THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 174585. October 19, 2007.]

FEDERICO M. LEDESMA, JR. , petitioner, vs . NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC-SECOND DIVISION) HONS. RAUL
T. AQUINO, VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY and ANGELITA A. GACUTAN
ARE THE COMMISSIONERS, PHILIPPINE NAUTICAL TRAINING INC.,
ATTY. HERNANI FABIA, RICKY TY, PABLO MANOLO, C. DE LEON and
TREENA CUEVA , respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p

This a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, led by petitioner Federico Ledesma, Jr., seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision, 1 dated 28 May 2005, and the Resolution, 2 dated 7 September 2006, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79724. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision
and Resolution, a rmed the Decision dated 15 April 2003, and Resolution dated 9 June
2003, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dismissing petitioner's
complaint for illegal dismissal and ordering the private respondent Philippine National
Training Institute (PNTI) to reinstate petitioner to his former position without loss of
seniority rights. DAHEaT

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On 4 December 1998, petitioner was employed as a bus/service driver by the
private respondent on probationary basis, as evidenced by his appointment. 3 As such,
he was required to report at private respondent's training site in Dasmariñas, Cavite,
under the direct supervision of its site administrator, Pablo Manolo de Leon (de Leon). 4
On 11 November 2000, petitioner led a complaint against de Leon for allegedly
abusing his authority as site administrator by using the private respondent's vehicles
and other facilities for personal ends. In the same complaint, petitioner also accused de
Leon of immoral conduct allegedly carried out within the private respondent's
premises. A copy of the complaint was duly received by private respondent's Chief
Accountant, Nita Azarcon (Azarcon). 5
On 27 November 2000, de Leon led a written report against the petitioner
addressed to private respondent's Vice-President for Administration, Ricky Ty (Ty),
citing his suspected drug use.
In view of de Leon's report, private respondent's Human Resource Manager, Trina
Cueva (HR Manager Cueva), on 29 November 2000, served a copy of a Notice to
petitioner requiring him to explain within 24 hours why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him for allegedly violating Section 14, Article IV of the private respondent's
Code of Conduct. 6
On 3 December 2000, petitioner led a complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.

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 In his Position Paper, 7 petitioner averred that in view of the complaint he led
against de Leon for his abusive conduct as site administrator, the latter retaliated by
falsely accusing petitioner as a drug user. VP for Administration Ty, however, instead of
verifying the veracity of de Leon's report, readily believed his allegations and together
with HR Manager Cueva, verbally dismissed petitioner from service on 29 November
2000. DaScHC

Petitioner alleged that he was asked to report at private respondent's main office
in España, Manila, on 29 November 2000. There, petitioner was served by HR Manager
Cueva a copy of the Notice to Explain together with the copy of de Leon's report citing
his suspected drug use. After he was made to receive the copies of the said notice and
report, HR Manager Cueva went inside the o ce of VP for Administration Ty. After a
while, HR Manager Cueva came out of the o ce with VP for Administration Ty. To
petitioner's surprise, HR Manager Cueva took back the earlier Notice to Explain given to
him and atly declared that there was no more need for the petitioner to explain since
his drug test result revealed that he was positive for drugs. When petitioner, however,
asked for a copy of the said drug test result, HR Manager Cueva told him that it was
with the company's president, but she would also later claim that the drug test result
was already with the proper authorities at Camp Crame. 8
Petitioner was then asked by HR Manager Cueva to sign a resignation letter and
also remarked that whether or not petitioner would resign willingly, he was no longer
considered an employee of private respondent. All these events transpired in the
presence of VP for Administration Ty, who even convinced petitioner to just voluntarily
resign with the assurance that he would still be given separation pay. Petitioner did not
yet sign the resignation letter replying that he needed time to think over the offers.
When petitioner went back to private respondent's training site in Dasmariñas, Cavite,
to get his bicycle, he was no longer allowed by the guard to enter the premises. 9
On the following day, petitioner immediately went to St. Dominic Medical Center
for a drug test and he was found negative for any drug substance. With his drug result
on hand, petitioner went back to private respondent's main o ce in Manila to talk to VP
for Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva and to show to them his drug test result.
Petitioner then told VP for Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva that since his drug
test proved that he was not guilty of the drug use charge against him, he decided to
continue to work for the private respondent. 1 0
On 2 December 2000, petitioner reported for work but he was no longer allowed
to enter the training site for he was allegedly banned therefrom according to the guard
on duty. This incident prompted the petitioner to le the complaint for illegal dismissal
against the private respondent before the Labor Arbiter. aSATHE

