Professional Documents
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Vda de Tan Toco vs. Ilo Ilo
Vda de Tan Toco vs. Ilo Ilo
Municipality of Iloilo
GR NO. L-24950, March 25, 1926
J. Villamor
Facts: Tantoco sued public respondent for 42,966.40. Said amount is the purchase price
of 2 strips of land which respondent appropriated for road widening. CFI ordered
the payment but due to lack of funds, R failed to pay P.
Plaintiff thus, filed for the issuance of writ of execution against the
property of R w/c the court granted. Thus, by virtue of said writ, sheriff
attached 2 trucks used for street sprinkling, a police patrol mobile, police
stations and a market along with the lots they occupy.
R countered Filed with CFI a motion praying that the attachment on said property be
dissolved saying that attachment is illegal and violative of the rights of the
municipality.
The CFI GRANTED respondent’s motion and declared the attachment null and void.
P appealed Questioning whether the property levied upon is exempt from execution.
Issue: W/N the properties in question may be subject to the writ of execution
and therefore may be attached.
The SC Held that: NO. The said properties may not be attached.
The FF. Laws Article 344 of the Civil Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares,
are the basis. streets, fountains and public waters, drives and public improvements of
general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or provinces, are
PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE.
SC, thru J. We believe that the principle governing property of the public domain of
Villamor said: the State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as
said municipal is similar in character.
Property for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of
man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is
inalienable.
The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to
which such kind of property is devoted.
The necessity for government service justifies that the property for public
use of the municipality be exempt from execution.
therefore The movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for
governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a
judgment against the municipality.
SALAS V JARENCIO
G.R. No. L-29788. August 30, 1972.
ESGUERRA, J.
Facts: RTC of Manila, acting as land registration court, declared the City of Manila
as the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 9,698 dqm. Purusant
to such, RD issued in favor of Manila an OCT for the land.
City of Manila then sold portions of the lot to Pura Villanueva therefore
TCTs were issued in the name of the latter. When the last purchase by
Pura was made, a final TCT was issued in the name of City of Manila.
Municipal Board of Manila presided by Vice Mayor Villegas adopted a
resolution asking President of the Philippines to declare a property as
patrimonial property of Manila.
On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution
requesting the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the land
under Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as patrimonial property of
Manila for the purpose of selling these lots to the actual occupants
thereof. The resolution was then transmitted to the Congress. The bill was
then passed by Congress and approved by President, and became Republic
Act 4118, converting the land from communal property to disposable and
alienable land of State.
To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of Manila to deliver
the City’s TCT 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name of Land
Authority. The request was granted with the knowledge and consent of
City mayor, cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of
Land Authority.
P complaint R Mayor Villegas then filed an Injunction against the Governor of LA and
Register of Deeds enjoining them from further implementing RA 4118 and
that it be declared unconstitutional.
On the grounds respondents (petitioners-appellants herein) contend, among other
defenses, that the property in question is patrimonial property.
R counter Appellants maintain that the land involved is a communal land or
argued this "legua comunal" which is a portion of the public domain owned by
proposition by the State; that in assigning these lands some lots were earmarked
for strictly public purposes, and ownership of these lots (for public
presenting that purposes) immediately passed to the new municipality; that in the
case of common lands or "legua comunal", there was no such
immediate acquisition of ownership by the pueblo, and the land
though administered thereby, did not automatically become its
property in the absence of an express grant from the Central
Government.
The RTC The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional for
allegedly depriving the City of Manila of its property without due
process of law and without payment of just compensation.
Issue: W/N property in question is patrimonial property
The SC Held No. The land is public property.
that: As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in
the possession of municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its
own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held for the
State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if the State itself
holds the property and puts it to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its
private or corporate capacity with its own funds (the land was originally
given to City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration and
disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of
according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional
mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of the people.
The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in
its private or proprietary capacity. The land was part of the territory of City
of Manila granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly
recognised the paramount title of the State over its land when it
requested the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the lot as
patrimonial property for selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land
belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of
Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use said
land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and
unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no
presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may
be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial
property.
wherefore WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners
shall proceed with the free and untrammeled implementation of Republic
Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents.