Senior officers Arube, Aseni attempt to

overthrow Amin
On March 23 and 24, 1974, Uganda‟s president Field Marshal Idi
Amin was nearly ousted. Known as the “Brig Arube Coup”, it was
the first military attempt to overthrow Amin since he became
president after his 1971 coup that toppled president Milton Obote.

The two chief plotters of the coup against Amin were Kakwa from
Koboko, in West Nile sub-region, just as Amin.

Brig Charles Arube, a former acting Chief of Staff of the Uganda

Armed Forces, was the initiator of the plot. He shared it with his
trusted friend Lt Col Elly Aseni, a former commanding officer of the
Malire Mechanised Specialised Reconnaissance Regiment based at
Lubiri in Kampala.

The two chief architects of the coup leaked the plot to other trusted
soldiers below their ranks, who in turn conveyed the message to
their juniors.

The soldiers were less than an hour away from capturing or killing
Amin and announcing Arube the new president of Uganda.

Unfortunately, Arube had made a tactical error. When he was

captured and killed, the coup was aborted.

Genesis

Arube and Aseni had drafted the mission well. The word “sort out”
all non-Ugandan officers serving in the armed forces electrified
soldiers, especially of the low ranks as they too had lost someone by
extrajudicial killings of the regime.

The most prominent foreigner officers targeted in this mission were,

Lt Col Hussein Malera, the commanding officer of the Military
Police, who was an Avukaya by tribe from South Sudan, and Ali
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Toweli, the head of the infamous security police, the Public Safety
Unit. Toweli was a Nubian from Congo who disguised himself as a
Mutoro from western Uganda.

Other targeted officers included Lt Col Isaac Maliyamungu, the staff

officer in charge of training and all operations, a Kakwa from
Congo, and Brig Taban Lupayigana, the commanding officer of the
marines, who was a South Sudanese.

Because Arube and Aseni had openly reprimanded Amin for the
presence of foreigners in the Uganda Army, enmity erupted between
senior foreign officers and those from Uganda.

Such animosity resulted into the shooting dead of all Aseni‟s family
members by Lt Col Malera.

Malera went to Aseni‟s home around Nateete, a Kampala suburb, to

kill him. But when he did not find him, Malera shot dead Aseni‟s
wife, children and house help.

Earlier, Malera had shot dead Aseni‟s driver in Bwaise. At Aseni‟s

home, Malera left a note taunting him, saying if Aseni was a man,
he should face him.

In a vengeance stupor, Aseni looked for Malera for the whole day,
but did not find him.

“Malera had been looking for Aseni for some time. Aseni was always
above Malera and that is why he was not killed. Aseni was a very
intelligent soldier. He was a professional soldier and that‟s why he
did not kill Malera‟s wife. He did not want to do what Malera did to
his wife,” says Isaac Bakka, a retired Captain of the Uganda Army.

Bakka, a former associate of both Arube and Aseni, revealed this to

Sunday Monitor in Kampala on Wednesday. Bakka is son of Brig
Barnabas Kili, a former minister of Education during Amin‟s era. He
was born on September 15, 1949, and joined the army in 1967.
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In February 1979, he was taken prisoner of war together with other
soldiers by the Tanzanian troops. They were taken to Tanzania
where they stayed until 1981 when they were repatriated to Uganda
and imprisoned before being set free.

Aseni meets Malera

“One day, Aseni met Malera at the quarter-guard of the Malire

Barracks [at Lubiri in Kampala]. Malera jumped out of the car ready
to shoot. But Aseni also had his pistol ready and the two men put
pistols at each other‟s stomachs, each saying „you shoot, I shoot‟,”
Capt Bakka narrates.

“They remained there until Lt Col Musa Eyega, the commanding

officer, came from his office and disarmed both of them and took
them to Amin who forced them to reconcile.”

“Did you witness this incident, or someone else told?” I ask.

“I saw it myself,” Bakka responds.

