Q: Discuss the effects of Talibanization on Muslim World?

(P.U 2007)
Ans:

Effects of Talibanization
Talibanization: .
Talibanization is a term coined following the rise of the Tahbhan
movement m . Afghanistan
. referring to the process where t .ert ·
O
religi~us groups or_ movem~nts ~o_me to follow or i~ita!e the s:ecd
practices of the Tahban. In its ongmal usage, Talibamzatton refe
to groups who followed Taliban practices such as:

l
 M.A Political Science Part-II
375
-)
1
usually strict regulation
. of women ' including forb1'dd mg
. o f most
employment or sc h o~ 1mg for women;
2) the b~nning of l_o ng hsts ?~ activities generally tolerated by other
Muslims-. movies, tele~1s1on, videos, mu~ic , dancing, hanging
pictures tn homes,_c~a_p ptng durin g sports events;
3) the banning of activities generally tolerated by other Muslims
the grounds that the activiti es are Western ; on
4) oppression of Shia, including takfir threats that they convert to
Sunni Islam or be prepared to be kill ed·
'
5) aggressive enforcement of its regulation s, partic ularly the use of
am1ed "religious police";
6) the destruction of non-Muslim artifacts, especiall y carvings and
statues such as Buddhas of Bamyan, generally tol erated by other
Muslin1s, on the grounds that the artifacts are idolatrous or Shirk
(polytheism)
7) harboring of Al Qaeda or other Islamic terrorists;
8) a discriminatory attitude towards non-Muslims such as
sumptuary laws against Afghan Hindus the Taliban regime
enacted, requiring them to wear yellow badges, a practice that
reminded some of Nazi Germany's anti-Semitic policies·
International relations:
During its time in power, the Taliban regime, or "Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan", gained diplomatic recognition from only
three states: the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia,
all of which provided substantial aid. The other nations including the
United Nations recognized the government oft he Islamic State of
Afghanistan as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
Pakistan:
The "vast majority" of the Taliban's rank and file and most
of the leadership, though not Mullah Omar, were Koranic students
who had studied at madrasas set up for Afghan refugees, usua lly by
JUI. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, JUi's leader, was a political ally of
Benazir Bhutto. After Bhutto became prime minister, Rehman "had
access to the government, the army and the ISi," whom he influenced
to help the Taliban .
Pakistan's ISi supported the previously unknown Kandahari
student movement, the Taliban, as the group conquered Afghanistan
• in the l 990s.
From 1994 onwards Pakistan has been the force behind the
Taliban. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf - then as Chief of
Anny Staff_ was responsible for se~ding thousands of Pakistanis to
fight alongside the Taliban and Btn Laden against the forces of
 376
M.A Political Science Part-II
ere believed to be 28,000 Pakistani
Ma~soud. In _tota~ t~er~ fiwhanistan . 20,000 were regular Pakistani
nationals fightmg ms 1de F g tier Corps or army and an estimated
. . h fr the ron .
so ld iers e1t er om ·t d in madrassas fi 11 ing regular Tali ban
8 000 T tan ts r ecru1 e .
, were m 1. 1 d OOO Taliban regular torcc 1,us compnsed
25
ranks. The estimate . ' . tionals A I~ 98 docum, nt by the U.S.
h 8 000 Pakistani na . . . . .
more t an ' finns that ''20-40 percent of Taliban soldiers
State Department con 1 f h
. . ,, Tl1 document further state; that the parents o t ose
are .Pakistani . e "know nothmg • regarcllng · h · h 'ld'
t ear c , s m1 1 ary
·1·t
Pak1stam nat1ona 1s . . .
with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to
1n vo 1vemen t f h .1 .
'T" • .

. t
Pa k1s an . " Further 3,000 fighters o t e regu"u 1 aJtban army were
. .
Arab and Central Asian militants. Of roughly 45,000 Pak1stan1,
Taliban and AI Qaeda soldiers fighting against the forces of Massoud
on ly 14.000 were Afghan.
