Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781.

October 6, 2000]
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon
petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional
seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in
the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.
BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELECG.R. No. 147589 - June 26, 2001Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by theCOMELEC. This resolution
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party
list elections. Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party
list system wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream politicalparties
, the none-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues:
a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list electionsb.Whether or not the
party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized andunderrepresented’ sectors and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELECwhich will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties andorganizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of theConstitution and RA 7941. The resolution of
this Court directed the COMELEC “to refrainproclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election,
shall remain in force until after theCOMELEC have compiled and reported
its compliance.a . Y e s b . N o .
Rationale:
a.
Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-listelections
. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot bedisqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system
. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system
of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3
expressly statesthat a
"party" is
"either a political party

or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."

b.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- maydo so. The requisite character of these parties
or organizations must be consistentwith the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
The provision on the party-listsystem is not self-executory
. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "inaccordance with law" or "as may be provided by law";
it was thus
up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution
.
Hence, RA 7941 wasenacted.
Mariano v COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a
resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers,
they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the
questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They
are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by
the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman
of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite
her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation
of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with
the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that
she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960
of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under

RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and
was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with

respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of
the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELECG.R. No. 147589 - June 26, 2001Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by theCOMELEC. This resolution
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party
list elections. Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party
list system wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream politicalparties
, the none-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues:
a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list electionsb.Whether or not the
party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized andunderrepresented’ sectors and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELECwhich will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties andorganizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of theConstitution and RA 7941. The resolution of
this Court directed the COMELEC “to refrainproclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election,
shall remain in force until after theCOMELEC have compiled and reported
its compliance.a . Y e s b . N o .
Rationale:
a.
Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-listelections
. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot bedisqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system
. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system
of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3
expressly statesthat a
"party" is
"either a political party

or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."

b.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- maydo so. The requisite character of these parties
or organizations must be consistentwith the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
The provision on the party-listsystem is not self-executory
. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "inaccordance with law" or "as may be provided by law";
it was thus
up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution
.
Hence, RA 7941 wasenacted.
 356 SCRA 636 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress –
Violations of RA 3019
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens.
Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order
No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were
allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant
to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant
of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a
car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension
of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda)
to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating
the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline
its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is
a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may
be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not
being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended
as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended
only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it
has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding
before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength
of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his
continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the
trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity
of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to
quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

