ii) When a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the

Senate President and the Speaker their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President, x x x Thereafter, when the President transmits
to the Senate President and Speaker his written declaration that no
inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of the Members of the Cabinet transmit
within 5 days to the Senate President and Speaker their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, Congress shall decide the issue. For this purpose,
Congress shall convene, if not in session, within 48 hours. And if, within
10 days from receipt of the last written declaration or, if not in session,
within 12 days after it is required to assemble, Congress determines by a
2/3 vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the
powers and duties of his office.

Steps in the appointing process:

. i) Nomination by the President;

. ii) Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;

. iii) Issuance of the commission;

. iv) Acceptance by the appointee. In Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740,,

the Supreme Court declared that an appointment is deemed complete

only upon its acceptance. Pending such acceptance, which is optional to
the appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn.
Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen except
for purposes of defense of the State under Sec. 4, Art. II, as an exception
to the rule against involuntary servitude.

e) Discretion of Appointing Authority. Appointment is essentially a

discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, should possess the
minimum qualification requirements, including the Civil Service
eligibility prescribed by law for the position. This discretion also includes
the determination of the nature or character of the appointment, i.e.,
whether the appointment is temporary or permanent. See Luego v. Civil
Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327; Lapinid v. Civil Service
Commission, 197 SCRA 106; Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738.

Special Constitutional Limitations on the President’s appointing power:

The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity
or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, as Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government- owned or
-controlled corporations [Sec. 13, Art. VII].

ii) Appointments extended by an acting President shall remain effective

unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his
assumption of office [Sec. 14, Art. VII].

iii) Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or acting President shall not make
appointments except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety [Sec. 15, Art. VII].

iiia) In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28,

2001, the Supreme Court ruled that this provision applies only to
presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits local executive
officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.

iiib) During this period, the President is neither required to make

appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of
Article VIII simply mean that the President is required by law to fill up
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein, unless
prohibited by Sec. 15 of Article VII. While the filling up of vacancies in
the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in
this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the
appointments during the period of the ban [In Re: Mateo Valenzuela,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998].

[Note: The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by

Congress through its power to prescribe qualifications for public office;
and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if
the appointee is not qualified or has not been validly confirmed.]

g) The Power of Removal. As a general rule, the power of removal may be

implied from the power of appointment. However, the President cannot
remove officials appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes
certain methods for separation of such officers from public service, e.g.,
Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions who can
be removed only by impeachment, or judges who are subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. In the cases where the
power of removal is lodged in the Presfdent, the same may be exercised
only for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the
prescribed administrative procedure.

i) Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by
the President may be directly disciplined by him [Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15
SCRA 710], provided that the same is for cause and in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law.

ii) Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office
depends upon the pleasure of the President may be replaced at any time,
but legally speaking, their separation is effected not by removal but by
expiration of their term. See Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil 683; Aparri v. Court
of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231.

3. The Power of Control [Sec. 17, Art. VII: "The President shall have control of all the 
executive departments, bureaus, and offices, x x x’]. 

a) Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter [Mondano v. Silvosa, supra.]. It is
distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties,
and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take
such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these
duties.

i) The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of

the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutes.
This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Art. VII,
Sections 1 and 17, of the Constitution. While the power to abolish
an office is generally lodged in the legislature, the authority of the
President to reorganize the executive branch, which may
incidentally include such abolition, is permissible under present
laws [Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the
Philippines (MEWAP) v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007].

ii) The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also

an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book
II, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of the
Philippines), which grants the President broad organization powers
to implement reorganization measures. Further, Presidential
Decree No. 1772, which amended P.D. 1416, grants the President
the continuing authority to reorganize the national government
which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
 classify functions, services and activities, and to standardize
salaries and materials [MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].

iii) Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in

carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the
executive department if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. R.A, 6656 enumerates the
circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in
the removal of civil service employees as a result of reorganization:
(a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions
in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
(b) where an office is abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents
are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a
classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and
the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as
the original offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of
separation [MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].

