Professional Documents
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Labor
Labor
1)
PAL v. Ligan (G.R. No. 146408)
Date: December 10, 2016Author: jaicdn
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling: YES.
(ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the
performance of the work of the contractual employee.
Even if only one of the two elements is present then, there is labor-only
contracting.
From the records of the case, it is gathered that the work performed by
almost all of the respondents – loading and unloading of baggage and
cargo of passengers – is directly related to the main business of petitioner.
And the equipment used by respondents as station loaders, such as trailers
and conveyors, are owned by petitioner.
Petitioner PAL, and not Synergy, exercises control and supervision over
the respondent workers’ methods of doing the work, as reflected in their
Agreement: (1) Contractor (Synergy) shall require all its workers,
employees, suppliers and visitors to comply with OWNER’S (PAL) rules,
regulations, procedures and directives relative to the safety and security of
OWNER’S premises, properties and operations (2) xxx shall furnish its
employees and workers identification cards to be countersigned by
OWNER and uniforms to be approved by OWNER. (3) OWNER may
require CONTRACTOR to dismiss immediately and prohibit entry into
OWNER’S premises of any person employed therein by CONTRACTOR
who in OWNER’S opinion is incompetent or misconducts himself or does
not comply with OWNER’S reasonable instructions xxx
Petitioner in fact admitted that it fixes the work schedule of respondents as
their work was dependent on the frequency of plane arrivals. And as the
NLRC found, petitioner’s managers and supervisors approved respondents’
weekly work assignments and respondents and other regular PAL
employees were all referred to as “station attendants” of the cargo
operation and airfreight services of petitioner.
2)
VS
PROSPERO A. ABALLA
461 SCRA 392 (2005)
After one year of rendering service, Aballa et al., filed a complaint before
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying that they be declared
as regular employees of SMC. On the other hand, SMC filed before
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Notice of Closure due
to serious business losses. Hence, the labor arbiter dismissed
the complaint and ruled in favor of SMC. Aballa et al. then appealed before
the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal finding that Sunflower is an
independent contractor.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed NLRC’s decision on the ground
that the agreement between SMC and Sunflower showed a clear intent to
abstain from establishing an employer-employee relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aballa et al. are employees of SMC
HELD:
The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether
one claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work
according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the
employer, except only as to the results of the work.
The Contract of Services between SMC and Sunflower shows that the
parties clearly disavowed the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between SMC and private respondents. The language of a
contract is not, however, determinative of the parties’ relationship; rather it is
the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case. A party
cannot dictate, by the mere expedient of a unilateral declaration in a contract,
the character of its business, i.e., whether as labor-only contractor or job
contractor, it being crucial that its character be measured in terms of
and determined by the criteria set by statute.
And from the job description provided by SMC itself, the work assigned to
Aballa et al. was directly related to the aquaculture operations of SMC. As
for janitorial and messengerial services, that they are considered directly
related to the principal business of the employer has been jurisprudentially
recognized.
All the foregoing considerations affirm by more than substantial evidence the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between SMC and Aballa
et al. Since Aballa et al. who were engaged in shrimp processing performed
tasks usually necessary or desirable in the aquaculture business of SMC,
they should be deemed regular employees of the latter and as such are
entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment.
They should thus be awarded differential pay corresponding to the difference
between the wages and benefits given them and those accorded SMC’s
other regular employees.
3)
Meralco Industrial Engineering Services vs NLRC 2008
Meralco Industrial Engineering Services, Co., vs. NLRCFacts:Meralco
and the private respondent executed a contract where the latter would
supply the petitioner janitorial services, which include labor, materials,
tools and equipment, as well as supervision of its assigned employees,
at Meralco’s Rockwell Thermal Plant in Makati City.The 49
employees lodged a Complaint for illegal deduction, underpayment, non-
payment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for
holiday and rest day and night differentials against the private respondent
before the LA.By virtue of RA 6727, the contract between Meralco and
the private respondent was amended to increase the minimum daily
wage per employee. 2 months after the amendment of the contract,
Meralcosent a letter to private respondent informing them that at the end
of business hours of Jan. 31, 1990, it would be terminating contract
entered into with the private respondents. On the said date, the
complainants were pulled out from their work. The complainants
amended their complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal
and to implead Meralco as a party respondent.The LA dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA
with the modification that Meralco was solidarily liable with the private
respondents. The CA on the other hand, modified the Decision of the
NLRC and held Meralco to be solidarily liable with the private
respondent for the satisfaction of the laborer’s separation
pay.Issue:Whether Meralco should beliable for the payment of the
dismissed laborer’s separation pay.Decision:Petition GRANTED,
Judgment and Resolution Reversed and SET ASIDE.The CA used
Art. 109 of the Labor Code to hold Meralco solidarily liable with
the private respondent as regardto the payment of separation pay.
However, the SC ruled that Art. 109 should be read in relation to Art.
106 and 107 of the LC. Thus, an indirect employer can only be held
liable with the independent contractor or subcontractor in the event that the
latter fails to pay the wages of its employees. While it is true that the
petitioner was the indirect employer of the complainants, it cannot be held
liable in the same way as the employer in every respect. Meralco may be
considered an indirect employer only for purposes of unpaid wages.
The only instance when the principal can also be held liable with the
independent contractor or subcontractor for the backwages and
separation pay of the latter’s employees is when there is proof that the
principal conspired with the independent contractor or subcontractor in the
illegal dismissal of the employees. In the present case, there is no
allegation, much less proof presented, that the petitioner conspired
with private respondents in the illegal dismissal of the latter’s
employees; hence, it cannot be held liable for the same.Neither can
the liability for the separation pay of the complainants be extended to
the petitioner based on contract.Contract Order No. 166-84
executed between the petitioner and the private respondents contains no
provision for separation pay in the event that the petitioner terminates the
same.It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties and the
stipulations therein, provided that they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, shall be binding
as between the parties.Hence, if the contract does not provide for such a
liability, this Court cannot just read the
Wages DigestPage 2of 7same into the contract without possibly
violating the intention of the parties.Although petitioner is not liable for
complainants’ separation pay, the Court conforms to the
consistent findings in the proceedings below that the petitioner is
solidarily liable with the private respondents for the judgment awards
for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay.In this
case, however, private respondents had already posted a surety
bond in an amount sufficient to cover all the judgment awards due
the complainants, including those for underpayment of wages and
non-payment of overtime pay.The joint and several liability of the
principal with the contractor and subcontractor were enacted to
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Labor Code, principally
those on statutory minimum wage.This liability facilitates, if not
guarantees, payment of the workers’ compensation, thus, giving the
workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.With
private respondents’ surety bond, it can therefore be said that the purpose
of the Labor Code provision on the solidary liability of the indirect
employer is already accomplished since the interest of the
complainants are already adequately protected.Consequently, it will
be futile to continuously hold the petitioner jointly and solidarily
liable with the private respondentsfor the judgment awards for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay.But
while this Court had previously ruled that the indirect employer can
recover whatever amount it had paid to the employees in
accordance with the terms of the service contract between itself and the
contractor, the said ruling cannot be applied in reverse to this
case as to allow the private respondents (the independent
contractor), who paid for the judgment awards in full, to recover from
the petitioner (the indirect employer).
4)
Manila Electric Company vs Benamira 2005
Facts:The individual respondents are licensed security guards formerly
employed by People‘s Security, Inc. and deployed as such at MERALCO‘s
head office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila.On Nov. 30, 1990,
the security service agreement between PSI and MERALCO was
terminated.Immediately thereafter, 56 of PSI‘s security guards, including
herein eight individual respondents, filed a complaint for unpaid monetary
benefits against PSI and MERALCO.Meanwhile, the security service
agreement between respondent Armed Security & Detective Agency, Inc.,
(ASDAI) and MERALCO took effect on Dec. 1, 1990. Subsequently, the
individual respondents were absorbed by ASDAI and retained at
MERALCO‘s head office.On June 29, 1992, the labor arbiter rendered
a decision in favor of the former PSI security guards, including the
individual respondents.Less than a month later, the individual respondents
filed another complaint for unpaid monetary benefits, this time against
ASDAI and MERALCO.On July 25, 1992, the security service
agreement between respondent Advance Forces Security &
Investigation Services, Inc. (AFSISI) and MERALCO took effect,
terminating the previous security service agreement with
ASDAI.Except as to the number of security guards, the amount to be
paid the agency, and the effectivity of the agreement, the terms and
conditions were substantially identical with the security service
agreement with ASDAI. The individual respondents amended their
complaint to implead AFSISI as party respondent.They then again
amended their complaint to allege that AFSISI terminated their
services on August 6, 1992 without notice and just cause and
therefore guilty of illegal dismissal.The individual respondents alleged
that: MERALCO and ASDAI never paid their overtime pay, service
incentive leave pay, premium pay for Sundays and Holidays, P50.00
monthly uniform allowance and underpaid their 13thmonth pay; on
July 24, 1992, when the security service agreement of ASDAI was
terminated and AFSISI took over the security functions of the former
on July 25, 1992, respondent security guard Benamira was no longer
given any work assignment when AFSISI learned that the former has
a pending case against PSI, ineffect, dismissing him from the service
without just cause; and, the rest of the individual respondents were
absorbed by AFSISI but were not given any assignments, thereby
dismissing them from the service without just cause. ASDAI denied
in general terms any liability for theclaims of the individual
respondents, claiming that there is nothing due them in connection with
their services.On the other hand, MERALCO denied liability on the ground
of lack of employer-employee relationship with individual respondents.It
averred that the individual respondents are the employees of the security
agencies it contracted for security services; and that it has no existing
liability for the individual respondents‘ claims since said security agencies
have been fully paid for their services per their respective security service
agreement.For its part, AFSISI asserted that: it is not liable for illegal
dismissal since it did not absorb or hire the individual respondents,
the latter were merely hold-over guards from ASDAI; it is not obliged to
employ or absorb the security guards of the agency it replaced since there
is no provision in its security service agreement with MERALCO or in law
requiring it to absorb and hire the guards of ASDAI as it has its own guards
duly trained to service its various clients.SC Ruling:At the outset, we
note that the individual respondents never alleged in their complaint
in the Labor Arbiter, in their appealin the NLRC and even in their
petition for certiorariin the CA that MERALCO was their
employer.They have always advanced the theory that AFSISI is their
employer.A perusal of the records shows it was only in their
Memorandum in the CA that this thesis was presented and discussed
for the first time.We cannot ignore the fact that this position of individual
respondents runs contrary to their earlier submission in their pleadings
filed in the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and even in the petition for
certiorariin the CA that AFSISI is their employer and liable for their
termination.As the object of the pleadings is to draw the lines of battle, so
to speak, between the litigants and to indicate fairly the nature of the claims
or defenses of both parties, a party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to, or inconsistent, with his pleadings.Moreover, it is a
fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are precluded from
entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during
the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a
motion for reconsideration or on appeal.The individual respondents are
bound by their submissions that AFSISI is their employer and they
should not be permitted to change their theory.Such a change of
theory cannot be tolerated on appeal, not due to the strict application of
procedural rules but as a matter of fairness.A change of theory on appeal
is objectionable because it is contrary to the rules of fair play,
justice and due process. Thus, the CA should not have considered the
new theory offered by the individual respondents in their memorandum.In
this case, the termsand conditions embodied in the security service
agreement between MERALCO and ASDAI expressly recognized
ASDAI as the employer of individual respondents.Under the security
service agreement, it was ASDAI which (a) selected, engaged or
hired and discharged the security guards; (b) assigned them to
MERALCO according to the number agreed upon; (c) provided the uniform,
firearms and ammunition, nightsticks,flashlights, raincoats and other
paraphernalia of the security guards; (d) paid them salaries or wages; and,
(e) disciplined and supervised them or principally controlled their
conduct.The agreement even explicitly provided that ―[n]othing herein
contained shall be understood to make the security guards under this
Agreement, employees of the COMPANY, it being clearly understood that
such security guards shall be considered as they are, employees of the
AGENCY alone.‖Clearly, the individual respondents are the employees of
ASDAI.As to the provision in the agreement that MERALCO reserved the
right to seek replacement of any guard whose behavior, conduct or
appearance is not satisfactory, such merely confirms that the power
to discipline lies with the agency.It is a standard stipulation in
security service agreements that the client may request the replacement of
the guards to it.Service-oriented enterprises, such as the business of
providing security services, generally adhere to the business adage that
―the customer or client is always right‖ and, thus, must satisfy the
interests, conform to the needs, and cater to the reasonable impositions of
its clients.Neither is the stipulation that the agency cannot pull out
any security guard from MERALCO without its consent an indication
of control.It is simply a security clause designed to prevent the agency from
unilaterally removing its security guards from their assigned posts at
MERALCO‘s premises to the latter‘s detriment.
12The clause that MERALCO has the right at all times to inspect
the guards of the agency detailed in its premises is likewise not
indicative of control as it is not a unilateral right.The agreement provides
that the agency is principally mandated to conduct inspections, without
prejudice to MERALCO‘s right to conduct its own inspections.Needless to
stress, for the power of control to be present, the person for whom the
services are rendered must reserve the right to direct not only the end to be
achieved but also the means for reaching such end.Not all rules imposed
by the hiring party on the hired party indicate that the latter is an
employee of the former.Rules which serve as general
guidelinestowards the achievement of the mutually desired result are
not indicative of the power of control.The security service agreements in
the present case provided that all specific instructions by MERALCO
relating to the discharge by the security guards of their duties shall be
directed to the agency and not directly to the individual respondents.The
individual respondents failed to show that the rules of MERALCO controlled
their performance. Moreover, ASDAI and AFSISI are not ―labor-only‖
contractors.There is ―labor only‖ contract when the person acting as
contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal
who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same
extent as if they had been directly employed by him.On the other hand,
―job (independent) contracting‖ is present if the following conditions are
met: (a) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes
the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility
according to his own manner and method, free from the control and
direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with
theperformance of the work except to the result thereof; and (b)
thecontractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are
necessary in the conduct of his business. Given the above distinction
and the provisions of the security service agreements entered into by
petitioner with ASDAI and AFSISI, we are convinced that ASDAI and
AFSISI were engaged in job contracting.The individual respondents
can not be considered as regular employees of the MERALCO for,
although security services are necessary and desirable to the business of
MERALCO, it is not directly related to its principal business and may even
be considered unnecessary in the conduct of MERALCO‘s principal
business, which is the distribution of electricity.Furthermore, the fact that
the individual respondents filed their claim for unpaid monetary benefits
against ASDAI is a clear indication that the individual respondents
acknowledge that ASDAI is their employer.We cannot give credence to
individual respondents‘ insistence that they were absorbed by AFSISI when
MERALCO‘s security service agreement with ASDAI was terminated.The
individual respondents failed to present any evidence to confirm that
AFSISI absorbed them into its workforce.Thus, respondent Benamira
was not retained in his post at MERALCO since July 25, 1992 due
to the termination of the security service agreement of MERALCO with
ASDAI.As for the rest of the individual respondents, they retained their post
only as ―hold-over‖ guards until the security guards of AFSISI took over
their post on August 6, 1992. In the present case, respondent Benamira
has been ―off-detail‖ for seventeen days while the rest of the individual
respondents have only been ―off-detail‖ for five days when they amended
their complaint on August 11, 1992 to include the charge of illegal
dismissal.The inclusion of the charge of illegal dismissal then was
premature.Nonetheless, bearing in mind that ASDAI simply stopped giving
the individual respondents any assignment and their inactivity clearly
persisted beyond the six-month period allowed by Article 286 of the
Labor Code, the individual respondents were, in effect, constructively
dismissed by ASDAI from employment, hence, they should be
reinstated.The fact that there is no actual and direct employer-employee
relationship between MERALCO and the individual respondents does not
exonerate MERALCO from liability as to the monetary claims of the
individual respondents.When MERALCO contracted for security
services with ASDAI as the securityagency that hired individual
respondents to work as guards for it, MERALCO became an indirect
employer of individual respondents pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor
Code, which reads:ART.107. Indirect employer -The provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person,
partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer,
contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work,
task, job or project.When ASDAI as contractor failed to pay the
individual respondents, MERALCO as principal becomes jointly and
severally liable for the individual respondents‘ wages, under Articles 106
and 109 of the Labor Code, which provide: ART.106. Contractor or
subcontractor. -Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another
person for the performance of the former[ s̳ ] work, the employees of the
contractor and of the latter[ s̳ ] subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in
accordancewith the provisions of this Code.In the event that the contractor
or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance
with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is
liable to employees directly employed by him. xxxART.109. Solidary liability
-The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every
employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his
contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this
Code.For purpose of determining the extent of their civil liability under this
Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.ASDAI is held liable
by virtue of its status as direct employer, while MERALCO is deemed the
indirect employer of the individual respondents for the purpose of paying
their wages in the event of failure of ASDAI to pay
them.Thisstatutoryschemegivestheworkers theample protection consonant
with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.However,
as held in Mariveles Shipyard Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, the solidary
liability of MERALCO with that of ASDAI does not preclude the application
of Article 1217 of the Civil Code on the right of reimbursement from his co-
debtor by the one who paid, which provides: ART. 1217.Payment made by
one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation.If two or more
solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to
accept.He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the
share which corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already
made.If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the
intervening period may be demanded.When one of the solidary debtors
cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying
the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion
to the debt of each. ASDAI may not seek exculpation by claiming that
MERALCO‘s payments to it were inadequate for the individual respondents‘
lawful compensation.As an employer, ASDAI is charged with knowledge of
labor laws and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for
contractual services is its principalconcern and not any other‘s.
5)
Dole Phils vs Esteva 2006
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the
Decision,1 dated 20 May 2002, and the Amended Decision,2 dated 27
November 2003, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
63405, which declared herein petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. as the
employer of herein respondents, Medel Esteva and 86 others; found
petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal; and ordered petitioner to reinstate
respondents to their former positions and to pay the latter backwages.
1. That the amount of this contract shall be or shall not exceed TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND ONLY (₱220,000.00) PESOS, terms
and conditions of payment shall be on a per job basis as specified in the
attached schedule of rates; the CONTRACTOR shall perform the following
services for the COMPANY;
2. That both parties shall observe the following terms and conditions as
stipulated, to wit:
However, the COMPANY may allow the use of its fixed equipment as
a casual facility in the performance of the contract;
4. This contract shall be for a specific period of Six (6) months from July 1
to December 31, 1993; x x x.
Investigation by DOLE
Records submitted to this Office show that the six (6) aforementioned
cooperatives are all duly registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA). These cooperatives were also found engaging in different
activities with DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. a company engaged in the
production of pineapple and export of pineapple products. Incidentally,
some of these cooperatives were also found engaging in activities which
are directly related to the principal business or operations of the company.
This is true in the case of the THREE (3) Cooperatives, namely;
Adventurer’s Multi Purpose Cooperative, Human Resource Multi Purpose
Cooperative and Cannery Multi Purpose Cooperative.
The three (3) other cooperatives, namely Polomolok Skilled Workers Multi
Purpose Cooperative, Unified Engineering and Manpower Service Multi
Purpose Cooperative and Tibud sa Katibawasan Multi Purpose
Cooperative whose activities may not be directly related to the principal
business of DOLE Philippines, Inc. are also advised not to engage in labor
only contracting with the company.
All the six cooperatives involved appealed the afore-quoted Order to the
Office of the DOLE Secretary, raising the sole issue that DOLE Regional
Director Director Parel committed serious error of law in directing the
cooperatives to cease and desist from engaging in labor-only contracting.
On 15 September 1994, DOLE Undersecretary Cresencio B. Trajano, by
the authority of the DOLE Secretary, issued an Order11 dismissing the
appeal on the basis of the following ratiocination –
The Regional Director has jurisdiction to issue a cease and desist order as
provided by Art. 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, to wit:
xxxx
The records reveal that in the course of the inspection of the premises of
Dolefil, it was found out that the activities of the members of the
[cooperatives] are necessary and desirable in the principal business of the
former; and that they do not have the necessary investment in the form of
tools and equipments. It is worthy to note that the cooperatives did not
deny that they do not have enough capital in the form of tools and
equipment. Under the circumstances, it could not be denied that the
[cooperatives] are considered as labor-only contractors in relation to the
business operation of DOLEFIL, INC.
