Princeton Classical Philosophy Work-in-Progress 08/03/2019

The Fabric of Akrasia: A New Reading of the Protagoras 351b-360e

Text 1
(a) Prot. 352b-c
They do not think of it in that way at all; but rather in this way: while knowledge is often present in a
man, what rules him is not knowledge but rather something else---sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure,
sometimes pain, at times love, often fear; they think of his knowledge as being utterly dragged around by
all these other things as if it were a slave.1
δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης
τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ’ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ’ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι·
οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ’ ἐνούσης (5)
πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ
ἄρχειν ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ
δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς
(c) διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου,
περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.

(b) Rep IV. 439e-440a

Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he
saw some corpses lying at the executioner’s feet. He had an appetite to look at them but at the same time
he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but finally,
overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying,
“Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!”
ὡς ἄρα (5)
Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιὼν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον
τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, @1
ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὖ δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι
(a) ἑαυτόν, καὶ τέως μὲν μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο· (1)
κρατούμενος δ’ οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς
ὀφθαλμούς, προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, “Ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν,”
ἔφη, “ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος.”

Text 2
(a) Prot. 351c-d
I don’t know, Socrates, if I should answer as simply as you put the question---that everything pleasant is
good and everything painful is bad. It seems to me to be safer to respond not merely with my present
answer in mind but from the point of view of my life overall, that on the one hand, there are pleasurable
things which are not good, and on the other hand, there are painful things which are not bad but some
which are, and a third class which is neutral---neither bad nor good.
Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς,
(d) εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἅπαντα
καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά· ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν
ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν
ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ’ αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ (5)
ἔστι κακά, ἔστι δ’ ἃ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ
οὔτ’ ἀγαθά.

1
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are from Cooper (ed.) Plato: Complete Works.

1
(b) Prot. 353c-e
Socrates:‘Listen, Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. Do you hold, gentleman, that this happens
to you in circumstances like these---you are often overcome by pleasant things like food or drink or sex,
and you do those things all the while knowing they are ruinous?’ They would say yes. Then you and I
would ask them again: ‘In what sense do you call these things ruinous? Is it that each of them is pleasant
in itself and produces immediate pleasure, or is it that later they bring about diseases and poverty and
many other things of that sort? Or even if it doesn’t bring about these things later, but gives only
enjoyment, would it still be a bad thing, just because it gives enjoyment in whatever way?’ Can we
suppose then, Protagoras, that they would make any other answer than that bad things are bad not because
they bring about immediate pleasure, but rather because of what happens later, disease and things like
that?
Protagoras: I think that is how most people would answer.
Socrates: ‘And in bringing about diseases and poverty, do they bring about pain?’ I think they would
agree.
Ἀκούετε δή· πειρασό-
μεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι. ἄλλο τι
γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε, (5)
οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατού-
μενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως
αὐτὰ πράττειν; — Φαῖεν ἄν. — Οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθ’ ἂν αὐτοὺς
ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν· Πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῇ φατε εἶναι; @1
(d) πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει
καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον
νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρα-
σκευάζει; ἢ κἂν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρα-
σκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ’ ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι (5)
μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὁπῃοῦν; ἆρ’ οἰόμεθ’ ἂν αὐτούς,
ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν
αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακά ἐστιν,
(e) ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τἆλλα. — Ἐγὼ
μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταῦτα
ἀποκρίνασθαι. — Οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ
πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. —
Συνέφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

(c) Prot. 354c-d

Socrates: ‘So then you pursue pleasure as being as being good and avoid pain as bad?’
Protagoras: Yes.
Socrates: ‘So this you regard as bad, pain, and pleasure, you regard as good, since you call the very
enjoying of something bad whenever it deprives us of greater pleasures than itself provides, or brings
about greater pains than the very pleasures inherent in it? But if you call the very enjoying of something
bad for some other reason and with some other criterion in view than the one I have suggested, you could
tell us what it is: but you won’t be able to.’
Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν
ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς
κακόν; — Συνεδόκει. — Τοῦτ’ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθ’ εἶναι κακόν, τὴν (5)
λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν
τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῇ
ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν
(d) αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ’ ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν

2
καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ
ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἕξετε.

Text 3
(a) Prot. 352d-e
You realize that most people aren’t going to be convinced by us. They maintain that most people are
unwilling to do what is best, even though they know what it is and are able to do it. And when I have
asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are overcome by
pleasure or pain or being ruled by one of the things I referred to just now.
οἶσθα οὖν
ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθονται, (5)
ἀλλὰ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν
πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν· καὶ ὅσους δὴ @1
ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅτι ποτε αἴτιόν ἐστι τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν
(e) ἡττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπό τινος
τούτων κρατουμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας.

