WILFREDO M.

CATU, complainant,

vs.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the
possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter
ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.5
When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the
filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,6
claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he
stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints
referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost
objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth
sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of
the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by
Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA
6713:8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law
for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with
any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that
Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective
Local Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit
of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials.
As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it
constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private
practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following:
the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city
mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal
mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the
punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang
kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore
devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold
regular sessions only at least once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice
their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer
any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of
these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this
stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is
supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he
should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by
civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority
From The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of
the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case
of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that
it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not
involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence
him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth
and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires
legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To
underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not
only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces
the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of
a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the
lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the
courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa
(Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as
counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty.
Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable
only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of
the IBP twice modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a
suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case
No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the
complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private
complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the case, and requested
the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a case
where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are
relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favor.
Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position of
the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s

request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting
the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as
counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.

In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for frustrated
murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of the
investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries.
During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the
time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated
murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case
No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a
complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution
of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law,
Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa
demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set
up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped and
aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed
by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one month and eleven
days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty days of prision
correccional, as maximum;

(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and

(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.

SO ORDERED.2

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor from the
Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon case on 16
November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for
the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and
the accused.

On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as "self-serving" and
"purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."

On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under
probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code,
do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a crime.’" He further
claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the
charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the category of crimes against public
officers x x x."

In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:

As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty.
Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to
have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the
case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa]
entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to

Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to
establish a lawyer-client relation.

As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than
seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one
person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness
[Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred
more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on November
2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even
the existence of the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.

As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no personal
knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
[Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in said case. The findings of the
Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not
binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged extortion
case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in violating
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3

In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the
practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of
the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March 2012.

We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its recommendations in the
second and third causes of action.

Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which
provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."

We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03
which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."

Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only be
described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to appear in the
arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation as
collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well
to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4

An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor —
when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon,
just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or
advocating his client’s cause in open court.
xxxx

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also
to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorney’s
intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5

Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by emphasizing
the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in
ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to
Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio
and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt,
and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no
reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand,
merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.

Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a member
of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the
time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court.7

We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a
disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt of the
right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which
a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or
does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:

Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in government service.

xxxx

It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case. There is no doubt
that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already
final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under
probation.

Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is
defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule
138 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.10

Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11

we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:

1. the offender is a public officer;

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to
committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance
of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a
promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in
exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties
which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of
his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit
at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery
clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows
as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more
severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards
of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his
capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity
in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise
this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, Complainants,

vs.

ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N.
Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with
the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed
fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by
using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of the land
belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants herein and
they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to him the amount of
[₱]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of the subject land and further by means
of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective
buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila
and he is the one handling William Gatchalian’s business transaction and that he has contracts at
NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver the said amount
([₱]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from complying with his obligation to
expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and benefit and despite demand upon
him to return the said amount, he failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a lawyer.2
In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated December 7, 19983
and June 22, 19994 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively,
finding probable cause for the filing of the criminal information5 against both Atty. Bernardo and Andres
Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging
them with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment.6 On September 24, 2004, the respondent filed an
undated Comment,7 wherein he denied the allegations against him and averred the following:

2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997 for
purposes of getting from them the amount of [₱]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted
and who in turn sought the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said
money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and respondent. The arrangement
for titling of the land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of
respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in law practice.8

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment pursuant to Rule
139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the respondent’s undated comment filed with
the Court was not verified.9

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15) days from
March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his medical confinement.10
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion11 for extension praying for another
20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference.12 The respondent failed to appear; thus,
the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an answer despite
extensions granted. The case was then submitted for report and recommendation.13

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made the
following findings:

[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help and in
connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by using false pretenses and deceitful
words, [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent would expedite the
titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of
complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the amount of
[₱]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the titling of the subject land. Respondent
represented himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay
Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it has been
titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and
the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false, fraudulent and were only made to
induce complainants to give and deliver to them the amount of [₱]495,000.00. Once in possession of the
said amount, far from complying with their obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject
land, respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon them to return
the said amount, they failed and refused to do so.

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a complaint for Estafa
against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to
hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7 December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga conducted a
re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to
complainants the amount of [₱]200,000.00 because according to him the amount of [₱]295,000.00
should be reimbursed by respondent considering that the said amount was turned over to respondent
for expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the subject land. Both respondent and
Magat requested for several extensions for time to pay back their obligations to the complainants.
However, despite extensions of time granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise
to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of compromise was construed to be an
implied admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason to disturb
the findings of the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed against respondent and
Magat on 8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions
and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent committed a crime that
import deceit and violation of his attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both
of which he was bound to ‘obey the laws of the land.’ The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes
involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the attorney’s oath, grossly immoral conduct
and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16 April 2004.
As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24
March 2004, "A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2)
years from the date of the professional misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII).14

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS from receipt
hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. 15
On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of
the amount of [₱]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice with Warning that if he does
not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then he will be meted the penalty of
Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.16

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the aforesaid
Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules
considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct and
therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in
convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer
through Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement18 signed by
the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the Investigating Commissioner considered him as in
default after having ignored the representative he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he
long restituted the amount of ₱225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but based on his moral
obligation as a lawyer due to Teresita’s declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel
sometime in the third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by Fidela in her
direct testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies of receipts.

In an Order19 dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to comment within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In her Comment,20 Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative case
because they took into consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial
proceeding since it would stain the respondent’s reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into
hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order to trace
the respondent’s whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the opportunity to be heard; and
finally, that no restitution of the ₱200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has yet been made by the
respondent.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation21 stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the criminal
case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the commission of
Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal
as maximum."22

In a Letter23 dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the present
action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case24 dated
September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela,
being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardo’s restitution of the amount of ₱200,000.00 so she can use
the money to buy her medicine and other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondent’s defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has
held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.25

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several extensions of
time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during the mandatory conference, as ordered by
the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey
and respect court processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on
the court’s authority which can not be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of
our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity
– for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.26
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted in his
answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported
titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition is shallow
considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into
believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not
benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of ₱495,000.00.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.27

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed
against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt
in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively."28

In Yu v. Palaña,29 the Court held that:

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to
a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A
criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances
are attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final
resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this
Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the
legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.30
(Citations omitted)

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of Estafa for which he
was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly
undermines the respondent’s moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides
that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment commensurate to all
his acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the justice they utmost
deserve.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of ₱200,000.00 to Fidela
Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his
proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS
therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.