of his election. But how then are we to explain certain curious waxings
and wanings of presidential authority. We know that if a president is
elected by a 'landslide' that there is much talk of a 'mandate', and
conversely, if he is a minority president the legitimacy of his authority
is somehow suspect. We know that challenges to presidential authority
will be made in terms of the consent of the governed, e.g., in the case of
unpopular undeclared wars the right of the president to wage such wars
is challenged on constitutional grounds and on the basis of the absence
of the consent of the governed. We know also that the authority of other
important political offices is often challenged on a similar basis. The
actions of the Supreme Court are thus often challenged on the grounds
that nine men, who are not elected, are frustratingthe popular will. The
legitimacyof actions by congressmenand governorsmay also be attacked
on the grounds of its divergence from what '... the people want ...'
The common element in these examples is of course the legitimacy of
authority based upon the consentof the governed.The authority of a
president swells or contracts with the size of his plurality and at any
point in the exercise of office by president, judges, congressmen or
governors, the legitimacy of the use of office may be disputed in terms
of the popular will. Thus the authority of these offices rests to a con-
siderable extent upon a supervening principle-the consent of the
governed-and the constitution is the embodiment of that principle.
The authorityof office is thus not merely defined, certified and bounded
by specific laws, but by a generalprinciplewhich underlies these laws and
which may be appealed to (and generally is) when the exercise of office
appears to violate that principle.
This fourth type of authority, which we shall call value-rational
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authority thus derives from a supervening general principle, and is

historicallyquite familiar.' Formsof protestagainst establishedauthority
have, under certain conditions taken the form of an attempt to subject
supreme political authority to some overriding principle. Thus in the
case of the origin of the Magna Carta, the Whig doctrinesof legitimacy
and the political theories of the French and American revolutions, the
monarch is made responsible to absolute principles of natural rights,
natural law, consent of the governed, the general will, etc. An absolute
principle of rational belief becomes the ultimate source of authority and
generates a constitutionalstructure of state in which all supreme
political authority is held subject to the basic principle. We note that
mere procedural correctness, or 'legality' is not sufficient to justify
supreme authority, but some substantive principle is required.
Thus value-rational authority has its embodiment in constitutional
government, generally involving some separationof powersin which the
supreme authorities owe their power to the constitutive principles of
the state as symbolized by the oath of office. We see this in the United
States, where each branch of government is ultimately responsible to
the principlesof the constitution. In these terms we can understand that
Western political theory of the past several centuries has involved the
articulation of explicit claims to legitimacy based upon value-rational
authority.
The distinction between legal-rational and value-rational authority
can be illustrated in terms of the characteristicplaces of these forms of
authority. Legal-rational authority is typically located in bureaucracies
and exists in relation to specific laws that define its precincts. Value-
rational authority is typically found in the higher realms of political
office-president, prime minister, chancellor or even constitutional
monarch, and exists in relation to principles. Thus if legal rational
authority is celebrated as an administrationof laws, not of men, value-
rational authority is a government of principles, not of men.2
We may summarize this portion of our argument as follows:
The legitimacy of affect or feeling involves the attachment of certain
sentiments to rules offices, or persons. The varieties of legitimacy of
norms and authority under this heading concern how the affect is
generated and to whatit is attached. In the case of charismaticauthority
the affect is generated by the personal qualities of the leader and is
attached to his person. In the case of traditionalauthorityit is generated
by usage and is attached to the person who occupies the position of
traditional leader. In the case of sacred laws it is generated by charis-
matic revelation and is attachedto rules.In the case of traditionalnorms
it is generated by usage and is attached to rules.
The legitimacy of reason involves an evaluationof rightnessmade with
respect to rules, or the commands of offices or persons. The sub-varieties
of wert-rational legitimacy thus concern how the evaluations are made
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and to whatthey refer. In the case of formal rationality the evaluation

