Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic of the Philippines

P complaint R Application for Land Registration

R presented to the The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
Court the prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
following the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for
proposition the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

P argued this Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as
counter Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting
proposition by of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
presenting that Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.

RTC RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law,
the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Whereas the OSG Remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable
and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of
the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the Court has yet to decide
a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year
possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and
not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that
the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from
the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property can be registered under Section 14 (1&2) of the Land
Registration Decree
The SC held that: No, the Court held that it was clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations
they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
 disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

It was affirmed in  People vs Naguit

It was concluded [T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought
to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title
is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

Therefore The Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of
judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and
reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
USERO V. CA (2005)
J. CORONA
Facts: Petitioners Lutgarda Samela and Nimfa Usero are the owners of a parcel of land while private
respondent spouses Polinar are the registered owners of a parcel of land behind the lots of
the petitioners.
Situated between the lots of the parties is a low-level strip of land, with a stagnant body of
water filled with floating water lilies; abutting and perpendicular to the lot of petitioner
Samela, the lot of the Polinars and the low-level strip of land is the perimeter wall of Pilar
Village Subdivision.
Apparently, every time a storm or heavy rains occur, the water in said strip of land rises and
the strong current passing through it causes considerable damage to the house of respondent
Polinars. Frustrated by their predicament, private respondent spouses, erected a concrete
wall on the bank of the low-level strip of land about three meters from their house and rip-
rapped the soil on that portion of the strip of land.
P demanded R to stop the construction
On the grounds that the strip of the land is part of a creek
P presented to the a copy of TCT, plan of consolidation, subdivision survey, tax declaration in her name,
court the following affidavits of Usero and Gamela whose property was located beside the perimeter
evidence wall
R counter argued this own TCT, certifications to the existence of the creek and the pictures of the subject
proposition by strip of land filled with water lilies
presenting
The MTC / LA ordered the defendants to vacate and remove at their expense the improvements
made on the subject lot
The RTC / NLRC reversed the decision and ordered the dismissal of the complaint because the
plaintiff cannot claim lawful ownership of the creek because it forms part of the
public dominion
Whereas the CA did not consider the petitioners’ petitions
Issue: WON the disputed strip of land is the private property of petitioners or part of the
creek which form part of the public dominion
The SC Held that: The subject strip of land is a creek as evidenced by the certifications that a creek
exists in the disputed land and the photographs showing the abundance of water
lilies which could only mean that there is a permanent stream of water or creek
there
The FF. Laws are the Article 420 of the Civil Code
basis. The phrase “other similar character” includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a river. It
is a property belonging to the public dominion which is not susceptible to private ownership.
therefore Being public water, a creek cannot be registered under the Torrens system in the
name of any individual.
wherefore Wherefore, the case is hereby denied.

Vda. de Tan Toco vs. Municipality of Iloilo

GR NO. L-24950, March 25, 1926
J. Villamor
Facts: Tantoco sued public respondent for 42,966.40. Said amount is the purchase price
of 2 strips of land which respondent appropriated for road widening. CFI ordered
the payment but due to lack of funds, R failed to pay P.
Plaintiff thus, filed for the issuance of writ of execution against the
property of R w/c the court granted. Thus, by virtue of said writ, sheriff
attached 2 trucks used for street sprinkling, a police patrol mobile, police
stations and a market along with the lots they occupy.
R countered Filed with CFI a motion praying that the attachment on said property be
 dissolved saying that attachment is illegal and violative of the rights of the
municipality.
The CFI GRANTED respondent’s motion and declared the attachment null and void.
P appealed Questioning whether the property levied upon is exempt from execution.
Issue: W/N the properties in question may be subject to the writ of execution
and therefore may be attached.
The SC Held that: NO. The said properties may not be attached.
The FF. Laws Article 344 of the Civil Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares,
are the basis. streets, fountains and public waters, drives and public improvements of
general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or provinces, are
PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE.
SC, thru J. We believe that the principle governing property of the public domain of
Villamor said: the State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as
said municipal is similar in character.
Property for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of
man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is
inalienable.
The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to
which such kind of property is devoted.
The necessity for government service justifies that the property for public
use of the municipality be exempt from execution.
therefore The movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for
governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a
judgment against the municipality.

Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968
J. BENGZON, J.P.
Facts: Municipality of Zamboanga became Zamboanga city by virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 39 on October 12, 1936.
Within Section 50 of the act it stated that buildings and properties
abandoned upon transfer by Zamboanga city will be paid for by the latter
at a price fixed by the Auditor General.
50 lots some with improvements and others vacant totaling P 1, 294, 244
(fixed value)
No. of Lots Use
1 ................................................ Capitol Site
3 ................................................ School Site
3 ................................................ Hospital Site
3 ................................................ Leprosarium
1 ................................................ Curuan School
1 ................................................ Trade School
2 ................................................ Burleigh School
2 ................................................ High School Playground
9 ................................................ Burleighs
1 ................................................ Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1 ................................................ San Roque
23 ................................................ vacant

