International Shoe Co. v.

Washington
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), was a landmark
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that a
International Shoe Co. v.
party, particularly a corporation, may be subject to the jurisdiction of a state
Washington
court if it has "minimum contacts" with that state.[1] The ruling has important
consequences for corporations involved in interstate commerce, their payments
to state unemployment compensation funds, limits on the power of states
imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
sufficiency of service of process, and, especially, personal jurisdiction.
Supreme Court of the United
States
Argued November 14, 1945
Contents Decided December 3, 1945
Facts Full case International Shoe
Procedural history
name Company v. State of
Washington, Office
Ruling of Unemployment
Analysis Compensation &
See also Placement, et al.
References Citations 326 U.S. 310 (http
s://supreme.justia.co
External links
m/us/326/310/case.h
tml) (more)
66 S. Ct. 154; 90 L.
Facts Ed. 95; 1945 U.S.
LEXIS 1447; 161
The plaintiff, the State of Washington, established a tax on employers A.L.R. 1057
conducting business therein with the stated legislative purpose of providing a
Case history
fund to be used for financial assistance to newly unemployed workers in the
Prior Special appearance
state. The tax was in effect a mandatory contribution to the state's by appellant in
Unemployment Compensation Fund. The defendant, International Shoe Washington state
Company, was an American company that was incorporated in Delaware with its court as defendant in
principal place of business ("PPB") in Missouri. The corporation had maintained lower court;
for some time a staff of 11-13 salesmen in the State of Washington, working on appellant moved to
set aside order on
commission. The salesmen were residents of that state and they met with
grounds of lack of
prospective customers in motels and hotels, and occasionally rented space to put personal jurisdiction;
up displays. The company thus had no permanent "situs" of business in the State. tribunal denied
Each year, the salesmen brought in about $31,000 in compensation. International motion; state
Shoe's solicitation system allegedly was set up explicitly to avoid establishing Superior Court
the situs of the business in other states insofar as salesman did not have offices, affirmed; state
Supreme Court
did not negotiate prices, and sent all orders back to Missouri; shipments from the
affirmed
plant to customers were sent f.o.b..
Holding
Suit cannot be brought against an
Procedural history individual unless they have minimum
contacts with the forum state, and
such lawsuit does not offend
International Shoe Co. did not pay the tax at issue in this case, so the state traditional notions of fair play and
effected service of process on one of their salesmen with a notice of assessment. substantial justice.
Washington also sent a letter by registered mail to their place of business in Court membership
Missouri. International Shoe made a special appearance before the office of Chief Justice
unemployment to dispute the state's jurisdiction over it as a corporate "person." Harlan F. Stone
However, the trial court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant Associate Justices
corporation. This ruling was upheld in the appeal tribunal, the Superior Court, Hugo Black · Stanley F. Reed
and the Supreme Court of Washington. International Shoe Co. then appealed to Felix Frankfurter · William O.
Douglas
the U.S. Supreme Court.
Frank Murphy · Robert H. Jackson
Wiley B. Rutledge · Harold H.
Ruling Burton
Case opinions
The issue involved a determination of the level of connection that must exist
Majority Stone, joined by
between a non-resident corporation and a state in order for that corporation to be
Reed, Frankfurter,
sued within that state. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Harlan Douglas, Murphy,
Fiske Stone (and in which Justice Robert Jackson did not participate), held that Rutledge, Burton
in view of 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (providing that no person shall be relieved from Concurrence Black
compliance with a state law requiring payments to an unemployment fund on the Jackson took no part in the
ground that he is engaged in interstate commerce) the fact that the corporation is consideration or decision of the
engaged in interstate commerce does not relieve it from liability for payments to case.
the state unemployment compensation fund. The activities in behalf of the Laws applied
corporation render it amenable to suit in courts of the State to recover payments U.S. Const. Amendment XIV; 26
due to the state unemployment compensation fund. The activities in question U.S.C. § 1606; Washington
established sufficient contacts or ties between the State and the corporation to Unemployment Compensation Act
make it reasonable and just, and in conformity to the due process requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the State to enforce against the corporation an obligation arising out of such activities. In such
a suit to recover payments due to the unemployment compensation fund, service of process upon one of the corporation's
salesmen within the State, and notice sent by registered mail to the corporation at its home office, satisfies the requirements of
due process. The tax imposed by the state unemployment compensation statute—construed by the state court, in its application to
the corporation, as a tax on the privilege of employing salesmen within the State—does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching its decision the Court stated that throughout American history, the jurisdiction of courts to
render judgment in personam has been grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now that the
capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that, in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Justice Hugo Black wrote a separate opinion, agreeing with the outcome in this case, but contending that the Court has
excessively restricted the power of states to find jurisdiction over companies doing business therein.

Analysis
A growing body of Supreme Court precedent and incremental statutory and common law doctrines related to personal jurisdiction
had been evolving over a period of several decades from the late 19th century through the early 20th century, and the Supreme
Court therefore could have upheld jurisdiction over defendant corporation. Initially the courts followed a strict interpretation of
territorial jurisdiction, where states only had power over property or defendants who were actually present in the state (excepting
corporations or residents). Defendants wishing to avoid claims could abscond to other jurisdictions without fear of suit.
As the doctrine of personal jurisdiction evolved with additional cases directed to related subject matter, the Supreme Court
expanded jurisdiction to anyone who tacitly "consented" to jurisdiction (in that case, a defendant consented to jurisdiction by
merely driving on a Massachusetts state highway). These doctrines were built upon the expanding legal fiction of "presence"
within the forum state or the defendant's commission of an act or failure to act within the forum state. (A "forum state" means the
state in whose courts a case is being litigated.)

In the instant case, the Court's majority chose to create a new doctrine, while still adhering to a "presence" rationale. The basic
formulation is: a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, so long as that defendant has "sufficient
minimum contacts" with the forum state, from which the complaint arises, such that the exercise of jurisdiction "will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . ." See 326 U.S. 310 (1940).

The court broke down the types of contact that a defendant can have with a state into "casual" contact and "systematic and
continuous" contact. In cases with only casual contact, the claim must be related to the contact in order for the state to have
jurisdiction. Casual contact is not a basis for bringing unrelated claims. Systematic and continuous contact allows for both claims
related to the contact and unrelated claims.

It was and remains a broad doctrine. It eventually allowed states to create "long arm" statutes and responded to the actualities of
the national market of the United States. Defendants had often avoided legal responsibilities by "scampering" from the state of
occurrence and not being available for service of process. This case changed that to some extent, though the "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" are drawn from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Aristotle's notions
of justice. The doctrine of International Shoe is broad, but the Court has recognized that it has limits, nevertheless.

See also
List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 326
List of United States Supreme Court cases

References
1. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/326/310/) (1945).

External links
Works related to International Shoe Company v. Washington at Wikisource
Text of International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) is available from: Findlaw (https://caselaw.findlaw.
com/us-supreme-court/326/310.html) Justia (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/326/310/) Library of
Congress (http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep326/usrep326310/usrep326310.pdf) Lawlio (https://www.lawli
o.com/opinion/104200/international-shoe-co-v-washington)
Official Website of the Supreme Court of the United States (https://www.supremecourt.gov/)
Supreme Court of the United States Case Citation Finder: United States Reports Volumes 272 – 337 (1926-
1948) (https://web.archive.org/web/20090822021856/http://supremecourtus.gov/opinions/casefinder/casefinder_
1926-1948.html)
International Shoe Co. v. Washington Case Brief at Lawnix.com (http://www.lawnix.com/cases/international-shoe.
html)

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