People vs.

Delos Santos
403 SCRA 153
Topic: Elements of Felonies

Facts:

On November 6, 1997 in San Jose, Del Monte, Bulacan Danny delos Santos, armed with a
kitchen knife, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab Rod Flores, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly caused his death.

The prosecution presented two eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused.
Marcelino de Leon and Marvin Tablante, corroborating each other’s narration of facts,
testified that they saw with their own eyes the accused stabbed the victim, twice on the
back, and continued to inflict a total of 21 wounds.

The defense argued that the accused had no motive to kill as there was no altercation when
the two crossed paths on that fateful day. The accused also was allegedly in his auntie’s
house watching TV, as testified by Sonny Bautista. Lastly, the defense also pointed out
that the statements of the witnesses of the prosecution were executed two months from
the date of the incident.

Issues:

In the absence of motive, can the crime of murder be proved beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling:

YES. Appellant argues that since the prosecution witnesses testified that there was no
altercation between him and Flores, it follows that no motive to kill can be attributed to
him. This is an inconsequential argument. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a
conviction, particularly where the accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his
participation is adequately established. In People vs. Galano, we ruled that in the crime of
murder, motive is not an element of the offense, it becomes material only when the
evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the accused
had committed it. In the case before us, no such doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate
positively identified appellant. Positive identification, where categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial. As to the qualifying element treachery, the
prosecution was able to establish that appellant’s attack on Flores was from behind
without any slightest provocation on his part and that it was sudden and unexpected.
There being treachery, appellant’s conviction for murder is in order.
With regard to the credibility of the witnesses, whom the defense tried to discredit, the
Court found them credible. The two-month delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted
story—it is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding
particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the
perpetrator. Born of human experience, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect
to the witnesses.

For the use of alibi by the defense, it did not prosper as the court was not convinced of the
physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the
incident. When probed by the trial court, he categorically stated that the house is only 40
meters away from the scene of the crime and may be traveled in about three or five
minutes.
US vs Dominguez
41 Phil 409
Topic: Factors to Consider in Determining Whether the Crime is
Attempted, Frustrated, or Consummated

Facts:

On January 19, 1920 in Manila, Dominguez, who was a salesman at the Philippine
Education Co. Inc. store, did then and there receive the sum of seven pesos and fifty
centavos from one Lamberto Garcia as payment for five copies of Sam's "Practical Business
Letters" bought from the store of the said company, which amount should have been turned
over to the cashier but which he did not deliver, until after it was discovered. He was
charged with the crime of estafa.

Issues:

Is immediate return by the accused of the thing he intended to convert, as soon as the
injured party found out the fraud committed, sufficient to divest the act of its consummated
character and to place it within the limits of a mere frustrated offense?

Ruling:

It is only a frustrated crime estafa because even while the accused performed
all the acts of execution which should produce the crime, the acts nevertheless
did not produce the crime by reason of a cause independent of his will, which
cause was the timely discovery of the acts prosecuted. With no appreciable
damage having been caused to the offended party, such damage being one of
the essential elements of the crime, there is only frustrated not consummated
crime.
People vs Dela Cruz
61 Phil 344
Topic: Justifying Circumstances - Self-Defense

Facts:

On the night of February 18, 1934, defendant-appellant Remedios dela Cruz was walking
home with neighbors along a dark trail after attending a wake. She was the last person in
a single file when a man suddenly grabbed her from behind without warning and without
making himself known and refused to say who he was. In the struggle that followed, the
man touched her breasts and private parts and kissed her, and because she was unable to
free herself by means of her strength alone, she took out her pocket-knife and stabbed the
man once under the right chest, in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her
honor, since she had no other means of defending herself. The man was Francisco Rivera
and he died the following afternoon.

Rivera’s companion on the trail that night testified that he saw Remedios await for
Francisco in the bushes and attacked him without provocation, allegedly because of
Remedios’s jealousy on Francisco, who had another girl. His testimony was not appreciated
by the court because he himself admitted that the place was very dark and he could hardly
see.

Issue:

Can Remedios’s act of stabbing and killing Francisco be a justifying circumstance of self-
defense?

Ruling:

YES. The Court held that a woman in defense of her honor is justified in stabbing a man
who was trying to perform preparatory sexual acts. Remedios tried to ask who he was but
she did not get any answer and it was very dark. The knife in her pocket could not mean
premeditation because she was a fruit vendor and did not change coat anymore when she
went out to attend the wake. In the case of the United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488),
it was held that a person is not criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of
facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them
to be, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
After the incident, Remedios still had with her the knife and did not inflict any further
wounds aside from the single stab, and she immediately went back to the wake and in
public stated that he killed Francisco.
People vs The Moro “Manalinde”
14 Phil 77
Topic: Aggravating Circumstance – Committed with Evident Pre-
meditation

Facts:

In the afternoon of January 19 1909, in Cotabato, the Moro named Manalinde went
huramentado with the use of his Kris struck a Spaniar Igual and a Chinaman Choa, both
at ramdom. Choa later died. Manalinde was charged with murder, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery (the victims could not defend themselves), promise of reward
and evident premeditation (he was induced by a certain Datu Mupuck to go to Cotabato
and kill the two persons you encounter in a form of a huramentado.) During the trial,
Manalinde admitted to the killing/murder but defended against the aggravating
circumstance of evident pre-meditation because the 2 victims were attacked randomly,
thus there could be no premeditation.

