THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE & GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, vs. HON.

BREVA
A petition for review
Facts:- respondent Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint for damages and reimbursement of insurance
premiums against the petitioner with the (RTC) of Davao City. The complaint specifically stated that the
petitioner could be served with summons and other court processes through its Manager at its branch
office located at Rizal St., Davao City
- Thereafter, Summons together with the complaint, was served upon the petitioner's Davao regional
office, and was received by its Insurance Service Officer,Ruthie Babael
- petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person due
to improper service of summons. It contended that summons was improperly served upon its employee in
its regional office at Davao City, and that the said employee was not among those named in Section 11,
Rule 14
- the respondent filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that summons and other court processes could
also be served at its principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, through the
president or any of its officers authorized to receive summons.
- RTC issued an Order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss and directing the issuance of an alias
summons to be served at its main office in Manila.
- petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. RTC issued an Order denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and supplemental oral motion to strike out the amended complaint
- the petitioner filed with the CA a special action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. CA dismissed
the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC. The CA held that the service of the alias
summons on the amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in
Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over its person. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the said decision.
Issues:(1) Did the trial court committ grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner due to improper service of summons? and
(2) Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as the defendant therein?
Held: No! Yes!
- A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should
be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court
complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed.
An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant.
- In the instant case, since at the time the complaint was amended no summons had been properly
served on the petitioner and it had not yet appeared in court, new summons should havebeen issued on
the amended complaint. Hence, the CA was correct when it held that, technically, the trial court should
have ordered the issuance of an original summons, not an aliassummons. After all, an alias summons is
merely a continuation of the original summons. In this case, however, there was no sense in issuing an
alias summons on the original complaint since the complaint had already been amended. The trial court
should have instead issued a new summons on the amended complaint
- Nonetheless, the CA deemed it necessary to treat the alias summons as a matter of nomenclature,
considering that the rationale behind the service of summons to make certain that the corporation would
promptly and properly receive notice of the filing of an action against it has been served in this case. The
CA held that it would be a great injustice to the respondent if the complaint would be dismissed just
because what was issued and served was an alias summons; that she would be made to file a new
complaint and thus, incur further monetary burden
- We agree with the CA. It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an original or an alias
summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons
complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant
together with the prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements under
the Rules, both as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all the information required under
the rules, and it was served on the persons authorized to receive the summons on behalf of the petitioner
at its principal office in Manila. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias summons but
more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a continuation of the first summons
considering that it particularly referred to the amended complaint and not to the original complaint
Belen vs Chavez
Issue: (1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners through either the proper
service of summons or the appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioner?
Held: Yes, thru the appearance of Atty. Alcantara.
-In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, the Court underscored the necessity of determining first whether
the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature of the action. The Court elaborated,
thus:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly
try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily
appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of
court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
physically present in the country. If he is
not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try
and decide the case against him. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a non-
resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was
his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a
mere offshoot of the first case.
-The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of the complaint, is for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment in a complaint for breach of contract whereby petitioners were ordered to pay private
respondents the monetary award. It is in the nature of an action in personam because private
respondents are suing to enforce their personal rights under said judgment.
-Applying the foregoing rules on the service of summons to the instant case, in an action in personam,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of
the court is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case through personal service or, if this is
not possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service as provided in Rule 14, Sections 6-
7. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode ofservice,
that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If the defendant, for justifiable
reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be
resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in
derogation of the usual method of service.
-If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a
Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines under
Rule 14, Section 15. In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the
Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is
essential to make a binding decision
-However, the records of the case reveal that herein petitioners have been permanent residents of
California, U.S.A. since the filing of the action up to the present. From the time Atty. Alcantara filed an
answer purportedly at the instance of petitioners relatives, it has been consistently maintained that
petitioners were not physically present in the Philippines. In the answer, Atty. Alcantara had already
averred that petitioners were residents of California, U.S.A. and that he was appearing only upon the
instance of petitioners relatives. In addition, private respondents attorney-in-fact, JoselitoRioveros,
testified during the ex parte presentation of evidence that he knew petitioners to be former residents of
Alaminos, Laguna but are now living in California, U.S.A. That being the case, the service of summons on
petitioners purported address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest
in court jurisdiction over their persons.
-Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his
filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners. Through
certain acts, Atty. Alcantara was impliedly authorized by petitioners to appear on their behalf. For
instance, in support of the motion to dismiss the complaint, Atty. Alcantara attached thereto a duly
authenticated copy of the judgment of dismissal and a photocopy of the identification page of petitioner
Domingo Belens U.S. passport. These documents could have been supplied only by petitioners,
indicating that they have consented to the appearance of Atty.Alcantaraon their behalf. In sum, petitioners
voluntarily submitted themselves through Atty. Alcantara to the jurisdiction of the RTC

Santos vs PNOC
This is a petition for review
Facts: -respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner
Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
-Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known
address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed
service of summons by publication.
-Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the
advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of respondents employee to the effect that he
sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address.
-When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved that the case be
set for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated
September 11, 2003
-Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the
case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.
-petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. He sought
reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by
respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the
clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September
11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondents evidence ex parte be stricken off the records and that his
answer be admitted.
-Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied with the rules on service by
publication. Moreover, pursuant to the September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in
default for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period
-trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
-petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari
-CA sustained the RTC’s Decision and it denied reconsideration. Thus, this petition.
Issue:Was there lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s person due to improper service of summons?
Held: No, there was jurisdiction.
-Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order. (emphasis supplied)
-Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his
whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons
by publication.
-Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that
substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in
personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to
which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to
in rem actions only. This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem
-Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:
an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office,
postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
-Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk,
or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The
service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the
defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit showing the
deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to
the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
-The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk
of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to
make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by
publication.
-Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him
-Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
to Admit Attached Answer. This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner

Wong vs Factor-Koyoma
For Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45
Facts: -The present controversy originates from a Complaint, for specific performance, sum of money,
and damages, filed with the RTC by private respondent Catherine Factor-Koyama (Koyama) against
Wong.Koyama alleged in her Complaint that Wong deliberately refused to execute and deliver a deed of
absolute sale, and to surrender the condominium certificate of title (CCT) pertaining to a condominium
unit.
-RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence, No. 21 West Riverside Street, San Francisco
Del Monte, Quezon City. However, the original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint
and its Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff IV Renebert B. Baloloy (Sheriff Baloloy),
who indicated in his Sheriffs Return dated 14 August 2007 that said court process should already be
deemed DULY SERVED. According to his Return, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the
summons at Wongs residential address on 27 July 2007, 8 August 2007, and 10 August 2007, but Wong
was always not around according to the latters housemaids, Marie Sandoval (Sandoval) and Loren Lopez
(Lopez). Sheriff Baloloy then attempted to leave the summons with Criz Mira (Mira), Wongs caretaker,
who is of legal age, and residing at the same address for two and a half years, but Mira refused to
acknowledge or receive the same
-after the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without Wong filing an answer to the Complaint in Civil
Case No. C-21860, Koyama moved for the RTC to declare him in default, and to allow her to present her
evidence ex parte and/or to render judgment in her favor. The RTC set Koyamas Motion for hearing on 25
October 2007 at 8:30 in the morning or as soon as counsel and the matter may be heard
-RTC, presided by public respondent Hon. Adoracion Angeles, issued an Order declaring Wong in
default.
-Wong subsequently filed with the RTC, by registered mail sent a Manifestation claiming that he did not
receive any summons from said court. According to him, he was only informed unofficially by a tricycle
driver on 27 September 2007 regarding papers from a court in Caloocan City, which the tricycle driver
returned to the court after failing to locate Wong. This prompted Wong to file an inquiry dated 28
September 2007 with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City as regards any case
