G.R. No.

11895 December 20, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEODORA TOPIÑO and GABRIEL GUZMAN, defendants. GABRIEL GUZMAN, appellant.

Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall lie with a man who is not her husband
and by a man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared void.

Under this article two elements are essential to the conviction of either party, assuming for the
moment that they can be convicted separately:

(1) the woman must be married and

(2) the carnal relation with a man not her husband must exist.

If either of these is not present a conviction of either party is impossible. But note that another
element is necessary to convict the man. It must be shown that he knew the woman was married.
Mere carnal relations with a married woman is not adultery as to the man whether he is married
or single. A man married or single cannot commit adultery. A married man may sustain relations
with an unmarried woman and be guilty of no crime so long as he does not commit concubinage.

G.R. L-No. 5110 August 19, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FABIANA LEGASPI and PAULINO PULONGBARET, defendants-appellants.

Proof of the commission of the crime of adultery, like proof of the commission of most other
crimes, may safely be rested on circumstantial evidence when that evidence is such that it leaves
no room for reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, and, indeed, contrary to the contention
of counsel for appellants, convictions for this crime have frequently been had without direct
evidence as to the specific acts constituting the offense, as will appear from the following citations
from decisions of the Tribunal Supremo de España:

The finding in the possession of a married woman of several love letters signed by her paramour;
their having been seen together in different places, and finally, the fact that they were surprised
in a well-known assignation house which the accused woman admitted having visited six times in
company with the former, are data and indications sufficient to convict them both of the crime of
adultery; because, as the supreme court of Spain says, "it shows without doubt not only thier illicit
relations but also such acts as constitute adultery and are the consequence of said relations."
(Decision of the 23d of June, 1874.)

First. It having reached the knowledge of . . . that his wife was living
in intimacy with . . . known by the name of . . . instead of remaining in the house
of . . . where she was placed, he asked for and obtained from the court a
warrant to enter and search the residence of the keeper . . ., at any time of the
night and when this was done by the proper authorities, on the morning of
January 5, at last, they found . . . and . . . in the only bedroom that there was
in the house, and in which there was but one bed, partially disrobed, the bed
 with evident signs having been used, while the clothes of both were mixed
together.

G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

G.R. No. L-47498 May 7, 1987

PETRONILO LIGTAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

In this jurisdiction pardon for adultery and concubinage must come before the institution of the
criminal action and both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party if said pardon is to be
effective. The pardon can be express or in applied. Thus, when the offended party in writing or in
an affidavit asserts that he or she is pardoning his or her erring spouse and paramour for their
adulterous act this is a case of express pardon. There is implied pardon when the offended party
continued to live with his spouse even after the commission of the offense. However such consent
or pardon cannot be implied when the offended party allows his wife to continue living in the
conjugal home after her arrest only in order to take care of their children.

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A,
for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.

The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after
the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of
its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be
rebutted by evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73).

If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute condonation?

Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms
of matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S., section 6-d).

A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it
was known (Land vs. Martin, 15 South 657; Day vs. Day, 80 Pac. 974) or there is sexual
intercourse after knowledge of adultery (Rogers vs. Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq. 534) or sleeping together
for a single night (Toulson vs. Toulson, 50 Atl. 401, citing Phinizy vs. Phinizy, 114 S. E. 185, 154
Ga. 199; Collins vs. Collins, 193 So. 702), and many others. The resumption of marital
cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the
contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife, especially as against the
husband (Marsh vs. Marsh, 14 N. J. Eq. 315).

There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no reason to depart from the
doctrines laid down in the decisions of the various supreme courts of the United States above
quoted.