G.R. No.

93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON.
IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing
Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State
Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed
rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors
filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. The second information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly
obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a
warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the
case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar
Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause
to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the
Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile
as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989
preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion
under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for
alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on
the following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed
meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the
"complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of
Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all
the component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree

No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent
irregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of
PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion
case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is
based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515
[1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile
v. Judge Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the
occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion
and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court
recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to
its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion.
(Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of
rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different
offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which
states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or
 wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal
laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col.
Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel
Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or
apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction
in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by
three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the
petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on
"or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches".
The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can
be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo,
p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the
very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the
Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed
with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent
prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829.
The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan.
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for
no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was
motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v.
Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive
factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex
net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed
in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime
of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or
concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case
of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some
kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a
mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often
is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the
deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and
can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can
not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug,
and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution
for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder
as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is
averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable
under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution
under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same.
All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or
ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not
be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and
parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either
separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ...
(People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as
provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain
us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but
also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too
intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form
two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring
with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed
as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of
the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of
the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted
of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court
ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused
is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of
rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case
and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the
present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now
would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court
had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the
information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine
of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of
the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866
because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make
up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and
charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex
the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in
Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate
prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the
independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a
friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with
political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the
crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being
prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other
issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED.
The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No.
90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from
conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble
between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated December 11, 1994,
petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In
response to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI,
and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two
alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing
of Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace
talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.

Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor,
counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.
Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of
their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. 1 However,
criminal charges were filed later against the two student suspects. 2

Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-
Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with
violation of P.D. 1829,3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution
of criminal offenders.

On May 18, 1995, an information4 was filed against them, alleging that:

That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
namely: ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU — Vice Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU
LAMBINO — Asst. Legal Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN — Chief, Security Force, all
of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the
performance of their respective official functions, taking advantage of their official duties and
committing the crime in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other and
with a certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct,
impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO
NARAG, both principal suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P.
graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student Council, and
delaying the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing
said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another principal
suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above acts were done by the above-named accused
public officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects were implicated in the brutal slaying
of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case.
But the recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated September 8, 1997, the Office of
the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the
Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the
Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.

Petitioners contend that:

I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE

RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE
SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE
SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND
FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC
TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.

II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.5

Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the
NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting
petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We answer these questions in the negative.

First. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after
finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions
when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, §5 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in
this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor
prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a
crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag
and Taparan were probably guilty.

Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the
course of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the
crime.6 They invoke the ruling in People v. Tonog, Jr. 7 in which it was held:

It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended
Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133
(sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a
 warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat.
Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him
personally in the course of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the
perpetrators.

In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the
presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station, the accused was
asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the
admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this
case. First, the accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second,
the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded
that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third,
the arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed. In the words of Rule 113, §5(b), the
crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed it."

In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two
students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two
alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.

We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must
be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making the arrest.8

Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime.
When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not
committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing
anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were
taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.

To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant
the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested
committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary
citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime.
Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to
protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can
order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, §2 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that
their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.

Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c), the Office of the
Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:

From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to suspect that
the SJ members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina,
eventually leading to the latter's demise. It must be remembered that these SJ members were
positively identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this
positive identification. In fact, respondents do not dispute the identification made on the alleged
participants in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina.

Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from arresting the
SJ members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with
Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal
arrest. While this justification may, at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact
that they had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested
committed the heinous crime of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two
eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear
intent, on respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension
and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively identified.

To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless arrests. It is
in this forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or
not the warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the quasi-judicial authority to rule on this
matter. Of course, there are various remedies under the law which respondents may have
likewise availed of or resorted to in order to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter
been arrested, without prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed
against the arresting NBI agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands
in a manner that obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement
agency like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by
eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina. 9

The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty.
The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a
court, considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases
provided in Rule 113, §5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized
the arrest without warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could
decide the question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. As
the Special Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in recommending the dismissal
of the case against petitioners:

All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12, 1994, the
accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police
headquarters had committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made on
campus that night, legal. The U.P. officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of
illegal arrests of students on campus.

Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge Posadas,
Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is
defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has
been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section
1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable
ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence of any
law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to
charge the accused with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the
accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.10

Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:

SEC. 1. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution
of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal
laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;

The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. 11 But as has been held, "[i]nfinitely
more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and
vexatious prosecution."12 As we held in the similar case of Venus v. Desierto:13

Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through
a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter,
to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled
exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:

a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano,
et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.
Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202);

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil. 62);

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109
Phil. 1140);

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
 h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R.
No. 4760, March 25, 1960);

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto
vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October
8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);

j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438); and

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953)
cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)

In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D.
No. 1829, §1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of
Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have
interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI
for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had
asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard
constitutional requirements.

The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape
of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their undertaking to surrender
the students the following day.14 Hence, the information against them charged that petitioners willfully
obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of
these students and another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta.15 The student suspect
mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta,
was not one of the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners prevented on December 12,
1994. Moreover, whether or not petitioner Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents
the following day is immaterial. In the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held
to their undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have validly
arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a warrant at that time. Hence,
only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI
believed the information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a
warrant before making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands. That they
chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their responsibility alone.
Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.

We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public clamor to bring to
justice those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures faced by law enforcement agencies
to effect immediate arrests and produce results without unnecessary delay. But it must be remembered
that the need to enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of
probable cause for the filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the records. They cannot
be indicted because they dared to uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no other recourse but
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners.

Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider petitioners' challenge
to P.D. No. 1829, §1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional adjudication is that the Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of
on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby prohibited from
prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 §1(c) as a result of the incident complained of in
Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal
Case No. 22801 against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.