is made with respect to the principle of legality, or procedural correct-
ness. Thus legal rational authority involves an evaluation of rightness
with respect to an incumbent of office who has achieved his position in
the proper way and who does not exceed the defined authority of his
office. The rightnessof legal rational normsconcernstheir relation to the
existing body of law-were they properly arrived at? In both cases the
evaluation is of the legalityof the command or rule.
In the matter of substantive rationality the principle of evaluation is
no longer legality, but some extra-legal absolute value, e.g., 'freedom',
'equality', 'the good of the people', 'the will of the majority', 'the
destiny of the nation'. In the case of 'absolute value norms' (c) of
Weber's category of normative legitimacy) the question is whether the
rule or law at hand serves the absolute value, i.e., has a rational rela-
tionship to it, if so, it is right. In the case of value-rational authority,
the commands are measured against the supervening principle and if
they fall short of this principle the resultmay be a 'declarationof inde-
pendence', affirmingthe sovereignty of the absolute value and the illegi-
timacy of any authority that contravenes it.
A graphic organization of these points is presented in the accom-
panying table.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TYPOLOGY

As noted previously, the significance of the legitimacy of normative

order is that legitimacy is the best guarantee of the stability of an order.
The same is obviously true of legitimate authority: it is the most stable
form of power. But the significance of the typology of legitimate auth-
ority goes beyond this observation. The essence of Weber's analysis
is a demonstration of the determinism of beliefs of legitimacy, i.e.,
that the type of authority contributes to the structure and dynamics
of political institutions. Each of the four types of authority generates
characteristic political institutions.
The typical structureof charismaticauthority is a band. A leader and
a group of followers attached on the basis of personal loyalty. Beyond
the distinction of leader and follower there is no clear division of
political labour. The political dynamics of the charismatic structure is
treated by Weber in his discussion of 'routinization' (Weber, 1964,
pp. 363-73) in which he notes the struggle over the problem of succes-
sion and the tendency for the followers to attempt to transformthe anti-
economic character of the band and to appropriate advantages on a
hereditary basis.
The typical structures of traditional authority are patrimonial rule,
involving a ruler and a personal administrative staff, and feudalism,
involving a hierarchy of lords and vassals bound by personal oaths of
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Spencer Weberon legitimatenormsandauthority

fealty. The typical dynamics of these structuresinvolve a struggle for

powerbetweenruler and staff,and organized social strata,and a struggle
between lords and overlords for the control of vassals and subvassals.
The typical structureof legal rational authority is a bureaucracyand
the typical political dynamics include a struggle between political chiefs
and the bureaucraciesthat serve them.

TABLE I Typesof legitimatenormsand authority

Basic attitudesunderlying
legitimacy
Affectual Wert-Rational

AUTHORITY

Charismatic Legal Rational

(Derived from personal (Defined by rational legal
qualities of leader) norms)
Leaders of political, Authority in bureaucratic
military and religious organizations
movements
Traditional Value-rational
(Derived from traditional (Defined by governing
norms defining position) principles)
Monarch, feudal lord, Supreme political authority
hereditary chieftain in const. governments

NORMS

norms
Affectually-legitimated Rationallegal norms
(Affectthrough charismatic (Formal rationality)
revelation)
Sacredlaw Ordinary laws created by
rational legislation

Traditionally-legitimated Absolutevaluenorms
norms
(Affect through usage) (Substantive rationality)
Custom Natural law,
laws relating to morally
salient issues

The typical structure of value-rational authority is a constitutional

governmentwith a separationof powers and collegiality. The character-
istic political struggle is between the executive authority and the colle-
gial bodies enjoined with the limitation of its power. Weber treats some
of these dynamics in his discussionof'Collegiality and the Separationof
Powers' (Weber, 1964, PP. 392-404).
In brief, the nature of legitimate beliefs implies a certain kind of
political structure and a certain kind of politics.3
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I. The problem of legitimate authority is linked to the problem of