7 SCRA 347 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used
primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the
required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it maintained
that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers
for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the
tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components
are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining
urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which
provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed
as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress
intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this
view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is
patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not
represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive
upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and
formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by
the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 97710, 26 Sept 1991Facts:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and EmigdioBondocof
the NP werecandidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda
was proclaimed winner.Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which is composed of 9 members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are
members of the House of Representatives (5 membersbelong to the LDP and 1 member is from the
NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP
toproclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him thathe was already expelled from the LDP
for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco andfor allegedly
inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of
thedecision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter
from the LDP,the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election
of CongressmanCamasura to the HRET.
Issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
maychange that party¶s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of
a decision freely reached by the tribunalin an election contest pending therein
Held:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independentand impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with completedetachment, impartiality and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence,disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline
are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. Inexpelling Congressman Camasura
from the HRET for having cast a ³conscience vote´ in favor of Bondoc, basedstrictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, theHouse of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution.
Itsresolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for
the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violatesCongressman
Camasura¶s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional
electioncontests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under theConstitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause,
such as, theexpiration of the member¶s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the politicalparty he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party or removal for other valid cause. Amember may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for
party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formallyaffiliated with another
EMILIANO R. BOY CARUNCHO III, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and The Chairman ATTY. CASIANO ATUEL, JR. and
MEMBERS, ATTY. GRACE S. BELVIS, DR. FLORENTINA R.
LIZANO, City Board of Canvassers, City of Pasig, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the
congressional seat in the lone district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized
elections. The other candidates were: Arnulfo G. Acedera, Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP); Marcelino
P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C. Bassig (Independent); Esmeraldo T. Batacan (PDR-LM
Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C. Rivera, Jr. (PRP/PDR); Elpidio G. Tuason
(Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal Party/LAMMP).
At 9:00 oclock in the morning of May 12, 1998, respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers
composed of Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. as Chairman, Atty. Grace S. Belvis as Vice-Chairman, and
Dr. Florentina Lizano as Member, started to canvass the election returns. The canvass was
proceeding smoothly when the Board received intelligence reports that one of the candidates for
the congressional race, retired General Arnulfo Acedera, and his supporters, might disrupt and stop
the canvassing.
At exactly 6:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General Acedera and his supporters
stormed the Caruncho Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing of election returns
was being conducted. They allegedly forced themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a glass
door in the process. As pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning shots causing those
present in the canvassing venue, including the members of the Board and canvassing units, to
scamper for safety. The canvassing personnel exited through the backdoors bringing with them the
Election Returns they were canvassing and tallying as well as the Statement of Votes that they
were accomplishing.They entrusted these documents to the City Treasurers Office and the Pasig
Employment Service Office (PESO). Election documents and paraphernalia were scattered all
over the place when the intruders left.
The following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units recovered the twenty-two (22)
Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurers Office and the PESO. However,
page 2 of each of the 22 election returns, which contained the names of candidates for
congressmen, had been detached and could not be found. An investigation was conducted to
pinpoint liability for the loss but it yielded negative result. Hence, the Board secured proper
authority from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),[1] through Election Director for the
National Capital Region Atty. Teresita Suarez, for the reconstitution of the missing page by
making use of the other copies of the election returns, particularly the provincial copy or the copy
in the ballot boxes placed therein by the Board of Election Inspectors.
At 2:40 a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board, satisfied that it had finished canvassing the 1,491
election returns from as many clustered precincts, proclaimed Henry P. Lanot as the winner in the
congressional race for the lone district of Pasig.[2] The votes obtained by the leading three
candidates were: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes; Emiliano R. Boy Caruncho III 42,942 votes, and
Arnulfo Acedera 36,139 votes. The winner, Lanot, led his closest rival, Caruncho, by 17,971 votes.
However, on May 21, 1998, petitioner Caruncho filed a Motion to Nullify Proclamation on
the Basis of Incomplete Returns[3] with the COMELEC. He alleged that the Board had proceeded
with the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winning congressional candidate even though one
hundred forty-seven (147) election returns involving about 30,000 votes, were still not
canvassed. He prayed that the COMELEC en banc declare the proclamation null and void and that
the Board of Canvassers be directed to convene and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the votes
of the candidates for the House of Representatives and thereupon proclaim the winner. On June 1,
1998, petitioner filed an amended motion to correct some errors in the listing of precincts under
paragraph 10, pages 2 and 3, and paragraph 12, pages 3 and 4, of the original motion.[4]
On June 8, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued an Order requiring respondent
Pasig City Board of Canvassers to comment on the amended motion to nullify Lanots
proclamation. In his comment filed on June 23, 1998, respondent Atty. Casiano G. Atuel, Jr.
admitted the disruption and stoppage of the canvass of election returns on May 11, 1998 but
asserted that there were only twenty-two (22) election returns, not 147 as claimed by Caruncho,
that were missing but these were eventually recovered. The Board stated in part:

x x x. Contrary to the insinuation of Atty. Irene D. Jurado, only 22 Election Returns

were reported missing. On the following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units
have recovered the 22 missing Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the
Treasurers Office and from the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO). There are
no missing election returns.

That to the surprise of the Board and of the 22 canvassing units, they found out that
Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns they recovered were detached and missing. We
wish to inform the Commission that Page 2 of the Local Election Returns contained
the name of candidates for Congressman. We conducted investigation on who did the
detachment of Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns. However, nobody from the
Treasurers Office nor from the PESO admitted that they committed such election
offense.