b) The alter ego principle. Also known as the “doctrine of qualified

political agency”. Under this doctrine which recognizes the establishment
of a single executive, all executives and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees. G.R. No.
149724, August 19, 2003].

i) The President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet

members or other subordinate executive officers [City of lligan v. Director
of Lands, 158 SCRA 158; Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328], Even
where the law provides that the decision of the Director of Lands on
questions of fact shall be conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the same may, on appeal to the
President, be reviewed and reversed by the Executive Secretary [Lacson-
Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895]. Thus, in Gascon v. Arroyo, 178 SCRA
582, it was held that the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter
into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with ABS-CBN, since he was acting on
behalf of the President who had the power to negotiate such agreement.
ii) Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the
National Government may validly be delegated to his Cabinet Members
exercising control over a particular executive department. Accordingly, in
this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City
to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the
DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, is presumed to be the
act of the President because the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, supra.].

iii) But even if he is an alter-ego of the President, the DECS Secretary

cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against
him, inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President
[Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000].

c) Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate executive

officers, including Cabinet members, completes exhaustion of
administrative remedies [Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302],
except in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency
applies, in which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the
presumptive approval of the

President, and there is no need to appeal the decision to the President in

order to complete exhaustion of administrative remedies [Kilusang
Bayan, etc., v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92],

d) But the power of control may be exercised by the President only over
the acts, not over the actor [Angangco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619].

e) The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is under the control of

the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA involving
P2- million or above require the approval of the President of the
Philippines under LOI 620 [Hutchinson Ports Phils, Ltd. V. SBMA, G.R.
No. 131367, August 31,2000]

g) The President exercises only the power of general supervision over

local governments [Sec. 4, Art. X], i)

i) On the President’s power of general supervision, however, the President

can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if
he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. The President or
any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law
and the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of
his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment
on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity,
autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the
executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350.
December 3, 2002].

ii) Sec. 187, R.A. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to
review the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance — and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds — is valid, and does
not confer the power of control over local government units in the
Secretary of Justice, as even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance,
he cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government
unit [Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135],

iii) In Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, the Supreme
Court held that Sec. 4, Administrative Order No. 327, which withholds
5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local government units, is
unconstitutional, because the President’s power over local governments
is only one of general supervision, and not one of control. A basic feature
of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of LGU shares in the
national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.

4. The Military Powers [Sec. 18, Art. VII: “The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. x x x”]

a) The Commander-in-Chief clause.

i) “The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of

the Philippines...” In Gudaniv. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006,
the Senate Committee on National Defense invited several senior AFP
officers to testify on matters related to the conduct of the 2004 elections.
AFP Chief of Staff General Senga wrote Senator Biazon, chairman of the
Senate Committee, that “no approval has been granted by the President
to any AFP officer to appear” at the Senate hearing. This
notwithstanding, General Gudani and Col. Balutan attended and both
testified atthe hearing. On recommendation of the Office of the Provost
Marshal General, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were charged with
violation of Articles of War 65, on will fully disobeying a superior officer,
in relation to Articles of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to good order and
military discipline. Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, asking that the order of PGMA preventing petitioners from
testifying be declared unconstitutional, the charges for violation of the
Articles of War be quashed, and the respondents be permanently
enjoined from

proceeding against the petitioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the

petition.

ia) The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior
consent before appearing in Congress pertains to a wholly different and
independent specie of presidential authority — the Commander-in-Chief
powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, these
commander- in- chief powers are not encumbered by the same degree of
restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive
control.

ib) The vitality, of the tenet that the President is the commander- in-chief
of the AFP is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civil
supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our
representative system of government. The Court quoted Kapunan v. De
Villa: “The Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements
of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of
persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be
circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree,
individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the
military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on
the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must
be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with,
irrespective of a soldier’s personal view on the matter.”

ii) To call out (such) armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.