Human Rights Watch also writes, "Pakistani aircraft assisted
with troop rotations of Taliban forces during combat operations in
late 2000 and ... senior members of Pakistan's intelligence agency
and army were involved in planning military :operations." Pakistan
prov1ded military equipment, recruiting assistance, training, and
tactical advice. Officially Pakistan denied supporting the Taliban
militari ly.
Author Ahmed Rashid claims that the Taliban had
"unprecedented access" among Pakistan's lobbies and interest
groups. He also writes that they at times were able to "play off one
lobby against another and extend their influence in Pakistan even
further" . By 1998-99, Taliban-style groups in Pakistan's Pashtun
belt, and to an extent in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, "were
banning TV an~ videos ... and forcing people, particularly women, to
adapt to the Taliban dress code and way of life."
. ~ter the a~cks of September 11, 2001, and the U.S.
operation 1~ Afghanistan the Afghan Taliban leadership has largely
fled dt~ Pakis~ ~here they regrouped and created several shuras to
coor
u s m.ate their d insurgency in A&',g . ha.n1s· tan. On February g, 2009 ,
M. C c o 7 der of operations in Afghanistan General Stanley
sta
. c hry pa::-,: other officials said that the Taliban leadership was
m 0 uetta, 4JUStan though th f~fi · I
U.. S a II y, denie · d th .'
1s. e Pakistani government, an o 1c1a
From 20 l 0, a report b .. . . . . d
that Pakistan's · t 1i · Ya leading British mst1tut1on c 1a1me
m e igence se . 1· k . h
the Taliban in Afr,lvi. · rvice still today has a strong 1n wit
01stan, P bl .
Economics the report&"'
s ·d h u 1shed by th.e London Schoo l of r
, a1 t at p 1.: S . I 11 ·
agency ( ISI) has an II official ~I\Jstan's Inter- erv1ces nte 1gence
Po hey" of support for the Taliban. It
 M.A Political Science Part-II 376
here were believed to be 28,000 Pakistani
Massoud In to ta I t · 20 000
. . fi h . 1·nside Afghanistan . ' were regular Pakistani
nationals 1g ting
.
· c
. h from the Frontier orps or army and an estimated
soldiers e1t er·1·t ts recruited in madrassas filling regular Taliban
8 000 were m 1 i an ·b ·
' . ted 25 000 Tah an regular torcc t'lus comprised
ranks. The estima '. . . l A 1r 98
8 000 Pakistani nat1ona s. -;, documt nt by the U.S.
h
more t an ' h t "20-40 f 1' 1·
State Department confinns t a h percent o a iban soldiers
. . " The document furt er state, that the parents of those
are Pa k1stam. h. . . .
Pakistani nationals "know not i~g re~arciln~ their child's military
. olvement with the Taliban until thetr bodies are brought back to
mv fi h f th 1 ,.,,. • . .
Pakistan." Further 3,000 1g ters O e regu1&1 1 aJ1ban army were
Arab and Central Asian militants. Of roughly 45,000 Pakistani,
Taliban and Al Qaeda soldiers fighting against the fore es of Massoud
only 14,000 were Afghan. . ·
Human Rights Watch also wntes, "Pakistani afrcraft assisted
with troop rotations of Taliban forces during combat operations in
late 2000 and ... senior members of P akistan~s intelligence agency
and army were involved in planning military =' operations." Pakistan
provided military equipment, recruiting assistance, training, and
tactical advice. Officially Pakistan denied supporting the Taliban;
militarily.
Author Ahmed Rashid claims that the Taliban had
"unprecedented access" among Pakistan's lobbies and interest
groups. He also writes that they at times were able to "play off one
lobby against another and extend their influence in Pakistan even
further". By 1998-99, Taliban-style groups in Pakistan's Pashtun
belt, and to an extent in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, "were
banning TV and videos ... and forcing people, particularly women, to
adapt to the Taliban dress code and way of life."
