1AC Lex R2

1AC – Saudi Kant

 Framework
The meta ethic is practical reason. Prefer:
1. Bindingness: Ethics begins with the authoritative question or “why
one should be moral.” Counter ethics that are normatively justified still
fail as evidenced by ethical conflict. Morality cannot be based on the
empirical world since anything empirical could have been otherwise
thus begging the question of why it’s moral. The solution is reason.
Adams on Gewirth
“Gewirth on Reason and Morality” by E. M. Adams http://www.jstor.org/stable/20127389 WHS-RS

Morality is an area of culture that is highly susceptible to philosophical skepticism . This has been so at least

since the time of the Greek Sophists. But modern Western civilization seems to be especially prone to philosophical doubts about the moral enterprise be cause of widely shared assumptions and views in the modern age about the knowledge-yielding
powers of the human mind. This par ticular trouble spot in the culture has received extensive philo sophical attention ever since the seventeenth century, but activity in moral philosophy has never been greater than in our own time. Most modern
philosophers attempt to solve the problem of morality from within the epistemological assumptions that define the dominant cultural perspective of our age. Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality* is a major work in this ongoing enterprise. Gewirth

Morality consists of
develops, with patience and skill, what he calls a "modified naturalism" in which morality is derived by logic alone from the concept of action. , according to Gewirth,

categorically obliga tory requirements for action that are addressed

" at least in part

to every agent and are concerned with furthering interests

actual , that the , especially the most important

The purpose is to find answers to

interests, of persons other than, or in addition to, the agent or speaker" (p. 1). of the book what Gewirth considers the central questions of

the authoritative question Why should one be moral,

moral philosophy. They are (" in the sense of accepting, as supremely

especially when these conflict

authoritative or obligatory for one's actions, the requirement of furthering or favor ably considering the important interests of other persons,

with one's own interests ?" [p. 3]), the distributive question ("Whose interests other than his own should the agent fa vorably consider in action?" [p. 3]), and the substantive question ("Of which

But the basic question is that of moral skepticism The

interests should favorable account be taken?" [p. 3]). ." crucial

difficulty is that so far different persons may give

. . .," he says, " as has been shown up to the present,

conflicting answers to the author itative question and uphold conflicting

criteria of moral rightness and thus conflicting moral [conflicting answers to the distributive and substantive questions],

judgments even if they have made no logical or empirical errors

, [Italics added]" (p.

moral judgments
4).
 Gewirth maintains that " cannot be connected , unlike factual statements of the sorts on which the natural sciences ultimately rest,

with empirical facts or observations in order to check their truth

without begging questions of principle about the criteria of moral . . .

rightness and hence moral judgments there must be some of the correctness of " (p. 5). But

correspondence independent variable that determines the truth

-correlate or " or at least the

of moral judgments
correctness He looks for a solution "by applying " if moral skepticism is to be avoided (p. 7).

reason to the concept of action this concept represents

[the canons of de ductive and inductive logic] , where

the phenomena of human voluntary and purposive behavior he " (p. 22). In this way,

claims to establish a supreme moral principle that no agent can

consistently deny and from which we can determine the correctness or incorrectness of particular moral judgments and general principles.

2. Undeniability: Any criticism occurs within the form of life that it
criticizes making the critique impossible to distinguish what it’s trying
to separate from. The solution is transcendence since it lies outside the
realm of what is being criticized. This also implies that any critique of
reason is impossible. Ng
Karen Ng (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University) “From the Critique of Reason to the Critique of Ideology: On the Relation
between Life and Consciousness from Hegel to Critical Theory” Recut RS

In order to determine exactly how the relation between life and consciousness can be methodologically instructive for a critique of ideology, I want to begin by clarifying the paradox inherited from the critique of reason that is constitutive of the critique
of ideology. In its most general statement, and following Raymond Geuss’ characterization, ideology critique is inherently reflexive or self-referential: a critique of a form of life as ideological necessarily belongs to the very “object-domain” that it both

ideology critique belongs to and is

describes and criticizes.4 Just as the critique of reason operates within the bounds of reason,

conditioned by the very social formation that it seeks to understand,

critique, and transform. This self-referentiality is the , necessitated by the project of self-critique, perhaps

formal characteristic that distinguishes traditional from critical

theories. In traditional theory, critique and object of critique the (or more broadly, subject and object)

are kept strictly apart and express no necessary or internal relationship. (Horkheimer associates this with the Cartesian point of view, whose contemporary incarnates include scientism and/or