iia) In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., the Supreme Court said that

the petitioners failed to prove that President Arroyo’s exercise of the
calling-out power, by issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. The Court noted the Solicitor General’s
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration
of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the record. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the
Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017,
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging from the seriousness of the
incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and
do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.

iia1) Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed
forces to aid her in suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion;
this involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the

President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this

reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. She

cannot invoke a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser
power.

iia2) General Order No. 5, issued to implement PP 1017, is valid. It is an

order issued by the President, acting as commander- in-chief, addressed
to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
Significantly, it provides a valid standard — that the military and the
police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence”. But the
words “acts of terrorism” found in the GO, had not been legally defined
and made punishable by Congress, and thus,

should be deemed deleted from the GO.

iia3) However, PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants

the President the authority to promulgate “decrees”, because legislative

power is

peculiarly within the province of Congress. Likewise, the inclusion in PP

1017 of Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution is an encroachment on the
legislature’s emergency powers. Sec. 17, Art. XII, must be understood as
an aspect of the emergency powers clause, and thus, requires a
delegation from Congress.

iib) In Guanzort v. de Villa, 181 SCRA 623, the Supreme Court

recognized, as part of the military powers of the President, the conduct of
“saturation drives” or “areal target zoning” by members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.

iic) In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284,

August 15, 2000, the Supreme Court said that when the President calls
out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. The Court cannot overrule the President’s discretion or
substitute its own. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes
necessary”, the President may call out the armed forces. In the exercise
of the power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Indeed, the decision to call out the armed forces must be done
swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
iid) In Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001, the Supreme
Court said that the President has discretionary authority to declare a
“state of rebellion”. The Court may only look into the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the exercise of the power.

iie) InSanlakasv.Reyes,supra.,itwasheldthatthePresident’s authority to

declare a “state of rebellion” springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-
in-Chief powers. However, a mere declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also
no basis for the apprehensions that, because of the declaration, military
and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests. As held in
Lacson v. Perez, supra., the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion as provided under Sec. 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Be that as it may, the Court said that, in
calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an
“utter superfluity”. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a
state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or
suppress it. “The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any
legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not
written.”

iie1) It is pertinent to state that there is a distinction between the

President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the
authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While the authority
to declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief
Executive (the statutory authority being Sec. 4, Chapter 2, Book II,
Administrative Code of 1997), and the declaration was deemed harmless
and without legal significance, in declaring a state of national emergency
in PP1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution, calling for
the exercise of awesome powers which cannot be deemed as harmless or
without legal significance [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.].

iii) The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members
of the armed forces, create military commissions for the punishment of
war criminals. See Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil 875; Kuroda v.
Jalandoni 42 0.G.4282.

iiia) But see Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144,
where it was held that military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil
courts are open and functioning. In Quilona v. General Court Martial,
206 SCRA 821, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.A. 6975,
members of the Philippine National Police are not within the jurisdiction
of a military court.
iiib) This is made clear in Navales v. General Abaya, G.R. No. 162318.
October 25, 2004, where the Supreme Court said that in enacting R.A.
7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts
jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their
jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases
mandated by the Articles of War. Thus, the RTC cannot divest the
General Court Martial of jurisdiction over those charged with violations
of Art. 63 (Disrespect Toward the President, etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward
Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition). 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Articles) of the Articles of War,
as these are specifically included as “service-connected offenses or
crimes” under Sec. 1, R.A. 7055.

iiic) In Gudani v. Senga, supra., on the issue of whether the court martial
could still assume jurisdiction over General Gudani who had been
compulsorily retired from the service, the Court quoted from Abadilla v.
Ramos, where it was held that an officer whose name was dropped from
the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of
military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has
been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

it.

b) Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

i) Grounds: Invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires .

ii) Duration: Not to exceed sixty days, following which it shall be lifted,
unless extended by Congress.

iii) Duty of President to report action to Congress: within 48 hours,

personally or in writing.

iv) Congress may revoke [or extend on request of the President] the
effectivity of proclamation byy a majority vote of all its members, voting
jointly.

v) The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by

any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing [Sec. 18, Art. VII]. See Lartsang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448.

vi) The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not impair the right to
bail [Sec. 13, Art. III].
vii) The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

viii) During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.

c) Martial Law. “A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ” [Sec. 18,
Art. VII].

i) The constitutional limitations for the suspension of the privilege of the

writ are likewise imposed on the proclamation of martial law.