Thus, Section 9, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, provides that:
(2) The workers recruited and placed by such person are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business or
operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed.
x x x x"
The reason why "labor-only" contracting is prohibited under the Labor Code
is that it encourages circumvention of the provisions of the Labor Code on
the workers’ right to security of tenure and to self-organization.
After the motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was denied, no
further motion was filed by the parties, and the Order, dated 15 September
1994, of DOLE Undersecretary Trajano became final and executory. A Writ
of Execution12 was issued by DOLE Regional Office No. XI only on 27 July
1999, years after the issuance of the order subject of the writ. The DOLE
Regional Office No. XI was informed that CAMPCO and two other
cooperatives "continued to operate at DOLE Philippines, Inc. despite the
cease and desist Order" it had issued. It therefore commanded the Sheriff
to proceed to the premises of CAMPCO and the two other cooperatives
and implement its Order dated 19 October 1993.
Petitioner, in its Position Paper16 filed before the NLRC, denied that
respondents were its employees.
Petitioner further averred that Department Order No. 10, amending the
rules implementing Books III and VI of the Labor Code, as amended,
promulgated by the DOLE on 30 May 1997, explicitly recognized the
arrangement between petitioner and CAMPCO as permissible contracting
and subcontracting, to wit –
(d) Works or services not directly related or not integral to the main
business or operation of the principal, including casual work,
janitorial, security, landscaping, and messengerial services, and work
not related to manufacturing processes in manufacturing
establishments;
After the parties had submitted their respective Position Papers, the Labor
Arbiter promulgated its Decision20 on 11 June 1999, ruling entirely in favor
of petitioner, ratiocinating thus –
After judicious review of the facts, narrated and supporting documents
adduced by both parties, the undersigned finds [and] holds that CAMPCO
is not engaged in labor-only contracting.
Had it not been for the issuance of Department Order No. 10 that took
effect on June 22, 1997 which in the contemplation of Law is much later
compared to the Order promulgated by the Undersecretary Cresencio
Trajano of Department of [L]abor and Employment, the undersigned could
safely declared [sic] otherwise. However, owing to the principle observed
and followed in legal practice that the later law or jurisprudence controls,
the reliance to Secretary Trajano’s order is overturned.
Verification of the records reveals that per Annexes "J" and "K" of [herein
petitioner DolePhil’s] position paper, which are the yearly audited Financial
Statement and Balance Sheet of CAMPCO shows [sic] that it has more
than substantial capital or investment in order to qualify as a legitimate job
contractor.
We likewise recognize the validity of the contract entered into and between
CAMPCO and [petitioner] for the former to assists [sic] the latter in its
operations and in the performance of odd jobs – such as the augmentation
of regular manning particularly during peaks in operation, work back logs,
absenteeism and excessive leave availment of respondent’s regular
employees. The rule is well-settled that labor laws discourage interference
with an employer’s judgment in the conduct of his business. Even as the
law is solicitors [sic] of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect
the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business
affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied (Yuco Chemical Industries
vs. Ministry of [L]abor, GR No. 75656, May 28, 1990).
The second issue is likewise answered in the negative. The reason is plain
and simple[,] section 12 of Department [O]rder No. 10 states:
"Judging from the very nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring, the
Commission finds the complainants to have been engaged to perform
work, although necessary or desirable to the business of respondent
company, for a definite period or what is community called TERM
EMPLOYMENT. It is clear from the evidence and record that the nature of
the business and operation of respondent company has its peaks and
valleys and therefore, it is not difficult to discern, inclement weather, or high
availment by regular workers of earned leave credits, additional workers
categorized as casuals, or temporary, are needed to meet the exigencies."
(Underlining in the original)
Anent the third issue, [respondents] dismally failed to provide us the exact
figures needed for the computation of their wage differentials. To simply
alleged [sic] that one is underpaid of his wages is not enough. No bill of
particulars was submitted. Moreover, the Order of RTWPB Region XI,
Davao City dated February 21, 1996 exempts [petitioner] company from
complying Wage Order No. 04 [sic] in so far as such exemption applies
only to workers who are not covered by the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, for the period January 1 to December 31, 1995,. [sic] In so far
as [respondents] were not privies to the CBA, they were the workers
referred to by RTWPB’s Order. [H]ence, [respondents’] claims for wage
differentials are hereby dismissed for lack of factual basis.
It is not correct, however, to say, as the Labor Arbiter did, that the afore-
said ruling of the Department of Labor and Employment has been
overturned by Department Order No. 10. It is a basic principle that "once a
judgment becomes final it cannot be disturbed, except for clerical errors or
when supervening events render its execution impossible or unjust"
(Sampaguita Garmens [sic] Corp. vs. NLRC, G. R. No. 102406, June 7,
1994). Verily, the subsequent issuance of Department Order No. 10 cannot
be construed as supervening event that would render the execution of said
judgment impossible or unjust. Department Order No. 10 refers to the
ramification of some provisions of the Rules Implementing Articles 106 and
109 of the Labor Code, without substantially changing the definition of
"labor-only" or "job’ contracting.
In the case at bench, it was established during the proceedings before the
[NLRC] that CAMPCO has a substantial capital. However, having a
substantial capital does not per se qualify CAMPCO as a job contractor. In
order to be considered an independent contractor it is not enough to show
substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machinery and work premises. The conjunction "and," in defining what a
job contractor is, means that aside from having a substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premise, and
other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business, the
contractor must be able to prove that it also carries on an independent
business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his
own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the
control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected
with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. [Herein
petitioner DolePhil] has failed to prove, except for the substantial capital
requirement, that CAMPCO has met the other requirements. It was not
established that CAMPCO is engaged or carries on an independent
business. In the performance of the respective tasks of workers deployed
by CAMPCO with [petitioner], it was not established that CAMPCO
undertook the contract of work it entered with [petitioner] under its own
account and its own responsibility. It is [petitioner] who provides the
procedures to be followed by the workers in the performance of their
assigned work. The workers deployed by CAMPCO to [petitioner]
performed activities which are directly related to the principal business or
operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed since
[petitioner] admitted that these workers were engaged to perform the job of
other regular employees who cannot report for work.
Moreover, [NLRC] likewise gravely erred in not giving weight to the Order
dated 19 October 1993 issued by the Office of the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, through Undersecretary Cresencio
Trajano, which affirmed the findings of the Department of Labor and
Employment Regional Office, Region XI, Davao City that Cannery Multi-
Purpose Cooperative is one of the cooperatives engaged in labor-only
contracting activities.
xxxx
SO ORDERED."
xxxx
[NLRC] held that CAMPCO, being not a real party-in interest in the above-
case, the said ruling is not binding and conclusive upon [petitioner]. This
Court, however, finds the contrary.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
However, the Court cannot declare that [herein respondents] are regular
employees of [petitioner]. x x x
xxxx
xxxx
All other claims of [respondents] are hereby DENIED for lack of basis.
As can be gleaned from the contract that CAMPCO entered into with the
[petitioner], the undertaking of CAMPCO is to provide [petitioner] with
workforce by assisting the company in its daily operations and perform odd
jobs as may be assigned. It is our opinion that CAMPCO merely acted as
recruitment agency for [petitioner]. CAMPCO by supplying manpower only,
clearly conducted itself as ‘labor-only" contractor. As can be gleaned from
the service contract, the work performed by the [herein respondents] are
directly related to the main business of the [petitioner]. Clearly, the
requisites of "labor-only" contracting are present in the case at bench.
Since, the argument that the [petitioner] is the real employer of the
[respondents], the next question that must be answered is – what is the
nature of the employment of the petitioners?
xxxx
The afore-quoted [Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended] provides for
two kinds of employment, namely: (1) regular (2) casual. In our Decision,
we ruled that the [respondents] while performing work necessary and
desirable to the business of the [petitioner] are seasonal employees as
their services were engaged by the [petitioner] for a definite period or only
during peak season.
This court however, finds no basis for the award of damages and attorney’s
fees in favor of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 20, 2002 rendered by this Court is
hereby AMENDED as follows:
3) The claims for damages and attorney’s fees are hereby denied for
lack of merit.
No costs.23
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DETERMINED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
IN RULING THAT CAMPCO IS ENGAGED IN THE PROHIBITED
ACT OF "LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING" DESPITE THERE BEING
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
VI.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that judicial review
under Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure is limited only to
issues concerning want or excess or jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment. It is the
contention of petitioner that the NLRC properly assumed jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter of the instant case. The errors assigned by
the respondents in their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
do not pertain to the jurisdiction of the NLRC; they are rather errors of
judgment supposedly committed by the the NLRC, in its Resolution, dated
29 February 2000, and are thus not the proper subject of a petition
for certiorari. Petitioner also posits that the Petition for Certiorari filed by
respondents with the Court of Appeals raised questions of fact that would
necessitate a review by the appellate court of the evidence presented by
the parties before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, and that questions of
fact are not a fit subject for a special civil action for certiorari.
It has long been settled in the landmark case of St. Martin Funeral Home v.
NLRC,25 that the mode for judicial review over decisions of the NLRC is by
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The different modes of appeal, namely, writ of error (Rule 41),
petition for review (Rules 42 and 43), and petition for review
on certiorari (Rule 45), cannot be availed of because there is no provision
on appellate review of NLRC decisions in the Labor Code, as
amended.26 Although the same case recognizes that both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction over such
petitions, it has chosen to impose the strict observance of the hierarchy of
courts. Hence, a petition for certiorari of a decision or resolution of the
NLRC should first be filed with the Court of Appeals; direct resort to the
Supreme Court shall not be allowed unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify an availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise by the Supreme Court of its primary jurisdiction.
The rule is settled that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Court to
review a decision of respondent NLRC (or Executive Labor Arbiter as in
this case) in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not normally
include an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence.
Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not
within the province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely
confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is thus
incumbent upon petitioner to satisfactorily establish that respondent
Commission or executive labor arbiter acted capriciously and whimsically in
total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy,
in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion
was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of
the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and
common law traditions.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, can grant the Petition for Certiorari if it
finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave
abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence which is material or decisive of the controversy; and the Court of
Appeals can not make this determination without looking into the evidence
presented by the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only evaluate
the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have
been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in
relation to all other evidence on record.
[I]t has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of
justice in certiorari proceedings. The cases in which certiorari will issue
cannot be defined, because to do so would be to destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court
that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary
than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending
control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." So it is that the
writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.
In this instance, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look
into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings. As a
corollary, this Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. The
same principles are now necessarily adhered to and are applied by the
Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated
through a petition for certiorari; thus, we see no error on its part when it
made anew a factual determination of the matters and on that basis
reversed the ruling of the NLRC.
II
The second assignment of error delves into the significance and application
to the case at bar of the two department orders issued by DOLE.
Department Order No. 10, series of 1997, amended the implementing rules
of Books III and VI of the Labor Code, as amended. Under this particular
DOLE department order, the arrangement between petitioner and
CAMPCO would qualify as permissible contracting. Department Order No.
3, series of 2001, revoked Department Order No. 10, series of 1997, and
reiterated the prohibition on labor-only contracting.
Which now brings this Court to the question as to what was the prevailing
rule on labor-only contracting from 1993 to 1996, the period when the
occurrences subject of the Complaint before the NLRC took place.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of
his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly
and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees
to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner
and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business or
operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed.
(c) For cases not falling under this Article, the Secretary of
Labor shall determine through appropriate orders whether or
not the contracting out of labor is permissible in the light of the
circumstances of each case and after considering the operating
needs of the employer and the rights of the workers involved. In
such case, he may prescribe conditions and restrictions to
insure the protection and welfare of the workers.
Since these statutory and regulatory provisions were the ones in force
during the years in question, then it was in consideration of the same that
DOLE Regional Director Parel and DOLE Undesrsecretary Trajano issued
their Orders on 19 September 1993 and 15 September 1994, respectively,
both finding that CAMPCO was engaged in labor-only contracting.
Petitioner, in its third assignment of error, questions the weight that the
Court of Appeals gave these orders in its Decision, dated 20 May 2002,
and Amended Decision, dated 27 November 2003.
III
The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September 1993,
and of DOLE Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, were
issued pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement power conferred by the
Labor Code, as amended, on the DOLE Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives, to wit –
ART. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power. – (a) The Secretary of Labor
or his duly authorized representatives, including labor regulation officers,
shall have access to employer’s records and premises at any time of the
day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right to
copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact,
condition or matter which may be necessary to determine violations or
which may aid in the enforcement of this Code and of any labor law, wage
order or rules and regulations pursuant thereto.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to
the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still
exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give
effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor
legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement
officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The
Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of
execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders,
except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor
employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by
documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.
It is obvious that the visitorial and enforcement power granted to the DOLE
Secretary is in the nature of a quasi-judicial power. Quasi-judicial power
has been described by this Court in the following manner –
The DOLE Secretary, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended,
exercise quasi-judicial power, at least, to the extent necessary to determine
violations of labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor
legislation. He can issue compliance orders and writs of execution for the
enforcement of his orders. As evidence of the importance and binding
effect of the compliance orders of the DOLE Secretary, Article 128 of the
Labor Code, as amended, further provides –
xxxx
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or
otherwise render ineffective the orders of the Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted under
this article, and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or
permanent injunction or restraining order or otherwise assume jurisdiction
over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in accordance with
this article.
Res judicata has dual aspects, "bar by prior judgment" and "conclusiveness
of judgment." This Court has previously clarified the difference between the
two –
Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the dual
aspects of res judicata in actions in personam. to wit:
xxxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."
Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by
prior judgment," whereas, Section 49(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of
judgment."
There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the
judgment was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is
invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
When the three identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered
in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. But where
between the first case wherein Judgment is rendered and the second case
wherein such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of parties but there
is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second
case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is
termed "conclusiveness of judgment."
The same parties who participated in the proceedings before the DOLE
Regional Office are the same parties involved in the case filed before the
NLRC. CAMPCO, on behalf of its members, attended the conference
before the DOLE Regional Office; submitted its position paper; filed an
appeal with the DOLE Secretary of the Order of DOLE Regional Director
Parel; and moved for reconsideration of the subsequent Order of DOLE
Undersecretary Trajano. Petitioner, although not expressly named as a
respondent in the DOLE investigation, was a necessary party thereto,
considering that CAMPCO was rendering services to petitioner solely.
Moreover, petitioner participated in the proceedings before the DOLE
Regional Office, intervening in the matter through a letter sent by its Senior
Legal Officer, dated 24 May 1993, and submitting its own position paper.
While the causes of action in the proceedings before the DOLE and the
NLRC differ, they are, in fact, very closely related. The DOLE Regional
Office conducted an investigation to determine whether CAMPCO was
violating labor laws, particularly, those on labor-only contracting.
Subsequently, it ruled that CAMPCO was indeed engaging in labor-only
contracting activities, and thereafter ordered to cease and desist from doing
so. Respondents came before the NLRC alleging illegal dismissal by the
petitioner of those respondents who were put on "stay home status," and
seeking regularization of respondents who were still working for petitioner.
The basis of their claims against petitioner rests on the argument that
CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor and, thus, merely an agent or
intermediary of petitioner, who should be considered as respondents’ real
employer. The matter of whether CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor
was already settled and determined in the DOLE proceedings, which
should be conclusive and binding upon the NLRC. What were left for the
determination of the NLRC were the issues on whether there was illegal
dismissal and whether respondents should be regularized.
This Court also notes that CAMPCO and DOLE still continued with their
Service Contract despite the explicit cease and desist orders rendered by
authorized DOLE officials. There is no other way to look at it except that
CAMPCO and DOLE acted in complete defiance and disregard of the
visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE Secretary and his authorized
representatives under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended. For the
NLRC to ignore the findings of DOLE Regional Director Parel and DOLE
Undersecretary Trajano is an unmistakable and serious undermining of the
DOLE officials’ authority.
IV
Petitioner cannot put up the excuse of piercing the veil of corporate entity,
as this is merely an equitable remedy, and maybe awarded only in cases
when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud or defend crime or where a corporation is a mere alter
ego or business conduit of a person.
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the
protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. But to
do this, the court must be sure that the corporate fiction was misused, to
such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was committed upon another,
disregarding, thus, his, her, or its rights. It is the corporate entity which the
law aims to protect by this doctrine.
Petitioner does not come before this Court with clean hands. It is not an
innocent party in this controversy.
VI
Neither can this Court apply herein the ruling of the NLRC in the previous
case involving petitioner and the individual workers they used to hire before
the advent of the cooperatives, to the effect that the employment of these
individual workers were not regular, but rather, were valid "term
employments," wherein the employer and employee knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to employment for only a limited or specified period of
time. The difference between that case and the one presently before this
Court is that the members of CAMPCO, including respondents, were not
informed, at the time of their engagement, that their employment shall only
be for a limited or specified period of time. There is absence of proof that
the respondents were aware and had knowingly and voluntarily agreed to
such term employment. Petitioner did not enter into individual contracts
with the CAMPCO members, but executed a Service Contract with
CAMPCO alone. Although the Service Contract of 1993 stated that it shall
be for a specific period, from 1 July to 31 December 1993, petitioner and
CAMPCO continued the service arrangement beyond 1993. Since there
was no written renewal of the Service Contract,41 there was no further
indication that the engagement by petitioner of the services of CAMPCO
members was for another definite or specified period only.
6)
Facts:
7)
Facts:
By practice, the petitioner contracts out some of the work in the warehouse
department, to three independent service providers or forwarders. These
forwarders also have their own employees who hold the positions of clerk,
material handler, system encoder and general clerk. The regular
employees of the petitioner and those of the forwarders share the same
work area and use the same equipment, tools and computers all belonging
to the petitioner.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. The employer was within its right in entering the forwarding
agreements with the forwarders as an exercise of its management
prerogative. The employer’s declared objective for the arrangement is to
achieve greater economy and efficiency in its operations – a universally
accepted business objective and standard that the union has never
questioned. In Meralco v. Quisumbing,[G.R. No. 127598, January 27, 1999]
the Court joined this universal recognition of outsourcing as a legitimate
activity when it held that a company can determine in its best judgment
whether it should contract out a part of its work for as long as the employer
is motivated by good faith; the contracting is not for purposes of
circumventing the law; and does not involve or be the result of malicious or
arbitrary action.
8)
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. ASTORGA G.R. No. 148132
January 28, 2008 Redundancy, authorised causes for dismissal, Article
283, One month Notice, Backwages
JULY 5, 2018
FACTS:
Astorga was employed by Smart as District Sales Manager of the
Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division. SMART
launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient
operations. Part of the reorganization was the outsourcing of the marketing
and sales force. Thus, SMART formed SMART-NTT Multimedia,
Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the sales and
marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorga’s division.
SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who would be recommended
by SMART. Astorga landed last in the performance evaluation, thus, she
was not recommended by SMART. SMART, nonetheless, offered her a
supervisory position in the Customer Care Department, but she refused the
offer because the position carried lower salary rank and rate.
In the meantime, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay
the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her
under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to the
company for proper disposition.
On the other hand, the labor arbiter held that Astorga’s dismissal from
employment illegal. While recognizing SMART’s right to abolish any of its
departments, the Labor Arbiter held that such right should be exercised in
good faith and for causes beyond its control. The Arbiter found the abolition
of CSMG done neither in good faith nor for causes beyond the control of
SMART, but a ploy to terminate Astorga’s employment. The Arbiter also
ruled that contracting out the functions performed by Astorga to an in-
house agency like SNMI was illegal.
SMART also appealed the unfavorable ruling of the Labor Arbiter in the
illegal dismissal case to the NLRC which declared the abolition of CSMG
and the creation of SNMI to do the sales and marketing services for
SMART a valid organizational action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Astorga’s dismissal was valid.
RULING:
Astorga was terminated due to redundancy, which is one of the authorized
causes for the dismissal of an employee. The nature of redundancy as an
authorized cause for dismissal is explained in the leading case of Wiltshire
File Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, viz:
We believe that redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where
the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded
by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is
redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions
may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers,
decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or
service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
However, as aptly found by the CA, SMART failed to comply with the
mandated one month notice prior to termination.
Smart gave her a formal notice of termination barely two (2) weeks before
the effective date of termination, a period very much shorter than that
required by law.
In DAP Corporation v. CA, the dismissal of the employees therein valid and
for authorized cause even if the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
The Court found the need to modify, by increasing, the indemnity awarded
by the CA to Astorga, as a sanction on SMART for non-compliance with the
one-month mandatory notice requirement, in light of our ruling in Jaka Food
Processing Corporation v. Pacot, viz.:
[I]f the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be
imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process
was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee, and (2) if the
dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should
be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s
exercise of his management prerogative.
The award of backwages to Astorga by the CA should be deleted for lack of
basis. Backwages is a relief given to an illegally dismissed employee. Thus,
before backwages may be granted, there must be a finding of unjust or
illegal dismissal from work.The Labor Arbiter ruled that Astorga was
illegally dismissed. But on appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s
ruling and categorically declared Astorga’s dismissal valid. This ruling was
affirmed by the CA in its assailed Decision. Since Astorga’s dismissal is for
an authorized cause, she is not entitled to backwages.
9)
Manila Water vs Dalumpines 2010
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated September 12, 2006 and the
Resolution2 dated November 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 94909.
Respondent bill collectors averred that when Manila Water issued their
individual contracts of service for three months in September 1997, there
was already an attempt to make it appear that respondent bill collectors
were not its employees but independent contractors. Respondent bill
collectors stressed that they could not qualify as independent contractors
because they did not have an independent business of their own, tools,
equipment, and capitalization, but were purely dependent on the wages
they earned from Manila Water, which was termed as "commission."12
Respondent bill collectors averred that even under the four-fold test of
employer-employee relationship, it appeared that Manila Water was their
true employer based on the following circumstances: (1) it was Manila
Water who engaged their services as bill collectors when it took over the
operations of the east zone from MWSS on August 1, 1997; (2) it was
Manila Water which paid their wages in the form of commissions every
fifteenth (15th) and thirtieth (30th) day of each month; (3) Manila Water
exercised the power of dismissal over them as bill collectors as evidenced
by the instances surrounding their termination as set forth in their
respective affidavits, and by the individual clearances issued to them not by
FCCSI but by Manila Water, stating that the same was "issued in
connection with his termination of contract as Contract Collector of Manila
Water Company"; and (4) their work as bill collectors was clearly related to
the principal business of Manila Water.15
On September 27, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision,21 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
TOTAL - - - - - - - ₱1,055,600.00
SO ORDERED.22
Respondent bill collectors and FCCSI filed their separate appeals with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 15, 2006, the
NLRC rendered a decision23 affirming in toto the decision of the LA.
Respondent bill collectors filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied in a resolution24 dated April 28, 2006.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner Manila Water and respondent bill collectors filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, the CA denied their respective motions for
reconsideration in a Resolution dated November 17, 2006.
Job contracting is permissible only if the following conditions are met: 1) the
contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract
work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own
manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or
principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except
as to the results thereof; and 2) the contractor has substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises,
and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of the business.31
"The office equipt [sic] with modern facilities such as computers, printers,
electric typewriter, working table, telephone lines, airconditioning unit,
pigeon holes, working tables and delivery vehicles such as a Suzuki van
and three (3) motorcycles. The firm’s audited financial statement for the
period ending 31 December 1996 [shows] that it earned a net income of
₱253,000.00. x x x."
The above document only proves that FCCSI has no sufficient investment
in the form of tools, equipment and machinery to undertake contract
services for Manila Water involving a fleet of around 100 collectors
assigned to several branches and covering the service area of Manila
Water customers spread out in several cities/towns of the East Zone. The
only rational conclusion is that it is Manila Water that provides most if not
all the logistics and equipment including service vehicles in the
performance of the contracted service, notwithstanding that the contract
between FCCSI and Manila Water states that it is the Contractor which
shall furnish at its own expense all materials, tools and equipment needed
to perform the tasks of collectors. Moreover, it must be emphasized that
petitioners who are "trained collectors" performed tasks that cannot be
simply categorized as "messengerial." In fact, these are the very functions
they were already discharging even before they joined FCCSI which
"invited" or "solicited" their placement just about the expiration of their three
(3)-month contract with Manila Water on November 28, 1997. The
Agreement between FCCSI and Manila Water provides that FCCSI shall
"field the required number of trained collectors to the following Customer
Relations Branch Office": Cubao, España, San Juan-Mandaluyong,
Marikina, Pasig, Taguig-Pateros and Makati.351avvphi1
The factual circumstances in the instant case are essentially the same as
those cited in Manila Water Company, Inc. v. Hermiño Peña.37 In that case,
121 bill collectors, headed by Peña, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Manila Water. The bill collectors formed ACGI which was registered
with the SEC. Manila Water, in opposing the claim of the bill collectors,
claimed that there was no employer-employee relationship with the latter. It
averred that the bill collectors were employees of ACGI, a separate entity
engaged in collection services, an independent contractor which entered
into a service contract for the collection of Manila Water’s accounts. The
Court ruled that ACGI was not an independent contractor but was engaged
in labor-only contracting, and as such, is considered merely an agent of
Manila Water.38
The Court ratiocinated that: First, ACGI does not have substantial
capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries,
work premises, and other materials to qualify as an independent contractor.
Second, the work of the bill collectors was directly related to the principal
business or operation of Manila Water. Being in the business of providing
water to the consumers in the east zone, the collection of the charges by
the bill collectors for the company can only be categorized as related to,
and in the pursuit of, the latter's business. Lastly, ACGI did not carry on an
independent business or undertake the performance of its service contract
in its own manner and using its own methods, free from the control and
supervision of its principal, Manila Water. Since ACGI is obviously a labor-
only contractor, the workers it supplied are considered employees of the
principal. Furthermore, the activities performed by the bill collectors were
necessary or desirable to Manila Water's principal trade or business; thus,
they are regular employees of the latter. Since Manila Water failed to
comply with the requirements of termination under the Labor Code, the
dismissal of the bill collectors was tainted with illegality.39
The similarity between the instant case and Peña is very evident. First, the
work set-up between the respondent contractor FCCSI and respondent bill
collectors is the same as in Peña. Respondent bill collectors were
individually hired by the contractor, but were under the direct control and
supervision of the concessionaire. Second, they performed the same
function of courier and bill collection services. Third, the element of control
exercised by Manila Water over respondent bill collectors is essentially the
same as in Peña, manifested in the following circumstances, viz.: (a)
respondent bill collectors reported daily to the branch offices of Manila
Water to remit their collections with the specified monthly targets and
comply with the collection reporting procedures prescribed by the latter; (b)
respondent bill collectors, except for Pamoraga and Zapatero, were among
the 121 collectors who incorporated ACGI; (c) Manila Water continued to
pay their wages in the form of commissions even after the employees
alleged transfer to FCCSI. Manila Water paid the respondent bill collectors
their individual commissions, and the lump sum paid by Manila Water to
FCCSI merely represented the agency fee; and (d) the certification or
individual clearances issued by Manila Water to respondent bill collectors
upon the termination of the service contract with FCCSI. The certification
stated that respondents were contract collectors of Manila Water and not of
FCCSI. Thus, this Court agrees with the findings of the CA that if, indeed,
FCCSI was the true employer of the bill collectors, it should have been the
one to issue the certification or individual clearances.
It should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the existence
of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not
essential that the employer actually supervises the performance of duties of
the employee. It is enough that the former has a right to wield the power.40
SO ORDERED.
10)
G.R. No. 186091
EMMANUEL BABAS, DANILO T. BANAG, ARTURO V. VILLARIN, SR.,
EDWIN JAVIER, SANDI BERMEO, REX ALLESA, MAXIMO SORIANO,
JR., ARSENIO ESTORQUE, and FELIXBERTO ANAJAO vs. LORENZO
SHIPPING CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 186091
December 15, 2010
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
x x x.
Petitioners vigorously insist that they were employees of LSC; and that
BMSI is not an independent contractor, but a labor-only contractor. LSC, on
the other hand, maintains that BMSI is an independent contractor, with
adequate capital and investment. LSC capitalizes on the ratiocination made
by the CA.
be measured in terms of, and determined by, the criteria set by statute. The
parties cannot dictate by the mere expedience of a unilateral declaration in
a contract the character of their business.
Despite the fact that the service contracts contain stipulations which are
earmarks of independent contractorship, they do not make it legally so. The
language of a contract is neither determinative nor conclusive of the
relationship between the parties. Petitioner SMC and AMPCO cannot
dictate, by a declaration in a contract, the character of AMPCO's business,
that is, whether as labor-only contractor, or job contractor. AMPCO's
character should be measured in terms of, and determined by, the criteria
set by statute.
Thus, in distinguishing between prohibited labor-only contracting and
permissible job contracting, the totality of the facts and the surrounding
circumstances of the case are to be considered.
First, petitioners worked at LSC’s premises, and nowhere else. Other than
the provisions of the Agreement, there was no showing that it was BMSI
which established petitioners’ working procedure and methods, which
supervised petitioners in their work, or which evaluated the same. There
was absolute lack of evidence that BMSI exercised control over them or
their work, except for the fact that petitioners were hired by BMSI.
Second, LSC was unable to present proof that BMSI had substantial
capital. The record before us is bereft of any proof pertaining to the
contractor’s capitalization, nor to its investment in tools, equipment, or
implements actually used in the performance or completion of the job,
work, or service that it was contracted to render. What is clear was that the
equipment used by BMSI were owned by, and merely rented from, LSC.
The law casts the burden on the contractor to prove that it has substantial
capital, investment, tools, etc. Employees, on the other hand, need not
prove that the contractor does not have substantial capital, investment, and
tools to engage in job-contracting.
Third, petitioners performed activities which were directly related to the
main business of LSC. The work of petitioners as checkers, welders, utility
men, drivers, and mechanics could only be characterized as part of, or at
least clearly related to, and in the pursuit of, LSC’s business. Logically,
when petitioners were assigned by BMSI to LSC, BMSI acted merely as a
labor-only contractor.
Lastly, as found by the NLRC, BMSI had no other client except for LSC,
and neither BMSI nor LSC refuted this finding, thereby bolstering the NLRC
finding that BMSI is a labor-only contractor.
Petitioners lost their employment when LSC terminated its Agreement with
BMSI. However, the termination of LSC’s Agreement with BMSI cannot be
considered a just or an authorized cause for petitioners’ dismissal. In
Almeda v. Asahi Glass Philippines. Inc. v. Asahi Glass Philippines, Inc.,[27]
this Court declared:
The sole reason given for the dismissal of petitioners by SSASI was the
termination of its service contract with respondent. But since SSASI was a
labor-only contractor, and petitioners were to be deemed the employees of
respondent, then the said reason would not constitute a just or authorized
cause for petitioners’ dismissal. It would then appear that petitioners were
summarily dismissed based on the aforecited reason, without compliance
with the procedural due process for notice and hearing.
Herein petitioners, having been unjustly dismissed from work, are entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their
monetary equivalents computed from the time compensation was withheld
up to the time of actual reinstatement. Their earnings elsewhere during the
periods of their illegal dismissal shall not be deducted therefrom.
SO ORDERED.
11)
Teng vs. Pahagac [GR No. 169704, November 17, 2010]Facts:Albert Teng
Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishing and, for this purpose,
owns boats (basnig), equipment,and other fishing paraphernalia. As
owner of the business, Teng claims that he customarily enters into joint
venture agreements with master fishermen (maestros) who are skilled
and are experts in deep sea fishing; they take charge of the
management of each fishing venture, including the hiring of the
members of its complement. He avers that themaestroshired the
respondent workers as checkers to determine the volume of the fish
caught in every fishing voyage.On February 20, 2003, the respondent
workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng Fish
Trading, Teng, and Chua before the NCMB, Region Branch No. IX,
Zamboanga City.The VA rendered a decisionin Teng's favor and
declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng
and the respondent workers.The CA reversed the VA's decision after
finding sufficient evidence showing the existence of employer-employee
relationshipIssues:1.Whether or not the VA‘s decision is subject to a motion
for reconsideration2.Whether or not there exists an employer-employee
relationship between Teng and the respondent workers.Ruling:Article 262-
A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.On March 21, 1989, Republic Act No. 6715took effect,
amending, among others, Article 263 of the Labor Code which was
originally worded as:Art. 263 . . . Voluntary arbitration awards or
decisionsshall be final, unappealable, and executory.As amended, Article
263 is now Article 262-A, which states:Art. 262-A. . . . [T]he award or
decision . . . shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based.It shall
be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy
of the award or decision by the parties.Notably, Article 262-A deleted the
word"unappealable"from Article 263. The deliberate selection of the
language in the amendatory act differing from that of the original act
indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law, and the court
should endeavor to give effect to such intent.There exists an employer-
employee relationship between Teng and the respondent workers.We
agree with the CA's finding that sufficient evidence exists indicating the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between Teng and the
respondentworkers.While Teng alleged that it was themaestroswho
hired the respondent workers, it was his company that issued to the
respondent workers identification cards (IDs) bearing their names as
employees and Teng's signature as the employer. Generally, ina business
establishment, IDs are issued to identify the holder as abona fideemployee
of the issuing entity.For the 13 years that the respondent workers
worked for Teng, they received wages on a regular basis, in addition
to their shares in the fish caught. The worksheet showed that the
respondent workers received uniform amounts within a given year,
which amounts annuallyincreased until the termination of their
employment in 2002.Teng's claim that the amounts received by the
respondent workers aremere commissions is incredulous, as it would mean
that the fish caught throughout the year is uniform and increases in number
each year.More importantly, the element of control —which we have ruled
in a number of cases to be a strong indicator of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship —is present in this case. Teng not only
owned the tools and equipment, he directed how the respondent workers
were to perform their job as checkers; they, in fact, acted as Teng's eyes
and ears in every fishing expedition
12)
Diamond Farms vs. FARMS AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (DARBMUPCO) G.R. Nos. 173254-55
& 173263, January 13, 2016 Facts: Diamond Farms, Inc. (DFI) and
Diamond Farms Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries MultiPurpose Cooperative
(DARBMUPCO) entered into a Banana Production and Purchase
Agreement (“BPPA”) to grow and cultivate only high grade quality
exportable bananas to be sold exclusively to DFI. The BPPA is effective for
10 years. DARBMUPCO and DFI executed a “Supplemental to
Memorandum Agreement” (“SMA”). The SMA stated that DFI shall take
care of the labor cost arising from the packaging operation, cable
maintenance, irrigation pump and irrigation maintenance that the workers
of DARBMUPCO shall conduct for DFI’s account under the BPPA.
DARBMUPCO was hampered by lack of manpower to undertake the
agricultural operation under the BPPA because some of its members were
not willing to work. Hence, to assist DARBMUPCO in meeting its
production obligations under the BPPA, DFI engaged the services of the
respondent-contractors, who in turn recruited the respondent-workers.
Respondent Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (“SPFL”)—a
legitimate labor organization with a local chapter in the awarded
plantation—filed a petition for certification election in the Office of the Med-
Arbiter in Davao City. SPFL filed the petition on behalf of some 400
workers (the respondent-workers in this petition) “jointly employed by DFI
and DARBMUPCO” working in the awarded plantation. DARBMUPCO and
DFI denied that they are the employers of the respondent-workers. They
claimed, instead, that the respondent-workers are the employees of the
respondent-contractors
Med Arbiter Ruling: The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification
election. It directed the conduct of certification election and declared that
DARBMUPCO was the employer of the respondent-workers. SOLE Ruling:
DARBMUPCO appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(“SOLE”). The SOLE modified the decision of the Med-Arbiter. The SOLE
held that DFI, through its manager and personnel, supervised and directed
the performance of the work of the respondent-contractors. The SOLE thus
declared DFI as the employer of the respondent-workers. DFI filed a motion
for reconsideration which the SOLE. DFI elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals (“CA”) via a Petition for Certiorari. CA Ruling: The CA agreed with
the ruling of the SOLE that DFI is the statutory employer of the respondent-
workers. It noted that the DFI hired the respondent-contractors, who in turn
procured their own men to work in the land owned by DARBMUPCO.
Further, DFI admitted that the respondent-contractors worked under the
direction and supervision of DFI’s managers and personnel. DFI also paid
for the respondentcontractors’ services. The CA said that the fact that the
respondent-workers worked in the land owned by DARBMUPCO is
immaterial. “Ownership of the land is not one of the four (4) elements
generally considered to establish employeremployee relationship. The CA
also ruled that DFI is the true employer of the respondent-workers because
the respondent-contractors are not independent contractors. DFI filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision which was denied. Hence,
the Petition. Issue/s: Whether or not DFI is the employer of the
respondents. SC Ruling: The SC denied the petition holding that the case
involves job contracting, a labor arrangement expressly allowed by law. As
a general rule, a contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor,
unless such contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the
substantial capital, investment, tools and the like. Based on the conditions
for permissible job contracting, the SC ruled that respondent-contractors
are labor-only contractors. There is no evidence showing that respondent-
contractors are independent contractors. The respondentcontractors, DFI,
and DARBMUPCO did not offer any proof that respondentcontractors were
not engaged in labor-only contracting. DFI should have presented proof
showing that respondent-contractors carry on an independent business and
have sufficient capitalization. DFI does not deny that it engaged the
services of the respondent-contractors. It does not dispute the claims of
respondent-contractors that they sent their billing to DFI for payment; and
that DFI’s managers and personnel are in close consultation with the
respondent-contractors. That DARBMUPCO owns the awarded plantation
where the respondent-contractors and respondent-workers were working is
immaterial. This does not change the situation of the parties. As correctly
found by the CA, DFI, as the principal, hired the respondent-contractors
and the latter, in turn, engaged the services of the respondent-workers.
13)
Case Digest: MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC. v. Lluz et al.
November 3, 2017
|
Nathalie Pattugalan
Respondents alleged that soon after the management declined their request
for regularization and to be recognized as legitimate members of the existing
labor union,the latter dismissed them. Hence, this case for illegal dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between Manila
Memorial and respondents for the latter to be entitled to their claim for wages
and other benefits.
Ruling:
Contracting arrangements for the performance of specific jobs or services
under the law and its implementing rules are allowed. However, contracting
must be made to a legitimate and independent job contractor since labor
rules expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.
In the present case, The Contract of Services proved the existence of labor-
only conrtacting between Manila Memorial and Ward Trading. The Contract
of Services provided that Ward Trading, as an independent contractor, will
render interment and exhumation services and other related work to Manila
Memoria.However,a closer reading of the Contract of Services reveals that
Ward Trading does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machinery, work premises and other materials since it is
Manila Memorial which owns the equipment used in the performance of work
needed for interment and exhumation services. Furthermore, although Ward
shall be in charge of the supervision over individual respondents, the
exercise of its supervisory function is heavily dependent upon the needs of
petitioner Memorial Park. The contract further provides that petitioner has
the option to take over the functions of Ward's personnel if it finds any part
or aspect of the work or service provided to be unsatisfactory
Manila Memorial failed to adduce evidence to prove that Ward Trading had
any substantial capital, investment or assets to perform the work contracted
for. Thus, the presumption that Ward Trading is a labor-only contractor
stands. Consequently, Manila Memorial is deemed the employer of
respondents.
14)
EMMANUEL D. QUINTANAR v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, GR No.
210565, 2016-06-28
Facts:
Complainants allege that they are former employees directly hired by
respondent Coca-Cola... assigned as regular Route Helpers under the
direct supervision of the Route Sales Supervisors.