Critical theories find themselves on both sides of the

positivism).5 divide,
, however, subject/object

and must be able to account for themselves as parts of their objects of

investigation. picture a snake biting its own tail the critique of
Initially, we might here , insofar as

ideology is an activity that arises out of the very form of life it criticizes.
Far from a mere idiosyncrasy, the selfreferentiality of critique tracks two essential and essentially connected modern developments. The first is the modern conception of the self, most commonly conceived under the heading of “self-consciousness.” In its
most minimal determination, selfconsciousness denotes a certain reflectiveness and self-awareness of one’s own constitutive conditions from within those conditions themselves.6 For Kant, this meant coming to an understanding of the transcendental
conditions of possibility for knowledge within the limits of possible experience; for Hegel, it meant attempting to establish the totality of conditions necessary for spirit’s development and self-understanding, a totality that he called, “actuality”
(Wirklichkeit);7 for Marx, it meant determining the conditions of the production of material life, a production that always takes place as a social and historical act.8 What we see in this progressive self-critical examination of one’s own conditions from
Kant to Marx is not only increasing concreteness (from transcendental conditions of possibility to conditions of actuality to material (economic) conditions), but an increasing awareness of history and historical conditions as self-determined, and hence,
as a potential site of freedom and transformation. Thus, the self-referentiality of critique, what Habermas called modernity’s consciousness of time,9 at the same time tracks a second modern injunction, namely, the normative demand to live a free life.10
In seeking to understand and criticize our own constitutive conditions, ideology critique exposes the ambivalence of those conditions from within, exemplifying a distinctively modern form of reflective, historical self-consciousness. Another common way
of characterizing this reflexivity is to identify ideology critique as a mode of immanent critique.11 Very roughly defined, immanent critique is a form of self-critique that arises out of the contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes, inversions, crises,
protests, failures, exclusions, and even tragedies of social formations. The locus classicus for the project of immanent critique is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, where the formation and experience of modern self-conscious life is traced according to the
failures of spirit to live up to its own self-given criteria for truth, goodness, and most importantly, freedom.12 More specifically, and in a way analogous to the distinguishing feature of critical theories, Hegel unfolds the experience, development, and
transformation of consciousness by demonstrating the entwinement of subject and object at every stage. Critique is immanent not only because consciousness continually finds itself in its object (an object of thought, another person, social reality), but

From
further, because the incongruencies and conflicts that arise immanently in the course of experience are transformative of both subject and object, producing new forms of consciousness, new norms, and new social realities.13

this very general description of the reflexivity of ideology critique we can , immediately

identify two well-known problems with this approach, problems that have led many theorists—both within and outside the confines of critical theory—to abandon the project of ideology critique altogether.14 The first can be called

the problem of totalization: in being unable to step outside of a form of

life in order to criticize it, in living in the very conditions that one , by, and through

seeks to understand, critique appears to be so fully integrated into that

which it criticizes that it becomes very difficult to distinguish between
ideology and non-ideology. the “complicity of cultural criticism 15 Thus, Adorno writes of

with culture,” suggest practices of critique might come to merge so

16 ing that

seamlessly with their object so as to render their critical edge entirely

obsolete the closure of ideology is so complete
. It appears here that there is , its reach so all-encompassing, that

simply no place for the critic to stand .

Prior to being able to set an end, an agent must have the ability to
pursue set end, else the agent could not achieve the end even it’s
possible. The only way that an agent can pursue an end is if that person
has freedom and the ability to set which course of action they want to
take, which mandates self-ownership. Agents cannot will contradictions
because that would both will an increase and decrease in freedom.

However, in the state of nature, there is no assurance of rights claims.

This requires the state as an impartial enforcer to prevent unilateral
willing. Ripstein
Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 2009, PDF
Kant’s point about disputes is not just a reiteration of Locke’s familiar claim that people often disagree about the application of principles to particular situations, especially when their interests are at stake. Unilateral judgment is a problem because of the
two dimensions of the innate right of humanity. The innate right to freedom demands that people be able to acquire things as their means without the explicit leave of others. Rightful honor requires people to stand up for their rights, and so that no

you are entitled to stand

person defer to any other private person’s judgment in cases of dispute about what either is permitted to do. If you think th at you have performed an act establishing a right,

by your claim in the face of all who contest it, but those who contest it are no less entitled to stand by their claims. Rightful
honor requires that each party accept no standard other than “what seems right and good” to him.”24 The only reason to defer is because you can’t win. Might makes right, regardless of how "good and law-abiding" you or the person who disputes your

The solution
claim might be. is to make the omnilateral will institutional. Disputes
to disputes about rights

can be resolved if the parties are subject to the authority of an

in a way that is consistent with rightful honor to it

impartial enforcer The state is

judge, and an this structure. who can carry out the decision. a generalized version of It is a common authority, charged with
making, applying, and enforcing law. It is legitimate because it makes it possible for people to resolve disputes about rights in a way that is consistent with the rightful honour of all. Legitimacy flows from what the state does, and so does not require an
explicit act of instituting it.

The standard is consistency with the omnilateral will. Intentions

outweighs: a) Culpability: consequences are determined by external
forces which makes them both unpredictable and impossible to assign
culpability to b) the problem of induction: induction relies on another
induction since we are literally unable to predict the future which is
circular. Only deduction solves which mandates intentionality. Prefer
additionally:
1. Justification: Any argumentative process must begin with
universality. Contained within the idea of a moral conversation is a
precept that both you and the Other agree to – that is universalism.
Benhabib
“Another Universalism: On the Unity and Diversity of Human Rights”; Seyla Benhabib; Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical
Association, Vol. 81, No. 2; http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653991 WHS-RS

The nerve of my reformulation the universalist tradition is the of

reconstruction of the "moral point of view" subject to the along the model of a moral conversation,

principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity The .