It is impossible that 147 Election Returns were missing. The COMELEC Instruction
is very specific that only Election Returns to be canvassed are suppose(d) to be
brought out from the Ballot Boxes containing still uncanvassed Election Returns. The
instruction further stated that once it was read by the Board, it will be stamped `READ
and then deliver the same (sic) to the 22 sub-canvassing units. Sub-canvassing units
cannot get another Election Returns unless the same is finished, tallied, stamped as
`CANVASSED, and submit the same to the Secretariat and placed inside a separate
ballot boxes with stamped `READ and `CANVASSED (sic) sealed with metal seals,
padlocked, chained and padlocked again. It was at this time where (sic) the sub-
canvassing units will get another Election Returns from the Board for tally and so
on. Sub-canvassing units are not allowed to canvass 2 or more Election Returns at one
time. This was the very reason why only 22 Election Returns were reported missing
but were recovered without Page 2.

That at the very start of the proceeding, the leading candidates for Congressman were
as follows:

HENRY LANOT - FIRST

EMILIANO CARUNCHO - SECOND

ARNULFO ACEDERA - THIRD

As the canvass goes on, Henry Lanot was leading Caruncho by thousands. Very few
Election Returns have Caruncho leading and even if leading, the lead was only a few
votes.

Proper authorities from the Commission on Elections was secured through Atty.
Teresita C. Suarez, Election Director for National Capital Region for the purpose of
making use of other copies of the Election Returns particularly the Provincial Copy or
the Copy in the Ballot Boxes. Fortunately, the authorities arrived on time so that the
Board of Canvassers waste(d) no time in opening the Ballot Boxes to retrieve the
copies from the Board of Canvassers left inside the Ballot Boxes by the careless
Board of Election Inspectors. Provincial copies were used as well in the reconstitution
of the missing page 2 of the 22 recovered Election Returns.

That there was no truth on the insinuation made by Atty. Irene D. Jurado that there
were 147 Election Returns which were not canvassed which will affect the result of
election for Emiliano Caruncho. The Board did everything to have all election returns
accounted forth (sic). We let no stone unturned before we finally come to the
conclusion. That we have finished canvassing the 1,491 Election Returns and
proclaimed the winning candidates.

That granting without admitting that there were missing Election Returns which were
uncanvassed, and if ordered canvass(ed), the more Lanot will widen his lead because
the trend was that Henry Lanots lead swollen (sic) as more election returns were
canvassed.

That for the first time, I am revealing this shocking fact to the Commission on
Elections that on two (2) occasions, an unidentified persons (sic) talked to me at the
unholy hours of the night 2 days while canvassing was going on and offered me TWO
MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS in cold cash just to proclaim `BOY as the elected
Congressman. I declined the offer and told the man that I am a straight man, I am on
the level, I have a family and I am about to retire. x x x.

That at 2:40 A.M. of May 17, 1998, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed all the
winning candidates for Local positions. As to the Congressman, the following results
are as follows:

HENRY LANOT - 60,914 votes

EMILIANO `BOY CARUNCHO - 42,942 votes

ARNULFO ACEDERA - 36,139 votes

The lead of Henry Lanot from Emiliano Caruncho was 17, 971 votes.

x x x x x x x x x.[5]
On June 24, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division[6] promulgated a Resolution[7] decreeing
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission:

1. Declares that the proclamation of the winning congressional candidate of Pasig City
as NULL AND VOID;

2. Orders that the respondents-Members of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City
to RECONVENE at the Session Hall of the Commission and use the Comelec copy of
the one hundred forty-seven (147) election returns above-mentioned and CANVASS
said authentic copy of the election returns and include the results thereof with the tally
of all election returns previously canvassed and, thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning
candidate; and

3. Orders the Law Department of this Commission to investigate candidate Arnulfo

Acedera and if after the investigation, the evidence so warrant, to file the necessary
charges against him.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, on June 26, 1998, respondent Board filed a Supplemental Comment raising the
following matters: (a) the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case under Section 242 of the
Omnibus Election Code; (b) petitioner failed to record his objections to the elections returns and
the certificate of canvass in the minutes of the proceedings of the Board, and (c) the winning
candidate, Henry Lanot, was not impleaded in the motion to nullify his proclamation.[8]
 On July 8, 1998, proclaimed winning candidate Henry Lanot filed a motion for leave to
intervene in the case.[9] He also prayed for the reconsideration of the June 24, 1998 Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division and for referral of the case to the COMELEC en banc. In his
motion for reconsideration[10] that was attached to said motion to intervene, movant Lanot argued
that failure to notify him of the case was fatal as he was a real party in interest who must be
impleaded therein. He also alleged that under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7166, the
COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case and that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 was not
based on facts.
That same day, petitioner, represented by new counsel,[11] filed a motion praying for the
formation of a new Board of Canvassers on account of the June 24, 1998 Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division.[12] The following day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an
order setting the case for hearing and postponing the reconvening of the City Board of Canvassers
of Pasig City.[13] On July 15, 1998, movant Lanot filed an opposition to the motion for the
formation of a new Board of Canvassers on the ground that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 is null
and void for the following reasons: (a) he was not notified of the proceedings and therefore his
right to due process was violated; (b) said resolution had not become final and executory by his
filing of a motion for reconsideration, and (c) the case was no longer a pre-proclamation
controversy but an electoral protest under the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, not the COMELEC.[14]
At the hearing on July 21, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the filing of
memorandum. Movant Lanot, however, manifested that he was no longer filing a
memorandum. Thus, the COMELEC, ruled that with or without said memorandum, the case would
be deemed submitted for resolution.[15] Meanwhile, on July 27, 1998, petitioner filed an opposition
to Lanots motion for reconsideration[16] after which Lanot filed his comment on the opposition.[17]
On September 28, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division granted Lanots motion for
intervention and elevated his motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.[18]
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc[19] promulgated a Resolution dated October 1, 1998
reconsidering the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and dismissing petitioners
amended motion (petition) to nullify the proclamation on the basis of incomplete returns for lack
of merit.[20] Relying on facts narrated by the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in its comment on the
motion to nullify the proclamation, the COMELEC en banc found:

Thus, the board of canvassers did everything to have all election returns accounted
for, and finished canvassing all the election returns of 1,491 clustered precincts of
Pasig City. On the basis of the canvass, the board proclaimed the winning candidates
for local positions. As to the winning candidate for congressman, the results were as
follows:

Henry P. Lanot - 60,914 votes

Emiliano `Boy Caruncho - 42,942 votes

Arnulfo Acedera - 36,139 votes

However, granting arguendo that there were missing twenty-two (22) election returns
involving about 4,400 votes, the same no longer affect the results of the election as
candidate Henry P. Lanot obtained the highest number of votes, with a lead of 17,971
votes over his closest rival, Emiliano `Boy Caruncho. The board of canvassers duly
proclaimed candidate Henry P. Lanot as the winning representative of the lone district
of Pasig City.

Consequently, we find without basis petitioners allegation that the proclamation of

Henry P. Lanot was based on an incomplete canvass. We carefully examined the
Comelec copies of the Statement of Votes and found no truth to the assertion that
there were one hundred forty seven (147) election returns not canvassed.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner seeks to nullify respondent COMELEC en bancs Resolution of October 1, 1998,
contending that said body acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
overruling his claim that 147 election returns involving about thirty thousand (30,000) votes were
not canvassed. Petitioner argued that it was enough reason for contesting the proclamation of Lanot
as winner under an incomplete canvass. However, as in the proceedings before the COMELEC,
petitioner failed to implead in the instant petition the proclaimed winning candidate, Lanot.
The petition must be dismissed.
Petitioner initiated this case through a motion to nullify the proclamation of Lanot as the
winner in the congressional race in Pasig City. Named respondents in the motion were the
individual members of the Board of Canvassers in that city. The proclaimed winner was not
included among the respondents. For that reason alone, the COMELEC should have been
forewarned of a procedural lapse in the motion that would affect the substantive rights of the
winning candidate, if not the electorate. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the
COMELEC requires due notice and hearing.[21] The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot
be annulled if he has not been notified of the motion to set aside his proclamation. [22] It was only
the intervention of Lanot in SPC 98-123, which the Second Division of the COMELEC allowed,
which cured the procedural lapse that could have affected the popular will of the electorate.
However, petitioner again failed to implead Lanot in the instant petition for certiorari. In this
connection, Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. By real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest.[23] As the winning candidate whose proclamation is sought
to be nullified, Henry P. Lanot is a real party in interest in these proceedings. The COMELEC and
the Board of Canvassers of Pasig City are mere nominal parties whose decision should be defended
by the real party in interest, pursuant to Rule 65 of the said Rules:

SEC. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the
acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with
such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining
the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to
appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public
respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only,
and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the
public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or
any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public
respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise
specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the
proceedings therein. (Underscoring supplied.)