. A~ter the a~acks of September 11, 2001, and the U.S.
operation 1n Afghanistan the Afghan Taliban leadership has largely
fled t~ Pakis~ ~here they regrouped and created several shuras to
coordinate their insurgency in Afghanistan. On February 8, 2009,
U.S. commander of operations in Afghanistan General ~tanley
~cChrystal an~ other officials said that the Taliban leadership ~as
1n Quetta, Pakistan, though the p k' i ovemment, an official
U.S. ally, denied this. a 1stan g
~ro~ 2? I 0, ~ report by a leadin British institution claim_ed
that Pakistan s mtelhgence serv· . g d h a strong link with
the Taliban in Afghanistan p icbel _still to ayh,. asLondon School of
· th
E conom1cs, . · u 1shed by t e
e report said that p . , _ rvices Intelligence
agency ( ISI) has an "official I~kistan s Inter Ser. th Taliban. It
Po icy" of support 1or e
 p O htical Science Part-II
rvf.A 377
~the JSI provides fu n <li~g and training for the Taliban, and that
:he agency has re_p resenta!ives ?n t~e so_-caned Quetta Shura, the
Taliban's leadership co~cil, ~h1ch 1s be11cved to meet in Paki stan .
fhe report, based ~n interviews with Taliban commanders in
Afghanistan, was wntten by Matt Waldman, a fellow at Harvard
Vniversity. . .
U.S. officials have long suspected a link between the ISi and
the Taliban, but t~ose suspicions are rarely confirmed. "Pakistan
appears to be playing a double-game of astonishing magnitude," the
report said. The repo~ also linked high-level members of the
Pakistani government with the Taliban. It said Asif Ali Zardari , the
Pakistani president, met with senior Taliban prisoners in 2010 and
promised to release them. Zardari reportedly told the detainees they
were only arrested because of American pressure. "The Pakistan
government's apparent duplicity - and awareness of it among the
American public and political establishment - could have enormous
geopohtical implications," Waldman said. "Without a change in
. .
Pakistani . behaviour it will be difficult if not impossible for
intemati_o nal forces and the Afghan government to make progress
against the insurgency." Afghan officials have long been suspicious
of the ISrs role. Amru11ah Saleh, the former director of Afghanistan's
intelligence service, told Reuters that the ISi was "part of a landscape
of destruction in this country".
Tehrik-i-Talil>an Pakistan:
The Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik~i-Taliban Pakistan differ
greatly in their history, leadership and goals although they share a
common interpretation of Isla~ and are both predominantly Pash tun.
The Afghan Taliban have no,affiliation with the Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan and routinely deny a~y connection to the TIP. The New
York Times quoted a spokesman for the Afghan_Taliban stating that:
"We don't like to be involved with them, as we have rejected all
affiliation with Pakistani Taliban fighters ... We have sympathy for
them as Muslims but beside that, there is nothing else between us."
' creation ·of the TIP some of their leaders and
Before the
~ghters were part of the 8,000 Pakistani militants fighting in the War
in ~fghanistan ( 1996-2001) and the War in Afghanistan ~gain st the
United Islamic Front and NATO forces. Most of them hail from the
Pakistani side of the Af-Pak border regions. After the fall of the
Afghan Taliban in late 2001 most Pakistani militants including
members of today's TIP fled home to ~ak~stan: _ . .
. After the creation of the Tehrik-1-Tahban Pakistan 1n 2007
Its members have officially defined goals to establish their rule over
M.A Political Science Part-II 378
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. They engage the
Pakistani army in heavy combat operations. Some intelligence
analysts believe that the TTP's attacks on the Pakistani government,
police and army strained the TIP's relations with the Afghan
Taliban. .
The A fghan Taliban have always relied on support by the
Pakistani army in the past and are still supported by them today in
their campaign to control Afghanistan. R~gular Pakistani army
troops fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in the War in
Afghanistan (1996-2001). Major leaders of the Afghan Taliban
including Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Siraj Haqqani are
believed to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan. In 2006 Jalaluddin Haqqani
was called a 'Pakistani asset' by a senior official of Inter-Services
Intelligence. Pakistan regards the Haqqani's as an important force for
protecting its interests in Afghanistan and therefore have been
unwilling to move against them:
Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar asked the Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan in late 2008 and early 2009 to stop attacks inside
Pakistan, to change their focus as an organization and to fight the
Afghan National Anny and ISAF forces in Afghanistan instead. In
late December 2008 and early January 2009 he sent a delegation, led
by former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Abdullah Zakir, to
persuade leading members of the TTP to put aside differences with
Pakistan.