goal of such moral conversation is communication not consensus or unanimity, but, in Hannah Arendt's terms, "the anticipated

with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement ."2
Departing from the strict consensual model of Habermas's discourse ethics, I sought to stake a middle ground between an a prioristic universalism and other more radical forms of contextualism. Since my attempt to stake such a middle ground has been
radically misunderstood by some critics of my work like Peter Dews,3 I will briefly repeat here my reasons for rejecting Habermas's derivation of the universalizability principle, 'U'.4 My reasons for rejecting Habermas's version of the principle of
universalizability are that on the one hand the derivation of 'U' within discourse ethics remains a problem, and on the other hand the formulation of 'U' washes away the necessary distinctions between a justice-oriented deontological theory like
discourse ethics and other versions of utilitarianism (34-38). A close look at the formulation of 'U' may be appropriate: Unless all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be

The
expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual, a norm of action could not be considered valid.5 From the beginning, the project of discourse ethics has been stymied by the problems of circularity or inconsistency.

normative content of the argumentation principles already seemed to

presuppose the moral theory which discourse ethics was supposed to
ground if one did not impute a certain normative content to the
; or,
principles of argumentation, then such a content was smuggled into the
theory at a later stage via the strictly universalist interpretation of the
conditions of reciprocity and symmetry . Since I have struggled to meet these objections and still hold on to the core ideas behind the program of a

the central premise of discourse

discourse ethic, in jettisoning 'U', I chose to admit the material normative content of the rules governing practical discourses. I wrote: 'D' [

ethics , together with those rules of argument governing discourses the

] ,

normative content of which I summarized as the principles of universal

moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, are in my view quite adequate
to serve as the only universalizability test. the (37) The gist of my reformulation of discourse ethics is, then,

admission that the two principles of universal moral respect and

egalitarian reciprocity are always already implied by any formulation of
practical discourses and hence cannot be said to be established only as
their result This strategy leads to a certain circularity
. I , but following some insights of hermeneutic philosophy,

suggest that this circularity is not vicious, but unavoidable. Within the hermeneutic horizon of the political

We
and ethical legacy of modernity and as a result of endless political and ethical struggles, the norms of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, in however contested a fashion, become part of our moral-political universe.

contest them even when we take them for granted in some form or
other according to some interpretation or other. Although any specific
,

interpretation of these norms is open to dispute in a discourse situation,

the very step leading to a discursive moral argumentation presupposes
some prior understanding of these norms [Vorverstdndnis] . At first sight this statement may seem not only naive, but simply false in the face of the
many racisms, xenophobisms, and nationalisms produced by modernity since the seventeenth century. Moral optimism of progress is not part of my agenda. Rather, what I am suggesting here, and what needs further historical and cultural analysis in
order to be substantiated, is a dialectic of universalism and discrimination, the simultaneous spread of the ideals of equali ty and the formation of prejudice towards "others."6 Intergroup prejudice has always existed in human history. What needs to be
investigated is how, after the spread of the universalist ideals of the Enlightenment, social and political prejudice is caught up in a dialectic of justification which is wholly different than the systems of prejudice which dominated premodernity. In the
latter, such difference among peoples, classes, genders, and races is thought to have a basis in nature, ontology, or theology. Modernity destroys these sources of justification - more or less; in doing so, it almost creates a heightened need for repression in

I
order to reestablish difference and discrimination.7This "hermeneutic universalism of modernity" may be what is most disturbing to Peter Dews, for it does mean a certain contextualism, but not of the sort which he imputes to me.

would never deny that the steps leading individuals from the
, as he seems to imply that I do,

moral struggles of everyday life to practical discourses require the "epoche" of

strenuous levels of cognitive and psychological abstraction . Neither the motivational willingness nor the

Such abilities and capacities

cognitive capacity to engage in discourses and to argue for the validity of controversial norms from the standpoint of all concerned falls from heaven.

are indeed contingent upon the cultural, institutional, and political

resources of collectivities; they also presuppose a certain level of
and histories

cognitive and psychological development among individuals . In this sense, I am a "pragmatist," as

Dews observes, but one who believes not in "naturalizing reason," but in discovering the historicity of its becoming.

2. Oppression: Understanding Kantian philosophy in a racialized context

is key to solving oppression -- also resolves all kant bad indicts. The end
of any approach to solving oppression is universal respect which
demands a Kantian focus. The race-specifc Kantianian seeks
understandings of freedom to repudiate structural oppression and
generate self-respect within particularities. Mills 18
[Charles W. Mills. “Black Radical Kantianism.” Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622.]
WHS-RS

To the extent that the dominant varieties of colonial/imperial liberalism were originally racist (Mehta 1999; Pitts 2005; Hobson 2012), presup- posing a hierarchy of European superiors and non-European inferiors (biologically and/or culturally), they
got the social ontology wrong in an obvious way. But to the extent that postwar postcolonial (at least nom- inally) liberalism retroactively sanitized its racial past and transformed this hierarchical essentialist metaphysics into an ontology of morally equal