After working for quite sometime as directly-hired employees of Coca-Cola,
complainants were allegedly... transferred successively as agency workers
to the following manpower agencies, namely, Lipercon Services, Inc.,
People's Services, Inc., ROMAC, and the latest being respondent
Interserve Management and Manpower Resources, Inc.
complainants allege that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
conducted an inspection of Coca-Cola to determine whether it is complying
with the various mandated labor standards, and relative thereto, they were
declared to be regular employees of Coca-Cola
As soon as respondents learned of the filing of the claims with DOLE, they
were dismissed... they filed their complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issues:
whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment with
Coca-Cola
Ruling:
The Court finds for the petitioners.
it cannot be said that route-helpers, such as the petitioners no longer enjoy
the employee-employer relationship they had with Coca-Cola since they
became employees of Interserve.
The argument of petitioner that its usual business or trade is softdrink
manufacturing and that the work assigned to respondent workers as sales
route helpers so involves merely "postproduction activities," one which is
not indispensable in the manufacture of its products,... scarcely can be
persuasive.
The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for
their services clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services
in the regular conduct of the business or trade of petitioner company.
Interserve did not have substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, and work premises; and respondents, its
supposed employees, performed work which was directly related to the
principal business of petitioner.
the petitioners were made to suffer under the prohibited practice of labor-
only contracting.
even if the Court would indulge Coca-Cola and admit that Interserve had
more... than sufficient capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, still, it cannot be denied that the petitioners
were performing activities which were directly related to the principal
business of such employer.
even if Interserve were to be considered as a legitimate job contractor,
Coca-Cola failed to rebut the allegation that petitioners were transferred
from being its employees to become the employees of ISI, Lipercon, PSI,
and ROMAC, which were labor-only... contractors. Well-settled is the rule
that "[t]he contractor, not the employee, has the burden of proof that it has
the substantial capital, investment, and tool to engage in job contracting."
In this case, the said burden of proof lies with Coca-Cola... although it was
not the contractor itself, but it was the one invoking the supposed status of
these entities as independent job contractors.
Principles:
15)
NESTLE v. PUEDAN
NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC., Petitioner VS. BENNY A. PUEDAN, et. al.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 220617
January 30, 2017
FACTS:
In effect, ODSI was not a labor-only contractor of NPI hence the NPI
cannot be deemed the true employer of the respondents. Therefore, NPI
cannot be held jointly and severely liable to ODSI’s monetary obligation
towards the respondents.
C) Classes of Employees
Probationary Employees
1)
CASE DIGEST: Abbott Laboratories Phil. et.al. v. Pearlie Ann F.
Alcaraz [G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013]
Subject: Labor Law – Probationary employees – Standards to qualify
as a regular employee
Decision (Perlas-Bernarbe, J.)
Dissent (Brion, J.)
FACTS:
On June 27, 2004, Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) caused the
publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Medical
and Regulatory Affairs Manager who would: (a) be responsible for drug
safety surveillance operations, staffing, and budget; (b) lead the
development and implementation of standard operating procedures/policies
for drug safety surveillance and vigilance; and (c) act as the primary interface
with internal and external customers regarding safety operations and
queries.
Alcaraz – who was then a Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager
at Aventis Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated (another pharmaceutical
company like Abbott) – showed interest and submitted her application on
October 4, 2004.
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the above-mentioned
position which was an item under the company’s Hospira Affiliate Local
Surveillance Unit (ALSU) department.
(b) she must implement Abbott’s Code of Good Corporate Conduct (Code of
Conduct), office policies on human resources and finance, and ensure that
Abbott will hire people who are fit in the organizational discipline;
(c) Kelly Walsh, Manager of the Literature Drug Surveillance Drug Safety of
Hospira, will be her immediate supervisor;
(d) she should always coordinate with Abbott’s human resource officers in
the management and discipline of the staff;
(e) Hospira ALSU will spin off from Abbott in early 2006 and will be officially
incorporated and known as Hospira, Philippines; and
(f) the processing of information and/or raw material data subject of Hospira
ALSU operations will be strictly confined and controlled under the computer
system and network being maintained and operated from the United States.
For this purpose, all those involved in Hospira ALSU are required to use two
identification cards: one, to identify them as Abbott’s employees and another,
to identify them as Hospira employees.
(b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective rapport with
them;
(d) was not able to obtain the knowledge and ability to make sound
judgments on case processing and article review which were necessary for
the proper performance of her duties.
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and thus,
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its
officers, namely, Misa, Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh, Terrible, and Feist. She
claimed that she should have already been considered as a regular and
not a probationary employee given Abbott’s failure to inform her of the
reasonable standards for her regularization upon her engagement as
required under Article 295 of the Labor Code. In this relation, she
contended that while her employment contract stated that she was to be
engaged on a probationary status, the same did not indicate the
standards on which her regularization would be based. She further
averred that the individual petitioners maliciously connived to illegally
dismiss her when:
(a) they threatened her with termination;
(b) she was ordered not to enter company premises even if she was still an
employee thereof; and
(c) they publicly announced that she already resigned in order to humiliate
her.
Abbott maintained that Alcaraz was validly terminated from her probationary
employment given her failure to satisfy the prescribed standards for her
regularization which were made known to her at the time of her engagement.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in Abbott’s favor. The NLRC reversed, upholding
Alcaraz’s allegations. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUES:
1) WON Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards
to qualify her as a regular employee
MAJORITY: YES. Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and
responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to, during the time of her
engagement, and the incipient stages of her employment. On this score, the
Court finds it apt to detail not only the incidents which point out to the efforts
made by Abbott but also those circumstances which would show
that Alcaraz was well-apprised of her employer’s expectations that
would, in turn, determine her regularization:
(a) On June 27, 2004, Abbott caused the publication in a major broadsheet
newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager, indicating therein
the job description for as well as the duties and responsibilities attendant to
the aforesaid position; this prompted Alcaraz to submit her application to
Abbott on October 4, 2004;
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was
to be employed on a probationary status;
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer, Bernardo sent
her (d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer, Bernardo
sent her copies of Abbott’s organizational structure and her job description
through e-mail;
(1) she was threatened with termination, which will surely damage her
reputation in the pharmaceutical industry;
(2) she was asked to evacuate her Commission and ordered not to enter the
Company’s premises even if she was still an Abbott employee; and
(3) Terrible and Walsh made a public announcement to the staff that
Alcaraz already resigned even if in reality she did not.
The CA also described in detail the abrupt and oppressive manner in which
Alcaraz’s employment was dismissed by Abbott:
On May 23, 2005, Alcaraz still reported for work since Abbott had not yet
handed the termination notice to her. However, the security guard did not
allow her to enter the Hospira ALSU office pursuant to Walsh[’s]
instruction. She requested Walsh that she be allowed to enter the company
premises to retrieve her last remaining things in her office which are mostly
her personal belongings. She was allowed to enter. However, she was
surprised to see her drawers already unlocked and, when she opened
the same, she discovered that her small brown envelope x x x, white
pouch containing the duplicate keys, and the staff’s final evaluation
sheets were missing.Alcaraz informed Bernardo about the incident. The
latter responded by saying she was no longer an employee of the
company since May 19, 2005.
Alcaraz reported the matter to the Pasig Police Station and asked for help
regarding the theft of her properties. The Pasig Police incident
report stated as follows:
x x x x When confronted by the suspect, in the presence of one SOCO officer
and staff, named Christian Perez, Kelly Walsh allegedly admitted that she
was the one who opened the drawer and got the green folders containing
the staff evaluations. The Reportee was told by Kelly Walsh that her Rolex
wristwatch will be returned to her provided that she will immediately vacate
her office.
On the same date, Alcaraz’s termination letter dated May 19, 2005 was
handed to her by Walsh, Almazar and Bernardo.
2)
Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation vs.
Buenviaje G.R. Nos. 183200-01/G.R. Nos. 183253 & 183257. June 29,
2016 Facts: Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development
Corporation (PNOC-EDC) hired Amelyn Buenviaje (Buenviaje) as Assistant
to the then Chairman/President and Chief Executive Officer Sergio A.F.
Apostol (Apostol), her father. Buenviaje’s employment contract provided
that she will serve until June 30, 2004 or coterminous with the tenure of
Apostol, whichever comes first. On August 4, 2003, Apostol approved the
creation of PNOC-EDC’s new Marketing Division composed of thirty (30)
positions. Seven (7) of these thirty (30) positions were also newly created,
one of which was that of a Marketing Division Manager. Buenviaje
assumed this position as early as the time of the creation of the Marketing
Division. On January 5, 2004, Apostol filed his Certificate of Candidacy as
Governor for the province of Leyte, yet continued to discharge his functions
as President in PNOCEDC. Buenviaje also continued to perform her duties
as Assistant to the Chairman/President and Marketing Division Manager in
PNOC-EDC. Subsequently, Paul Aquino (Aquino), the new President of
PNOC-EDC, appointed Buenviaje to the position of Senior Manager for
Marketing Division. In line with PNOC-EDCs policies, Buenviaje was
subjected to a performance appraisal. She received a satisfactory grade of
three (3). In her subsequent performance appraisal, she received an
unsatisfactory grade of four (4). Thus, Ester Guerzon (Guerzon), Vice
President for Corporate Affairs of PNOC-EDC, informed Buenviaje that she
did not qualify for regular employment. PNOC-EDC, through Guerzon,
communicated in writing to Buenviaje her non-confirmation of appointment
as well as her separation from the company effective July 31, 2004. On
July 2, 2004, Buenviaje gave her written comments on the results of her
second performance appraisal. In reply, PNOC-EDC sent her two (2) more
letters reiterating her non-confirmation and separation from the company.
Aquino also issued a Memorandum to Buenviaje instructing her to prepare
a turnover report before her physical move-out. Buenviaje responded by
filing a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal with money
claims. LA Ruling: The Labor Arbiter held that Buenviaje was a regular
employee because her appointment letter clearly says so. Any doubt
caused by the statement in the appointment letter that Buenviaje’s
appointment was subject to confirmation must be resolved against PNOC-
EDC. In addition, PNOC-EDC failed to prove that reasonable standards
were explained to Buenviaje at the time of her engagement, thusly negating
PNOC-EDC’s claim that she was merely a probationary employee. The
Labor Arbiter noted that PNOC-EDC even admitted that the alleged
standards were only set and discussed with Buenviaje more than a month
after her actual appointment. The Labor Arbiter further ruled that PNOC-
EDC also failed to explain why Buenviaje was allowed to enjoy benefits that
were supposed to be exclusive for regular employees. As a regular
employee, therefore, Buenviaje could only be dismissed for any of the just
or authorized causes under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. Since
the cause for Buenviaje’s dismissal was not included in any of the grounds
enumerated in either Article, she was considered illegally dismissed. Both
parties appealed to the NLRC. NLRC Ruling: The NLRC partly granted the
appeal. The NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Buenviaje was a
regular employee of PNOC-EDC, noting that the terms of her appointment
expressly grants a regular status of employment. The NLRC also found that
PNOC-EDC admitted that Buenviaje has been performing the functions of a
Marketing Division Manager for more than six (6) months before she was
formally appointed to the said position. Nevertheless, the NLRC ruled that
she was not illegally dismissed because she did not enjoy security of
tenure. The NLRC noted that the condition in Buenviaje’s appointment
letter, which provided that her appointment is subject to confirmation by her
immediate superior based on her performance during the next six (6)
months, was clear and understood by her when she affixed her signature to
the appointment letter. The NLRC concluded that only upon confirmation of
her appointment will Buenviaje enjoy the right to security of tenure. As it
was, PNOCEDC found her performance unsatisfactory and Buenviaje
failed to disprove these findings. Therefore, Buenviaje failed to complete
her appointment as a regular employee and her non-confirmation cannot
be considered as an illegal dismissal. CA Ruling: The CA partially modified
the Resolution of the NLRC. The CA found no reason to disturb the findings
of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that Buenviaje was a regular
employee of PNOC-EDC. However, it disagreed with the NLRC’s ruling that
Buenviaje failed to acquire security of tenure. The CA stated that where an
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such
employee is deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security of
tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of
employment. As a regular employee, Buenviaje may only be dismissed if
there are just or authorized causes. Thus, PNOC-EDC’s reasoning that she
failed to qualify for the position cannot be countenanced as a valid basis for
her dismissal. Both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the consolidated petitions.
Issue/s: Whether or not Buenviaje was a regular employee SC Ruling:
Buenviaje was a permanent employee. If the clause in the appointment
letter did cause an ambiguity in the employment status of Buenviaje, the
ambiguity should be resolved in her favor. This is in line with the policy
under our Labor Code to afford protection to labor and to construe doubts
in favor of labor. We upheld this policy in De Castro vs. Liberty
Broadcasting Network, Inc., ruling that between a laborer and his employer,
doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or interpretation of
agreements and writing should be resolved in the former’s favor. Hence,
what would be more favorable to Buenviaje would be to accord her a
permanent status. What was significant in the case of Abbott Laboratories,
Philippines vs. Alcaraz, was that both the offer sheet and the employment
contract specifically stated that respondent was being employed on a
probationary status. Thus, the intention of Abbott was to hire Alcaraz as a
probationary employee. This circumstance is not obtaining in this case and
the opposite, as we have already discussed, is true. By the very nature of a
probationary employment, the employee needs to know from the very start
that he will be under close observation and his performance of his assigned
duties and functions would be under continuous scrutiny by his superiors. It
is in apprising him of the standards against which his performance shall be
continuously assessed where due process lies. Likewise, probationary
employees are entitled to know the reason for their failure to qualify as
regular employees. An unsatisfactory rating can be a just cause for
dismissal only if it amounts to gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Analogous to this ground, an unsatisfactory performance may also mean
gross inefficiency. “Gross inefficiency” is closely related to “gross neglect,”
for both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee
resulting in damage to the employer or to his business. Failure to observe
prescribed standards of work or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due
to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency is
understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by
failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by
producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative of requiring
standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for
the advancement of the employer’s. The fact that an employee’s
performance is found to be poor or unsatisfactory does not necessarily
mean that the employee is grossly and habitually negligent of or inefficient
in his duties. Awarded moral damages due to termination as probationary
despite the fact she was treated as regular with the use of performance
appraisal form for regular employee.
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the June 27, 2002 Decision[1] of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 62257, and the January 8, 2003 Resolution[2] denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
We pertinently quote from the said July 24, 2007 Resolution the facts, thus:
On June 30, 1986, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) executed by
and between Kimberly-Clark (Phils.), Inc., (Kimberly), a Philippine-
registered corporation engaged in the manufacture, distribution, sale and
exportation of paper products, and United Kimberly-Clark Employees
Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers' Organization (UKCEO-
PTGWO) expired. Within the freedom period, on April 21, 1986, KILUSAN-
OLALIA, then a newly-formed labor organization, challenged the
incumbency of UKCEO-PTGWO, by filing a petition for certification election
with the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment (MOLE),
Regional Office No. IV, Quezon City.
On November 13, 1986, MOLE issued an Order stating, among others, that
the casual workers not performing janitorial and yard maintenance services
had attained regular status on even date. UKCEO-PTGWO was then
declared as the exclusive bargaining representative of Kimberly's
employees, having garnered the highest number of votes in the certification
election.
During the pendency of G.R. No. 77629, Kimberly dismissed from service
several employees and refused to heed the workers' grievances, impelling
KILUSAN-OLALIA to stage a strike on May 17, 1987. Kimberly filed an
injunction case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
which prompted the latter to issue temporary restraining orders (TRO's).
The propriety of the issuance of the TRO's was again brought by
KILUSAN-OLALIA to this Court via a petition for certiorari and prohibition
which was docketed as G.R. No. 78791.
G.R. Nos. 77629 and 78791 were eventually consolidated by this Court and
decided on May 9, 1990. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
All other aspects of the decision appealed from, which are not so
modified or affected thereby, are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary
restraining order issued in G.R. No. 77629 is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant thereto, on August 1, 2000, the Bureau of Working Conditions
(BWC) submitted its report finding 47 out of the 76 complainants as entitled
to be regularized.
SO ORDERED.
Kimberly, steadfast in its stand, filed a petition for certiorari before the
appellate court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62257 alleging
that the employees who were dismissed due to the illegal strike staged on
May 17, 1987 (the subject of G.R. Nos. 149158-59) should not be awarded
regularization differentials.
SO ORDERED.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Kimberly elevated the case
before this Court, on the following grounds:
Kimberly, in this case, contends that the reckoning point in determining who
among its casual employees are entitled to regularization should be April
21, 1986, the date KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for certification election
to challenge the incumbency of UKCEO-PTGWO. It posits that in the
implementation of the May 9, 1990 Decision in G.R. No. 77629,[5] the DOLE
should then exclude the employees who had not rendered at least one (1)
year of service from the said date.[6]
Kimberly also argues that the employees who are not parties in G.R. No.
77629 should not be included in the implementation orders. For DOLE to
declare this group of employees as regular and to order the payment of
differential pay to them is to amend a final and executory decision of this
Court.[7]
Owing to their length of service with the company, these workers became
regular employees, by operation of law, one year after they were employed
by KIMBERLY through RANK. While the actual regularization of these
employees entails the mechanical act of issuing regular appointment
papers and compliance with such other operating procedures as may be
adopted by the employer, it is more in keeping with the intent and spirit of
the law to rule that the status of regular employment attaches to the casual
worker on the day immediately after the end of his first year of service. To
rule otherwise, and to instead make their regularization dependent on the
happening of some contingency or the fulfillment of certain requirements, is
to impose a burden on the employee which is not sanctioned by law.
That the first stated position is the situation contemplated and sanctioned
by law is further enhanced by the absence of a statutory limitation before
regular status can be acquired by a casual employee. The law is explicit.
As long as the employee has rendered at least one year of service, he
becomes a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed. The law does not provide the qualification that the employee
must first be issued a regular appointment or must first be formally declared
as such before he can acquire a regular status. Obviously, where the law
does not distinguish, no distinction should be drawn.[8]
Considering that an employee becomes regular with respect to the activity
in which he is employed one year after he is employed, the reckoning date
for determining his regularization is his hiring date. Therefore, it is error for
petitioner Kimberly to claim that it is from April 21, 1986 that the one-year
period should be counted. While it is a fact that the issue of regularization
came about only when KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for certification
election, the concerned employees attained regular status by operation of
law.[9]
Further, the grant of the benefit of regularization should not be limited to the
employees who questioned their status before the labor tribunal/court and
asserted their rights; it should also extend to those similarly
situated.[10] There is, thus, no merit in petitioner's contention that only those
who presented their circumstances of employment to the courts are entitled
to regularization.[11]
Finally, oft-repeated is the rule that appellate courts accord the factual
findings of the labor tribunal not only respect but also finality when
supported by substantial evidence,[14] unless there is showing that the labor
tribunal arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or misapprehended
evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly
appreciated.[15] Likewise, the appellate court cannot substitute its own
judgment or criterion for that of the labor tribunal in determining wherein
lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.[16]
SO ORDERED.
2)
Rowell Industrial Corporation vs CA
(EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON REGULAR EMPLOYMENT)
Facts:
Rowell Industrial is engaged in manufacturing tin cans for use in packaging
of consumer products, e.g., foods, paints, among other things. Taripe was
employed by petitioner on November 8, 1999 as a “rectangular power
press machine operator” Taripe alleged that upon employment, he was
made to sign a document, which was not explained to him but which was
made a condition for him to be taken in and for which he was not furnished
a copy.
Issue:
Whether respondent was a regular employee
Held:
Under Art 280 regular employees are classified into:
(1) regular employees by nature of work - those employees who perform
a particular activity which is necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, regardless of their length of service;
(2) regular employees by years of service - those employees who have
been performing the job, regardless of the nature thereof, for at least a
year.
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, however, does not proscribe or
prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period. It does not necessarily
follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties
are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such
activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite
period of employment and the nature of the employee’s duties.
In the case at bar, Taripe signed a contract of employment good only for a
period of five months unless the said contract is renewed by mutual
consent. Along with other contractual employees, he was hired only to
meet the increase in demand for packaging materials for the Christmas
season and to build up stock levels for the early part of the year.