For its part, private respondent countered that petitioner was never dismissed
from employment but merely served a Notice to Explain why no disciplinary action
should be led against him in view of his superior's report that he was suspected of
using illegal drugs. Instead of ling an answer to the said notice, however, petitioner
prematurely lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before
the Labor Arbiter. 1 1
Private respondent likewise denied petitioner's allegations that it banned the
latter from entering private respondent's premises. Rather, it was petitioner who failed
or refused to report to work after he was made to explain his alleged drug use. Indeed,
on 3 December 2000, petitioner was able to claim at the training site his salary for the
period of 16-30 November 2000, as evidenced by a copy of the pay voucher bearing
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 petitioner's signature. Petitioner's accusation that he was no longer allowed to enter
the training site was further belied by the fact that he was able to claim his 13th month
pay thereat on 9 December 2000, supported by a copy of the pay voucher signed by
petitioner. 1 2
On 26 July 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, 1 3 in favor of the
petitioner declaring illegal his separation from employment. The Labor Arbiter, however,
did not order petitioner's reinstatement for the same was no longer practical, and only
directed private respondent to pay petitioner backwages. The dispositive portion of the
Labor Arbiter's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the dismissal of the [petitioner] is
herein declared to be illegal. [Private respondent] is directed to pay the
complainant backwages and separation pay in the total amount of One Hundred
Eighty Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty One Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos
(P184,861.53). 1 4 AHCETa

Both parties questioned the Labor Arbiter's Decision before the NLRC. Petitioner
assailed the portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision denying his prayer for
reinstatement, and arguing that the doctrine of strained relations is applied only to
con dential employees and his position as a driver was not covered by such
prohibition. 1 5 On the other hand, private respondent controverted the Labor Arbiter's
nding that petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment, and insisted that
petitioner was never dismissed from his job but failed to report to work after he was
asked to explain regarding his suspected drug use. 1 6
On 15 April 2003, the NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and
reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. 1 7 The NLRC declared that petitioner failed to
establish the fact of dismissal for his claim that he was banned from entering the
training site was rendered impossible by the fact that he was able to subsequently
claim his salary and 13th month pay. Petitioner's claim for reinstatement was, however,
granted by the NLRC. The decretal part of the NLRC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is, hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another entered, DISMISSING the complaint for
lack of merit.
[Petitioner] is however, ordered REINSTATED to his former position without
loss of seniority rights, but WITHOUT BACKWAGES. 1 8

The Motion for Reconsideration led by petitioner was likewise denied by the
NLRC in its Resolution dated 29 August 2003. 1 9 HTAIcD

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court, and a rmed the NLRC Decision giving more credence to
private respondent's stance that petitioner was not dismissed from employment, as it
is more in accord with the evidence on record and the attendant circumstances of the
instant case. 2 0 Similarly ill-fated was petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution issued on 7 September 2006. 2 1
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 2 under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, led by petitioner assailing the foregoing Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I.

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 WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION
OF FACTS, AND THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. PETITIONER'S DISMISSAL WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE
UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCES ON RECORD, WHICH WERE MISAPPRECIATED
BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC, AND HAD THESE BEEN CONSIDERED THE
INEVITABLE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THE AFFIRMATION OF THE LABOR
ARBITER'S DECISION FINDING ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
II.
WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SUBVERTED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS NO JUST CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL AS PETITIONER IS NOT A DRUG
USER AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL.

III.
WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SUBVERTED PETITIONER'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW. 2 3 DCESaI

Before we delve into the merits of this case, it is best to stress that the issues
raised by petitioner in this instant petition are factual in nature which is not within the
office of a Petition for Review. 2 4 The raison d'etre for this rule is that, this Court is not a
trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties for the factual ndings of the labor o cials who
have acquired expertise in their own elds are accorded not only respect but even
finality, and are binding upon this Court. 2 5
However, when the ndings of the Labor Arbiter contradict those of the NLRC,
departure from the general rule is warranted, and this Court must of necessity make an
in nitesimal scrunity and examine the records all over again including the evidence
presented by the opposing parties to determine which ndings should be preferred as
more conformable with evidentiary facts. 2 6
The primordial issue in the petition at bar is whether the petitioner was illegally
dismissed from employment.
The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed from
employment warranting the payment of his backwages. The NLRC and the Court of
Appeals found otherwise.
In reversing the Labor Arbiter's Decision, the NLRC underscored the settled
evidentiary rule that before the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove the
validity of the employee's dismissal, the employee must rst su ciently establish that
he was indeed dismissed from employment. The petitioner, in the present case, failed
to establish the fact of his dismissal. The NLRC did not give credence to petitioner's
allegation that he was banned by the private respondent from entering the workplace,
opining that had it been true that petitioner was no longer allowed to enter the training
site when he reported for work thereat on 2 December 2000, it is quite a wonder he was
able to do so the very next day, on 3 December 2000, to claim his salary. 2 7 STcHEI

The Court of Appeals validated the above conclusion reached by the NLRC and
further rationated that petitioner's positive allegations that he was dismissed from
service was negated by substantial evidence to the contrary. Petitioner's averments of
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 what transpired inside private respondent's main o ce on 29 November 2000, when he
was allegedly already dismissed from service, and his claim that he was effectively
banned from private respondent's premises are belied by the fact that he was able to
claim his salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000 at private respondent's training
site.
Petitioner, therefore, is now before this Court assailing the Decisions handed
down by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, and insisting that he was illegally
dismissed from his employment. Petitioner argues that his receipt of his earned salary
for the period of 16-30 November 2000, and his 13th month pay, is neither inconsistent
with nor a negation of his allegation of illegal dismissal. Petitioner maintains that he
received his salary and bene t only from the guardhouse, for he was already banned
from the work premises.
We are not persuaded.
Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before judicial
and quasi-administrative bodies, it is necessary that allegations must be supported by
substantial evidence. 2 8 Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. 2 9 SIEHcA