Indeed, some foreign officers in the armed forces had ruined

Uganda. And undoubtedly, concerned Ugandan-born officers
wanted the york of humiliation and subjugation removed.

And because the president of the country couldn‟t be held

accountable, a coup was the only solution.

Brig Arube and Lt Col Aseni had clandestinely mobilised a sizeable

rebel force within the Uganda Army who were willing to execute the
mission and eliminate all known foreigners in the armed forces.
From a hideout in Kampala, the two commanded the „war‟.

From around 8 O‟clock, when the last briefing is believed to have

been held, Arube instructed his men to execute the mission within
three hours, short of which, the most wanted foreign soldiers in the

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army, State Research and police, as well as Amin, would get wind of
it and escape.

The forces under the command of Arube swiftly went into action
across the country to arrest or kill any foreigners in sight.

Col Kisule defies order to arrest Malera

Having failed to locate Malera in Kampala, the search for him

shifted to Kigumba in Masindi District where he had a country
home.

In an interview with Sunday Monitor at his home in Nagojje,

Mukono District, last week, Lt Col Abdul Kisule, the former
commanding officer of the Masindi Artillery Regiment, revealed how
he defied Brig Arube‟s order to arrest Malera.

Kisule told us that while in Masindi without knowing what was

happening in Kampala; at around 1am in the morning of the coup,
Brig Arube contacted him on phone and ordered him to arrest Lt
Col Malera on sight.

“I asked him [Arube] whose order it was to arrest Malera and why.
He did not explain, but I also remember him asking me, „Don‟t you
see the disappearance of people in Uganda?‟ And he also mentioned
Fr Kiggundu [editor of the Catholic Munno newspaper],” Kisule
says.

“He said if I did not arrest Malera, they [from Malire Mechanised
Specialised Regiment] he would come and attack our regiment. I
immediately telephoned the commander-in-chief [Amin]. I asked
him if it was him who had ordered for the arrest of Malera. He said
no.”

“So that night, I deployed my forces ready to fight the enemy, but
they did not come.”

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Asked what Amin‟s reaction to Arube‟s order to arrest Malera was,
Kisule says: “He didn‟t say anything about it, apart from telling me
that ambassador Ondoga had died.”

On why he was appointed to chair the commission of inquiry into

the Arube coup plot, Kisule says: “After that incident, we were at a
senior army officers‟ meeting with the president at Entebbe and I
made a comment. I said if anyone attempted to attack us [Masindi
Artillery Regiment], it would have taken them three months to
capture it.”

“I think Amin felt confident of my forces [at Masindi]. I think that

was the reason I was appointed to head the inquiry.”

However, his statement at that meeting nearly caused him death by

officers who thought he was so boastful. Asked how, Kisule says he
will reveal it another time.

The inquiry

Although the inquiry was about “the Arube case”, the outcome was
rather about a different person – president Amin. Why?

Lt Col Kisule says instead of pinning Arube, all the officers

[witnesses] blamed Amin for the trouble.

“Amin went around the country and personally selected officers who
appeared before the commission as witnesses. One of them was an
operations officer from the State Research Centre/Bureau, who
reported directly to Amin about what every officer said before the
commission. All the high-ranking officers appeared before the
commission and all stressed the disappearing of Ugandans, ordered
by the presidential bodyguards, State Research Bureau, Military
Police and Public Safety Unit,” Kisule recalls.

“Some individuals such as Malera, Toweli and Kassim Obura were

also mentioned in the disappearance of people in Uganda.”
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The inquiry also discovered that the West Nilers were unhappy with
Amin because he did not attend the burial of Uganda‟s former
ambassador to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),
Michael Ondoga.

Asked why the attempted coup was not mentioned at all in the
inquiry, Kisule said: “The planning of the coup was not mentioned
partly because most of the witnesses were Arube‟s friends.”

Kisule also adds that around September 1973, there was a world
peace conference held in Moscow, Russia, involving senior military
officers from other countries and he was a member of the Ugandan
delegation.