The Afro-modern claim is that

and symmetrically positioned atomic individuals, it still continues, I would contend, to get the social ontology wrong. neither is correct, because

blacks and other people of color are equal and because

(contra the first) the (contra the second)

socially constructed inequali- ties and their historic legacy cannot be

metaphysically ignored considering how fundamentally and
asymmetrically they have shaped the modern world order and the raced individuals within that order. In

the Afro-modern tradition is insistent that modernity is established

other words,

on and structured by a social ontology of race. It is not, of course—assuming meta-ethical objectivism—that these racist social conven-

the denial to them of social recognition as full

tions and structures actually make blacks and other people of color less than full persons. But

persons, depriving them of equal rights, freedoms, and protections, and

unjustly privileging whites at their expense, foundationally affects both
these racial groups and the moral and political dynamics of the societies
so created , their personhood is unaffected, along with the rights,
. Objectively

freedoms, and protections they should have, as persons. But

intersubjectively, insofar as white social recognition is dominant and
determinant, their socially effective personhood—the rights, freedoms,
and protections they actually have—is denied Thus, we have an .5

ontology socially rather than biologically

—races as central existents profoundly shaping one’s being as an individual—but an ontology

created —the product of “sociogenesis,” in Frantz Fanon’s (1991 [1967]) famous coinage. As George Fredrickson (2015 [2002], 11–12) has pointed out, pre- modern social ontologies are characterized by social hierarchies of multiple

kinds. So even if race existed then (which Fredrickson denies, as an expo- nent of the short periodization), it would not have been sharply differen- tiated from the others. It is the advent of modernity, which is supposed to flatten these systems of
ascriptive hierarchy into simple personhood (as in the conventional portrayal of Kant), that sets racial inferiority so sharply into relief, since the R2s are then being stigmatized as less than human while the R1s become (making allowance for gender
differentiation) coextensive with the human. The Afro-modern diagnosis of a metaphysics of personhood that is actually racialized is thus different from standard Euro-modern discussions of personhood and its implications for ethico- political theory. It
is making a different claim than the anti-utilitarian critique within liberalism that it permits the disrespecting of persons. The putative problem with utilitarianism is not that it regards a set of persons as sub-persons, but that the fungibility of (equal)

The Afro-modern analysis is

persons opens the door to the rights-violations of some (equal) persons if social welfare for (equal) persons as a whole can thereby be maximized.

saying that , independent of this issue, some persons are not recognized as equal persons in
the first place . So it is also different from the Marxist critique from outside liberalism. The putative problem here, as originally stated in “On the Jewish Question” (Marx 2000) and later in Capital (Marx 1990 [1976], 279–

280), is that in assuming individuals of equal moral and juridical status, equal recognized personhood, liberalism’s social ontology is ignoring the effects of the material differences in wealth and property ownership in the liberal state that in reality make
the (white) working class effectively unequal. But the Afro-modern claim is that for blacks and other people of color, not even ethico-juridical equality, limited as it may be, is attained, so that their positioning in the liberal state is different from the
beginning. Consider some classic statements of this realization from figures across the black diaspora. In his second autobiography, My Bondage and My Freedom, Frederick Douglass (1996, 213) describes how, after he had escaped from slavery to the
North, and was giving abolitionist speeches, “I was generally introduced as a ‘chattel’—a ‘thing’—a piece of southern ‘property’—the chairman assuring the audience that it could speak.” But this was not surprising to him, because the experience of
enslavement had taught him that “A man, without force, is without the essential dignity of humanity. Human nature is so constituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man, although it can pity him” (199). W. E. B. Du Bois’s Darkwater (2007 [1920], 35)
concludes that “By reason of a crime [Atlantic slavery] (perhaps the greatest crime in human history) the modern world has been system- atically taught to despise colored peoples. . . . all this has unconsciously trained millions of honest, modern men into
the belief that black folk are sub-human.” The Jamaican anti-colonial activist Marcus Garvey (1992 [1923–1925]) judges of blacks that “A race without authority and power is a race without respect.” French colonial subject Aimé Césaire (2016 [1972],
202) draws up the equation “colonization equals ‘thingification’,” an assessment echoed and elaborated upon in his Martiniquan compatriot Frantz Fanon’s (1991 [1967], 8), description of “the zone of nonbeing,” in which “the black is not a man.” Black
American writer Ralph Ellison (1995 [1952]) uses Invisible Man as the title of his celebrated first novel, signifying not, as in its predecessor, H. G. Wells’s (2017) early 1897 science-fiction classic The Invisible Man, a physico-chemical invention to make
the body imperceptible to our fellow-humans, so that the inventor cannot be seen, but rather the lack of equal social recognition given to blacks by their white fellow humans, who simply refuse to see them. Malcolm X (Breitman, ed. 1965, 51) recounts

All of our people

how “I grew up with white people. . . . and I have never met white people yet—if you are around them long enough—who won’t refertoyouasa‘boy’ora‘gal,’nomatterhowoldyouare. . . .

have the same goals, the same objective. That objective is freedom,
justice, equality. All of us want recognition and respect as human beings.
We don’t want to be integrationists. Nor do we want to be
separationists. We want to be human beings. ” Across the Atlantic, South African militant Steve Biko (2002 [1978]) declares that: In terms of

What Black
the Black Consciousness approach we recognize the existence of one major force in [apartheid] South Africa. This is White Racism. It is the one force against which all of us are pitted. . . .