legitimate norms since norms and authority representthe basic forms of
ordered interaction. The various types of authority exist in specific
relationship to types of legitimate norms: Charismaticauthority gener-
ates sacred law; traditional norms define traditional authority; rational
legal norms define legal rational authority and principles of absolute
value regulate value-rational authority.
2. Underlying the eight varieties of legitimate norms and authority
are two basic types of legitimacy: a legitimacy of affect or feeling in
which norms and authority are tinged with awe and reverence, and a
legitimacy of reason in which norms and authority are accepted because
of their rational relation to basic values. The latter form has two sub-
varieties: a legitimacy of formal rationality (legal rational norms and
authority) in which laws and authority are accepted because of the
formal legality attached to them (here legality is the basic value) and a
legitimacy of substantive rationality (absolute value norms and value
rational authority) in which laws and authority are accepted because
of their congruence with fundamental extra-legal values.
3. In addition to the three Weberian categories of authority we
recognize a fourth category of value-rational authority which derives
from a basic principlesuch as natural law, or the consent ofthe governed.
The characteristicform of such authority is found in Supreme political
authority in constitutional governments.
4. The types of legitimate authority are associated with character-
istic structures of legitimate authority(a charismaticband, a bureaucracy,
or a constitutional government) which display characteristic dynamic
tendenciesand politics.These structuresand formsof politics are intrinsic
to these forms of authority and thus reflect a primacy or autonomy of
postures and ideas of legitimacy with respect to political action. Weber
arguesin efect thatthepoliticalexperience of a society
flows to a significant
degree
from its ideasof legitimacy.Thus the entire discussion is a counter to the
materialistic interpretation of government and politics, although as is
clear from Weber's other work, it is in no way inconsistentwith such an
interpretation.
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Spencer Weberon legitimatenormsandauthority

The Theoryof Economicand Social Organization,tr. A. M. Henderson and Talcott

Parsons, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

Notes
i. Simmel treats this type of authority prehended by the category of legal-
in his remarks on 'subordination under a rational authority. From our point of
principle' (Simmel, 1950, pp. 261-7), in view such instances involve a dual basis
which he provides an interesting example of authority, e.g., the authority of the
of the interplay between legal-rational, professor is legal rational to the degree
and what we have here called value- that it flows from the rules of the organi-
rational authority. Thus in peace-time zation, and value-rational to the degree
he notes authority in the army is based that it stems from the student's recogni-
upon the strict organizational hierarchy tion of his knowledge-which is their
of rank, while in war officers can draw acceptance of that knowledge as an
authority from the principle that the absolute value that merits obedience and
entire group is defending the nation. respect. The same duality is found in a
This corresponds to the dualism we have variety of work settings within govern-
noted in the authority of office in demo- ment bureaucracies, military organiza-
cratic political institutions: on the one tions, factories, etc., where the legal
hand this authority is rooted in the pure rational component of authority, i.e., the
legality of proper electoral procedure, official ranking, is tempered by a value-
on the other it rests upon the principle of rational authority grounded in institu-
the consent of the governed. The distinc- tional measures of competence.
tion is far from academic: its practical 3. An interesting historical treatment
consequence is the general difference in that accurately grasps Weber's basic
attitude towards electoral positions (presi- point is Charles Petit-Dutaillis', The
dent, governor, senator, representative) Feudal Monarchyin France and England
and non-electoral positions (federal civil (Petit-Dutaillis, 1964) in which he demon-
service, executive and congressional strates how the political ideas implicit
staffs, etc.). It is also reflected in the fact in feudalism determined the centralizing
that a sure way of increasing the authority politics of the Capetian and Anglo-
of an office in a democratic polity is to Norman monarchies. In fact, in line
broaden the electoral base, e.g., the with our central thesis here, Petit-
history of the offices of president and Dutaillis offers as his basic argument that
senator in the United States. the idea of feudalism had as its logical
2. The concept of value-rational outcome the centralized monarchy:
authority, or subordination to a principle, '... in proportion as the feudal regime
can we believe, be usefully applied to the became systematized, logic demanded a
problem of the authority of technical recognition that the pyramid had a
competence raised by Parsons in his summit; the hierarchy ends in the
introduction to Weber's Theoryof Eco- monarch whom Beaumanoir calls sover-
nomic and Social Organization (Weber, eign over all: the Kings will turn to the
1964, footnote 4, PP. 58-60). There development of this principle and sooner
Parsons argues that technical knowledge or later will reap all its consequences.
is an authority-granting factor in certain The Feudal system includes a King.'
bureaucratic structures, but is not com- (Petit-Dutaillis, 1964, P. 2.)

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