Standards for valid fixed term employment:
(1) the fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances
vitiating his consent; or
(2) it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
exercised by the former on the latter.
3)
Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any cancellation or
issuance of title over the land involved as well as any subsequent
transaction affecting the same would have to be subject to the outcome of
the suit.
Carrascoso alleged that he was given an extension to pay the balance and
El Dorado committed a gross misrepresentation when it warranted that the
property was not being cultivated by any tenant to take it out of
the coverage of the Land Reform Code. Two years after their agreement to
Buy and Sell, Carrascoso and PLDT forged a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the 1,000 hectare portion of the property. PLDT alleged that it is a purchaser
in good faith and for value.
The CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground of prematurity. The Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the CFI granting the rescission of El
Dorado. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that PLDT took the right,
interest and title to the farm subject to the notice of lis pendens
HELD:
Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any cancellation or
issuance of title over the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction
affecting the same would have to be subject to the outcome of the suit. In
other words, a purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact
that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third party stands in the shoes
of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending
litigation.
Notice of lis pendens has been conceived and, more often than not, availed
of, to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such
rights is pending resolution or decision. With the notice of lis pendens duly
recorded, and while it remains uncancelled, the registrant could rest secure
that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens in effect (1) keeps the subject matter of
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment so
as to prevent the defeat of the latter by successive alienations; and
(2) binds a purchaser of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or
decree that will be promulgated thereon whether such a purchaser is a bona
fide purchaser or not; but (3) does not create a non-existent right or lien.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation
within the power of the court until the judgment or decree shall have been
entered; otherwise by successive alienations pending the litigation, its
judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution.
The doctrine of lis pendens is based on considerations of public policy
and convenience, which forbid a litigant to give rights to others, pending the
litigation, so as to affect the proceedings of the court then progressing to
enforce those rights, the rule being necessary to the administration of justice
in order that decisions in pending suits may be binding and may be given full
effect, by keeping the subject matter in controversy within the power of the
court until final adjudication, that there may be an end to litigation, and to
preserve the property that the purpose of the pending suit may not be
defeated by successive alienations and transfers of title.
PLDT cannot shield itself from the notice of lis pendens because all that it
had at the time of its inscription was an Agreement to Buy and Sell with
Carrascoso, which in effect is a mere contract to sell that did not pass to it
the ownership of the property. PLDT’s possession at the time the notice of
lis pendens was registered not being a legal possession based on ownership
but a mere possession in fact and the Agreement to Buy and Sell under
which it supposedly took possession not being registered, it is not protected
from an adverse judgment that may be rendered in the case subject of the
notice of lis pendens.
4)
ABS-CBN vs NAZARENO Case Digest
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. MARLYN NAZARENO
et al.
G.R. No. 164156
September 26, 2006
The presumption is that when the work done is an integral part of the regular
business of the employer and when the worker, relative to the employer,
does not furnish an independent business or professional service, such work
is a regular employment of such employee and not an independent
contractor. As regular employees, respondents are entitled to the benefits
granted to all other regular employees of petitioner under the CBA . Besides,
only talent-artists were excluded from the CBA and not production assistants
who are regular employees of the respondents. Moreover, under Article 1702
of the New Civil Code: “In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the
laborer.”
5)
FULACHE vs ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION Case Digest
FARLEY FULACHE, MANOLO JABONERO, DAVID CASTILLO, JEFFREY
LAGUNZAD, MAGDALENA MALIG-ON BIGNO, FRANCISCO CABAS, JR.,
HARVEY PONCE and ALAN C. ALMENDRAS, Petitioners, vs ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Respondent
FACTS:
The petitioners in this case are questioning the CBA executed between ABS-
CBN and the ABS-CBN Rank-and-File Employees Union (Union) because
under such agreement, they are only considered as temporary and not
regular employees. The petitioners claimed that they should be recognized
as regular employees of ABS-CBN because they had already rendered more
than a year of service in the company and, therefore, entitled to the benefits
of a regular employee.
Instead of salaries, ABS-CBN pointed out that talents are paid a pre-
arranged consideration called “talent fee” taken from the budget of a
particular program and subject to a ten percent (10%) withholding
tax. Talents do not undergo probation. Their services are engaged for a
specific program or production, or a segment thereof. Their contracts are
terminated once the program, production or segment is completed.
The NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s ruling in the illegal dismissal case; it
found that petitioners Fulache, Jabonero, Castillo, Lagunzad and Atinen had
been illegally dismissed and awarded them backwages and separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement. Under both cases, the petitioners were awarded CBA
benefits and privileges from the time they became regular employees up to
the time of their dismissal.
The NLRC resolved the motions for reconsideration on by both parties, thus,
on the regularization issue, the NLRC stood by the ruling that the petitioners
were regular employees entitled to the benefits and privileges of regular
employees. On the illegal dismissal case, the petitioners, while recognized
as regular employees, were declared dismissed due to redundancy. The
NLRC denied the petitioners’ second motion for reconsideration in its order
of May 31, 2006 for being a prohibited pleading.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are correct that they should be considered already as
regular employees
WON Fulache and the other petitioners were dismissed illegally
RULING:
1. As regular employees, the petitioners fall within the coverage of the
bargaining unit and are therefore entitled to CBA benefits as a matter of law
and contract.
The inclusion or exclusion of new job classifications into the bargaining unit
shall be subject of discussion between the COMPANY and the UNION.
2. Their dismissal was not only unjust and in bad faith as the above
discussions abundantly show. The bad faith in ABS-CBN’s move toward its
illegitimate goal was not even hidden; it dismissed the petitioners – already
recognized as regular employees – for refusing to sign up with its service
contractor. Thus, from every perspective, the petitioners were illegally
dismissed.
6)
FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK v. ARLENE S. ESPIRITU, GR No. 204944-
45, 2014-12-03
Facts:
Arlene S. Espiritu ("Arlene") was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc.
("Fuji") as a news correspondent/producer[4] "tasked to report Philippine
news to Fuji through its Manila Bureau field office."[5] Arlene's
employment... contract initially provided for a term of one (1) year but was
successively renewed on a yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every
renewal.[6]
Arlene was diagnosed with lung cancer.[7] She informed Fuji about her
condition. In turn, the Chief of News Agency of Fuji, Yoshiki Aoki, informed
Arlene "that the company will have a problem renewing her contract"[8]
since it would be difficult for her to perform her job.[9] She "insisted that she
was still fit to work as certified by her attending physician.
Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal contract... the day after Arlene
signed the non-renewal contract, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
She alleged that she was forced to sign the... non-renewal contract when
Fuji came to know of her illness and that Fuji withheld her salaries and
other benefits
Labor Arbiter Corazon C. Borbolla dismissed Arlene's complaint... rlene
appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission.
the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter's
decision.[21] It held that Arlene was a regular employee with respect to the
activities... for which she was employed since she continuously rendered
services that were deemed necessary and desirable to Fuji's business.
n the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor
Relations Commission with the modification that Fuji immediately reinstate
Arlene to her position as News Producer without loss of seniority rights,
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the National Labor Relations Commission
when it ruled that Arlene was a regular employee, not an independent
contractor, and that she was illegally dismissed; and
Whether the Court of Appeals properly modified the National Labor
Relations Commission's decision by awarding reinstatement, damages,
and attorney's fees
Ruling:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the National Labor
Relations Commission's finding that Arlene was a regular employee
Fuji alleges that Arlene was an independent contractor, citing Sonza v.
ABS-CBN and relying on the following facts: (1) she was hired because of
her skills; (2) her salary was US$1,900.00, which is higher than the normal
rate; (3) she had the power to bargain with her... employer; and (4) her
contract was for a fixed term.
Arlene argues that she was a regular employee because Fuji had control
and supervision over her work. The news events that she covered were all
based on the instructions of Fuji.[142] She maintains that the successive
renewal of her employment contracts for... four (4) years indicates that her
work was necessary and desirable.
On her illness, Arlene points out that it was not a ground for her dismissal
because her attending physician certified that she was fit to work.[147]
Fuji's argument that Arlene was an independent contractor under a fixed-
term contract is contradictory. Employees under fixed-term contracts
cannot be independent contractors because in fixed-term contracts, an
employer-employee relationship exists. The test in this kind of... contract is
not the necessity and desirability of the employee's activities, "but the day
certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination
of the employment relationship."[179] For regular employees, the necessity
and desirability of... their work in the usual course of the employer's
business are the determining fac... tors. On the other hand, independent
contractors do not have employer-employee relationships with their
principals.
Arlene was hired by Fuji as a news producer, but there was no showing
that she... was hired because of unique skills that would distinguish her
from ordinary employees. Neither was there any showing that she had a
celebrity status. Her monthly salary amounting to US$1,900.00 appears to
be a substantial sum, especially if compared to her salary when she was...
still connected with GMA.[199] Indeed, wages may indicate whether one is
an independent contractor. Wages may also indicate that an employee is
able to bargain with the employer for better pay. However, wages should
not be the conclusive factor in... determining whether one is an employee
or an independent contractor.
Fuji had the power to dismiss Arlene, as provided for in paragraph 5 of her
professional employment contract.[200] Her contract also indicated that Fuji
had control over her work because she was required to work for eight (8)
hours from Monday to Friday,... although on flexible time.[201] Sonza was
not required to work for eight (8) hours, while Dumpit-Murillo had to be in
ABC to do both on-air and off-air tasks.
The expiration of Arlene's contract does not negate the finding of illegal
dismissal by Fuji. The manner by which Fuji informed Arlene that her
contract would no longer be renewed is tantamount to constructive
dismissal. To make matters worse, Arlene was asked to sign a letter... of
resignation prepared by Fuji.[235] The existence of a fixed-term contract
should not mean that there can be no illegal dismissal. Due process must
still be observed in the pre-termination of fixed-term contracts of
employment.
There is no evidence showing that Arlene was accorded due process. After
informing her employer of her lung cancer, she was not given the chance to
present medical certificates. Fuji immediately concluded that Arlene could
no longer perform her duties because of chemotherapy. It... did not ask her
how her condition would affect her work. Neither did it suggest for her to
take a leave, even though she was entitled to sick leaves. Worse, it did not
present any certificate from a competent public health authority. What Fuji
did was to inform her that her... contract would no longer be renewed, and
when she did not agree, her salary was withheld.
ell-entrenched is the rule that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement as a matter of right. . . .
To protect labor's security of tenure, we emphasize that the doctrine of
"strained relations" should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an
illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. Every labor
dispute almost always results in "strained relations" and the... phrase
cannot be given an overarching interpretation, otherwise, an unjustly
dismissed employee can never be reinstated.[245] (Citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals reasoned that strained relations are a question of fact
that must be supported by evidence.[246] No evidence was presented by
Fuji to prove that reinstatement was no longer feasible. Fuji did not allege
that it ceased operations or that
Arlene's position was no longer available. Nothing in the records shows
that Arlene's reinstatement would cause an atmosphere of antagonism in
the workplace. Arlene filed her complaint in 2009. Five (5) years are not yet
a substantial period[247] to bar... reinstatement.
Principles:
It is the burden of the employer to prove that a person whose services it
pays for is an independent contractor rather than a regular employee with
or without a fixed term. That a person has a disease does not per se entitle
the employer to terminate his or... her services. Termination is the last
resort. At the very least, a competent public health authority must certify
that the disease cannot be cured within six (6) months, even with
appropriate treatment.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action where the issue
is limited to grave abuse of discretion. As an original action, it cannot be
considered as a continuation of the proceedings of the labor tribunals.
On the other hand, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a
mode of appeal where the issue is limited to questions of law. In labor
cases, a Rule 45 petition is limited to reviewing whether the Court of
Appeals correctly determined the presence or absence of grave... abuse of
discretion and deciding other jurisdictional errors of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
Another classification of employees, i.e., employees with fixed-term
contracts, was recognized in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora[150] where this
court discussed that:
Logically, the decisive determinant in the term employment should not be
the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day
certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination
of their employment relationship, a day... certain being understood to be
"that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known
when."[151] (Emphasis in the original)
GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga[154] expounded the doctrine on fixed-term
contracts laid down in Brent in the following manner:
Cognizant of the possibility of abuse in the utilization of fixed-term
employment contracts, we emphasized in Brent that where from the
circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to
preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they... should be
struck down as contrary to public policy or morals. We thus laid down
indications or criteria under which "term employment" cannot be said to be
in circumvention of the law on security of tenure, namely:
1. The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure
being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent; or
2. It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt
with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance
exercised by the former or the latter.
On the other hand, an independent contractor is defined as:
. . . one who carries on a distinct and independent business and
undertakes to perform the job, work, or service on its own account and
under one's own responsibility according to one's own manner and method,
free from the control and direction of the principal in... all matters connected
with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof.[
Orozco v. Court of Appeals,[163] Wilhelmina Orozco was a columnist for
the Philippine Daily Inquirer. This court ruled that she was an independent
contractor because of her "talent, skill, experience, and her unique
viewpoint as a feminist... advocate."[164] In addition, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer did not have the power of control over Orozco, and she worked at
her own pleasure.[165]
Semblante v. Court of Appeals[166] involved a masiador[167] and a
sentenciador.[168] This court ruled that "petitioners performed their
functions as masiador and sentenciador... free from the direction and
control of respondents"[169] and that the masiador and sentenciador
"relied mainly on their 'expertise that is characteristic of the cockfight
gambling.'"[170] Hence, no employer-employee... relationship existed.
Bernarte v. Philippine Basketball Association[171] involved a basketball
referee. This court ruled that "a referee is an independent contractor,
whose special skills and independent judgment are required specifically for
such position and cannot... possibly be controlled by the hiring party."[172]
In these cases, the workers were found to be independent contractors
because of their unique skills and talents and the lack of control over the
means and methods in the performance of their work.
Since no employer-employee relationship exists between independent
contractors and their principals, their contracts are governed by the Civil
Code provisions on contracts and other applicable laws.
However, there may be a situation where an employee's work is necessary
but is not always desirable in the usual course of business of the employer.
In this situation, there is no regular employment.
San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[206]
Francisco de Guzman was hired to repair furnaces at San Miguel
Corporation's Manila glass plant. He had a separate contract for every
furnace that he repaired. He filed a... complaint for illegal dismissal three
(3) years after the end of his last contract.[207] In ruling that de Guzman
did not attain the status of a regular employee, this court explained:
The process of manufacturing glass requires a furnace, which has a...
limited operating life. Petitioner resorted to hiring project or fixed term
employees in having said furnaces repaired since said activity is not
regularly performed. Said furnaces are to be repaired or overhauled only in
case of need and after being used continuously for a... varying period of
five (5) to ten (10) years.
s stated in Price, et al. v. Innodata Corp., et al.:[228]
The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and
not by what the parties say it should be. Equally important to consider is
that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that
labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Thus, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the
contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their
relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply
contracting with each other
7)
Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. vs. Boclot [G.R. No. 173849.
Sept. 28, 2007] Facts: Boclot was hired by PASSI to perform the functions
of a stevedore. Later on, Boclot filed Complaint with the Labor Arbiter
claiming regularization; payment of service incentive leave and 13th month
pays; moral, exemplary and actual damages; and attorney’s fees. He
alleged that he was hired by PASSI in October 1999 and was issued
company ID No. 304, a PPA Pass and SSS documents. In fact, respondent
contended that he became a regular employee by April 2000, since it was
his sixth continuous month in service in PASSI’s regular course of
business. He argued on the basis of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor
Code. He maintains that under paragraph 2 of Article 280, he should be
deemed a regular employee having rendered at least one year of service
with the company. Issue: Whether or not hehas attained regular status
Held: Yes. Though usual and necessary, his employment is dependent on
availability of work SC took judicial notice that it is an industry practice in
port services to hire “reliever” stevedores in order to ensure smooth-flowing
24-hour stevedoring and arrastre operations in the port area. No doubt,
serving as a stevedore, respondent performs tasks necessary or desirable
to the usual business of petitioners. However, it should be deemed part of
the nature of his work that he can only work as a stevedore in the absence
of the employee regularly employed for the very same function. Moreover,
respondent does not contest that he was well aware that he would only be
given work when there are absent or unavailable employees. Respondent
also does not allege, nor is there any showing, that he was disallowed or
prevented from offering his services to other cargo handlers in the other
piers at the North Harbor other than petitioners. As aforestated, the
situation of respondent is akin to that of a seasonal or project or term
employee, albeit on a daily basis. Under the CBA, he qualifies as a regular
employee The Supreme Court still finds respondent to be a regular
employee on the basis of pertinent provisions under the CBA between
PASSI and its Workers’ union, wherein it was stated that it agrees to
convert to regular status all incumbent probationary or casual employees
and workers in the Company who have served the Company for an
accumulated service term of employment of not less than six (6) months
from his original date of hiring. Respondent assents that he is not a
member of the union, as he was not recognized by PASSI as its regular
employee, but this Court notes that PASSI adopts a union-shop agreement,
culling from © 2010 www.pinoylegal.com Page 2 Article II of its CBA. Under
a union-shop agreement, although nonmembers may be hired, an
employee is required to become a union member after a certain period, in
order to retain employment. This requirement applies to present and future
employees. The same article of the CBA stipulates that employment in
PASSI cannot be obtained without prior membership in the union. Hence,
applying the foregoing provisions of the CBA, respondent should be
considered a regular employee after six months of accumulated service.
Having rendered 228.5 days, or eight months of service to petitioners since
1999, then respondent is entitled to regularization by virtue of the said CBA
provisions.
8)
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated August 23, 2004 and
Resolution2 dated March 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 67007, which reversed the Decision3 dated December 29, 2000 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No.
023890-00. The NLRC had earlier affirmed with modification the Labor
Arbiter's Decision,4 dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal against
herein petitioners, but awarding respondent herein separation pay
amounting to P20,000.
The hotel operates a clinic 24 hours a day and employs three regular
nurses who work eight hours each day on three separate shifts. The hotel
also engages the services of reliever nurses who substitute for the regular
nurses who are either off-duty or absent.
After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, but directed that Peninsula pay Alipio separation pay amounting
to P20,000. The Labor Arbiter held,
SO ORDERED.5
SO ORDERED.6
Upon further review, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
NLRC after ascertaining that the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC that Alipio is not an employee of Peninsula and that she was validly
dismissed is not supported by the evidence on record.7 The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated August 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated
December 29, 2000 and the Order dated June 29, 2001 of the
National Labor Relations Commission are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied. Hence,
the instant petition for review on certiorari contending that the Court of
Appeals seriously erred:
I.
II.
Alipio, for her part, counters that the NLRC decision, affirming that of the
Labor Arbiter, is not beyond the scope of judicial review because palpable
mistake was committed in disregarding evidence showing (1) her status as
a regular employee of Peninsula; and (2) petitioners' failure to observe
substantive and procedural due process. She points out that a Certification
dated April 22, 1997 issued by the hotel proves she was a regular staff
nurse until her illegal dismissal. She stresses that her supposed
employment at the Quezon City Medical Center does not negate the fact
that she also worked as a regular nurse of the hotel. Additionally, she
contends that obtaining copies of her own payslips does not indicate a
perverse attitude justifying dismissal for serious misconduct or willful
disobedience. She adds, there is no showing that her refusal to return
copies of her payslips caused material damage to petitioners. She further
claims that bad faith attended her dismissal.
The conclusions reached by the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, that Alipio
was not a regular employee of the hotel and that she was validly dismissed,
are not supported by law and evidence on record.
In this case, records show that Alipio's services were engaged by the hotel
intermittently from 1993 up to 1998. Her services as a reliever nurse were
undoubtedly necessary and desirable in the hotel's business of providing
comfortable accommodation to its guests. In any case, since she had
rendered more than one year of intermittent service as a reliever nurse at
the hotel, she had become a regular employee as early as December 12,
1994. Lastly, per the hotel's own Certification dated April 22, 1997, she was
already a "regular staff nurse" until her dismissal.
Did Alipio commit serious misconduct when she obtained copies of her
payslips?