Consciousness seeks to do is to produce black people who do not . . . real

regard themselves as appendages to white society . . . . We do not need to apologise for this because . . . the white systems have

the common theme is the demand for

produced through the world a number of people who are not aware that they too are people. (50–51) So

equal recognition, equal dignity, equal respect, equal personhood, in a

white-supremacist world where disre- spect rather than respect is the
norm, the default mode, for blacks A race- sensitive Kantianism not .

merely purged of Kant’s own racism but attuned to these (in a way nominally color-blind Kantianism is not)

racially demar- cated particularities a black radical for the different sub-sections of the human population—

Kantianism will thus understand the need to “universalize” the

—

categorical imperative in a very different way to register the crucial

differences between those socially recognized as persons and those
socially recognized as sub-persons. I suggest that we divide the different moral relations involved into two categories based on whether one is a member of the
privileged race, the R1s, or the subordinated race, the R2s. That gives us the following six-way breakdown: (1) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect to oneself, (2) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect to one’s fellow-R1s, (3) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect
to R2s, (4) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to oneself, (5) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to one’s fellow-R2s, and (6) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to R1s. Historically, each of these will have been affected by race (as racism), leaving an
ideological and psychological legacy, habits of disrespect, that will shape the “inclinations” most likely to be determinative and mos t imperatively to be resisted. Instead of (what could be graphically thought of as) “horizontal” relations of reciprocal and
symmetrical race-indifferent respect among equal raceless persons, the R1s will have historically respected themselves and each other as R1s, while “vertically” looking down on, disrespecting, R2s as inferiors. In turn, the [inferiors] R2s will have been

required to show racial deference to the R1s, looking up to them as R2s, and—having most probably internalized their lower ontological status—will have been prone to regard both themselves and their fellows with racial contempt. Thus, a
morally reclamatory project cognizant of race now self-consciously as social positioning rather than biology will
need both to identify and expunge these corrupt inherited reflexes , and to rethink

Universalization for the goal of respecting objective

what genuine race-sensitive universalization now requires of us.

personhood in a Kantian “impure ethics” of this kind will require

advertence to these differentiated histories, this differentiated
positioning, and the need for addressing and redressing them To treat .

everyone in a “color-blind” way would in this context be equivalent to

ignoring the history, and thus particularizing rather than universalizing
respect by taking as one’s reference point whose personhood has those persons (the R1s)

not historically been in question. Abstracting away from history the and (possibly ongoing)

actually undermines universality, because it

reality of social disrespect for the R2s and social deference for the R1s, tempting as it may be,

does not genuinely include the [inferior] on the terms necessary to R2s

correct their situation . Rather, by assimilating the R2s to the R1s, it renders their R1 particularity the universal, which is a bogus universal considering how radically different their normative

positioning in the social order and the social ontology has been. This revisionist framework, I would claim, enables us to better under- stand and appreciate the dynamics both of the long black tradition of moral uplift through what has been called “racial
vindicationism” and the more recent activism (albeit with older precedents) of white anti-racists urging a critical rethinking of “whiteness.” These can both legitimately be framed as “Kantian” exercises once we acknowledge how divergent from the ideal
Kantian community actual racialized societies have been. I am not, of course, suggesting that anyone in either camp had to have read Kant to be motivated to take on this moral -political task. Rather, the idea is to bring out, especially for a largely white
philosophical readership, how recognizable these projects should be, how illuminating their translation into, and analysis from the perspective of, Kantian discourse could be, once one recognizes the radical difference a racially partitioned personhood

mainstream ideal-
would make to the assumptions of that world of discourse. We could think of it as the systematic working out of personhood theory under non-ideal conditions. Whereas

theory Kantianism tends to presup- pose an already-achieved social

ontology of socially recognized equals a social-ontological , here

transformation is being sought to bring that equality about Such a .

transformation will require the repudiation of internalized inferiority

on the part of blacks and of internalized superiority on the part of
whites , with their associated asymmetries and non-reciprocities. Far from being themselves racist, then (as, through an apprehensive mainstream white lens, both, but particularly the black project, are often represented as being), they
should ideally culminate in a convergence, an equalization of respective socially recognized metaphysical statuses. But to repeat: precisely because these respective standings have been tied to race, a “color-blind” ig- noring of race cannot accomplish this

end. Rather, the history and its legacy need to be admitted and confronted for the Kantian ideal of a community of reciprocally respecting persons to be realized. Moreover, as briefly mentioned in the previous section, the obstacles
to such universalization will be far more extensive , and they require far more theorization than in mainstream Kantianism,

including as they will cognitive and motivational hurdles manifest not just in individualist but group-linked and social-structural forms. One of the virtues of the left tradition, going back to Marx, is the realization that in class society, ruling- class-linked
“ideology” is a central barrier to the objective apprehension of the social world. Correspondingly, Ideologiekritik is a crucial part of the struggle for the new socialist order. However, Marxism’s general weakness on normative matters means that the
specifically moral dimension of this critique was historically undeveloped, so that those sympathetic to the project of moralizing historical materialism had to seek theoretical resources elsewhere, as discussed in section 2. What I am now suggesting is

a black radical Kantianism needs a com- parable theorization of white

that

racial ideology , both for the achievement of individual and civic virtue. Liberalism in general, especially considering the (descriptive) individualism of its dominant versions, and its ideal-theoretic orientation in Rawls
in particular, has not historically paid much atten- tion to such issues. But contractarian liberalism in particular is nominally committed to the ideal of what Rawls (1999, 15, 48–49, 152–156) calls the “publicity” (what we would now term “transparency”)