Some regional experts state the the common name "Taliban"
may be more misleading than illuminating. Gilles Dorronsoro, a
scholar of ·South Asia currently .at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington says:
"The fact that they have the same name causes all kinds of
confusion."
As the Pakistani Army began offensives against the
Pakistani Taliban, many unfamiliar with the region thought
incorrectly that the assault was against the Afghan Taliban of Mullah
Omar which was not the case.
Al Qaeda:
_In 199_6, ?in. Laden moved to Afghanistan from Sudan. He
came without invitation, and sometimes irritated Mullah Omar with
his de~laration of. war and fatwas against citizens of third-party I
countries, .but relations between the two groups improved over time, g
to th~ p~int ~hat Mul~ah Omar rebuffed his group's patron Saudi .,7
Arabia,
. insulting
. Saudi minister Prince T urki w h 1"le reneging
. on an
earlier promise to turn bin Laden over to th e Sau d is.
.
 J\ Political Science .Part-II
M- - - - - - --~ ~ : - - ~ ~ - - - - - ~ 3 ~ 7 ~ 9
-- Bin Laden was able to forge a~ alliance between the T l"b
and AI-Qaeda . The Al Qaeda-trained 055 Brigade integrated w·~~
Taliban anny bet~een 1 97_a~d 2001 . Several bi.u:idred Arab Afghan
?
t:
{-ig hters sentThby bin called
Laden assisted the Taliban in the Mazar-e-Sh ·r
B '· · an
slaughter. ~ so- _ . . _ . ngade · 055 · was also responsible· for
massacres again st ci.vth~ns in other parts of A fghanistan. From 1996
to 2001 the organizatro_ n of Osama Bi·n Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri had become a virtual state within the Taliban state. · ·
Taliba_n-Al-qaeda connections were also strengthened by the
reported marriage . of one _of bin Laden's sons to Omar's daughter.
While in Afghanistan, bin Laden may ha\'c helped finance the
Taliban .
After the 199.8 U .S . embassy bombings in Africa, bin Laden
and several Al-Qaeda members were indicted in U .S . criminal court.
The Taliban rejected extradition requests _by the U .S·. , variously
'
claiming that bin Laden had "gone missing" , or that Washington
"cannot provide any evidence or any proof' that bin Laden is
I involved in terroris.t,activities and that "without any evidence, bin
\ J
Laden is a man \vithout sin·... he is a free man ."
Evidence against bin Laden included courtroom testimony·
and satellite phone· records. Bin Laden ·in tum, praise~ the Taliban as
.I the "only Islamic government" in existence, and lauded Mullah Omar
for his destruction of idols. such as the Buddhas pf Bamyan.
At the end of 2008, the TalibcII1 was in talks to sever all ties
with Al-Qaeda.
In 201 1, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn at .
New York University's Center on · International · Cooperation
proclaimed that the two groups did not get along at times .before .the
s~ptembcr l I attacks, and they have continued to spar since.
, Contrary to the established perception that-they are of one mind , the
Taliban and al-Qaeda are not in lockstep. In fact, the Taliban in
Afghanistan could' be persuaded to renounce the infamous terrorist
brroup ·1cd by Osama bin Laden .
Iran:
In early August I 998, relati?ns ~ith other countries became
much more troubled. After attacking . the city of Mazar. Taliban
forces killed several tl,crusand civilians and 10 Iranian diplomat~ and
incelligence officers in the Iranian consulate. Alleged radio intercepts
indicak Mullah Omar personally ap~~oved the killings. The _Ir~~ari
govemmen.t was incensed, and cnsis ensued as Iran· mobthzed
200,000 regular troops, though war was eventually ~verted.

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