When Santos had a meeting with Alipio on December 21, 1998, she was
not informed that the hotel was contemplating her dismissal. Neither was
she informed of the ground for which her dismissal was sought. She was
simply told right there and then that she was already dismissed, thereby
affording no opportunity for her to be heard and defend herself. Thus, Alipio
was likewise deprived of procedural due process.
In this case, while the petitioners issued a Certification dated April 22, 1997
and recognized Alipio as a regular employee, they deprived her of copies of
her own payslips. Moreover, her dismissal was effected in a manner
whereby she was deprived of due process. Under these circumstances,
she is also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P15,000 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.
Lastly, the award of attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
total monetary award is consistent with prevailing jurisprudence19 and thus
ought to be affirmed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
9)
Case Digest: Samonte et al. v. La Salle Greenhills, Inc. November 3, 2017 |
Nathalie Pattugalan G.R. No. 199683 February 10, 2016 PEREZ, J.: Facts:
Petitioners are medical professional hired by LSGI under a uniform one-
page Contract of Retainer for the period of a specific academic calendar
beginning in June of 1989 and the succeeding 15 years and terminating in
March of the following year when the school year ends. The contract
specifically provides that the retainer is only temporary in character and
exclusively limited to the undertaking and/or to the job/task assigned to the
retainer within the said undertaking. Furthermore, at any time prior to the
expiration or completion date/s, LSGI may upon written notice to the
retainers, terminate the contract should the retainer fail in anyway to
perform his assigned job or task to the satisfaction of the school of for any
just cause. Accordingly, after 15 consecutive years of renewal each
academic year, on the last day of the 15th year in 2004, the school (LSGI)
informed the petitioner that their contracts will no longer be renewed for the
following school year. When petitioners’ requests for payment of their
separation pay were denied, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for separation pay, damages and attorneys’ fees. They alleged that
they were regular employees because received regular benefits, bonuses &
more, that they were subjected to the school’s administrative and
disciplinary rules and regulations. On the other hand, LSGI posited that
petitioners were independent contractors retained by LSGI by reason of
their medical skills and expertise to provide ancillary medical and dental
services to both students and faculty. More importantly, petitioners were
paid retainer fees and not regular salaries and whose performance is not
subject to the control of the school. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint and ruled that the petitioners were independent contractors but
on the ground of compassionate social justice, awarded separation pay.
Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC. The NLRC disagreed with
the appealed decision, finding petitioners as fixed term employees
according to the Contract of Retainer signed by the parties. In a petition for
certiorari, the court of appeals affirmed the NLRC decision. Issue: Whether
or not petitioners were regular employees who may only be dismissed for
just and authorized causes. Ruling: The petitioners attained retained
regular employment. each other on equal terms not one exercising moral
dominance over the other. Further, a fixed-term contract is an employment
contract, the repeated renewals of which make for a regular
employment. In Fuji Network Television v. Espiritu, the court noted that
Fuji's argument that Espiritu was an independent contractor under a fixed-
term contract is contradictory where employees under fixed-term contracts
cannot be independent contractors because in fixed-term contracts, an
employeremployee relationship exists. The uniform one-page Contracts of
Retainer signed by petitioners were prepared by LSGI alone. Petitioners,
medical professionals as they were, were still not on equal footing with
LSGI as they obviously did not want to lose their jobs that they had stayed
in for fifteen (15) years. There is no specificity in the contracts regarding
terms and conditions of employment that would indicate that petitioners and
LSGI were on equal footing in negotiating it. Notably, without specifying
what are the tasks assigned to petitioners, LSGI "may upon prior written
notice to the retainer, terminate [the] contract should the retainer fail in any
way to perform his assigned job/task to the satisfaction of La Salle
Greenhills, Inc. or for any other just cause." In all, given the following: (1)
repeated renewal of petitioners' contract for fifteen years, interrupted only
by the close of the school year; (2) the necessity of the work performed by
petitioners as school physicians and dentists; and (3) the existence of
LSGI's power of control over the means and method pursued by petitioners
in the performance of their job, we rule that petitioners attained regular
employment, entitled to security of tenure who could only be dismissed for
just and authorized causes. Consequently, petitioners were illegally
dismissed and are entitled to the twin remedies of payment of separation
pay and full back wages.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated
May 25, 2015 and the Resolution[3]dated August 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127777, which affirmed the
Decision[4]dated July 31, 2012 and the Resolution[5] dated September 28,
2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission RC) in NLRC LAC No.
07-001962-12, dismissing petitioner Enrique Y. Sagun's (petitioner)
complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
The Facts
On July 11, 2011, petitioner was instructed to report to ANZ[17] and was
handed a letter of retraction[18] signed by ANZ's Human Resources
Business Partner, Paula Alcaraz (Alcaraz), informing him that the job offer
had been withdrawn on the ground that the company found material
inconsistencies in his declared information and documents provided after
conducting a background check with his previous employer, particularly at
Siemens.[19]
Asserting that his employment contract had already been perfected upon
his acceptance of the offer on June 8, 2011, and as such, was already
deemed an employee of ANZ who can only be dismissed for cause,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against
ANZ, Cruzada, and Alcaraz (respondents) before the NLRC, National
Capital Region, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 08-11752-11.
For their part, respondents countered that the NLRC had no jurisdiction
over the complaint as they have no employer-employee relationship with
petitioner. They contended that their offer was conditional and the
effectivity of petitioner's employment contract was subject to a term or
period.[20] They claimed that petitioner made material misrepresentations in
his job application and interview that prompted them to withdraw the offer.
They pointed out that the discrepancies in his declarations, namely: (a) that
he only held the position of a Level 1 and not a Level 2 Technical Support
Representative at Siemens; and (b) that he was terminated for cause due
to his absence without official leave (AWOL) and not because of his
resignation, were not satisfactorily explained despite the opportunity
accorded to him. They added that petitioner likewise failed to report for
work on or before July 11, 2011; hence, his employment never took effect
and no employer-employee relationship was created. Thus, they asserted
that petitioner was never dismissed, more so, illegally. Finally, they denied
his money claims for lack of basis and further averred that the impleaded
officers cannot be held personally liable under the circumstances.[21]
The LA Ruling
In a Decision[22] dated April 23, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the
complaint, holding that there was no perfected employment contract
between petitioner and respondents since there was a valid cause for the
withdrawal of the offer that was made prior to the commencement of
petitioner's service with the company. The LA held that the material
misrepresentation committed by petitioner was a reasonable ground to
withdraw the employment offer and as such, no employer-employee
relationship was created between them.[23]
In a Decision[25] dated July 31, 2012, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the
LA, ruling that no employer-employee relationship existed between
petitioner and respondents. It held that petitioner's employment with ANZ
never took effect since its effectivity was dependent on his reporting for
work on or before July 11, 2011, which he admittedly failed to comply. The
NLRC added that the withdrawal of job offer was valid and reasonable,
there being substantial evidence to show that petitioner committed
misrepresentations in his job application.[26]
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in holding that
no employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and
respondent.
In this case, the Court agrees with the finding of the CA that there was
already a perfected contract of employment when petitioner signed ANZ's
employment offer and agreed to the terms and conditions that were
embodied therein. Nonetheless, the offer of employment extended to
petitioner contained several conditions before he may be deemed an
employee of ANZ. Among those conditions for employment was the
"satisfactory completion of any checks (e.g. background, bankruptcy,
sanctions and reference checks) that may be required by ANZ."[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 25, 2015
and the Resolution dated August 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 127777 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Project Employees
1)
POSEIDON FISHING vs NLRC Case Digest
[G.R. No. 168052 February 20, 2006]
On 3 July 2000, private respondent failed to record a 7:25 a.m. call in one of
the logbooks. However, he was able to record the same in the other logbook.
Consequently, when he reviewed the two logbooks, he noticed that he was
not able to record the said call in one of the logbooks so he immediately
recorded the 7:25 a.m. call after the 7:30 a.m. entry. Around 9:00 o’clock in
the morning of 4 July 2000, petitioner Jesus, the manager, detected the error
in the entry in the logbook. Subsequently, she asked private respondent to
prepare an incident report to explain the reason for the said oversight.
Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor
Arbiter. He averred that petitioner Poseidon employed him as a Chief Mate
sometime in January 1988. He claimed that he was promoted to the position
of Boat Captain five years after. However, in 1999, he was demoted from
Boat Captain to Radio Operator without any reason and shortly, he was
terminated without just cause and without due process of law.
HELD: The SC held that the ruling in the Brent case could not apply in the
case at bar. The acid test in considering fixed-term contracts as valid is: if
from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to
preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be
disregarded for being contrary to public policy. The SC will not hesitate to
nullify employment contracts stipulating a fixed term after finding that the
purpose behind these contracts was to evade the application of the labor
laws, since this is contrary to public policy.
Moreover, unlike in the Brent case where the period of the contract was fixed
and clearly stated, note that in the case at bar, the terms of employment of
private respondent as provided in the Kasunduan was not only vague, it also
failed to provide an actual or specific date or period for the contract. There is
nothing in the contract that says complainant, who happened to be the
captain of said vessel, is a casual, seasonal or a project worker. The date
July 1 to 31, 1998 under the heading “Pagdating” had been placed there
merely to indicate the possible date of arrival of the vessel and is not an
indication of the status of employment of the crew of the vessel.
Petition is denied.
2)
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
The Facts
‘SO ORDERED.’
The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and the labor arbiter thus:
The Issues
"1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse
of discretion in finding that:
"3. Whether or not the Court a quo erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course to the private respondent’s petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure; and in
annulling and setting aside the Decision dated May 18, 2001 and the
Resolution dated June 29, 2001 of the NLRC?
"4. Whether or not the Court a quo erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the evidence submitted by the petitioners proving
that there was retrenchment program implemented by the petitioner
company, as a defense that the private respondent’s services was
terminated due to absence if not lack of construction project contract,
where he may be redeployed or reinstated?
"5. Whether or not the Court a quo erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the private respondent, with full
back wages plus payment of 10% attorney’s fees?"9
In the main, the issues boil down to (1) whether Roger Puente is a project
employee, and (2) whether he is entitled to reinstatement with full back
wages.
First Issue:
Project Employee
In general, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the
Supreme Court. One exception to this rule, however, is when the factual
findings of the former are contrary to those of the trial court (or the lower
administrative body, as the case may be).10 The question of whether
respondent is a regular or a project employee is essentially factual in
nature; nonetheless, the Court is constrained to resolve it due to the
incongruent findings of the NLRC and the CA.
The Labor Code defines regular, project and casual employees as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
(a) The duration of the specific/identified undertaking for which the worker
is engaged is reasonably determinable.
That his employment contract does not mention particular dates that
establish the specific duration of the project does not preclude his
classification as a project employee. This fact is clear from the provisions of
Clause 3.3(a) of Department Order No. 19, which states:
"x x x employment, under this contract is good only for the duration of the
project unless employee’s services is terminated due to completion of the
phase of work/section of the project or piece of work to which employee is
assigned:
"We agree clearly that employment is on a Project to Project Basis and that
upon termination of services there is no separation pay:
Evidently, although the employment contract did not state a particular date,
it did specify that the termination of the parties’ employment relationship
was to be on a "day certain" -- the day when the phase of work termed
"Lifting & Hauling of Materials" for the "World Finance Plaza" project would
be completed. Thus, respondent cannot be considered to have been a
regular employee. He was a project employee.
Second Issue:
Reinstatement
However, if indeed the World Finance Plaza project has already been
completed during the pendency of this suit, then respondent -- being a
project employee -- can no longer be reinstated.25 Instead, he shall entitled
to the payment of his salary and other benefits corresponding to the
unexpired portion of his employment,26 specifically from the time of the
termination of his employment on October 1, 1999, until the date of the
completion of the World Finance Plaza project.
SO ORDERED.
3)
LEYTE GEOTHERMAL VS. PNOC
On December 28, 1998, the petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE
against the [respondent] on the ground of purported commission by the
latter of unfair labor practice for “refusal to bargain collectively, union
busting and mass termination.” On the same day, the petitioner declared a
strike and staged such strike.
Secretary of Labor intervened and ordered all workers to return to work.
However, petitioner did not abide.
NLRC: ruled that the employees are PROJECT EMPLOYEES, and the
strike as ILLEGAL
Petitioner Union contends that its officers and members performed
activities that were usually necessary and desirable to respondent’s usual
business.
(b) project employees or those “whose employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking[,] the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee”;
(c) seasonal employees or those who work or perform services which are
seasonal in nature, and the employment is for the duration of the season;
and
(d) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal
employees.
Jurisprudence has added a fifth kind— a fixed-term employee.
NOTES:
The term “project” could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or
undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. Such
a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the
ordinary or regular business operations of the employer. The job or
undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable times.
4)
ROY D. PASOS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPOR
ATION G.R. No. 192394, 3 July 2013
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not employer’s failure to file termination reports after every proj
ect completion constitutes the regularity of the project employee.
With regard his dismissal, a regular employee dismissed for a cause other t
han the just or authorized causes provided by law is illegally dismissed. Pet
itioner’s regular employment was terminated by PNCC due to contract expir
ation or project completion, which are both not among the just or authorized
causes provided in the Labor Code, as amended, for dismissing a regular
employee. Thus, petitioner was illegally dismissed and according to Article
279 of the Labor Code, he is entitled to reinstatement, full back wages, incl
usive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent f
rom the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.
5)
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Decision2 dated August
10, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79800, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari challenging the Resolutions dated
January 17, 20033 and July 31, 20034 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CASE Nos. 30-11-04656-005 and 30-
12-04714-00.
Factual Antecedents
Miguel B. Bobillo (Miguel) was hired and assigned at Pacific Plaza Towers
on March 10, 2000.
Fernando, Ferdinand, and Miguel were caught eating during working hours
on November 25, 2000 for which they were reprimanded by their foreman.
Since then they no longer reported for work.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
1. Guillermo Biscocho
₱ 15,806.25 - Sub-Total
+ 1,580.87 - 10% Attorney’s Fees
P 17,386.86 Total
2. Fernando Pereda
₱ 16,273.75 - Sub-Total
+ 1,627.37 - 10% Attorney’s Fees
₱ 17,901.12 Total
3. Miguel Bobillo
₱ 5,133.34 - Sub-Total
+ 513.33 - 10% Attorney’s Fees
P 5,646.67 Total
4. Ferdinand Mariano
9,674.19
3,055.00 - Holiday Pay
₱ 14,589.61 - Sub-Total
+ 1,458.96 - 10% Attorney’s Fees Total
₱ 16,048.57
5. Gregorio Bellita
7,800.00
2,700.00 - Holiday Pay
₱ 12,000.00 - Sub-Total
+ 1,200.00 - 10% Attorney’s Fees
₱ 13,200.00 Total
The rest of complainants’ claims for lack of merit are hereby Dismissed.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners sought recourse to the NLRC limiting their appeal to the award
of service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, holiday pay and 10%
attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱70,183.23.
On January 17, 2003, the NLRC dismissed the appeal. It ruled that
petitioners, who have complete control over the records of the company,
could have easily rebutted the monetary claims against it. All that it had to
do was to present the vouchers showing payment of the same. However,
they opted not to lift a finger, giving an impression that they never paid said
benefits.
As to the award of attorney’s fees, the NLRC found the same to be proper
because respondents were forced to litigate in order to validate their claim.
The NLRC thus affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, viz:
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 which was denied by the
NLRC in a Resolution14 dated July 31, 2003.
On August 10, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. It opined that in a situation
where the employer has complete control over the records and could thus
easily rebut any monetary claims against it but opted not to lift any finger,
the burden is on the employer and not on the complainants. This is so
because the latter are definitely not in a position to adduce any
documentary evidence, the control of which being not with them.
SO ORDERED.18
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Petitioners’ Arguments
Our Ruling
"[T]his Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of illegal dismissal,
the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination was
for a valid or authorized cause."21 But "[b]efore the [petitioners] must bear
the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, [the respondents] must
first establish by substantial evidence" that indeed they were dismissed.
"[I]f there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or
illegality thereof."22
There was no dismissal in this case, hence, there is no question that can
be entertained regarding its legality or illegality.
In this case, petitioners were able to show that they never dismissed
respondents. As to the case of Fernando, Miguel and Ferdinand, it was
shown that on November 25, 2000, at around 7:30 a.m., the petitioners’
foreman, Wenifredo Lalap (Wenifredo) caught the three still eating when
they were supposed to be working already. Wenifredo reprimanded them
and, apparently, they resented it so they no longer reported for work. In the
case of Gregorio, he absented himself from work on September 15, 2000 to
apply as a painter with SAEI-EEI, the general contractor of Pacific Plaza
Towers. Since then he never reported back to work. Lastly, in the case of
Guillermo, he absented himself without leave on November 27, 2000, and
so he was reprimanded when he reported for work the following day.
Because of the reprimand, he did not report for work anymore.
The Labor Arbiter is also correct in ruling that there was no abandonment
on the part of respondents that would justify their dismissal from their
employment.
(1) the employee must have failed to report for work or must have
been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) there must have been a clear intention on the part of the
employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by
some overt act."
"It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any
intention of returning."27 It is therefore incumbent upon petitioners to
ascertain the respondents’ interest or non-interest in the continuance of
their employment. However, petitioners failed to do so.
Clearly therefore, there was no dismissal, much less illegal, and there was
also no abandonment of job to speak of. The Labor Arbiter is therefore
correct in ordering that respondents be reinstated but without any
backwages.
Petitioners are misguided. They forgot that there are two types of
employees in the construction industry. The first is referred to as project
employees or those employed in connection with a particular construction
project or phase thereof and such employment is coterminous with each
project or phase of the project to which they are assigned. The second is
known as non-project employees or those employed without reference to
any particular construction project or phase of a project.
The second category is where respondents are classified. As such they are
regular employees of petitioners. It is clear from the records of the case
that when one project is completed, respondents were automatically
transferred to the next project awarded to petitioners. There was no
employment agreement given to respondents which clearly spelled out the
duration of their employment, the specific work to be performed and that
such is made clear to them at the time of hiring. It is now too late for
petitioners to claim that respondents are project employees whose
employment is coterminous with each project or phase of the project to
which they are assigned.
Respondents are also entitled to their money claims such as the payment
of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay. Petitioners
as the employer of respondents and having complete control over the
records of the company could have easily rebutted the monetary claims
against it. All that they had to do was to present the vouchers or payrolls
showing payment of the same. However, they decided not to provide the
said documentary evidence. Our conclusion therefore is that they never
paid said benefits and therefore they must be ordered to settle their
obligation with the respondents.1avvphi1
In this case, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claim for
payment of their holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month
pay. The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA were one in ruling that
petitioners did not pay the respondents their holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, and 13th month pay as mandated by law. For sure, this
unjustified act of petitioners had compelled the respondents to institute an
action primarily to protect their rights and interests.
reinstatement but without backwages. In this case, both the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC made a finding that there was no dismissal much less an
illegal one. "It is settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies are
generally accorded respect and finality so long as these are supported by
substantial evidence."31
SO ORDERED.
6)
Civil Case: D.M. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 137873
April 20, 2001
D.M. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 137873
April 20, 2001
FACTS:
Issue:
Held:
7)
G.R. No. 204406 February 26, 2014
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Macarthur Malicdem (Malicdem) and Hermenigildo Flores (Flores)
assails the July 18, 2012 Decision2 and the November 12, 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 1244 70,
dismissing their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in an action for illegal
dismissal.
The Facts:
A complaint4 for illegal dismissal, separation pay, money claims, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees was filed by petitioners Malicdem
and Flores against respondents Marulas Industrial Corporation (Marulas)
and Mike Mancilla (Mancilla), who were engaged in the business of
manufacturing sacks intended for local and export markets.
Marulas countered that their contracts showed that they were fixed-term
employees for a specific undertaking which was to work on a particular
order of a customer for a specific period. Their severance from employment
was due to the expiration of their contracts.