5. The Pardoning Power [Sec. 19, Art. VII: “Except in cases of

impeachment, or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress”.]

a) Definitions:

i) Pardon. An act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is

bestowed from the punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has
committed.

. ii) Commutation. Reduction or mitigation of the penalty.

. iii) Reprieve. Postponement of a sentence or stay of execution.

. iv) Parole. Release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of

liberty, as parolee is still in the custody of the law although not in

confinement.

v) Amnesty. Act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usually

extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, which
puts into oblivion the offense itself.

b) Exercise bv the President. Discretionary; may not be controlled by the

legislature or reversed by the courts, unless there is a constitutional
violation. Thus, it was a legal malapropism for the trial court to interject
par. 2, Art. 135, Revised Penal Code, recommending the grant of pardon
after the convict shall have served a jail term of 5 years, considering that
this was a prosecution under a special law, and that the matter of a
pardon is within the President’s exclusive prerogative [People v. de
Gracia, supra.].

c) Limitations on exercise:

. i) Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment [Sec. 19, Art. VII].

. ii) Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without

the favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections [Sec. 5,

Art. IX-C].

iii) Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment. In People v.

Salle, 250 SCRA 581, reiterated in People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44, the
Court declared that the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from the judgment of conviction by the trial court. Any application
for a pardon should not be acted upon, or the process toward its grant
should not begin, unless the appeal is withdrawn. The ruling in
Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, which was laid down under the
1973 Constitution, is now changed by virtue of the explicit requirement
under the 1987 Constitution. In People v. Catido, G.R. No. 116512,
March 7, 1997, it was held that while the pardon was void for having
been extended during the pendency of the appeal, or before conviction by
final judgment, and therefore a violation of Sec. 19, Art. VII, the grant of
amnesty, applied for by the accused-appellants under Proclamation No.
347, was valid.

iv) Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate

separation of powers), or civil contempt (as the State is without interest
in the same) ,

v) Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability. See People v. Nacional,

G.R. No. 11294, September 7, 1995, where the Court said that the grant
of conditional pardon and the subsequent dismissal of the appeal did not
relieve the accused of civil liability.

vi) Cannot restore public offices forfeited [Monsanto v. Factoran, supra.].

But see Sabello v. DECS, 180 SCRA 623, where a pardoned elementary
school principal, on considerations of justice and equity, was deemed
eligible for reinstatement to the same position of principal and not to the
lower position of classroom teacher. On executive clemency re:
administrative decisions, see Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit,
226 SCRA 356.
d) Pardon Classified.

. i) Plenary or partial.

. ii) Absolute or conditional.

. iia) On conditional pardon, see Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273.

The rule is reiterated in In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Wilfredo S. Sumulong, supra., that a conditional pardon is in the
nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted
criminal; by the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the
contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of
the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it
that the pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon. Sec.
64 (i), Revised Administrative Code, authorizes the President to
order the arrest and re- incarceration of such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of the pardon.
And the exercise of this Presidential judgment is beyond
. judicial scrutiny.e) Amnesty.
. i) In People v. Patriarca, G,R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000, it
was held that the person released under an amnesty proclamation
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its
effects are thus extinguished.
. ii) In Vera v. People of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 152, it was held
that to avail of the benefits of an amnesty proclamation, one must
admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation.
. iii) Distinguished from pardon: A - addressed to political offenses, P
- infractions of peace of the state; A - classes of persons, P -
individuals; A - no need for distinct acts of acceptance, P -
acceptance necessary; A - requires concurrence of Congress, P -
does not; A - a public act which the courts may take judicial notice
of, P - private act which must be pleaded and proved; A - looks
backward and puts into oblivion the offense itself, P - looks
forward and relieves the pardonee of the consequences of the
offense. See People v. Casido, supra.