The Ugandan delegation later visited Arube at the military academy

in Russia and he realised how much respect Arube commanded
from the Ugandan soldiers who visited him. Kisule further says he
suspects that Amin may have sent some officers to observe Arube‟s
conduct while in Russia.

Kisule also recalls that it was shortly after Arube had returned from
Russian that the attempt coup occurred.

Intimidation from Malyamungu

Lt Col Kisule says he was physically intimidated on the day he read

report to president Amin.

“There are two occasions in my life when I have felt like choking.
The first was the day I read that inquiry report and the second was
when I was arrested in 1979,” Kisule says.

“On that day, I almost failed to talk. Every time I opened my mouth
to say a word, I felt as if I was going to bite my tongue or choke.”

“Why?” I asked.

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“Do you know what it meant to sit next to Amin while [Isaac]
Malyamungu is standing behind you to ensure that you do not miss
a word? I felt threatened.”

Although the notorious Malyamungu was not a member of the

commission, and neither Amin‟s bodyguard nor Kisule‟s escort, he
was ordered to stand behind the seated Kisule to ensure that he
altered no word.

Amin instates an inquiry

Amin could not believe that Arube and Aseni, fellow West Nilers,
had plotted to oust him. And so, he wanted to know why.

In April 1974, a commission of inquiry to investigate what led to the

coup plot was established. It was chaired by the Uganda Army
officer No: UO.110 Lt Col Abdul Kisule, the commanding officer of
Masindi Artillery Regiment.

On May 16, 1974, at the Republic House (Bulange) Mengo, the

Defence Council, chaired by Amin himself, heard the plenary report
about the inquiry.

The Sunday Monitor obtained a faded page of the plenary which

read in part: “The Defence Council also heard that the report of the
commission of inquiry set up to probe the circumstances that led to
the March 23 and 24, 1974, incident when soldiers of Malire
Mechanised Specialised Reconnaissance Regime took up arms and
drove armoured vehicles through Kampala firing rifles, therefore
disrupting the peace of the people.”

The commission recommended for the trial of those involved.

Aseni faces Court Marshal

After the inquiry was finished, Amin appointed a military tribunal to

try the coup plotters.

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The military tribunal sat for the first time on June 4, 1974, at
Makindye Military Barracks in Kampala.

On that day, the tribunal heard that: “Army officer NO:UA.403 Lt

Colonel Elly Aseni, former governor of north Buganda province,
attempted to incite persons [soldiers] to commit at act of mutiny
contrary to section 25(a) of the Penal Code Act on the night of
March 23 and 24, 1974.”

“He [Aseni] gave orders to Malire Mechanised Specialised

Reconnaissance Regiment soldiers to take arms to attack Makindye
Military Police and arrest Brig Hussein Malera who was the acting
Chief of Staff of the Uganda armed forces.”

The tribunal also accused officer NO: UA.637 Lt James Ayoma of

the Kifaru Mechanised Regiment of murder, contrary to section 183
of the Penal Code Act. It was said that on March 24, 1974, he
ordered six soldiers from Bondo Battalion [in Arua] to kill three
soldiers related to Brig Malera.

As a result of his order, two soldiers; namely NO: UA 15986 Sgt

Samson Gugu and NO: UA.15920 private Abdullah Jumna, both of
Bondo Battalion, were murdered. The tribunal was chaired by Col
Zed Maruru. Other members were Col John Mwaka, Lt Col Isaac
Lumago, Lt Col Yusuf Onek and Lt Col Cyril Orombi.

On June 4, 1974, the tribunal sat for the second time, according to
the records available.

Lt Col Aseni had just returned from exile from Congo, and as soon
as he returned, he was arrested and court marshalled.

He was accused of treason and therefore would be hanged if

convicted. But the soldiers had resolved that in the event that he
was sentenced to death, they would organise for another coup.
Amin got that military intelligence and secretly told Col Mwaka,

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chairman of the military tribunal, to alter the judgment and
exonerate Aseni of all charges.