(b) Prot. 354e-355a

But even now it is still possible to withdraw, if you are able to say that the good is anything other than
pleasure or that the bad is anything other than pain. Or is it enough for you to live life pleasantly without
pain?
ἀλλ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν,
(a) εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν,
ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν· ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως
καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν;

(c) Prot. 355b

Just how absurd this will become very clear, if we do not use so many names at the same time, ‘pleasant’
and ‘painful,’ ‘good’ and ‘bad’; but since these turned out to be only two things let us instead call them by
two names, first, ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ then later, ‘pleasant’ and ‘painful.’
ὡς δὲ ταῦτα
γελοῖά ἐστιν, κατάδηλον ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι
χρώμεθα ἅμα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλ’ (5)
ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν
αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἔπειτα αὖθις ἡδεῖ τε
(c) καὶ ἀνιαρῷ.

(d) Prot. 355c-e

if by chance the questioner is rude he might burst out laughing and say: ‘what you are saying is
ridiculous---someone does what is bad, knowing that it is bad, when it is not necessary to do it, having
been overcome by the good. So’ he will say, ‘within yourself, does the good outweigh the bad or not?’
We will clearly say in reply that it does not; for if it did, the person who we say is overcome by pleasure
would not have made any mistake. ‘ In virtue of what,’ he might say, ‘does the good outweigh the bad or
the bad the good? Only in that one is greater and one is smaller, or more or less.’ We could not help but
agree. ‘So clearly then’ he will say, ‘by “being overcome” you mean getting more bad things for the sake
of fewer good things.’ That settles that, then.
ἂν οὖν τύχῃ ὁ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς ὑβριστὴς ὤν, γελάσεται
(d) καὶ ἐρεῖ· “Ἦ γελοῖον λέγετε πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακά,
γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώ-
μενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἆρα,” φήσει, “οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων

3
νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων;” φήσομεν
δῆλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι Οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν (5)
ἐξημάρτανεν ὅν φαμεν ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. “Κατὰ τί
δέ,” φήσει ἴσως, “ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ
τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ
(e) σμικρότερα ᾖ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ᾖ;” οὐχ ἕξομεν εἰπεῖν
ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. “Δῆλον ἄρα,” φήσει, “ὅτι τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο
λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν.”
Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω.

Text 4
(a) Prot. 356a
For if someone were to say: ‘But Socrates, the immediate pleasure is very different from the pleasant and
the painful at a later time,’
εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι “Ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ (5)
Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον
καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ,”

(b) Prot. 356a-b

I would reply, ‘They are not different in any other way than by pleasure and pain; for there is no other
way that they could differ. Weighing is a good analogy; you put the pleasures together and the pains
together, both the near and the remote, on the balance scale, and then say which of the two is more
Μῶν ἄλλῳ τῳ, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε,
ἢ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ
(b) ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ
λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ,
εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν.

(c) Prot. 356b-c

For if you weigh pleasant things against pleasant, the greater and the more must always be taken; if
painful things against painful, the fewer and the smaller. And if you weigh pleasant things against painful,
and the painful is exceeded by the pleasant---whether the near by the remote or the remote by the near---
you have to perform the action in which the pleasant prevails; on the other hand, if the pleasant is
exceeded by the painful, you have to refrain from doing that.
ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα
ἱστῇς, τὰ μείζω ἀεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς
λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς (5)
λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων,
ἐάντε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐάντε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ᾗ ἂν ταῦτ’ ἐνῇ· ἐὰν
(c) δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα. μή πῃ ἄλλῃ
ἔχει, φαίην ἄν, ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι;

Text 5 Prot. 356c-e

Since this is so, I will say to them: ‘ Answer me this: Do things of the same size appear to you larger
when seen near at hand and smaller when seen from a distance, or not?’ They would say they do. ‘And
similarly for thickness and pluralities? And equal sounds seem louder when near at hand, softer when
farther away?’ They would agree. ‘If then our well-being depended upon this, doing and choosing large
things, avoiding and not doing small ones, what would we see as our salvation in life? Would it be the art
of measurement or the power of appearance? While the power of appearance often makes us wander all
over the place in confusion, often changing our minds about the same things and regretting our actions

4
and choices with respect to things large and small, the art of measurement in contrast, would make
appearances lose their power by showing us truth, would give us peace of mind firmly rooted in the truth
and would save our life.’
Ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω.
φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, (5)
πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὔ; — Φήσουσιν. — Καὶ τὰ παχέα
καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ <αἱ> ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν
μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι; — Φαῖεν ἄν. — Εἰ οὖν
(d) ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα @1
μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν
καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἆρα
ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη
μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις (5)
μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτὰ καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν
καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ
μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώ-
(e) σασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν
μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον;