Given the
of the society’s political principles, institutions, and basic structure, taken (in ideal theory) to be the result of general agreement, and consistent with people’s moral psychology and desire to secure their self-respect.

deviation from ideality of real-life racialized societies calling themselves

liberal, however, these actual principles, institutions, and basic
structure will reflect a white rather than race-inclusive agreement , with deleterious

the achievement of “Enlightenment”

effects for both white and black moral psychologies. So and the overcoming of “immaturity”—here on both an individual and a

will require a recognition of the distinctive opacities

group level— , the peculiar systemic violations of transparency,

To the extent that sub-persons have

necessary to maintain the racialized social order, and their effect at different racial poles on people’s self-respect. the R2

internalized the ideology of the dominant they will look up to them as R1s,

superior beings while looking down on themselves. The

, who are owed not just respect but deference,

Kantian duty to respect oneself will potentially then have very powerful
corrective implications it will require one to repudiate the status here (cf. Hay 2013), since

of sub-personhood. And this repudiation will be linked with epistemic

duties the obligation to develop an enlightenment that sees through
also,

white-supremacist ideology and to not inflict “epistemic injustice” on ,

oneself by refusing to give one’s own counter-hegemonic perceptions

and alternative conceptualizations a fair hearing Thinking of oneself as .

a sub-person is based on a certain inculcated historical and social

not adventitious but is

picture of the world As an [inferior] e will . Achieving moral virtue will of necessity be intimately tied up with achieving epistemic virtue. R2, on

need to seek out the actual history that has put [people] in a position of R1s

domination and to recognize and repudiate the ideology that has

over R2s,

justified it —hence the long-standing emphasis in the black radical tradition of educating oneself about black history, against the myth of the history-less “negro,” and of understanding the actual social forces that have brought

Assertions of “black pride,”

about the present social order. then, need not be racist (though admittedly they may degenerate into racism). Translated as I have

can be
suggested, they read as asserting equal personhood and the
sympathetically

entitlement to equal respect for a population traditionally subjugated

and denied bot h. A 1933 essay by Du Bois (2016 [1933]) makes the connection explicit in his title: “On Being Ashamed of Oneself: An Essay on Race Pride.” “Pride” in this

From the classic civil rights

context is not racial self/group glorification, the assertion of superiority, but the corrective to “shame,” aimed at equalization.

placards to “Black Lives Matter!” we

that simply (but revolutionarily) declared “I AM A MAN” the recent movement (Lebron 2017),

find a thematic continuity of protest against the reality of continuing

racial subordination It is the repudiation of psychologically internalized
.

inferiority and the demand for an end to socially prescribed

(“You are not a man/person”)

inferiority the aspiration to equalization rather than to

(“Black lives do not matter”),

superiority “race” as blackness needs to be part of this moral

. And

declaration rather than being jettisoned because of its historic as irrelevant

signification as sub-personhood . In Malcolm X’s (Breitman, ed. 1965, 169) typically blunt assessment: You know yourself that we have been a
people who hated our African characteristics. . . . [W]e hated the color of our skin, hated the blood of Africa that was in our veins. And in hating our features and our skin and our blood, why, we had to end
up hating ourselves. . . . Our color became to us a chain—we felt that it was holding us back. . . . It made us feel inferior; it made us feel inadequate; made us feel helpless. And when we fell victims to this

Overcoming self-hatred
feeling of inadequacy or inferiority or helplessness, we turned to [the white man] to show us the way. and the lack of self-respect

will thus require but the genuine

not merely the nominal repudiation of racial deference to the racially superior R1s,

affirmation of a personhood not defined on terms not tacitly tied to R1 ,

“whiteness,” and its derogation of oneself and one’s fellow R2s.

3. Parameters: Ethical frameworks must defines the word ought, so it’s a

T question.
Standard is Real world Education: an understanding of Kantianism is
key to understanding the law in the real world because most states
abide by inviolable side-constraints in their constitutions—Germany
proves. Ripstein 2
Arthur RIpstein, Force and Freedom

Strictly speaking, the right to dignity is not an enumerated right in the German Basic Law [says], but the organizing principle
under which all enumerated rights—ranging from life and security of the person through freedom of expression, movement, association, and employment and the right

to a fair trial to equality before the law—are organized. It appears as Art I.1: . “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” Art. I.3 explains that the
enumerated rights follow: “The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the

executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.” Other, enumerated rights are subject to
proportionality analysis, through which they can be restricted in light of each other so as to give effect to a consistent system of rights. The right to

dignity is the basis of the state’s power to legislate and so is not subject
to any limitation, even in light of the enumerated rights falling under it, because—to put it in explicitly
Kantian terms—citizens could not give themselves a law that turned
them into mere objects.
Real world education is key because it impacts debaters outside of the
round and teaches them be good advocates the in their daily lives.
 Offense
Plan Text: The United States ought not provide military aid to the
authoritarian regimes of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
Now Affirm:
1. The military is intentionally used for the end of killing innocent lives.
That isn’t universalizable since killing an innocent life would justify
someone doing that action unto the person that commits the killing
generating a contradiction. New York Times 18 is the solvency advocate
“Why Are U.S. Bombs Killing Civilians in Yemen” by the Editorial Board for the NYT on August 28th, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/opinion/us-yemen-saudi-arabia-trump-civilian-casualties.html