that might have been filed against him. In response, the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Caloocan City issued a Certification dated 3 October 2007 bearing the details of Civil Case No. C-21860,
which Koyama had instituted against him. Wong asserted that he would not hesitate to submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the RTC, should the proper procedure be observed.
RTC stressed that, as early as 25 September 2007, Wong had been declared in default
-Wong, by special appearance of counsel, then filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss
-Koyama maintained that there was a proper substituted service of the summons, consequently, the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Wong; and that Wong was served a copy of the Motion to have
him declared in default on 3 October 2007, as evidenced by the Registry Return Card.Wong filed a Reply
to Koyamas aforementioned Opposition, denying that a Loren Lopez or Criz Mira resided at his home
address.
-The RTC denied Wongs Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Wong went before the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed Wongs Petition for Certiorari outright for being the
improper remedy. Wong filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the Court of
Appeals denied the same for lack of merit in a Resolution.
-In the meantime, since neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the proceedings in Civil Case No. C-21860, the RTC
continued hearing the said case. In anOrder dated 20 November 2008, the RTC motuproprio allowed
Wong to cross- examine Koyama during the hearing on 23 January 2009, even though it did not lift its 25
September 2007 Order, which had declared him in default
Issue: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over Wong’s person?
Held: -Yes! (But bec of voluntary appearance not bec of the summons)
-Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly
upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines,
the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner described in
Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court
-Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is generally preferred over
substituted service. Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an
extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a
suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another to whom the law could
only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.
-The Court requires that the Sheriffs Return clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or
hopelessness of personal service. Proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of
service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in
the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise
required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the
officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.
-The Court, after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloys afore-quoted Return, finds that he improperly resorted
to substituted service upon Wong of the summons. Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to
Wongs residence on three different dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is nothing
else in the Sheriffs Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted extraordinary efforts to locate Wong.
During his visits to Wongs residence on 27 July 2007 and 10 August 2007, Sheriff Baloloy was informed
by the housemaids that Wong was at his office. There is no showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy
exerted effort to know Wongs office address, verify his presence thereat, and/or personally serve the
summons upon him at his office. Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy attempted to serve
the summons at the formers residence on 8 August 2007, there was no indication that Wongs absence
was other than temporary or that he would not soon return
-Evidently, the Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by Sheriff Baloloy to locate Wong, as
well as the impossibility of personal service of summons upon Wong within a reasonable time. Sheriff
Baloloys three visits to Wongs residence hardly constitute effort on his part to locate Wong; and Wongs
absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloys visits, since Wong was at the office or out-of-town,
does not connote impossibility of personal service of summons upon him. It must be stressed that, before
resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal service
on the defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the
sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant.
-Nevertheless, even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14
-The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance before it in Civil Case No.
C-21860. The Court is not referring to Wongs filing of his Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case
No. C-21860, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over his person, because that clearly does
not constitute voluntary appearance. The Court, instead, calls attention to the RTC Order dated 20
November 2008 allowing Wong to cross-examine Koyama. Wong, through his counsel, took advantage of
the opportunity opened to him by the said Order and aggressively questioned her during the 23 January
2009 hearing, despite his knowledge that the RTC had not yet lifted the 25 September 2007 Order
declaring him in default. By actively participating in the 23 January 2009 hearing, he effectively
acknowledged full control of the RTC over Civil Case No. C- 21860 and over his person as the defendant
therein; he is, thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said trial court.