On July 13, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision5 in favor of
the respondents, finding no illegal dismissal. He ruled that Malicdem and
Flores were not terminated and that their employment naturally ceased
when their contracts expired. The LA, however, ordered Marulas to pay
Malicdem and Flores their respective wage differentials, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the complaints for illegal dismissal are dismissed for lack of
merit. Respondent Marulas Industrial Corporation is, however, ordered to
pay complainants wage differential in the following amounts:
20,111.26
; and
2. Herminigildo Flores ₱18,440.50
2/2/08 – 6/13/08 = 4.36 mos. None
6/14/08 – 8/27/08 = 963.30
8/28/08 – 6/30/10 = 11,471.20
7/1/10 – 12/16/10 = 5.50 mos.
₱404 x ₱362 = ₱42
x 26 days x 5.50 mos. = 6,006.00
18,440.50
SO ORDERED.6
Malicdem and Flores appealed to the NLRC which partially granted their
appeal with the award of payment of 13th month pay, service incentive
leave and holiday pay for three (3) years. The dispositive portion of its
December 19, 2011 Decision7 reads:
SO ORDERED.8
Still, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
NLRC on February 29, 2011.
Aggrieved, Malicdem and Flores filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
with the CA.
On July 18, 2012, the CA denied the petition,9 finding no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
NLRC. It ruled that the issue of whether or not the petitioners were project
employees or regular employees was factual in nature and, thus, not within
the ambit of a petition for certiorari. Moreover, it accorded respect and due
consideration to the factual findings of the NLRC, affirming those of the LA,
as they were supported by substantial evidence.
On the substantive issue, the CA explained that "the repeated and
successive rehiring of project employees do not qualify them as regular
employees, as length of service is not the controlling determinant of the
employment tenure of a project employee, but whether the employment
has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, its completion has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee."10
Corollarily, considering that there was no illegal dismissal, the CA ruled that
payment of backwages, separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees had
no factual and legal bases. Hence, they could not be awarded to the
petitioners.
Aggrieved, Malicdem and Flores filed a motion for reconsideration, but their
pleas were denied in the CA Resolution, dated November 12, 2012.
The Petition
Malicdem and Flores now come before this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying for the
reversal of the CA decision anchored on the principal argument that the
appellate court erred in affirming the NLRC decision that there was no
illegal dismissal because the petitioners’ contracts of employment with the
respondents simply expired. They claim that their continuous rehiring
paved the way for their regularization and, for said reason, they could not
be terminated from their jobs without just cause.
Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, however, "an employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee." When an employer renews a contract of employment after the
lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employee thereby becomes
a regular employee. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the
fitness of its employees.14 While length of time is not the controlling test for
project employment, it is vital in determining if the employee was hired for a
specific undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital, necessary and
indispensable to the usual business of trade of the employer.15 Thus, in the
earlier case of Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC,16 it was ruled that a project or work
pool employee, who has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to
intermittently, rehired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of
tasks; and (2) those tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the
usual business or trade of the employer, must be deemed a regular
employee. Thus:
Guided by the foregoing, the Court is of the considered view that there was
clearly a deliberate intent to prevent the regularization of the petitioners.
Now that it has been clearly established that the petitioners were regular
employees, their termination is considered illegal for lack of just or
authorized causes. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. The law intends the award of
backwages and similar benefits to accumulate past the date of the LA
decision until the dismissed employee is actually reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
8)
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioners moved for reconsideration,20 but the CA denied their motion
on August 8, 2003.21
Issues
III
Stare decisis does not apply where the facts are essentially different
That Innodata drafted the contracts with its business interest as the
overriding consideration did not necessarily warrant the holding that the
contracts were prejudicial against the petitioners.47 The fixing by Innodata
of the period specified in the contracts of employment did not also indicate
its ill-motive to circumvent the petitioners' security of tenure. Indeed, the
petitioners could not presume that the fixing of the one-year term was
intended to evade or avoid the protection to tenure under Article 280 of
the Labor Code in the absence of other evidence establishing such
intention. This presumption must ordinarily be based on some aspect of the
agreement other than the mere specification of the fixed term of the
employment agreement, or on evidence aliunde of the intent to evade.48
Lastly, the petitioners posit that they should be accorded regular status
because their work as editors and proofreaders were usually necessary to
Innodata's business of data processing.
We reject this position. For one, it would be unusual for a company like
Innodata to undertake a project that had no relationship to its usual
business.49 Also, the necessity and desirability of the work performed by
the employees are not the determinants in term employment, but rather the
"day certain" voluntarily agreed upon by the parties.50 As the CA cogently
observed in this respect:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is proof to establish that Innodata's operations indeed rests upon job
orders or undertakings coming from its foreign clients. Apparently, its
employees are assigned to projects - one batch may be given a fixed
period of one year, others, a slightly shorter duration, depending on the
estimated time of completion of the particular job or undertaking farmed out
by the client to the company.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In fine, the employment of the petitioners who were engaged as project
employees for a fixed term legally ended upon the expiration of their
contract. Their complaint for illegal dismissal was plainly lacking in
merit.chanrobleslaw
SO ORDERED.
9)
EGI v. ANDO, JR.
E. GANZON, INC. (EGI) and EULALIO GANZON, Petitioners vs.
FORTUNATO B. ANDO, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 214183
February 20, 2017
Facts:
On the other hand, EGI countered his contention that, as proven by the
three (3) project employment contract, Ando was engaged as a project
worker (Formworker-2) in Bahay Pamulinawen Project in Laoag, Ilocos
Norte from June 1, 2010 to September 30, 20107and from January 3, 2011
to February 28, 20118 as well as in EGI-West Insula Project in Quezon
City, Metro Manila from February 22, 2011 to March 31, 2011; he was paid
the correct salary based on the Wage Order applicable in the region; he
already received the 13th month pay for 2010 but the claim for 2011 was
not yet processed at the time the complaint was filed; and he voluntarily
agreed to pay ₱500.00 monthly for the cost of the barracks, beds, water,
electricity, and other expenses of his stay at the job site.
The Labor Arbiter declared Ando a project employee of EGI but granted
some of his money claims. Both parties elevated the case to the NLRC,
which dismissed the appeals filed and affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Ando filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. He
then filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA, which granted the same
annuling the assailed NLRC resolutions dated May 25, 2012 and July 17,
2012, . EGI's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Ruling:
The terms regular, project, seasonal and casual employment are taken
from Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended. Under Art. 280, project
employment is one which "has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee." To be considered as project-
based, the employer has the burden of proof to show that: (a) the employee
was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking and (b) the
duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employee was
engaged for such project or undertaking. It must be proved that the
particular work/service to be performed as well as its duration are defined
in the employment agreement and made clear to the employee who was
informed thereof at the time of hiring.
Further, Ando was adequately notified of his employment status at the time
his services were engaged by EGI for its projects.. The contracts he signed
consistently stipulated that his services as a project worker were being
sought. There was an informed consent to be engaged as such. His
consent was not vitiated. As a matter of fact, Ando did not even allege that
force, duress or improper pressure were used against him in order to
agree. His being a carpenter does not suffice.
Therefore, the petition is granted and the February 28, 2014 Decision and
September 4, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are reversed and
set aside. The decision of the labor arbiter is reinstated.
Seasonal Employees
1)
BENARES vs. PACHO
Posted: May 1, 2015 in case digests, labor relations
Tags: BENARES vs. PACHO, case digests, LABOR RELATIONS 0
JOSEFINA BENARES vs. JAIME PACHO, RODOLFO PANCHO JR,
FACTS:
On July 24, 1991, complainants thru counsel wrote the Regional Director of
the Department of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City for intercession
particularly in the matter of wages and other benefits mandated by law.
On July 14, 1992, notification and summons were served to the parties
wherein complainants were directed to file a formal complaint.
On July 28, 1992, a formal complaint was filed for illegal dismissal with
money claims.
From the records, summons and notices of hearing were served to the
parties and apparently no amicable settlement was arrived, hence, the
parties were directed to file their respective position papers.
On March 17, 1994, complainants filed their reply position paper and
affidavit. Correspondingly, a rejoinder was filed by respondent on May 16,
1994.
On January 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter issued an order to the effect that
the case is now deemed submitted for resolution.
On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter a quo issued the assailed decision
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
On June 26, 1998, complainants not satisfied with the aforecited ruling
interposed the instant appeal before the NLRC. The NLRC held that
respondents attained the status of regular seasonal workers of Hda.
Maasin II having worked therein from 1964-1985. It found that petitioner
failed to discharge the burden of proving that the termination of
respondents was for a just or authorized cause. Hence, respondents were
illegally dismissed and should be awarded their money claims.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s ruling, with the modification that
the backwages and other monetary benefits shall be computed from the
time compensation was withheld in accordance with Article 279 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is guilty of illegal dismissal with money claims.
HELD: YES, the Supreme Court dismissed the instant petition and affirmed
the Decision of the Court of Appeals base on the following premise:
2)
HACIENDA BINO/HORTENCIA STARKE, INC. vs CUENCA et.al. Case
Digest
[G.R. No. 150478. April 15, 2005]
On July 18, 1996, during the off-milling season, petitioner Starke issued an
Order or Notice which stated, thus:
Please bear in mind that all those who signed in favor of CARP are
expressing their desire to get out of employment on their own volition.
Wherefore, beginning today, July 18, only those who did not sign for CARP
will be given employment by Hda. Bino.
The respondents alleged that they are regular and permanent workers of the
hacienda and that they were dismissed without just and lawful cause. They
further alleged that they were dismissed because they applied as
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
over the land owned by petitioner Starke.
For her part, petitioner Starke recounted that the company’s Board of
Directors petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan of Kabankalan for authority to
re-classify, from agricultural to industrial, commercial and residential, the
whole of Hacienda Bino, except the portion earmarked for the CARP. She
asserted that half of the workers supported the re-classification but the
others, which included the herein respondents, opted to become
beneficiaries of the land under the CARP. Petitioner Starke alleged that in
July 1996, there was little work in the plantation as it was off-season; and so,
on account of the seasonal nature of the work, she issued the order giving
preference to those who supported the re-classification. She pointed out that
when the milling season began in October 1996, the work was plentiful again
and she issued notices to all workers, including the respondents, informing
them of the availability of work. However, the respondents refused to report
back to work. With respect to the respondents’ money claims, petitioner
Starke submitted payrolls evidencing payment thereof.
HELD: The SC held that the primary standard for determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in Relation to the usual trade o business of the
employer. There is no doubt that the respondents were performing work
necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of an employer. For
respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is
not enough that they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature.
They must have been employed only for the duration of one (1) season.
While the records sufficiently show that the respondents’ work in the
hacienda was seasonal in nature, there was, however, no proof that they
were hired for the duration of one season. In fact, the payrolls submitted by
the petitioners, show that they availed the services of the respondents since
1991. Absent any proof to the contrary, the general rule of regular
employment should, therefore, stand. It bears stressing that the employer
has the burden of proving the lawfulness of his employees’ dismissal.
Petition is denied.
3)
1
UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION and RENE
CABATI v.FERDINAND ACIBO, et al.G.R. No. 186439, 15 January 2014,
SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J.)The period denominated in the contract of
employment is not the basis in determining whetheran employee is
seasonal or regular.FERDINAND ACIBO, et al. were employees of
UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGARMILLING CORPORATION (URSUMCO).
Acibo, et al. signed contracts of employment for agiven period and after its
expiration, URSUMCO repeatedly hired these employees to performthe
same duties and obligations.Acibo, et al. filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for regularization however it was deniedbecause the LA argued that
they were seasonal employees. Seven of the 22 complainants filed
anappeal to the NLRC. The latter reversed the LA’s ruling
claiming that they were regularemployees. The CA affirmed NLRC’s
decision but excluded the Acibo, et al. from monetarybenefits under the
CBA.ISSUE:Whether or not Acibo, et al. are regular employees of
URSUMCO.HELD:Plantation workers or mill employees only work on
seasonal basis. This, however, does notexclude them from the benefits of
regularization. Being in such nature, Acibo, et al. areconsidered to be
regular employees.Regular employment means that there was an
arrangement between the employee and theemployer that the former will
be engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirableto the
usual business or trade of the latter. On the other hand, a
project employment is anarrangement for a specific project or
undertaking whose termination is determined by thecompletion of
the project.The nature of the employment does not depend solely on the
will or word of the employeror on the procedure for hiring and the manner
of designating the employee. Rather, the nature ofthe employment
depends on the nature of the activities to be performed by the
employee,considering the nature of the employer’s business, the
duration and scope to be done.Accordingly, Acibo, et al. are neither
project nor seasonal employees.Acibo, et al. were made to perform tasks
that does not pertain to milling operations ofURSUMCO. However, their
duties are regularly and habitually needed in URSUMCO’s
operation. Moreover, they were regularly and repeatedly hired to perform
the same tasks. Beingrepeatedly hired for the same purpose makes them
regularized employees.The plantation workers or the mill employees do not
work continuously for 1 whole yearbut only for the duration of the growing
or the sugarcane or the milling season. Their seasonalwork, however, does
not detract from considering them in regular employment.
4)
Jaime Gapayao vs Rosario Fulo et al | Uber Digests
"x x x.
HELD: Yes. Fulo was a regular employee and was thus entitled to receive
SSS benefits, among others. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals in ruling that it “does not follow that a person who does not
observe normal hours of work cannot be deemed an employee.” It is also
not material that Gapayao never supervised Fulo.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated January 31,
2007 and of the Resolution dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93917 entitled Magis Young Achievers’ Learning
Center and Violeta T. Cariño v. National Labor Relations Commission,
3rd Division, Quezon City, and Adelaida P. Manalo.
Dear Madame:
I would like to express my thanks and gratitude for the opportunity, trust
and confidence given to me as an Acting Principal in your prestigious
school.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed)
Mrs. ADELAIDA P. MANALO1
Greetings of Peace!
(Signed)
Mrs. Violeta T. Cariño
School Directress
Noted by:
(Signed)
Mr. Severo Cariño
President2
In her position paper,4 respondent claimed that her termination violated the
provisions of her employment contract, and that the alleged abolition of the
position of Principal was not among the grounds for termination by an
employer under Article 2825 of the Labor Code. She further asserted that
petitioner infringed Article 2836 of the Labor Code, as the required 30-day
notice to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and to her as
the employee, and the payment of her separation pay were not complied
with. She also claimed that she was terminated from service for the alleged
expiration of her employment, but that her contract did not provide for a
fixed term or period. She likewise prayed for the payment of her 13th month
pay under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 851.
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, petitioner went
up to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA, in its Decision dated
January 31, 2007, affirmed the NLRC decision and dismissed the petition.
It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the Resolution
dated June 29, 2007. Hence, this petition anchored on the following
grounds—
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
RESIGNATION OF RESPONDENT MANALO DID NOT BECOME
EFFECTIVE DUE TO ALLEGED LACK OF ACCEPTANCE;
Before going to the core issues of the controversy, we would like to restate
basic legal principles governing employment of secondary school teachers
in private schools, specifically, on the matter of probationary employment.
Indeed, the employer has the right, or is at liberty, to choose who will be
hired and who will be declined. As a component of this right to select his
employees, the employer may set or fix a probationary period within which
the latter may test and observe the conduct of the former before hiring him
permanently.14
But the law regulates the exercise of this prerogative to fix the period of
probationary employment. While there is no statutory cap on the minimum
term of probation, the law sets a maximum "trial period" during which the
employer may test the fitness and efficiency of the employee.
(A)ll school personnel who are formally engaged in actual teaching service
or in research assignments, either on full-time or part-time basis; as well as
those who possess certain prescribed academic functions directly
supportive of teaching, such as registrars, librarians, guidance counselors,
researchers, and other similar persons. They include school officials
responsible for academic matters, and may include other school officials.19
The reason for this disparate treatment was explained many years ago in
Escudero v. Office of the President of the Philippines,20 where the Court
declared:
It is, thus, clear that the Labor Code authorizes different probationary
periods, according to the requirements of the particular job. For private
school teachers, the period of probation is governed by the 1970 Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools x x x.21
The probationary period of three years for private school teachers was, in
fact, confirmed earlier in Labajo v. Alejandro,22 viz.:
Over the years, even with the enactment of a new Labor Code and the
revision of the Manual, the rule has not changed.
Sec. 93. Regular or Permanent Status. - Those who have served the
probationary period shall be made regular or permanent. Full-time teachers
who have satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be
considered regular or permanent.
Accordingly, as held in Escudero, no vested right to a permanent
appointment shall accrue until the employee has completed the
prerequisite three-year period necessary for the acquisition of a permanent
status. Of course, the mere rendition of service for three consecutive years
does not automatically ripen into a permanent appointment. It is also
necessary that the employee be a full-time teacher, and that the services
he rendered are satisfactory.23
The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a
contract, effective for one school year. At the end of the school year, the
employer has the option not to renew the contract, particularly considering
the teacher’s performance. If the contract is not renewed, the employment
relationship terminates. If the contract is renewed, usually for another
school year, the probationary employment continues. Again, at the end of
that period, the parties may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. If
renewed, this second renewal of the contract for another school year would
then be the last year – since it would be the third school year – of
probationary employment. At the end of this third year, the employer may
now decide whether to extend a permanent appointment to the employee,
primarily on the basis of the employee having met the reasonable
standards of competence and efficiency set by the employer. For the entire
duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains under probation.
Upon the expiration of his contract of employment, being simply on
probation, he cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel the
employer to renew his employment contract.24 It is when the yearly contract
is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manual becomes
operative, and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent
employment status.
All this does not mean that academic personnel cannot acquire permanent
employment status earlier than after the lapse of three years. The period of
probation may be reduced if the employer, convinced of the fitness and
efficiency of a probationary employee, voluntarily extends a permanent
appointment even before the three-year period ends. Conversely, if the
purpose sought by the employer is neither attained nor attainable within the
said period, the law does not preclude the employer from terminating the
probationary employment on justifiable ground;26 or, a shorter probationary
period may be incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement.27 But
absent any circumstances which unmistakably show that an abbreviated
probationary period has been agreed upon, the three-year probationary
term governs.
This is, by no means, to assert that the security of tenure protection of the
Constitution does not apply to probationary employees. x x x During such
period, they could remain in their positions and any circumvention of their
rights, in accordance with the statutory scheme, is subject to inquiry and
thereafter correction by the Department of Labor.
the fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily
by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances
vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer
and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no
moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.30
It does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employees
consist of activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of
the employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time
for the performance of such activities.31 Thus, in St. Theresa’s School of
Novaliches Foundation v. NLRC,32 we held that a contractual stipulation
providing for a fixed term of nine (9) months, not being contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and public policy, is valid, binding and
must be respected, as it is the contract of employment that governs the
relationship of the parties.
We are also inclined to agree with the CA that the resignation of the
respondent36 is not valid, not only because there was no express
acceptance thereof by the employer, but because there is a cloud of doubt
as to the voluntariness of respondent’s resignation.
Under this circumstance, We can only apply Article 1702 of the Civil Code
which provides that, in case of doubt, all labor contracts shall be construed
in favor of the laborer. Then, too, settled is the rule that any ambiguity in a
contract whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations must be
read against the party who drafted it. In the case at bar, the drafter of the
contract is herein petitioners and must, therefore, be read against their
contention.43
Thus, following Article 1702 of the Civil Code that all doubts regarding labor
contracts should be construed in favor of labor, then it should be
respondent’s copy which did not provide for an express period which
should be upheld, especially when there are circumstances that render the
version of petitioner suspect. This is in line with the State policy of affording
protection to labor, such that the lowly laborer, who is usually at the mercy
of the employer, must look up to the law to place him on equal footing with
his employer.45
SO ORDERED.
2)
G.R. No. 157788. March 08, 2005
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated May 21, 2002 and
the Resolution2 dated February 12, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63240 which dismissed the petition for certiorari of St. Mary’s
University and its motion for reconsideration, respectively.
In its defense, petitioner St. Mary’s University showed that respondent was
merely a part-time instructor and, except for three semesters, carried a load
of less than eighteen units. Petitioner argued that respondent never
attained permanent or regular status for he was not a full-time teacher.
Further, petitioner showed that respondent was under investigation by the
university for giving grades to students who did not attend classes.