Saudi Arabia and its allies intervened in Yemen Sunni more than three years ago to rout Iran-backed Shiite rebels who had driven the

the rebels have also been accused of

internationally recognized government out of the capital and into Saudi exile. As the conflict has dragged on,

atrocities but the U N , y it is the Saudi-led air war that has

nited ations body and human rights groups sa

done the most to turn a impoverished country into a humanitarian n already

nightmare Saudi-led airstrikes have struck civilian

and an indiscriminate killing field. Again and again,

targets slaughtering innumerable innocents Last Friday the U N said

, . , nited ations

the coalition killed at least 22 children and four women as they fled a
battle zone. a coalition air assault struck a school bus
Two weeks earlier, on Aug. 9, , killing dozens of children.

Countless more civilians have been killed by bombs at markets,

weddings, funerals more than 6,500 by the official count but certainly — ,

many, many more The bomb that

. Millions more civilians are suffering from shortages of food and medical care. That’s the horror. The shame:

annihilated the school bus was American and its young passengers . According to CNN, it was a 500-pound, laser-guided bomb sold to Saudi Arabia in an

After that Obama banned the

approved arms deal — similar to the bomb that devastated a funeral hall in October 2016, in which 155 people were killed. , then-President Barack

sale of precision-guided military technology to Saudi Arabia. The ban

was overturned by the Trump administration in March 2017. A report published last week by Human Rights Watch focused on the

investigations
“woefully inadequate” amount to cover-ups of what are conducted by the coalition’s own mechanism; they often

likely war crimes. Many war violations committed by coalition

“ of the apparent laws-of-

forces show evidence of war crimes serious violations committed by —

individuals with criminal intent King Salman ,” Human Rights Watch stated. Yet far from holding anyone accountable, of Saudi Arabia in July

issued a sweeping pardon of all military personnel involved in the Yemen operation. The report also disparaged claims by

the U S provides operational logistical and intelligence support to

nited tates, which ,

the coalition the coalition has “improved” targeting practices the

, that . In fact,

report said, the U S risk complicity in unlawful

nited tates, Britain and France, all of which sell weapons to Saudi Arabia,

attacks American military

. Given the record of the Saudi-led band, it is hardly surprising that commanders are becoming increasingly exasperated. “Clearly, we’re

concerned about civilian casualties, and they know about our

concern,” Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian , soon to complete an assignment as the senior American air commander in the Middle East, said in the telephone interview with

It was the bluntest critique of several that have been voiced by

The Times.

senior American officials. It’s time for the United States and its But words are not enough.

Western allies to stop selling arms or giving any military assistance to

Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners. The horror in Yemen has gone way past any discussion of who’s right and who’s wrong, and it has become clear that

only a negotiated peace agreement can bring the killings to an end Saudi .

Arabia and its allies seem to have little compunction about slaughtering
children as long as more bombs can be bought, so it’s up to the enablers to call a halt.

2. The omnilateral will cannot act for private purposes, because its sole
goal is maintaining the freedom of its citizens. Thus, an obligatory
constraint is that the omnilateral will not function outside of that single
purpose. That affirms because the state ought not provide aid to entities
such as foreign governments which fall outside of its jurisdiction—that’s
a violation of its only purpose. Ripstein 3
Arthur Ripstein, 2015. Arthur Ripstein is a Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, Canada. “Just War, Regular War, and Perpetual Peace.” RS

As an artificial person, a state does not enjoy the

The relation of states as against other states follows from this distinctive nature.

free purposiveness that individual human beings enjoy. This is not a

claim about it lacking psychological capacities, or the full freedom of
self-determination A state lacks the free that Kant identifies with wille. Instead, it follows from its distinctive role in relation to its citizens.

purposiveness of a natural person because its moral status depends

exclusively on its provision of a rightful condition for its people. It does
not have any entitlement as against either its members or other states
to set and pursue private purposes . , not even the purposes that a majority, or even all of its members happen to share It is essentially public; any pursuit of private

If it violates this essentially public character by acting for

purposes is, simply as such, ultra vires.

other than public purposes, it thereby violates its duty to its citizens. This

essentially public character also restricts how others may treat it; as against other states, it is a private moral person, and does them no wrong by providing a rightful condition (even a defective one) for the inhabitants of its territory. Another way of

the authority of each state is restricted to what

saying that it does no wrong is to say that no other state has authority over it;

concerns it, namely providing a rightful condition for its members. If no

other state has authority over it, then it is, as against those other states ,

none wrongs another by declining to

sovereign – sui iuris. Relations between states are structured by the form of private relation more generally:

accommodate itself to another’s wishes,24 and the internal organization

of a state, as such, is not a wrong against any of its neighbors.25
3. Next, the basis for the omnilateral will is that citizens form the state to
resolve rights claims. However, authoritarian states necessarily violate
this condition because they exercise control over political and economic
spheres, thus denuding them of the legitimacy of the omnilateral will.
This means that authoritarian regimes are illegitimate forms of
governance and it is prohibited to support them because the state’s job
is to ensure freedom, not will its restrictions.
4. States cannot tax their citizens for foreign objectives because it’s
intrinsically coercive and not within the jurisdiction of the government,
generating a prohibition. Vance 17
[Laurence M. Vance, (Laurence M. Vance is a columnist and policy advisor for the Future of Freedom Foundation, an associated scholar of the
Ludwig von Mises Institute, and a columnist, blogger, and book reviewer at LewRockwell.com.) "Conservatives and Foreign Aid" Future of
Freedom Foundation, 5-4-2017, https://www.fff.org/explore-freedom/article/conservatives-foreign-aid/, DOA:12-5-2018 // WWBW]

