ARIGO VS SWIFT
FACTS APPLICATION TO LAWS
TOPIC: Writ of The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship
Kalikasan, of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines
UNCLOS, requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the
Immunity territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay
from suit for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew
liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay,
arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for
its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20
a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest
side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-
southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have
been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-
salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to
cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology
Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial
waters. Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within
territorial waters. Yes.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took
the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship
entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage
to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He
explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from
suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s
internal waters and the territorial sea. According to Justice Carpio,
although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS, as can
be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and
Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal
Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. The international law of the sea is generally
defined as “a body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the uses
of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction
over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating
the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans.” The UNCLOS
is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10,
1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984
but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the
60th ratification. The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that
seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of
freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the world’s
marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international
law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying
degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters,
2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5)
the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over
foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located. Insofar as the
internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law.
Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as
to its bed and subsoil. In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice
Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any
request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State
may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for noncommercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage
to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the
laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30
and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and
other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis
supplied.) A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters
with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a
nonparty to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority – over 80% — of nation states are now
members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world’s leading maritime
power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS’ negotiation
and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately voted against and refrained
from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology
transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort
to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states
cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise
the objectionable provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton
administration, which signed the revised Part XI implementing agreement
in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the
Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and
consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his
successors, and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate
has since withheld the consent required for the President to
internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs CA
FACTS
Principle/s:  An action for eminent domain was filed by
- General Rule: Public funds are petitioner Municipality of Makati, attached was a
not subject to levy and execution. certification that a bank account (Account No.
Unless otherwise, provided by the S/A 265-537154-3) opened with the PNB Buendia
statute. Branch. After due hearing, respondent Judge
- State’s inherent power of fixed the appraised value of the property to
eminent domain (expropriation) P5,291,666.00 and ordering petitioner to pay this
Eminent domain is defined as “the amount minus the advanced payment of
power of the nation or a sovereign P338,160.00 which was earlier released to
state to take, or to authorize the taking
private respondent. Private respondent moved
of, private property for a public use
without the owner's consent, for the issuance of a writ of execution, followed
conditioned upon payment of just by the garnishment of petitioners fund with PNB
compensation.” Buendia Branch. Petitioner alleges that it has two
accounts with PNB Buendia:
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 — exclusively for the
expropriation of the subject property, with an
outstanding balance of P99,743.94.
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 — for statutory
obligations and other purposes of the municipal
government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of
July 12, 1989.
Petitioner claims that only the first PNB account may be
garnished, but not the second.
Is the second PNB account (S/A 263-530850-7) exempt
from garnishment?
Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are
exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.
APPLICATION OF LAW
The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are
public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is
the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute More particularly, the properties of a
municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use
cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment
against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution The foregoing rule finds application
in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has
passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4,
1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-
3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of
petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge
involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and
thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation
required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction,
well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from
taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing
that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating
the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy
under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner
to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will
not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising
from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of
eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice.
 REPUBLIC v PURISIMA
DOCTRINE
 “State may not be sued without
its consent” reflects nothing less
than a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State
and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction
of courts. It is based on the very
essence of sovereignty.\
 A sovereign is exempt from suit,
not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right
depends.
A suit considered as suit against the State
under the following instances:
1. When the Republic is sued by name;
2. When the suit is against an
unincorporated government agency;
3. When the suit is on its face against a
government officer but the case is such.
FACTS
 The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and
prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of
respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the
Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the
well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the
non-suability of a State, including its offices and
agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so
alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant
Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil
suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the
collection of a money claim arising from an
alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being
private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn
Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines,
Inc. operate as a waiver of the national government
from suit? NO
APPLICATION OF LAW
 The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State
thru a statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the
Rice and Corn Administration.Apparently respondent Judge was
misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent,
plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration
which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract
within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The
consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting
through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in
Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.
That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.