7. The Diplomatic Power. Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3
of all the members of the Senate. ”

a) In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351, the

Supreme Court distinguished treaties from executive agreements, thus:
(i) international agreements which involve political issues or changes of
national policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character take the form of a treaty; while international
agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well established
national policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or
less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements; and (ii) in
treaties, formal documents require ratification, while executive
agreements become binding through executive action.

b) But see Bayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10,
2000, where the Supreme Court said that the Philippine government had
complied with the Constitution in that the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) was concurred in by the Philippine Senate, thus complying with
Sec.-21, Art. VII. The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the
United States to submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence,
for that would be giving a strict construction to the phrase, “recognized
as a treaty”. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the
VFA as merely an executive agreement because, under international law,
an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty.

8. Budgetary Power. Sec. 22, Art. VII: “The President shall submit to
Congress within 30 days from the opening of every regular session, as
the basis of the general appropriations act, a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures. ”

9. The Informing Power. Sec. 23, Art. VII: “The President shall address
the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear
before it at any other time.”

10. Other powers:

a) Call Congress to a special session [Sec. 15, Art. VI: “x x x The

President may call a special session at any time ],

b) Power to approve or veto bills [Sec. 27, Art. VI].

c) To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission

on Elections [Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-C].

d) To discipline such deputies [Sec. 2(8), Art. IX-C].

e) By delegation from Congress, emergency powers [Sec. 23(2), Art. VI],

and tariff powers [Sec. 28(2), Art. VI].

f) General supervision over local governments and autonomous regional

governments [Art. X].

i) See Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December

2, 2002.

A. The Judicial Power

1. Defined. Includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government [Sec. 1, par. 2,
Art. VIII].

a) The second clause effectively limits the “political question” area which,
heretofore, was forbidden territory for the courts.

b) The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes

and orders to as to make them conformable with law and justice includes
the right to reverse itself, especially when, in its honest opinion, it has
committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its
decision will cause injustice to a party litigant [Tocao v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127405, September 20, 2001]. The Court is not precluded from
examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and
stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice
to technicality [De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, December
5, 2001].

2. Where vested: In one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law [Sec. 1, Art. VIII].

3. Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as the power to hear and decide a

case.

a) Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5, Art. VIII [Sec. 2,
Art. VIII],

b) No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and
concurrence [Sec. 30, Art. VI]. i)

i) Thus, Sec. 27, R.A. 6770, which authorizes an appeal to the Supreme
Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases, was declared unconstitutional, because the provision was passed
without the advice and consent of the Supreme Court [Fabian v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998; Villavertv. Desierto,
G.R. No. 133715, February 13, 2000].

B. Constitutional Safeguards to insure the independence of the

Judciiary.

1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished

by the legislature.

2. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by

impeachment.

3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and
appellate jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not be increased
without its advice and concurrence.

4. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior

courts and personnel.

5. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/

justices of inferior courts.

6. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure.

7. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency

performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

8. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal

autonomy.

a) In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational Structure and

Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy, A.M. No. 01-
1-04-SC- Philja, 481 SCRA 1, the Supreme Court said that fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority
to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding
the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of
the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of
their functions. In downgrading the positions and salary grades of two
positions in the Philippine Judicial Academy, the DBM overstepped its
authority and encroached upon the fiscal autonomy of the Supreme
Court and its power of supervision over court personnel, as enshrined in
the Constitution. 9

9. The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of
Court.

. The Supreme Court, alone, may order temporary detail of judges.

. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary.

C. The Power of Judicial Review/lnquiry. [See: CHAPTER II.] D.

Appointment to the Judiciary.