Aseni was, therefore, released and was later appointed to the USSR
as Uganda‟s ambassador.

He died in battle in 1980 near Bondo, Arua, in the war against

Tanzanians and Ugandan forces that had ousted Amin a year
earlier.

On March 23, 1974, Brig Charles Arube and Lt Col Elly Aseni
wanted president Idi Amin ousted before midday. The two daring
soldiers from West Nile sub-region, Amin‟s home area, had plotted a
surprise coup and until Sunday March 23, the day of the coup, the
plot had remained a secret only to the two senior Uganda Army
soldiers.

It was inconceivable that a Ugandan soldier could dare oust Field

Marshal Idi Amin. But to Arube and Aseni, to stage a coup was the
sole solution to remove Amin and his foreign agents in the armed
forces. The foreign agents were accused of killing thousands of
innocent Ugandans.

Arube, Aseni involve other soldiers

After Arube and Aseni had masterminded the plot and were certain
that the coup was achievable, they decided to involve other soldiers.
And the right time to inform the trusted soldiers was on the day of
the coup – lest the plot leaked to Amin. This was also done to avoid
excitement among soldiers.

On the day of the coup, Brig Arube and Lt Col Aseni contacted then
2nd Lieutenant Isaac Bakka to join the coup. Bakka is the son of
Brig Barnabas Kili, who was the minister of education at the time.

The two senior officers met their junior, Bakka at his private home
on Plot 40 Rashid Khamis Road, Old Kampala, and in minutes, they
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had convinced him to join the coup plot because the reasons
forwarded were obvious.

“Can you tell us what happened when Arube and friends attempted
to oust Amin?” I asked Capt Bakka.

“I was at my house early that morning. It was Sunday morning and

as usual, I was preparing to go for my Sunday prayers. It is then
that Col Elly Aseni knocked at my door. With him was Brig Charles
Arube. I welcomed them in,” he said.

“After they had sat and settled, they introduced me to why they
were so early at my house, yet I was a junior officer.”

“What time was it?” I asked.

“That was before 8 O‟clock. It was 7:45.”

“Where was that?”

“That was at my house on Plot 40 Rashid Khamis Road, old

Kampala.”

“What happened?” I asked.

“Elly proceeded to introduce to me the reason for their early visit at

my house. He told me that they have a very serious issue of
national concern that they wanted to share with me. I said „yes I am
glad to hear that‟. Then he [Aseni] said since I know them, there is
no need to introduce themselves,” Bakka said.

“They said the issue was the question of foreigners in the Ugandan
Army and other security forces that were doing a lot of bad things to
all Ugandans, including military personnel, civilians, members of
the public and the business community.”

“They said several people had been disappearing and their bodies
found thrown in bushes in various parts of Kampala and on

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highways and said this cannot continue without having something
done about it.”

“They [Arube and Aseni] had done their research and found that the
leadership [of the Uganda government] was adamant and indecisive,
as if it was involved. And they had even challenged the president
[Amin] about it. And this led them to find their own solution.”

“I asked them, „what solution do you have?‟” They said in the matter
where there is complacency by the top level, the solution is to get
rid of the leadership itself, because it was responsible.

“This led me to ask them why they thought that the leadership
[Uganda government] did not give them attention, that they thought
of other avenues to tackle the issue. They said „you cannot expect Lt
Col Ondoga [Michael], who was an ambassador to the Soviet Union
[Russia], to die like that‟. And Aseni said „you cannot expect leading
politicians like Ben Kiwanuka, Jolly Joe Kiwanuka of the
Democratic Party and some soldiers; Capt Kenneth Onzima, Capt
Jackson Avuduria and Lt Col Toroko – all from West Nile and had
been shot dead at Imperial Hotel [in Kampala] – to die like that‟.
They said this cannot be work of usual criminals. The State
machinery must be behind it.”