Text 6
(a) Prot. 357c-d
You asked it, if you remember, when we were agreeing that nothing was stronger or better than
knowledge, which always prevails, whenever it is present, over pleasure and everything else. At that point
you said that pleasure often rules even the man who knows; since we disagreed, you went on to ask us
this: ‘Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not being overcome by pleasure, what is it then: what
do you say it is? Tell us.’ If immediately we had said to you ‘(double) ignorance,’ you might have
laughed at us, but if you laugh at us now, you will be laughing at yourselves.
ἤρεσθε δέ, εἰ μέμνησθε,
ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὡμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι
κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, καὶ ἡδονῆς
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων· ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν
πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν (5)
οὐχ ὡμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς· “Ὦ Πρωταγόρα
τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι,
ἀλλὰ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατε
(d) ἡμῖν.” εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι Ἀμαθία,
κατεγελᾶτε ἂν ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελᾶτε, καὶ ὑμῶν
αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε.

(b) Apo. 29a-b

To fear death, gentleman, is no other than think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows what
one does not know. No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet
men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of all evils. And how could double ignorance, believing
that one knows what one does not know, not be extremely blameworthy?2
τὸ γάρ τοι
θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν (5)
εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ’ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ’ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες

2
Grube: And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know.

5
(b) ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν
αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν;

Text 7
(a) Prot. 358c-d
Now, no one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so
it seems, to want to go toward what one believes bad instead of to the good. And when he is forced to
choose between one of the two bad things, no one will choose the greater if he is able to choose the lesser.
Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπί γε τὰ
κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ’
(d) ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ
εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ
δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἱρήσεται
ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον;

(b) Prot. 358d

Well, then, is there something you call dread or fear? And I address this to you, Prodicus. I say that
whether you call it fear or dread, it is an expectation of something bad.
Τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ <τι> δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἆρα (5)
ὅπερ ἐγώ; (πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε). προσδοκίαν τινὰ
λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε.

(c) Prot. 359d

Right again; so, if our demonstration has been correct, then no one goes toward those things he considers
to be fearsome, since not to be in control of oneself was found to be ignorance.
Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ὥστ’ εἰ
τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἶναι οὐδεὶς (5)
ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ ηὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα.

(d) Prot. 359e-360a

Socrates: Is going to war honorable or is it disgraceful?
Protagoras: Honorable.
Socrates: Then, if it is honorable, we have agreed before, it is also good, for we agreed that all honorable
actions were good.
Protagoras: Very true, and I always believed this.
Socrates: And rightly; but who would you say are not willing to go to war, war being honorable and
good.
Protagoras: The cowardly.
Socrates: If a thing is noble and good, is it also pleasant?
Protagoras: That was definitely agreed upon.
Socrates: So, the cowardly, with full knowledge are not willing to go toward the more honorable, the
better, and the more pleasant?
Protagoras: If we agreed that, we will undermine what we agreed on earlier.
Πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ,
καλὸν ὂν ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; — Καλόν, ἔφη. — Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ (5)
καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς
γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὡμολογήσαμεν. — Ἀληθῆ
λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. — Ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ.
(a) ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φῂς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν
ὂν καὶ ἀγαθόν; — Τοὺς δειλούς, ἦ δ’ ὅς. — Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ,
εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ; — Ὡμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη. —

6
Ἆρ’ οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ
κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον; — Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν (5)
ὁμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας.

(e ) Prot. 360c
Socrates: Now then, that through which cowardly people are cowardly, do you call it cowardice or
courage?
Protagoras: Cowardice.
Socrates: And aren’t cowards shown to be so through their ignorance of what is to be feared?
Protagoras: Absolutely.
Τί οὖν; τοῦτο δι’ ὃ δειλοί εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί,
δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; — Δειλίαν ἔγωγ’, ἔφη. — Δειλοὶ
δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες; — Πάνυ
γ’, ἔφη.

Text 8 Prot. 357d-e

For you agreed with us that those who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, in
other words, with regard to good and bad, do so because of a lack of knowledge and not merely a lack of
knowledge but a lack of knowledge you agreed was measurement. And the mistaken act done without
knowledge you must know is one done with ignorance.3
καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὡμολογήκατε ἐπιστή-
μης ἐνδείᾳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ
λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας—ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθά τε καὶ (5)
κακά—καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι
ὡμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη πρᾶξις
(e) ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθίᾳ πράττεται.

3
Lombardo and Bell: from ignorance