Sansio Phil. Vs Sps. Mogol

Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45
Facts:-Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation that is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling appliances and other related products.petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money and Damages against respondent spouses Mogol before the MeTC of Manila.
- Petitioner stated in the Complaint that respondent spouses Alicia and LeodegarioMogol, Jr. were the
owners and managers of MR Homes Appliances, with residence at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village,
Lucena City, where summons and other written legal processes of the court may be served. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent spouses Mogol purchased from petitioner air-conditioning units and fans.
Respondent spouses Mogol apparently issued postdated checks as payment therefor, but said checks
were dishonored, as the account against which the checks were drawn was closed. Respondent spouses
Mogol made partial payments, leaving a balance of P87,953.12 unpaid. Despite several demands by
petitioner, respondent spouses Mogol failed to settle their obligation
- at the request of herein petitioner, the process server of the MeTC of Manila served the summons and
the copy of the complaint on respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch
24. Respondent spouses were in the said premises, as they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of the
criminal cases filed by petitioner against respondent Alicia Mogol for violations of Batas PambansaBlg.
22. Upon being so informed of the summons and the complaint, respondent spouses Mogol referred the
same to their counsel, who was also present in the courtroom. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol
took hold of the summons and the copy of the complaint and read the same. Thereafter, he pointed out to
the process server that the summons and the copy of the complaint should be served only at the address
that was stated in both documents, i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, and not
anywhere else. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol apparently gave back the summons and the
copy of the complaint to the process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy and sign for the
same. As the process server could not convince the respondent spouses Mogol to sign for the
aforementioned documents, he proceeded to leave the premises of the courtroom
- the process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service of Summons
- petitioner filed a Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default.Petitioner averred that the summons and
the copy of the complaint were already validly served upon the respondent spouses Mogol at the
courtroom of the MeTC, Branch 24, which they refused to accept for no valid reason at all. From the date
of said service up to the time of the filing of the above-stated motion, respondent spouses Mogol had yet
to file any responsive pleading. Petitioner, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered against respondent
spouses Mogol, and that the relief prayed for in its Complaint be granted
- through a special appearance of their counsel, respondent spouses Mogol filed an Opposition to the
Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. They posited that Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
requires that the complaint must contain the names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant.
Therefore, the process server should have taken notice of the allegation of the complaint, which referred
to the address of respondent spouses Mogol wherein court processes may be served. If such service, as
alleged in the complaint, could not be complied with within a reasonable time, then and only then may the
process server resort to substituted service. Respondent spouses Mogol further averred that there was
no quarrel as to the requirement that the respondents must be served summons in person and, if they
refused to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to them. They merely reiterated that the service should
have been effected at the respondent spouses residential address, as stated in the summons and the
copy of the complaint.
- The MeTC of Manila, Branch 25 ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not specify
where service is to be effected. For obvious reasons, because service of summons is made by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, the same may be undertaken wherever the defendant may be
found. Although the Return on the Service of Summons indicated that the original and the duplicate
copies thereof were returned UNSERVED, the same could not be taken to mean that respondent
spouses Mogol had not yet been served with summons. That allegation in the return was clearly
prompted by the statement in the first paragraph thereof that respondents spouses Mogol refused to
received (sic) [the summons and the copy of the complaint] with no valid reason at all. Respondent
spouses Mogol were, thus, validly served with summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file
any responsive pleading before the lapse of the reglementary period therefor, the Motion to Declare
[Respondents] in Default filed by petitioner was declared to be meritorious
- respondent spouses Mogol filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction before the RTC of
Manila against Judge Severino B. de Castro, Jr. of the MeTC of Manila.
The RTC of Manila, Branch 33, held that Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not mandate that
summons be served strictly at the address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily, said
provision states that the service of summons may be made wherever such is possible and practicable.
Therefore, it did not matter much that the summons and the copy of the complaint in this case were
served inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, instead of the address at 1218 Daisy St.,
Employee Village, Lucena City.
-CA however ruled infavor of respondents, it said that “A perusal of the said return readily shows that the
summons was unserved upon the Mogol spouses”
- Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals
Issue: Was the service of summons in the courtroom, before the hearing, a valid service of summons?
Held:Yes!
-It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons
most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is
accomplished. The essence of personal service
is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, he may be found; that is,
wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines
-In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of
respondent spouses Mogol. To recapitulate, the process server presented the summons and the copy of
the complaint to respondent spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24. The latter
immediately referred the matter to their counsel, who was present with them in the aforesaid courtroom.
At the express direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons and the copy of the complaint, read
the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of the said documents. Ineluctably, at that point,
the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the
complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latters
behest and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of handing a copy of the summons to
respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was
already acquired by the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel
of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server was
no longer material.
-Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the summons
and the copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be served only in the address
stated therein, was a gross mistake. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the
service of summons on the defendant in person must be effected only at the latters residence as stated in
the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear that, whenever practicable, summons shall
be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him. Nothing more is required. As correctly held by the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, the
service of the copy of the summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila,
Branch 24 was the most practicable act under the circumstances, and the process server need not wait
for respondent spouses Mogol to reach their given address, i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village,
Lucena City, before he could serve on the latter the summons and the copy of the complaint. Due to the
distance of the said address, service therein would have been more costly and would have entailed a
longer delay on the part of the process server in effecting the service of the summons.
- Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply
simultaneously. Said provisions do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can
either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules, service
of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service. Substituted
service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method, since it seeks to
bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit, even though notice of such action is
served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending
proceedings. For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly
established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were
exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or
place of business
- Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the fact that the summons was returned to the process
server and respondent spouses Mogul subsequently declined to sign for them did not mean that the
service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses was a failure, such that a further effort was
required to serve the summons anew. A tender of summons, much less, a substituted service of
summons, need no longer be resorted to in this case.