RA No 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two

(Zamboanga del norte and Zamboanga del sur) and the assets are divided
 in accordance to article 6 of the law. “The assets shall be divided equitably
between the provinces by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Auditor General”.
-Auditor general divided: 54.39% to del Norte and 45.61% to del Sur ( they
divided the lots in question)
-Executive Secretary: Zamboanga del norte had a vested right over the
properties mentioned in CA 39 section 50 and it is payable by Zamboanga
city.
-Secretary of Finance: allowed 25% be deducted from Internal revenue
allotment (IRA) for the cit of Zamboanga for every quarter ending.
RA 3039 was enacted on June 17, 1961 and it amended section 50 of CA
39 and it provided that “All buildings, properties and assets belonging to
the former province Zamboanga and located within the city of Zamboanga
are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said city of
Zamboanga”
-Secretary of finance: on July 12, 1961 ordered the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to stop effecting further payments to Zamboanga del
Norte and that the amount 57, 373 Php be given back to Zamboanga City.
P complaint R For declaratory relief with preliminary mandatory injunction
On the grounds a) Republic act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving
plaintiff province of property without due process and just
compensation
P presented to That the secretary of finance be enjoined from from reimbursing 57, 373
the court the to defendant city
following That the defendant city should be ordered to continue paying the balance
proposition of 704, 20.05 Php in quarterly installments of 25% of its IRA
R counter City of zamboanga countered that the 50 properties in question were
argued this patrimonial properties and therefore subject to the control of the congress
proposition by and thus RA 3039 was not unconstitutional.
presenting that
The MTC / LA Ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction as prayed for and declared
RA 3039 unconstitutional for it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its
private property and ordered defendant to pay quarterly.
The RTC / NLRC None
Whereas the None
CA
Issue: Whether or not the 50 properties are owned by Zamboanga del Norte in
its governmental capacity and therefore not subject to the absolute
control of the congress.
The SC Held all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
that: playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former
Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium
sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not
for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public
service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such
public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone.
The SC J. Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of
Bengzon, J.P. its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are
patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly,
governmental purposes (the 26 vacant lots)
The FF. Laws The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which
are the basis. provide:
ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is
divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
It Was That the plaintiff is entitled to 54.39% of shares this percent corresponds
Concluded to the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature.
The same is That the demands of the plaintiff to be paid in lump sum is denied except
also affirmed as to the 43, 030. 11 Php already returned to the defendant city. For such
demand was without legal basis since RA 3039 has no retroactive effect.
HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, where it was stated that:
"... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public
purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the
public market, or other necessary municipal building, we will, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the States in favor
of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may be
invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes...."
Under this (FOR LABOR) TEST Promulgated by SC (ex. 4 fold test)
circumstance
Synthesis (if (Applying 4 fold test)
any)
Conclusion +
Facts
therefore defendant city was ordered to pay its balance of whatever was left of the
54.39% in the 26 patrimonal properties and to return to Zamboanga del
norte in lump sum the amount of 43, 030.11 Php
wherefore The decision appealed from by the plaintiff is set aside and the
abovementioned judgement was applied

SALAS V JARENCIO
G.R. No. L-29788. August 30, 1972.
ESGUERRA, J.
Facts: RTC of Manila, acting as land registration court, declared the City of Manila
as the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 9,698 dqm. Purusant
to such, RD issued in favor of Manila an OCT for the land.
City of Manila then sold portions of the lot to Pura Villanueva therefore
TCTs were issued in the name of the latter. When the last purchase by
Pura was made, a final TCT was issued in the name of City of Manila.
Municipal Board of Manila presided by Vice Mayor Villegas adopted a
resolution asking President of the Philippines to declare a property as
patrimonial property of Manila.
On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution
requesting the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the land
under Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as patrimonial property of
Manila for the purpose of selling these lots to the actual occupants
thereof. The resolution was then transmitted to the Congress. The bill was
then passed by Congress and approved by President, and became Republic
 Act 4118, converting the land from communal property to disposable and
alienable land of State.
To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of Manila to deliver
the City’s TCT 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name of Land
Authority. The request was granted with the knowledge and consent of
City mayor, cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of
Land Authority.
P complaint R Mayor Villegas then filed an Injunction against the Governor of LA and
Register of Deeds enjoining them from further implementing RA 4118 and
that it be declared unconstitutional.
On the grounds respondents (petitioners-appellants herein) contend, among other
defenses, that the property in question is patrimonial property.
R counter Appellants maintain that the land involved is a communal land or
argued this "legua comunal" which is a portion of the public domain owned by
proposition by the State; that in assigning these lands some lots were earmarked
for strictly public purposes, and ownership of these lots (for public
presenting that purposes) immediately passed to the new municipality; that in the
case of common lands or "legua comunal", there was no such
immediate acquisition of ownership by the pueblo, and the land
though administered thereby, did not automatically become its
property in the absence of an express grant from the Central
Government.
The RTC The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional for
allegedly depriving the City of Manila of its property without due
process of law and without payment of just compensation.
Issue: W/N property in question is patrimonial property
The SC Held No. The land is public property.
that: As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in
the possession of municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its
own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held for the
State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if the State itself
holds the property and puts it to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its
private or corporate capacity with its own funds (the land was originally
given to City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration and
disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of
according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional
mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of the people.
The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in
its private or proprietary capacity. The land was part of the territory of City
of Manila granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly
recognised the paramount title of the State over its land when it
requested the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the lot as
patrimonial property for selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land
belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of
Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use said
land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and
unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no
presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may
be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial
property.
wherefore WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners
shall proceed with the free and untrammeled implementation of Republic
Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents.