168
premises.
Bascon VS CA
Facts: The petitioners in the instant
case were employees of private
respondent Metro Cebu Community
Hospital, Inc. (MCCH) and members of
the Metro Cebu Community Hospital
Union.
Petitioner Elizabeth C. Bascon had been
employeed as a nurse by respondent
MCCH since 1984. At the time of her
termination from employment in 1996,
she already held position of Head
Nurse. The other petitioner, Noemi V.
Cole, had been working as nursing aide
with MCCH since 1974. Both petitioners
were dismissed by the respondent
hospital for allegedly participating in an
illegal strike.
The instant controversy arose from an
intra – union conflict between the NAMA
- MCCH and the National Labor
Federation (NLF), the mother federation
of NAMA - MCCH.
NAMA - MCCH asked MCCH to renew
their CBA which was set to expire.
NFLC, however, opposed this move by
its local affiliate. Mindful of the apparent
intra – union dispute, MCCH decided to
defer the CBA negotiations until there
was a determination as to which of said
unions had the right to negotiate a new
CBA.
Believing that their union was the
certified bargaining agent, the members
and officers, of NAMA - MCCH staged a
series of mass actions inside MCCH’s
The DOLE issued two (2) certifications
stating that NAMA – MCCH was not a
registered labor organization.
Meanwhile, the MCCH management
received reports that petitioners
participated in NAMA – MCCH’s mass
actions. Thus, notices were served on
all union members, petitioners included,
asking them to explain in writing why
they were wearing red and black ribbons
and roaming around the hospital with
placards.
The petitioner explained that wearing
armbands and putting up placards was
their answer to MCCH’s illegal refusal to
negotiate with NAMA – MCCH.
Thus, MCCH notified the petitioners that
they were to be investigated for their
activities in the mass actions, with the
hearings being scheduled. However,
petitioners denied receiving said notices.
Petitioners Bascon and Cole were then
served notices terminating their
employment.
The dismissal of petitioners did not deter
NAMA – MCCH from staging more mass
actions. The means of ingress and
egress from the hospital were blocked.
As a result, the hospital suffered heavy
losses. To address its labor problems,
MCCH sought an injunction from the
NLRC.
Bascon and Cole filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and denied having
participated in said mass actions or
having received the notices (1) enjoining
them from wearing armbands and
putting up placards with warning that
disciplinary measure would be imposed
and (2) informing them of the schedule
of hearing. They admit, however, to
wearing armbands for union identity
while nursing patients as per instruction
of their union leaders.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners
were validly terminated for (1)
allegedly participating in an illegal
strike and/or (2) gross
insubordination to the order to stop
wearing armbands and putting up
placards?
HELD: As to the first ground, Article 264
(a) of the Labor Code provides that in
part that “any union officer who
knowingly participates in illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his
employment status.
While a union officer can be terminated
for mere participation in an illegal strike,
an ordinary striking employee, like
petitioners herein, must have
participated in the commission of illegal
acts during strike. There must be
proof that they committed illegal acts
during the strike. But proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required.
Substantial evidence in the
imposition of the penalty of
dismissal, may suffice.
The court of appeals is correct in
arguing that that the petitioners actual
participation in an illegal strike was
limited to wearing armbands and putting
up placards. There was no finding that
the armbands or the placards contained
offensive words or symbol. Thus it
cannot be said that wearing of
armbands and putting up placards are
illegal acts. In fact, they are within the
mantle of constitutional protection under
freedom of speech.
As regards the appellate court’s finding
that petitioners were justly terminated for
gross insubordination or willful
disobedience, Article 282 of the Labor
Code provides “an employer may
terminate an employment for any of the
following causes
(a) serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his
work.
Willful disobedience of the employer’s
lawful orders, as a just cause for
dismissal of an employee, envisions the
concurrence of at least 2 requisites
(1) the employee’s assailed conduct
must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude; and (2) the order
violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he
had been engaged to discharge.
In the case at bar, the court found
lacking the element of wilfulness
characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude. Wearing armbands
and putting up placards to express one’s
views without violating the rights of 3rd
parties, are legal and constitutional.
Thus, MCCH could have done well to
respect petitioner’s right to freedom of
speech.
employee has no say in the operation of
the employer’s business. Petitioners, in
the case at bar, are nurse and nursing
aide respectively in MCCH and thus,
have no prerogative in the operation of
the business. The employer’s power to
dismiss must be tempered with the
employee’s right of security of tenure.

Finally, even willful disobedience may

be properly appreciated, still, the penalty
of dismissal is too harsh.

Not every case of willful disobedience by

an employee of a lawful work –
connected order of the employer may be
penalized with dismissal. THERE MUST
BE REASONABLE
PROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN, ON
THE ONE HAND, THE WILLFUL
DISOBEDIENCE BY THE EMPLOYEE
AND ON THE ONE HAND, THE
PENALITY IMPOSED.

The termination of the petitioner’s

employment not being for any of the just
and authorized causes, it constitutes
illegal dismissal and the petitioners are
entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and
to his full backwages, and other
allowances.

Doctrine of strained relation – MCCH

alleges that due to strained relations
reinstatement is no longer possible. The
court disagree. In Quijano VS. Mercury
Drug Corporation, the court held that the
doctrine of strained relation is in
applicable to a situation where the
Liwayway VS. Permanent Concrete
Workers Union
Facts: The case commenced when
Liwayway Publication Inc. brought an
action in the CFI – Manila against
Permanent Concrete Workers Union for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and for damages it incurred
when its employees were prevented
from getting their daily supply of
newsprint from its bodega.
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second
sublessee of a part of the premises of
the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila from Don Ramon Roces, a first
lessee from the aforesaid company.
The premises of the plaintiff is separated
from the compound of Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. by a concrete
and barbed wire fence with its own
entrance and road leading to the
national road. This entrance is separate
and distinct from the entrance road of
the Permanent concrete Products Inc.
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a
bodega for its newsprint in the sublet
property which it uses for its printing and
publishing business. The daily supply of
newsprint needed to feed its printing
plant is taken from this bodega.
The employees of the Permanent
Concrete Products Inc. who are
representative and members of the
defendant union declared a strike
against their company. For unknown
reason and without legal justification,
Permanent Concrete Workers Union
and its members picketed, stopped and
prohibited plaintiff’s truck from entering
the compound to load newsprint from its
bodega. The union members intimidated
and threatened with bodily harm the
employees who were in the truck.
Union members stopped and prohibited
the general manager, personnel
manager, bodega – in – charge and
other employees of the plaintiff from
getting newspaper in their bodega.
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the
defendants not to intimidate and
threaten its employees and not to
blocked, picket or prohibit plaintiff’s truck
from getting newsprint in their bodega.
Defendants refused and continued to
refuse to give in to the demands of the
plaintiff.
As a consequence thereof, plaintiff
rented another bodega during the time
members of the defendant union
prevented its employees from entering
its bodega in the compound of
Permanent Concrete Product Inc. and
thus incurred expenses both in terms of
bodega rentals and transporting
newsprint from the pier to the temporary
bodega.
The lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the
defendants from their acts.
Defendant union moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that that this
case arose out of a labor dispute
involving unfair labor practice and
therefore the Court of First Instance
where this action was brought has no
jurisdiction to issue an injunction since
this case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relation
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of
First Instance has a jurisdiction to
issue writ of preliminary injunction
considering that there was a labor
dispute between Permanent Concrete
Product, Inc. and appellants for
alleged unfair labor practice
committed by the former.
Whether or not the appellee
(Liwayway Publication) is a 3rd party
or an “innocent by – stander” whose
right been invaded and therefore,
entitled to protection by the regular
courts?
HELD: It may be agreed that the
appellant Union has a labor dispute with
the Permanent Concrete Products
company and that the dispute is pending
before the court of industrial relation.
The SC held that with regard to activities
that may be enjoined, in order to
ascertain what court has jurisdiction to
issue the injnction it is necessary to
determine the nature of the controversy.
There is no connection between the
appellee Liwayway Publication and the
striking union, nor with the company
against whom the strikers staged the
strike, and neither are the acts of the
driver of the appellee, its general
manager, personnel manager, the man
– in – charge of the bodega and other
employees appellee linked with the labor
dispute between the striking union and
the Permanent concrete company.
If there is a connection between
appellee publishing company and the
permanent concrete products company;
it is that both are situated in the same
premises, which can hardly be
considered as linked with the labor
dispute pending in the CIR between the
strikers and their employer.
Notes:
 A picketing labor union has no
right to prevent employees of
another company from getting
in and out of its rented
premises, otherwise it will be
held liable for damages for its
acts against an innocent by –
stander
 The lessor of property is not
the proper party in acts of mere
trespass committed by 3rd
persons as the lessor in such a
case is not liable to answer for
damages to the lessee.
 If the strikers act from unlawful
or unreasonable motive, even if
they do so in good faith, and
the CIR, so finds, the strike
may be declared illegal
notwithstanding their good
faith.
 A strike by a union is
considered illegal where it
appears that it was declared
even before the employer had
 answered the union’s demands
and it was in violation of an
agreement to maintain the
status quo pending resolution
of the union’s petition for a
certification election and also
in violation of a CBA.
 Even if done in good faith, if
strikers act for an illegitimate,
unjust reason, the strike may
be declared illegal
notwithstanding their good
faith.
 The strikers must have offered
to return to work under the
same conditions before their
strike so that the company’s
refusal would have place in
their blame for their economic
loss.