Manuel vs Ong
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:- respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, a
complaint for accionreivindicatoria. Ong charged the Spouses Manuel with having constructed
improvements — through force, intimidation, strategy, threats, and stealth — on a property he supposedly
owned.
-Ong filed an "amended complaint." summons was issueddirected to the Spouses Manuel.
-Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel indefault. Per the
sheriffs return on summons, on February 12, 2010, Sheriff Joselito Sales, along with Ong's counsel, Atty.
Christopher Donaal, and a certain Federico Laureano, attempted to personally serve summons on the
Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. The Spouses Manuel,
however, requested that service be made at another time considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's
mother was then critically ill. The sheriffs return further indicates that on March 16, 2010, another attempt
at personal service was made. After Sheriff Joselito Sales had personally explained to petitioner Sandra
Manuel the content of the summons and the complaint, the latter refused to sign and receive the
summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons
and complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to file their answer within fifteen (15) days.
As the Spouses Manuel failed to file their answer within this period, Ong asked that they be declared in
default.
- the Regional Trial Court issued an order granting Ong's motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in
default. Following this, Ong moved for the ex parte presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial
Court granted
- Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default. They alleged that it is the siblings of petitioner
Sandra Manuel who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La
Trinidad, Benguet. Thus, summons could not have been properly served on them in the former address.
They surmised that Ong and his companions mistook petitioner Sandra Manuel's siblings as the
defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582. They further claimed that they only subsequently received via
registered mail copies of (1) a compliance and manifestation filed by Ong and (2) the Regional Trial
Court's order scheduling the ex parte presentation of evidence. Attached to the Spouses Manuel's motion
to lift order of default was their answer
- Regional Trial Court denied the Spouses Manuel's motion to lift order of default. It noted that, first, their
motion was not sworn to, as required by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and, second, they did not
show that their failure to timely file an answer "was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence." In its order dated February 16, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied the Spouses Manuel's
motion for reconsideration.
- the Spouses Manuel filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, but it was denied.
Issue:Was jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel acquired?
Held: Yes!
- We hold that jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582 — the
Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel — was validly acquired. This is so because personal service of
summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales on March 16, 2010
-In this case, the sheriffs return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to
personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate
occasions. He relented from doing so on the first occasion in deference to the medical condition of
petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother. On the second occasion, he was constrained to tender the summons
and copy of the complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept them.
-The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the sheriffs return but
claimed that no valid service of summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside in Lower
Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service of summons, was made. From this, they surmised
that the "Sandra Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriffs return was someone other than
petitioner Sandra Manuel.
-The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant's address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires:
personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse
to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of
the defendant, not the locus of service
-A sheriffs return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and, hence,
taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a
sheriff. In this case, the Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-serving) claim of maintaining
residence elsewhere but failed to even allege that there was anything irregular about the sheriffs return or
that it was otherwise incomplete.
-Having alleged irregularities in the service of summons, it was incumbent upon the Spouses Manuel to
adduce proof of their claims. All they mustered was their self-serving allegation of an alternative address.
If at all, this claim of maintaining residence elsewhere should not even be lent an iota of credibility
considering that, as respondent Ramon Ong pointed out, the barangay clearances, which the Spouses
Manuel themselves attached to one of their pleadings (as proof of their identities), actually indicated that
they were residents of BacongLoacan, Itogon, Benguet. 25 Their lie is, thus, revealed by their own
pleading.
aAs the Spouses Manuel not only failed in discharging the burden of proving their allegation but even
succeeded in contradicting themselves, Sheriff Joselito Sales' recollection of events must be taken to be
true.

BD Long Span Builders vs RS Ameploquio Realty

This is a petition for review
Facts:- Petitioner B. D. Long Span Builders, Inc. and respondent R. S. Ampeloquio Realty Development,
Inc. are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
- petitioner and respondent entered into an Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to render rip rapping
construction services at respondents Ampeloquio International Resort in Ternate, Cavite
- Respondent failed to fulfill its obligations under the Agreements, resulting in the cancellation of the
project. Petitioner demanded the return of the P800,000 cash bond, but respondent refused to do so
-petitioner (plaintiff) filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and damages against
respondent (defendant). On 17 October 2002, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on
respondent, through its staff member, RomelDolahoy.
-Respondent failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the complaint. Upon motion of
petitioner, the RTC issued an Order dated 29 November 2002, declaring respondent in default, and
allowing petitioner to present evidence ex parte
-RTC: in favor of petitioner
- Upon receipt of the RTC decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. After
considering the pleadings filed by petitioner andrespondent, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of Appeals
Issue:Was there a valid service of summons upon respondent?
Held: No!
- As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a domestic private
juridical entity, the service of summons must be made upon an officer who is named in the statute (i.e.,
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel), otherwise, the service is insufficient.
The purpose is torender it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in
an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served onhim. However, if the
summons cannot be served on the defendant personally within a reasonable period of time, then
substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7 of Rule 14
-Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have
been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed.
This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a
method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribedand in the circumstances
authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully
and fully, and any substituted service other thanthat authorized by statute is considered ineffective.
-In Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., this Court held that in case of substituted
service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendants
behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter would
actually receive the summons.
-Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant (respondent) through any of the
officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14; rather, summons was served by substituted service on the
defendants staff member, RomelDolahoy. Substituted service was resorted to on the servers first attempt
at service of summons, and there was no indication that prior efforts were made to render prompt
personal service on the defendant. Moreover, nothing on record shows that RomelDolahoy, the staff
member who received the summons in respondents behalf, shared such relation of confidence ensuring
that respondent would surely receive the summons. Thus, following our ruling in Orion, we are unable to
accept petitioners contention that service on RomelDolahoy constituted substantial compliance with the
requirements of substituted service.
-Petitioners contention that respondents filing of Notice of Appeal effectively cured any defect in the
service of summons is devoid of merit. It is well-settled that a defendant who has been declared in default
has the following remedies, to wit: (1) he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before
judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense;
(2) if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; (3) if he
discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief
under Section 2 of Rule 38; and (4) he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to setaside the order of default has been
presented by him. Thus, respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of appeal and
question the validity of the trial courts judgment without being considered to have submitted to the trial
courts authority

Planters Devt. Bank vs Chandumal

A petition for review under Rule 45
Facts:- The instant case stemmed from a contract to sell a parcel of land, together with improvements,
between BF Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) and herein respondent Julie Chandumal (Chandumal). BF Homes
sold to PDB all its rights, participations and interests over the contract.
-Chandumal paid her monthly amortizations from December 1990 until May 1994 when she began to
default in her payments. Despite demand, Chandumal still failed to settle her obligation.
- Consequently, summons was issued and served by deputy sheriff Roberto T. Galing (Sheriff Galing).
According to his return, Sheriff Galing attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on
July 15, 19 and 22, 1999 but it was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence,
the sheriff caused substituted service of summons on August 5, 1999 by serving the same through
Chandumal’s mother who acknowledged receipt thereof
- For her failure to file an answer within the prescribed period, PDB filed an ex parte motion to declare
Chandumal in default. RTC issued an Order granting the motion of PDB.
-Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer. She
maintained that she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified of the same. She further alleged
that her failure to file an answer within the reglementary period was due to fraud, mistake or excusable
negligence
- the RTC denied Chandumal’s motion to set aside the order of default. Her motion for reconsideration
was also denied for lack of merit.Chandumal appealed to the CA. the CA, without ruling on the propriety
of the judicial confirmation of the notarial rescission, rendered the assailed decision nullifying the RTC
decision due to invalid and ineffective substituted service of summons.
Issue:Was there proper service of summons?
Held: None!
-In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve it
personally. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted
service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service – the party
relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or
there is impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in the
Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a
person of suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is,
and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which
matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person
in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. These were
reiterated and applied in Pascual v. Pascual, where the substituted service of summon made was
invalidated due to the sheriff’s failure to specify in the return the necessary details of the failed attempts to
effect personal service which would justify resort to substituted service of summons
- In applying the foregoing requisites in the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the sheriff’s return
failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons. According to the CA, the Return of Summons
does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by
the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return
merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Indeed, the sheriff’s return shows a mere perfunctory
attempt to cause personal service of the summons on Chandumal. There was no indication if he even
asked Chandumal’s mother as to her specific whereabouts except that she was “out of the house”, where
she can be reached or whether he even tried to await her return. The “efforts” exerted by the sheriff
clearly do not suffice to justify substituted service and his failure to comply with the requisites renders
such service ineffective
-BUTdespite that there was no valid substituted service of summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that
Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
- When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer,
she effectively submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where
one seeks an affirmative relief is equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with
jurisdiction over the defendant’s person. Thus, it was ruled that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration is considered voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction

Macasaet vs Co
Facts:- respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in Manila, sued Abante
Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director
Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and
Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of an
allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite.
- was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each
defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305
3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila.
- In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to
effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each
defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable.
He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was
informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the
summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s return dated September 22, 2005
- On October 3, 2000, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special
appearance in their behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and
ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to
serve the summons personally on each of them in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. They further moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither
a natural nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in a civil action
- At the hearing of petitioners’ motion to dismiss, Medina testified that he had gone to the office address
of petitioners in the morning of September 18, 2000 to personally serve the summons on each defendant;
that petitioners were out of the office at the time; that he had returned in the afternoon of the same day to
again attempt to serve on each defendant personally but his attempt had still proved futile because all of
petitioners were still out of the office; that some competent persons working in petitioners’ office had
informed him that Macasaet and Quijano were always out and unavailable, and that Albano, Bay, Galang,
Hagos and Reyes were always out roving to gather news; and that he had then resorted to substituted
service upon realizing the impossibility of his finding petitioners in person within a reasonable time
- RTC denied the motion to dismiss. RTC denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
-CA promulgated its questioned decision, mandamus, dismissing the petition for certiorari, prohibition. CA
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over petitioners?
Held: Yes!
-It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered
ineffective. This is because substituted service, being in derogation of the usual method of service, is
extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by
statute. Only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time may substituted
service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement should be
found in the proof of service or sheriff’s return. 28 Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility
of prompt personal service as basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the defendant
either expressly or impliedly
- There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners
in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the
afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and
not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina
learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any
of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that
further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully
warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal
service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted
service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what
was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on
personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already
justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
-In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous.
They had actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of
several pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-
trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the
Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action