“They said Secret Service, the State Research, was manned by some
foreigners [Congolese, Sudanese and Rwandans trained by Mossad
and KGB spy agencies of Israel and Russia respectively].”

“I said, „Which foreigners?‟ And they mentioned a number of

foreigners, which I myself knew was true; these fellows were
foreigners. A man like Brig Hussein Malera, who commanded
military police and was at that time the acting chief of staff, was
from South Sudan. Then there was a man called Ali Toweli who
headed a police department called Public Safety Unit. This man was
pretending to be a Ugandan from Tooro [sub-region] but to the best

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of my knowledge, he was from Congo [a Nubian]. He spoke fluent
Rutoro.”

“Then in the army were men like Brig [Isaac] Maliyamungu in

charge of all operations and training, who was from Congo [a
Kakwa]. To their concern, these people were appointed to those
positions deliberately by the head of State [Amin]. He could not,
therefore, convince anyone that he did not know the kind of people
he was appointing to these high positions.”

“These were people, in their [Arube and Aseni‟s] opinion, who issued
orders to their juniors and their juniors handled Ugandans
ruthlessly because they knew that if matters came to the worst,
they would simply run away to their countries and would not be
held responsible. The best thing was to get rid of them when they
were still here; corner them with their leader [Amin] and get rid all
of them.”

Why Arube, Aseni chose Bakka‟s home

“So I said, „what do you want me to do?‟ They said „your

contribution is required. As a junior officer, we have chosen your
house deliberately so that we are not spied on [the two officers came
in Aseni‟s ordinary car but in military uniform]. For this matter, we
have come to your house purely for concealing our planning so that
nobody knows that something serious is being planned here. Your
role is this; we want you to move, to inform stations outside
Kampala while we handle Kampala.‟”

“When they said „we handle‟, I said „you and who?‟ They said „we
have some officers we are going to assign duties. Yours is to go to
Masindi [Artillery Regiment garrison], from there go to Bondo
[Barracks] in Arua and come via Gulu. Inform all our people
[soldiers] there to get hold of all the suspected foreigners in their
units. We are ordering that all people who are not Ugandans, who

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were illegally recruited in the armed forces and are responsible for
mass murder in Uganda, must be held responsible for their
crimes.‟”

“‟Because they are going to flee, we must blocked the road to Gulu.
The reason why we are sending you via Masindi is because the
Artillery Regiment in Masindi is at a strategic place, between
Kigumba and Karuma. That road must be blocked.‟”

“We blocked all major roads. We blocked the Kabale-Masaka road

from Masaka [to block Rwandan Tutsi mostly operating in the
infamous State Research Bureau]. Our men in Jinja were going to
take care of those [foreigners in Jinja] and the infantry brigade in
Mbale would do the same.”

“Each military unit was to sort out foreigners in its unit. The war
was on sorting out foreign nationals in Uganda security forces who
were only paying allegiance to the head of State [Amin] but not the
Uganda people. This was because their role here was only to make
money and if they spoiled our country, leaving Ugandans blaming
one another and killing one another, they would simply vanish
away.”

“Then they told me, „as we all come from West Nile – Arube and
Aseni were Kakwas from Koboko while I came from Maracha County
in Arua District – we must realise that we owe a lot to the future of
West Nile‟. They told me that all of us from West Nile must
understand that because people come to join the army under the
cover of being West Nilers, all their actions were going to be blamed
on West Nile children.”

“They said „in future other Ugandans will think West Nilers were
responsible for the death of their relatives, whereas it was not true.
West Nile was being used to recruit soldiers from Congo, from
South Sudan to be used [by Amin] for political ambitions. They have

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no regard for Uganda as a nation and for Ugandan citizens. But
then, Ugandans would not know that our brothers from West Nile
are not the ones who were killing them.‟ So I realised their
reasoning was true.”