Hence, quasi-judicial agencies should be joined as public respondents but it is the duty of the
private respondent to appear and defend such agency.[24] That duty cannot be fulfilled by the real
party in interest such as the proclaimed winning candidate in a proceeding to annul his
proclamation if he is not even named as private respondent in the petition. Ordinarily, the
nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party in interest is not by itself a ground for the
dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder
of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of
the petition.[25]However, this being an election case which should be resolved with dispatch
considering the public interest involved, the Court has not deemed it necessary to require that
Henry P. Lanot be impleaded as a respondent in this case.
A crucial issue in this petition is what body has jurisdiction over a proclamation controversy
involving a member of the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more
explicit in this regard. Article VI thereof states:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x.

The foregoing constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of
the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, to wit:

RULE 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.

In the recent case of Rasul v. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta,[26] the Court, in interpreting the
aforesaid constitutional provision, stressed the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction
over its members, thus:
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code provide that (t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x. In Javier v.
Comelec (144 SCRA 194), this Court interpreted the phrase election, returns and
qualifications as follows:

The phrase election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications to matters
that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 250 of
the Omnibus Election Code underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunals jurisdiction
over election contests relating to its members. Inasmuch as petitioner contests the
proclamation of herein respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning
senatorial candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner. x x x.

In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the
winner in the congressional race for the sole district of Pasig City, his remedy should have been to
file an electoral protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).[27]
Even granting arguendo that the thrust of petitioners case is to question the integrity of the
election returns or the validity of the incomplete canvass as the basis for Henry Lanots
proclamation, and not the proclamation itself, still, the instant petition is devoid of merit.
The factual question of how many election returns were missing as a consequence of the
disruption of the canvassing of election returns has been definitely resolved by the COMELEC en
banc. Thus, raising the same issue before this Court is pointless because this Court is not a trier of
facts.[28] The facts established below show that all the legal steps necessary to carry out the
reconstitution of the missing page 2 of the twenty-two (22) election returns have been
followed. Proper authorization for the reconstitution of that page was secured from the
COMELEC. The reconstitution was based on the provincial copy of the election returns that was
retrieved from the sealed ballot boxes. For his part, petitioner failed to have the anomaly recorded
in the minutes of proceedings of respondent Board as required by Section 15 of Republic Act No.
7166. Respondent Board, therefore, observed the following provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code:
SEC. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. In case its copy of
the election returns is missing, the board of canvassers shall, by messenger or
otherwise, obtain such missing election returns from the board of election inspectors
concerned, or if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers,
upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said
election returns or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission,
and forthwith direct its representative to investigate the case and immediately report
the matter to the Commission.

The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have
been received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on
the basis of the available election returns if the missing election returns will not affect
the results of the election.

Granting that the proclamation was made without taking into account the twenty-two (22)
election returns, still, the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion. The election returns represented
only 4,400 votes. That number cannot affect the result of the election because Henry Lanots lead
over his closest rival, herein petitioner, was 17,971 votes. As the second paragraph of Section 233
of the Omnibus Election Code aforequoted states, the Board of Canvassers could have totally
disregarded the twenty-two (22) election returns and legally proclaimed Lanot as the winner in the
election in Pasig City for Member of the House of Representatives.
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation.[29] A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns
are considered and none is omitted.[30] However, this is true only where the election returns missing
or not counted will affect the results of the election. It bears stressing that in the case at bar, the
COMELEC has categorically found that the election returns which were not counted by respondent
canvassers represented only 4,400 votes. To be sure, this number will not affect the result of the
election considering that Lanots lead over petitioner was already 17,971 votes.
On the whole, this Court finds that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution of October 1, 1998 dismissing petitioners motion
to nullify the proclamation of Henry P. Lanot as Member of the House of Representatives for the
lone district of Pasig City.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., no part.