In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the
quantum of evidence required, i.e., substantial evidence. Petitioner's claim of illegal
dismissal is supported by no other than his own bare, uncorroborated and, thus, self-
serving allegations, which are also incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory.
Petitioner himself narrated that when his presence was requested on 29
November 2000 at the private respondent's main o ce where he was served with the
Notice to Explain his superior's report on his suspected drug use, VP for Administration
Ty offered him separation pay if he will just voluntarily resign from employment. While
we do not condone such an offer, neither can we construe that petitioner was
dismissed at that instance. Petitioner was only being given the option to either resign
and receive his separation pay or not to resign but face the possible disciplinary
charges against him. The nal decision, therefore, whether to voluntarily resign or to
continue working still, ultimately rests with the petitioner. In fact, by petitioner's own
admission, he requested from VP for Administration Ty more time to think over the
offer.
Moreover, the petitioner alleged that he was not allowed to enter the training site
by the guard on duty who told him that he was already banned from the premises.
Subsequently, however, petitioner admitted in his Supplemental A davit that he was
able to return to the said site on 3 December 2000, to claim his 16-30 November 2000
salary, and again on 9 December 2000, to receive his 13th month pay. The fact alone
that he was able to return to the training site to claim his salary and bene ts raises
doubt as to his purported ban from the premises.
Finally, petitioner's stance that he was dismissed by private respondent was
further weakened with the presentation of private respondent's payroll bearing
petitioner's name proving that petitioner remained as private respondent's employee up
to December 2000. Again, petitioner's assertion that the payroll was merely fabricated
for the purpose of supporting private respondent's case before the NLRC cannot be
given credence. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the
presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court. It is
therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to adduce clear and convincing evidence in
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 support of his claim of fabrication and to overcome such presumption of regularity. 3 0
Unfortunately, petitioner again failed in such endeavor. TIDcEH

On these scores, there is a dearth of evidence to establish the fact of petitioner's

dismissal. We have scrupulously examined the records and we found no evidence
presented by petitioner, other than his own contentions that he was indeed dismissed
by private respondent.
While this Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of illegal dismissal, the
employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause in the case at bar, however, the facts and the evidence did not
establish a prima faciecase that the petitioner was dismissed from employment. 3 1
Before the private respondent must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was
legal, petitioner must rst establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal
from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the
legality or illegality thereof.
In Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc. , 3 2 we had underscored that the
burden of proving the allegations rest upon the party alleging, to wit:
The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it ;
thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents
dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the
evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing . The
rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases nds
no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the
petitioners. 3 3 ASETHC

In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, 3 4 this Court took the occasion to emphasize:
It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the
part of the party who makes the allegations — ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non
qui negat. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by
competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of that of his opponent . 3 5

It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in light of
this Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in striking down any attempt of the
management to exploit or oppress the working class. However, it does not mean that
we are bound to uphold the working class in every labor dispute brought before this
Court for our resolution.
The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the
scales of justice in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent economic inequality
between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scales of justice; to put
the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the
circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never
should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer. Justitia nemini
neganda est — justice is to be denied to none. 3 6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 28 May 2005 and its Resolution dated 7 September 2006 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79724 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. DEcSaI

SO ORDERED.
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 Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) with Associate
Justices Josefina Guevarra-Salonga and Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, concurring. Rollo,
pp. 38-50.
2. Rollo, pp. 52-53.

3. Id. at 82.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 85-86.
6. Id. at 107.
7. Id. at 71-81.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 91-105.
12. Id.

13. Id. at 65-70.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 144-160.
16. Id. at 160-172.

17. Id. at 54-64.

18. Id. at 63.
19. Id. at 42.
20. Id. at 38-50. cdasia2005

21. Id. at 52-53.

22. Id. at 12-36.

23. Id. at 236-237.
24. Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Llamera, G.R. No. 152514, 12 July 2005, 463 SCRA 254, 260.
25. Dusit Hotel Nikko v. National Union of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries
(NUWHRAIN), Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter, G.R. No. 160391, 9 August 2005, 466 SCRA 374,
387-388; The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R. No.
156963, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 274, 283.

26. Sta. Catalina College v. National Labor Relations Commission, 461 Phil. 720, 730 (2003).

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 27. Rollo, pp. 118-119.
28. Philippine Air Line v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159556, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 236, 251.

29. Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 511, 531 (1998).
30. Id. at 529.
31. Schering Employees Labor Union (SELU) v. Schering Plough Corporation, G.R. No. 142506,
17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 689, 695.
32. G.R. No. 168664, 4 May 2006, 389 SCRA 534.
33. Id. at 544-545.
34. G.R. No. 146202, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 418.

35. Id. at 428.

36. JPL Marketing Promotions v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151966, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA
136, 149-150. IcDESA

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