HSBC vs. Catalan

Before us are two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:- On January 29, 2001, respondent filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money with
damages against petitioner HSBANK, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-11372, due to HSBANK’s alleged
wanton refusal to pay her the value of five HSBANK checks issued by Frederick Arthur Thomson
(Thomson) amounting to HK$3,200,000.00
- On February 7, 2001, summons was served on HSBANK at the Enterprise Center, Tower I, Ayala
Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas St., Makati City. 3 HSBANK filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer or Motion to Dismiss dated February 21, 2001. 4 Then, it filed a Motion to Dismiss
- Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading petitioner HSBC TRUSTEE as co- defendant and
invoking Article 19 of the Civil Code as basis for her cause of action.
The Amended Complaint alleges:
Defendants HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, doing business in the Philippines, are corporations duly
organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with head office at 1 Grenville Street, St. Helier
Jersey, Channel Islands and with branch offices at Level 12, 1 Queen’s Road Central, Hongkong and
may be served with summons and other court processes through their main office in Manila with address
at HSBC, the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas Street, Makati City
-Catalan prays that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE be ordered to pay P20,864,000.00, in addition to
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigationexpenses
- HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on the grounds that: (a) the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since the action is a money claim for a debt
contracted by Thomson before his death which should have been filed in the estate or intestate
proceedings of Thomson; (b) Catalan engages in forum shopping by filing the suit and at the same time
filing a claim in the probate proceeding filed with another branch of the RTC; (c) the amended complaint
states no cause of action against HSBANK since it has no obligation to pay the checks as it has not
accepted the checks and Catalan did not re-deposit the checks or make a formal protest; (d) the RTC has
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of HSBANK for improper service of summons; and, (e) it did not
submit to the jurisdiction of the RTC by filing a motion for extension of time to file a motion to dismiss
- Meanwhile, on October 17, 2001, summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to the In House Counsel
of HSBANK (Makati Branch) at the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas,
Makati. Without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Special
Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, dated October 29, 2001, questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC over it. 11 HSBC TRUSTEE alleges that tender of summons through HSBANK
Makati did not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over it because: (a) it is a corporation separate and
distinct from HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office at the HSBANK Makati or in any other place in the
Philippines; (c) it has not authorized HSBANK Makati to receive summons for it; and, (d) it has no resident
agent upon whom summons may be served because it does not transact business in the Philippines
-RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss
- HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate motions for reconsideration, but both were denied
- Catalan moved to declare HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in default for failure to file their answer to the
amended complaint.
- Catalan moved to declare HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in default for failure to file their answer to the
amended complaint.CA dismissed the two petitions for certiorari.
Issue: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?
Held:Only over HSBANK but not over HSBC Trustee
-In holding that it acquired jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, the RTC held that both
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by setting up in their Motions to Dismiss other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the CA ruled that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE are
estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the RTC because they filed their respective answers before
the RTC.
-We find that both lower courts overlooked Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance." Nonetheless, such
omission does not aid HSBANK’s case.
-It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or Motion to
Dismiss. HSBANK already invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over it by praying that its motion for extension of
time to file answer or a motion to dismiss be granted. The Court has held that the filing of motions seeking
affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, HSBANK’s expressed reservation in its Answer
ad cautelam that it filed the same "as a mere precaution against being declared in default, and without
prejudice to the Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition xxx now pending before the Court of Appeals" to
assail the jurisdiction of the RTC over it is of no moment. Having earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the
RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time to file answer or motion to dismiss,
HSBANK, effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from
asserting otherwise, even before this Court
-In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be considered a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional appearance, entered precisely to question
the regularity of the service of summons. It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in
court challenging the jurisdiction of said court, e.g., invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be
considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. HSBC TRUSTEE has been
consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the service of summons and the jurisdiction of the RTC over it.
Thus, HSBC TRUSTEE cannot be declared in estoppel when it filed an Answer ad cautelam before the
RTC while its petition for certiorari was pending before the CA. Such answer did not render the petition for
certiorari before the CA moot and academic. The Answer of HSBC TRUSTEE was only filed to
preventany declaration that it had by its inaction waived the right to file responsive pleadings.
- Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the
British Virgin Islands. For proper service of summons on foreign corporations, Section 12 of Rule 14 of
the Revised Rules of Court
- Besides, there is no allegation in the amended complaint that HSBANK is the domestic agent of HSBC
TRUSTEE to warrant service of summons upon it. Thus, the summons tendered to the In House Counsel
of HSBANK (Makati Branch) for HSBC TRUSTEE was clearly improper

Green Star Express vs. Nissin-Universal Robina

Petition for Review under Rule 45
Facts:- On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation ( URC) owned
figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.' s (Green Star) passenger bus,
resulting in the death of the van's driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner FrutoSayson, Jr., was charged
with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
- Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent NissinUniversal Robina Corporation (NURC)
for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to P567, 070.68. NURC denied any liability therefore and
argued that the criminal case shall determine the ultimate liabilities of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal
case was dismissed without prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence
- Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the R TC of San
Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons. On
February 6, 2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service
- RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial
compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC
- Aggrieved, Green Star and Sayson moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Was summons properly served on NURC, vesting the trial court with jurisdiction?
Held:No!
- NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its
cost accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which
provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a
domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be served only through its officers
-In the past, the Court upheld service of summons upon a construction project manager, a corporation’s
assistant manager, and ordinary clerk of a corporation, private secretary of corporate executives, retained
counsel, and officials who had control over the operations of the corporation like the assistant general
manager or the corporation’s Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. The Court then considered said
persons as "agent" within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of
summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The rule now likewise states "general
manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and "treasure"
instead of "cashier." It has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated
in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of
one person excludes all others, or expression unions est exclusion alterius. Service must, therefore, be
made only on the person expressly listed in the rules. If the revision committee intended to liberalize the
rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
-Here, Tinio, a, member of NURC’s accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004. Green
star claims that it was received upon instruction of JunadetteAvedillo. The general manager of the
corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriff’s Return. The Return did not even state
whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant
manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to
sign and receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. However,
Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC’s motion to dismiss to
attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to support such allegation,
the same was likewise not presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA
that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is
not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not vadily acquire
jurisdiction over NURC, although the corporation may have actually received the summons. To rule
otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration
of
justice