“Looking ahead, I realised that unless something was done to

exonerate us, we risked our children being held responsible in
future for the affairs of Idi Amin and his foreign gangs.”

“Subsequently, I accepted the mission and left immediately. My

mission was very clear, to deliver the message to these units to sort
out foreigners in their units. While here in Kampala, he [Arube]
assumed the role of commander-in-chief. Elly [Aseni] was now the
de facto operations chief. Now they directed different units to take
action.”

“The directive was strictly to root out foreigners: Foreigners in the

State Research, in the army, in the airforce and in the police,” Capt
Bakka says.

Kisule refuses to join the coup

“Did they (Arube and Aseni) tell you that they had already assigned
others?” I asked Bakka.

“Yes. They told me „don‟t be afraid, we have already assigned. Now

you go your own way. Because of security reasons, the names and
whereabouts of these people cannot be disclosed.‟ I left and arrived
in Masindi [Artillery Regiment] and found Masindi hostile,” he said.

“The commanding officer there was Lt Col Abdul Kisule. Kisule

viewed the uprising as an uprising against Islam. He said Baganda
kings were all Christians since Mwanga, meaning Muslims would
never have the chance of leading Uganda again.”

“Did you contact Lt Col Kisule personally?” I ask.

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“Yes.”

“What did you say to him?” I ask.

“I said I am on a mission. And the mission is that foreign soldiers

are going to flee via here [Masindi], block the road from River Kafu
and Kigumba so that you arrest all foreigners in Masindi and on
that road. He refused. He said he can‟t,” Bakka says.

“He said he had already inquired and that this was an uprising
against Muslim leadership. He said Christians want Muslims to lose
this chance. He said „Obote was a Christian, [Sir Edward] Muteesa
was a Christian and now that time has come for Muslims to have a
chance, you people want to get rid of him.‟ So I left.”

“I drove to Bondo [garrison in Arua]. Brig Arube had already called

the commanding officer, telling him that „2nd Lt Bakka is on the
way with a message. When he arrives please cooperate with him‟.”

“This man was Lt Col Gabriel, also a Christian. Gabriel did not
seem to accept my mission – because on arrival, he arrested me. He
said he needed further clarification. Luckily, Brig Arube had also
sent a similar message about the mission to Gen Mustafa Adrisi
who had travelled to Koboko,” Bakka says.

According to Bakka, Adrisi agreed with the decision Arube had

taken. And when Adrisi heard of Bakka‟s arrest, he went to Lt Col
Gabriel and ordered him to release Bakka.

Upon his release, Bakka continued with his mission to Gulu, Lira,
Mbale, Jinja and back to Kampala. He says the entire journey took
him less than 10 hours.

However, soon after Bakka arrived at Kireka near Kampala, the

songs the soldiers had been playing after capturing Radio Uganda
suddenly stopped playing, and minister for information and
broadcasting, Juma Oris, went on air.
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He gave a statement that some soldiers had attempted a coup to
oust the government but failed. A puzzled Bakka attempted to
contact Arube and Aseni on radio call, to no avail.

About Idi Amin

Idi Amin was a member of the small Kakwa ethnic group of north-
western Uganda. His birthdate is unconfirmed, but estimated to
have been in 1925. His mother, a herbalist and diviner, raised him
after his father deserted the family. Amin had little formal education
before joining the King‟s African Rifles of the British colonial army
in 1946 as an assistant cook.

Extremely charismatic and skilled, Amin quickly rose through the

ranks. His stature was rather notable. He stood 6 feet, 4 inches tall
and was a Ugandan light-heavyweight boxing champion from 1951
to 1960, as well as a swimmer. He soon became notorious among
fellow soldiers for his overzealous and cruel military interrogations.
Eventually, he made the highest rank possible for a black African
serving in the British army. From 1952 until 1956, he served in the
British action against the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya.

Before Uganda‟s independence in 1962, Amin became closely

associated with the new nation‟s prime minister and president,
Milton Obote.

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