Petitioner alleged that respondent did not respond to inquiries relative to
the investigation. Instead, respondent filed the instant case against the
university.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent was lawfully dismissed because he
had not attained permanent or regular status pursuant to the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools. The Labor Arbiter held that only full-time
teachers with regular loads of at least 18 units, who have satisfactorily
completed three consecutive years of service qualify as permanent or
regular employees. 3
On appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the
reinstatement of respondent without loss of seniority rights and privileges
with full backwages from the time his salaries were withheld until actual
reinstatement.4 It held that respondent was a full-time teacher as he did not
appear to have other regular remunerative employment and was paid on a
regular monthly basis regardless of the number of teaching hours. As a full-
time teacher and having taught for more than 3 years, respondent qualified
as a permanent or regular employee of the university.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration and pointed out that respondent was
also working for the Provincial Government of Nueva Vizcaya from 1993 to
1996. Nevertheless, the NLRC denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the Decision of the NLRC.
Hence, this petition with a motion for temporary restraining order, alleging
that the Court of Appeals erred in:
In the present case, petitioner claims that private respondent lacked the
requisite years of service with the university and also the appropriate
quality of his service, i.e., it is less than satisfactory. The basic question,
however, is whether respondent is a full-time teacher.
c. Whose total working day of not more than eight hours a day is devoted to
the school;
All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are
considered part-time.
The law, while protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither
the oppression nor destruction of the employer.13 And when the law tilts the
scale of justice in favor of labor, the scale should never be so tilted if the
result would be an injustice to the employer.14
SO ORDERED.
3)
BRION, J.:
20072cЃa and its resolution of June 20, 20083cЃa that set aside the
National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC) resolution dated July 18,
2005.4cЃa
The background facts are not disputed and are summarized below.
You are hereby instructed to report to the HRD for further instruction.
Please bear in mind that as per company policy, you are required to
accomplish your clearance and turn-over all documents and
accountabilities to your immediate superior.
The NLRC ruled that the new screening guidelines for the school year
2000-20001 cannot be imposed on the petitioners and their employment
contracts since the new guidelines were not imposed when the petitioners
were first employed in 1998. According to the NLRC, the imposition of the
new guidelines violates Section 6(d) of Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code, which provides that "in all cases of probationary
employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the
standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of
his engagement." Citing our ruling in Orient Express Placement Philippines
v. NLRC,18cЃa the NLRC stressed that the rudiments of due process
demand that employees should be informed beforehand of the conditions
of their employment as well as the basis for their advancement.
AMACC elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. It charged that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in: (1) ruling that the petitioners were illegally dismissed; (2)
refusing to recognize and give effect to the petitioner's valid term of
employment; (3) ruling that AMACC cannot apply the performance
standards generally applicable to all faculty members; and (4) ordering the
petitioners' reinstatement and awarding them backwages and attorney's
fees.
The CA Ruling
The CA ruled that under the Manual for Regulations for Private Schools, a
teaching personnel in a private educational institution (1) must be a full time
teacher; (2) must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3)
such service must be satisfactory before he or she can acquire permanent
status.
The CA noted that the petitioners had not completed three (3) consecutive
years of service (i.e. six regular semesters or nine consecutive trimesters of
satisfactory service) and were still within their probationary period; their
teaching stints only covered a period of two (2) years and three (3) months
when AMACC decided not to renew their contracts on September 7, 2000.
The CA effectively found reasonable basis for AMACC not to renew the
petitioners' contracts. To the CA, the petitioners were not actually
dismissed; their respective contracts merely expired and were no longer
renewed by AMACC because they failed to satisfy the school's standards
for the school year 2000-2001 that measured their fitness and aptitude to
teach as regular faculty members. The CA emphasized that in the absence
of any evidence of bad faith on AMACC's part, the court would not disturb
or nullify its discretion to set standards and to select for regularization only
the teachers who qualify, based on reasonable and non-discriminatory
guidelines.
The CA disagreed with the NLRC's ruling that the new guidelines for the
school year 2000-20001 could not be imposed on the petitioners and their
employment contracts. The appellate court opined that AMACC has the
inherent right to upgrade the quality of computer education it offers to the
public; part of this pursuit is the implementation of continuing evaluation
and screening of its faculty members for academic excellence. The CA
noted that the nature of education AMACC offers demands that the school
constantly adopt progressive performance standards for its faculty to
ensure that they keep pace with the rapid developments in the field of
information technology.
Finally, the CA found that the petitioners were hired on a non-tenured basis
and for a fixed and predetermined term based on the Teaching Contract
exemplified by the contract between the petitioner Lachica and AMACC.
The CA ruled that the non-renewal of the petitioners' teaching contracts is
sanctioned by the doctrine laid down in Brent School, Inc. v.
Zamora20cЃa where the Court recognized the validity of contracts providing
for fixed-period employment.
THE PETITION
The petitioners submit that the CA should not have disturbed the findings of
the LA and the NLRC that they were illegally dismissed; instead, the CA
should have accorded great respect, if not finality, to the findings of these
specialized bodies as these findings were supported by evidence on
record. Citing our ruling in Soriano v. National Labor Relations
Commission,22cЃa the petitioners contend that in certiorari proceedings
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA does not assess and weigh the
sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based
their conclusions. They submit that the CA erred when it substituted its
judgment for that of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who were the "triers of
facts" who had the opportunity to review the evidence extensively.
On the merits, the petitioners argue that the applicable law on probationary
employment, as explained by the LA, is Article 281 of the Labor Code
which mandates a period of six (6) months as the maximum duration of the
probationary period unless there is a stipulation to the contrary; that the CA
should not have disturbed the LA's conclusion that the AMACC failed to
support its allegation that they did not qualify under the new guidelines
adopted for the school year 2000-2001; and that they were illegally
dismissed; their employment was terminated based on standards that were
not made known to them at the time of their engagement. On the whole,
the petitioners argue that the LA and the NLRC committed no grave abuse
of discretion that the CA can validly cite.
AMACC also asserts that the petitioners knew very well that the applicable
standards would be revised and updated from time to time given the nature
of the teaching profession. The petitioners also knew at the time of their
engagement that they must comply with the school's regularization policies
as stated in the Faculty Manual. Specifically, they must obtain a passing
rating on the Performance Appraisal for Teachers (PAST) - the primary
instrument to measure the performance of faculty members.
Since the petitioners were not actually dismissed, AMACC submits that the
CA correctly ruled that they are not entitled to reinstatement, full
backwages and attorney's fees.
b. Fixed-period Employment
The use of employment for fixed periods during the teachers' probationary
period is likewise an accepted practice in the teaching profession. We
mentioned this in passing in Magis Young Achievers' Learning Center v.
Adelaida P. Manalo,28cЃa albeit a case that involved elementary, not
tertiary, education, and hence spoke of a school year rather than a
semester or a trimester. We noted in this case:
The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a
contract, effective for one school year. At the end of the school year, the
employer has the option not to renew the contract, particularly considering
the teacher's performance. If the contract is not renewed, the employment
relationship terminates. If the contract is renewed, usually for another
school year, the probationary employment continues. Again, at the end of
that period, the parties may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. If
renewed, this second renewal of the contract for another school year would
then be the last year - since it would be the third school year - of
probationary employment. At the end of this third year, the employer may
now decide whether to extend a permanent appointment to the employee,
primarily on the basis of the employee having met the reasonable
standards of competence and efficiency set by the employer. For the entire
duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains under probation.
Upon the expiration of his contract of employment, being simply on
probation, he cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel the
employer to renew his employment contract. It is when the yearly contract
is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manual becomes
operative, and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent
employment status.
It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the
period or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise duration
could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year
probationary period.
We have long settled the validity of a fixed-term contract in the case Brent
School, Inc. v. Zamora29cЃa that AMACC cited. Significantly, Brent
happened in a school setting. Care should be taken, however, in reading
Brent in the context of this case as Brent did not involve any probationary
employment issue; it dealt purely and simply with the validity of a fixed-term
employment under the terms of the Labor Code, then newly issued and
which does not expressly contain a provision on fixed-term employment.
Last but not the least factor in the academic world, is that a school enjoys
academic freedom - a guarantee that enjoys protection from the
Constitution no less. Section 5(2) Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees
all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.30cЃa
The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for
itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the
overarching limitations under the Labor Code. Academic freedom, too, is
not the only legal basis for AMACC's issuance of screening guidelines. The
authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management
prerogative - the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, such as hiring, the freedom to prescribe work assignments,
working methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of
employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal
and recall of workers.34cЃa Thus, AMACC has every right to determine for
itself that it shall use fixed-term employment contracts as its medium for
hiring its teachers. It also acted within the terms of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools when it recognized the petitioners to be
merely on probationary status up to a maximum of nine trimesters.
Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of
knowing the company standards the new hires have to meet during the
probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards,
aside from the usual standards applicable to employees after they achieve
permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards
should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start
of their probationary period, or at the very least under the circumstances of
the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester during which
the probationary standards are to be applied. Of critical importance in
invoking a failure to meet the probationary standards, is that the school
should show - as a matter of due process - how these standards have been
applied. This is effectively the second notice in a dismissal situation that the
law requires as a due process guarantee supporting the security of tenure
provision,42cЃa and is in furtherance, too, of the basic rule in employee
dismissal that the employer carries the burden of justifying a
dismissal.43cЃa These rules ensure compliance with the limited security of
tenure guarantee the law extends to probationary employees.44cЃa
When fixed-term employment is brought into play under the above
probationary period rules, the situation - as in the present case - may at
first blush look muddled as fixed-term employment is in itself a valid
employment mode under Philippine law and jurisprudence.45cЃa The
conflict, however, is more apparent than real when the respective nature of
fixed-term employment and of employment on probationary status are
closely examined.
Under the given facts where the school year is divided into trimesters, the
school apparently utilizes its fixed-term contracts as a convenient
arrangement dictated by the trimestral system and not because the
workplace parties really intended to limit the period of their relationship to
any fixed term and to finish this relationship at the end of that term. If we
pierce the veil, so to speak, of the parties' so-called fixed-term employment
contracts, what undeniably comes out at the core is a fixed-term contract
conveniently used by the school to define and regulate its relations with its
teachers during their probationary period.
To be sure, nothing is illegitimate in defining the school-teacher relationship
in this manner. The school, however, cannot forget that its system of fixed-
term contract is a system that operates during the probationary period and
for this reason is subject to the terms of Article 281 of the Labor Code.
Unless this reconciliation is made, the requirements of this Article on
probationary status would be fully negated as the school may freely choose
not to renew contracts simply because their terms have expired. The
inevitable effect of course is to wreck the scheme that the Constitution and
the Labor Code established to balance relationships between labor and
management.
Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, we cannot but conclude
that in a situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term
contract not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should
assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give
way. This conclusion is immeasurably strengthened by the petitioners' and
the AMACC's hardly concealed expectation that the employment on
probation could lead to permanent status, and that the contracts are
renewable unless the petitioners fail to pass the school's standards.
If the school were to apply the probationary standards (as in fact it says it
did in the present case), these standards must not only be reasonable but
must have also been communicated to the teachers at the start of the
probationary period, or at the very least, at the start of the period when they
were to be applied. These terms, in addition to those expressly provided by
the Labor Code, would serve as the just cause for the termination of the
probationary contract. As explained above, the details of this finding of just
cause must be communicated to the affected teachers as a matter of due
process.
AMACC, by its submissions, admits that it did not renew the petitioners'
contracts because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System
for Teachers (PAST) and other requirements for regularization that the
school undertakes to maintain its high academic standards.47cЃa The
evidence is unclear on the exact terms of the standards, although the
school also admits that these were standards under the Guidelines on the
Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla put in place at the start of
school year 2000-2001.
While we can grant that the standards were duly communicated to the
petitioners and could be applied beginning the 1st trimester of the school
year 2000-2001, glaring and very basic gaps in the school's evidence still
exist. The exact terms of the standards were never introduced as evidence;
neither does the evidence show how these standards were applied to the
petitioners.48cЃaWithout these pieces of evidence (effectively, the finding of
just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners' contracts), we have
nothing to consider and pass upon as valid or invalid for each of the
petitioners. Inevitably, the non-renewal (or effectively, the termination of
employment of employees on probationary status) lacks the supporting
finding of just cause that the law requires and, hence, is illegal.
In this light, the CA decision should be reversed. Thus, the LA's decision,
affirmed as to the results by the NLRC, should stand as the decision to be
enforced, appropriately re-computed to consider the period of appeal and
review of the case up to our level.
Given the period that has lapsed and the inevitable change of
circumstances that must have taken place in the interim in the academic
world and at AMACC, which changes inevitably affect current school
operations, we hold that - in lieu of reinstatement - the petitioners should be
paid separation pay computed on a trimestral basis from the time of
separation from service up to the end of the complete trimester preceding
the finality of this Decision.49cЃa The separation pay shall be in addition to
the other awards, properly recomputed, that the LA originally decreed.
(a) backwages and 13th month pay computed from September 7, 2000 (the
date AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc. illegally dismissed the
petitioners) up to the finality of this Decision;
(c) separation pay on a trimestral basis from September 7, 2000 (the time
of separation from service) up to the end of the complete trimester
preceding the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
4)
DECISION
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the August 31, 2005
Decision2 and the November 10, 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85188, which affirmed the July 31, 2003
Decision4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Said NLRC
Decision affirmed with modification the October 7, 2002 Decision5 of the
Labor Arbiter (LA) which, in turn, granted respondent Emmanuel Rojo’s
(respondent) Complaint6 for illegal dismissal.
Factual Antecedents
Thus, on July 13, 1995, respondent filed a Complaint10 for illegal dismissal.
He alleged that since he had served three consecutive school years which
is the maximum number of terms allowed for probationary employment, he
should be extended permanent employment. Citing paragraph 75 of the
1970 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1970 Manual), respondent
asserted that "full- time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive
years of satisfactory services shall be considered permanent."11
On the other hand, petitioners argued that respondent knew that his
Teacher’s Contract for school year 1994-1995 with CSR would expire on
March 31, 1995.12 Accordingly, respondent was not dismissed but his
probationary contract merely expired and was not renewed.13 Petitioners
also claimed that the "three years" mentioned in paragraph 75 of the 1970
Manual refer to "36 months," not three school years.14 And since
respondent served for only three school years of 10 months each or 30
months, then he had not yet served the "three years" or 36 months
mentioned in paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual.15
The LA ruled that "three school years" means three years of 10 months, not
12 months.16 Considering that respondent had already served for three
consecutive school years, then he has already attained regular
employment status. Thus, the non-renewal of his contract for school year
1995-1996 constitutes illegal dismissal.17
The LA also found petitioners guilty of bad faith when they treated
respondent’s termination merely as the expiration of the third employment
contract and when they insisted that the school board actually deliberated
on the non-renewal of respondent’s employment without submitting
admissible proof of his alleged regular performance evaluation.18
SO ORDERED.20
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s Decision with modification. It held
that after serving three school years, respondent had attained the status of
regular employment21 especially because CSR did not make known to
respondent the reasonable standards he should meet.22 The NLRC also
agreed with the LA that respondent’s termination was done in bad faith. It
held that respondent is entitled to reinstatement, if viable; or separation
pay, if reinstatement was no longer feasible, and backwages, viz:
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its April
28, 2004 Resolution24 for lack of merit.
In a Decision26 dated August 31, 2005, the CA denied the Petition for lack
of merit. Citing Cagayan Capitol College v. National Labor Relations
Commission,27 it held that respondent has satisfied all the requirements
necessary to acquire permanent employment and security of tenure viz:
Issue
Our Ruling
Such employment for fixed terms during the teachers’ probationary period
is an accepted practice in the teaching profession. In Magis Young
Achievers’ Learning Center v. Manalo,34 we noted that:
The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a
contract, effective for one school year. At the end of the school year, the
employer has the option not to renew the contract, particularly considering
the teacher’s performance. If the contract is not renewed, the employment
relationship terminates. If the contract is renewed, usually for another
school year, the probationary employment continues. Again, at the end of
that period, the parties may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. If
renewed, this second renewal of the contract for another school year would
then be the last year – since it would be the third school year – of
probationary employment. At the end of this third year, the employer may
now decide whether to extend a permanent appointment to the employee,
primarily on the basis of the employee having met the reasonable
standards of competence and efficiency set by the employer. For the entire
duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains under probation.
Upon the expiration of his contract of employment, being simply on
probation, he cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel the
employer to renew his employment contract. It is when the yearly contract
is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manual becomes
operative, and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent
employment status. (Emphases supplied)
Sec. 93. Regular or Permanent Status. - Those who have served the
probationary period shall be made regular or permanent. Full-time teachers
who have satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be
considered regular or permanent. (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision clearly provides that full-time teachers become regular
or permanent employees once they have satisfactorily completed the
probationary period of three school years.37 The use of the term
satisfactorily necessarily connotes the requirement for schools to set
reasonable standards to be followed by teachers on probationary
employment. For how else can one determine if probationary teachers
have satisfactorily completed the probationary period if standards therefor
are not provided?
As such, "no vested right to a permanent appointment shall accrue until the
employee has completed the prerequisite three-year period necessary for
the acquisition of a permanent status. [However, it must be emphasized
that] mere rendition of service for three consecutive years does not
automatically ripen into a permanent appointment. It is also necessary that
the employee be a full-time teacher, and that the services he rendered are
satisfactory."38
Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of
knowing the company standards the new hires have to meet during the
probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards,
aside from the usual standards applicable to employees after they achieve
permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards
should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start
of their probationary period, or at the very least under the circumstances of
the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester during which
the probationary standards are to be applied. Of critical importance in
invoking a failure to meet the probationary standards, is that the school
should show – as a matter of due process – how these standards have
been applied. This is effectively the second notice in a dismissal situation
that the law requires as a due process guarantee supporting the security of
tenure provision, and is in furtherance, too, of the basic rule in employee
dismissal that the employer carries the burden of justifying a dismissal.
These rules ensure compliance with the limited security of tenure
guarantee the law extends to probationary employees.
In the same case, this Court has definitively pronounced that "in a situation
where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not
specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should assume
primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give way."40
In this case, glaringly absent from petitioners’ evidence are the reasonable
standards that respondent was expected to meet that could have served as
proper guidelines for purposes of evaluating his performance. Nowhere in
the Teacher’s Contract44 could such standards be found.45 Neither was it
mentioned that the same were ever conveyed to respondent. Even
assuming that respondent failed to meet the standards set forth by CSR
and made known to the former at the time he was engaged as a teacher on
probationary status, still, the termination was flawed for failure to give the
required notice to respondent.46 This is because Book VI, Rule I, Section 2
of the IRR of the Labor Code provides:
xxxx
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
5)
DLSU - ARANETA v. BERNARDO
De La Salle University - Araneta Vs. Juanito C. Bernardo
G.R. No. 190809
February 13, 2017
Facts:
The case was about the denial of the retirement benefits of an employee by
its employer. Bernardo was a part-time lecturer for DLSU. He has been an
employee of DLSU from 1974 up to 2003. On the year 2003, Bernardo
received a letter from DLSU that his services is no longer required.
Bernardo being a 75 years old teacher, did not protest the decision of
DLSU not to re hire him. Bernardo, later, then asked his employer for his
retirement benefits, which the latter then refused to pay and allege that
Bernardo is only a part time employee and is not allowed to avail the
retirement benefits agreed by the labor union, and that; he’s action has
already prescribe, stating that he should have filed for his claim 3 years
after he turned 65 years old. Aggrieved, Bernardo filed a claim against
DLSU.
Issue:
WON the agreement of their labor union and the employer shall prevail.
WON the prescription shall run against Bernardo when he turned 65.
Held:
No. provisions of the CBA can be respected as long as it is not contrary to
law. Hence, a part time worker is not one of those who are exempted from
receiving a retirement benefit.
No. The prescription should run after his last day at work. Even though the
compulsory retirement age is 65, the mutual consent of each party to work
for and to allow to work the other will still be respected. Hence the
prescription should run after the last day of work.