Foreign aid is simply the looting of American taxpayers. The federal government cannot give away
billions of dollars in aid to foreign governments, agencies, NGOs, and privileged foreign contractors without

first taking it out of the pockets of American citizens. The libertarian position on foreign aid
is straightforward: The government has no right to take money from Americans

against their will and give it to foreigners or their governments — regardless of the need,
crisis, or circumstances. All foreign aid should be individual, private, and voluntary. Any American who wants to

help the poor, the hungry, the downtrodden, the oppressed, the disadvantaged, or the underprivileged in any county is
welcome to do so on his own or through any number of private organizations — as long as he uses
his own money. All government agencies and programs devoted to providing

foreign aid should be eliminated. All foreign aid supplied by the

government should be eliminated immediately. Conservative support for foreign aid flies in the
face of the Constitution, limited government, private property, individual liberty, and the free market — things they profess to believe in.
Revoking support results in peace talks Bandow 12/18
Doug Bandow, 12-18-2018, [senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to
President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine,
National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times. Bandow speaks frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses,
and to business groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News Channel, and MSNBC. He holds a JD from
Stanford University.] "It's Time to End U.S. Support for the Saudi War on Yemen," Cato Institute,
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen RE

The ongoing peace talks offer some hope. They have advanced further
than previous attempts, and have reached some positive agreements,
such as prisoner exchange The fact that Western nations
, though implementation remains.

have turned against the war encouraged the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to
start making concessions, necessary to reach a more enduring peace. So
long as Riyadh can count on a blank check from Washington —it turns out the United States

the kingdom has no reason to temper its policy.

wasn’t even charging enough for refueling Saudi aircraft—

Which means the administration should take the next step and end all
support for the war; MbS and his companions should bear the full
burden of what amounts to imperial warmongering.
U.S. support of human rights reduces the risk of conflict and mass
structural violence. Green 17
Shannon N. Green, 3-8-2017, [director and senior fellow of the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.]
"When the U.S. Gives Up on Human Rights, Everyone Suffers," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/04/when-the-u-s-gives-up-
on-human-rights-everyone-suffers/ RE

This capitulation would have major security and economic

consequences for the United States and its closest allies. In addition to
the moral imperative, America has strong interests in supporting
democracy and human rights abroad. First, democratic countries make
the best, most stable partners. Democracies are more likely to form
alliances and cooperate with other democracies and less likely to get
embroiled in conflict. The U.S. military understands the value of having
partners that respect human rights and the rule of law, and thus invests billions a year in
enhancing the professionalism of security forces overseas. Recent research has deepened our understanding of the benefits for American security of having broad and
deep ties to other countries. In a statistical analysis of Muslim-majority countries’ cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism, Peter S. Henne found states

Conversely, emboldened dictators

that received more foreign assistance were more collaborative than those that did not.

tend to pursue foreign policy agendas that are erratic and destructive
for the United States and its allies. North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un’s
spate of nuclear tests and missile launches and Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea and incursions into eastern
Ukraine are emblematic of the kind of aggressive behavior the
international community has come to expect from autocratic leaders.
Second, contrary to the president’s assertions, the United States has
benefitted immensely from the liberal world order that it helped create.
From the ashes of World War II, America invested in interlocking
political and economic institutions, alliances, and norms — based on
universal human rights, shared values, and the rule of law — that would
prevent large-scale conflict and displacement in the future and fuel
Europe’s recovery from the war. The United States has been both the primary engine and beneficiary of this liberal
international order. To be clear, inequality has been a terrible byproduct of this system — and too many have been left behind. But, far from being victimized by
globalization, the United States has enjoyed nearly 70 years of unparalleled influence because of its investment in the promotion of democracy and human rights.

Finally, U.S. support for democracy and human rights matters in

people’s lives. It is true that the United States has been far from perfect in championing human rights, especially where America has short-term
security interests. Yet there is no other country that can substitute for the United

States when it comes to fighting for universal freedoms. American

presidents, members of Congress, and cabinet secretaries have
personally intervened to get political prisoners released from jail,
prevent genocide, and bring war criminals to justice. The solidarity
expressed by U.S. political and civil leaders has provided sustenance and
hope to human rights defenders in the grimmest conditions. An Egyptian activist once
pulled a speech given by President Barack Obama on the vital contributions of civil society out of his pocket and said to me, “When I heard these words, I knew I wasn’t

At a moment in which the forces of nationalism, authoritarianism,

alone.”

and hatred threaten to tear our societies apart again, the United States
needs to make sure that those bravely fighting against repression and
injustice all around the world know that they have not been forgotten.
Underview