Issues:

Will there be no evident premeditation if the victim/s are random or the first persons he
will encounter?

Ruling:

Upon accepting the order from Datu Mupuck and undertaking the journey in order to
comply therewith, Manalinde deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully
meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which he was about to carry
out, and to that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up in
banana leaves, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking
the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never
had any trouble. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the
perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that
the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime.
People vs Samano
77 Phil 136
Topic: Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies – Principals, By Direct
Participation

Facts:

This is a consolidation of two cases both involving the murders of three suspected Japanese
spies. In the first case, Ernesto Lorenzana was beaten to death while in the second,
brothers Virgilio and Emilio Beltran were executed. The incidents happened both on
February 22, 1945, and the place the murders is the same, the headquarters of Company
"G," 51st Infantry, Ramsey Guerilla Unit. There was a total of 18 people charged in the
combined cases.

Issues:

The issue is whether or not all those charged are guilty as “principals” by some degree of
participation as defined by law.

Ruling:

The ruling for the 18 accused varies depending on the evidence showing any direct
participation in the murders. After going over all the record, the Court found that the
different personalities charged were not all proved as principals by direct participation.
Some were merely guarding the headquarters, in obedience to superior orders, without no
knowledge of the acts being performed inside. The others were also not in the headquarters
when the incidents happened.

It is a well-known rule that, without proof of conspiracy, mere passive presence at the
scene of another's crime does not constitute complicity. Thus, some of the appellants,
including Samano who were not guilty of any participation, were acquitted.
Tavera vs Valdez
1 Phil 468
Topic: Characteristics of Criminal Law, Prospective. Exception,
unless favorable to the accused. Exception to the exception, unless the
later law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing
causes of actions.

Facts:

Vicente Garcia Valdez was found guilty of libel against Trinidad Pardo de Tavera when
the former, as editor of Miau, published a libelous article on September 15, 1901. The
article is couched throughout in grossly abusive language, and in terms not capable of
being misunderstood, and charges Tavera, who had been then recently appointed a
member of the United States Philippine Commission, with having displayed cowardice at
the time of the murder of his mother and sister and with having subsequently entered into
intimate political relations with the assassin. The article contains other statements and
imputations of a derogatory.

Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission "defining the law of libel," was
passed during the pendency of the case. The act affixes to the offense of publishing a libel
a lesser punishment compared to existing law under Spanish criminal statutes. Section 13
of the same act provides as follows: "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the
same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed: Provided, That nothing herein
contained shall operate as a repeal of existing laws in so far as they are applicable to
pending actions or existing causes of action, but as to such causes of action or pending
actions existing laws shall remain in full force and effect.

Issue:

Can the favorable provisions of Act 277 apply to the accused on the basis of the retroactive
effect of criminal laws when it favors the accused?

Ruling:

NO. There is an exception to the exception: When the later law is expressly made
inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of actions. Thus, the case will be
penalized based on the prevailing law upon its commission because Act 277 made an
express provision on the inapplicability of the rule that repeals of criminal laws retroact
when it favors the accused.
People vs Sanidad
402 SCRA 381
GR No. 146099
Topic: Application of Penalties in Complex Crimes – Art 48: when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

Facts:

On January 16, 1999, Rolando Tugadi was with nine friends going to the next town in
Lagangilang, Abra for a fiesta. They had a drinking session with friends, including the
accused Jimmel Saninad and Ponce Manuel. On their way home on board a jeepney,
Jimmel and Ponce with 2 other unidentified gunmen treacherously ambushed the group
by spraying the jeepney with several rounds of Armalite and .45 pistol bullets.
Miraculously, 9 survived and it was only Rolando Tugadi who died in the incident. Jimmel
and Ponce were charged with murder and multiple attempted murder,

Issue:

Does this fall in the purview of Complex Crime? If it does, how is the penalty applied?

Ruling:

In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute
only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Although
several independent acts were performed by the accused in firing separate shots from their
individual firearms, the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill the group
as a whole and not specific persons, let alone the specific victim. Thus, one of accused-
appellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: “My gosh, we were not able to kill
all of them.”.

The penalty for the most serious offense of murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. The maximum
penalty in accordance with law, it therefore death penalty.