1. Qualifications: Of proven competence, integrity, probity and

independence [Sec. 7 (3), Art. VIII]. In addition:

a) Supreme Court: Natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40

years of age,.for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in
the practice of law in the Philippines [Sec. 7 (1), Art. VIII]..

b) Lower Collegiate Courts: Natural born citizen of the Philippines,

member of the Philippine Bar, but Congress may prescribe other
qualifications [Sec. 7 (1) and (2), Art. VIII].

c) Lower Courts: Citizen of the Philippines, member of the Philippine Bar,

but Congress may prescribe other qualifications [Sec. 7 (1) and (2), Art.
VIII]..

2. Procedure for Appointment.

a) Appointed by the President of the Philippines from among a list of at

least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy; the appointment shall need no confirmation [Sec. 9, Art. VIII]..

b) Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90)
days from the occurrence thereof [Sec. 4 (1). Art. VIII],

c) For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within
ninety (90) days from the submission by the JBC of such list [Sec. 9, Art.
VIII]. i)

i) Relate this to the constitutional prohibition against midnight

appointments [Sec. 15, Art. W//which states that two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or acting President shall not make appointments
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-

SC, November 9, 1998, it was held that during this period (when
appointments are prohibited), the President is not required to make
appointments to the courts, nor allowed to do so. While the filling up of
vacancies in the Judiciary is in the public interest, there is no showing in
this case of any compelling reason to justify the issuance of the
appointment during the period of the ban.

3. The Judicial and Bar Council.a) Composition [Sec. 8 (1), Art. VIII]:

i) Ex-officio members: Chief Justice, as Chairman; the Secretary of

Justice, and a representative of Congress.

ii) Regular members: A representative of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, a professor of law, a retired justice of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.

iii) Secretary ex-officio: The Clerk of the Supreme Court.

b) Appointment: The regular members shall be appointed by the

President for a term of four [4] years, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. They shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court [Sec. 8 (2), Art. VIII].

c) Powers/Functions: Principal function of recommending appointees to

the Judiciary. May exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it [Sec. 8 (5), Art. VIII].

E. The Supreme Court.

1. Composition: A Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. It may sit en

banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five or seven members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof [Sec. 4(1),
Art. VIII],

2. En Banc/Division Cases:

a) En Banc: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law; and all other cases which,
under the Rules of Court, are to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other
regulations. These cases are decided with the concurrence of a majority
of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
and voted thereon.

b) Division: Other cases or matters may be heard in division, and decided

or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon,
but in no case without the concurrence of at least three (3) such
members.

i) When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided
en banc. In Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999, the
Supreme Court interpreted the provision by drawing a distinction
between “cases” on the one hand, and “matters” on the other hand, such
that cases are “decided”, while matters are “resolved”. On the basis of
this distinction, only “cases” are referred to the Supreme Court en banc
for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.

ii) No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision

rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by
the court sitting en banc.

iii) The reorganization (of the three divisions) of the Court is purely an
internal matter in which the petitioner has no business at all. With its
new membership, the Court is not obliged to follow blindly a decision
upholding a party’s case when, after its re-examination, the rectification
appears proper and necessary [Limketkai Sbns Milling v. Court of
Appeals, 261 SCRA 464],

3. Powers [Sec. 5, Art. VIII]:

a) Original jurisdiction: over cases affecting ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.

b) Appellate jurisdiction: Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on

appeal or certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in (i) all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance or regulation is in question; (ii) all cases involving the legality
of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto; (iii) all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue; (iv) all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher; and (v) all cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved. i)

i) Note that this power does not include the power of the Supreme Court
to review decisions of administrative bodies, but is limited to “final
judgments and orders of lower courts” [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff,

ii) Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death must the
trial court forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review of the conviction [People v. Redulosa, 255 SCRA 279].
Where the penalty imposed is merely reclusion perpetua, the accused
should appeal the decision of conviction, otherwise, the judgment of
conviction will become final and executory [Garcia v. People, G.R. No.
106531, November' 18, 1999].

iii) Sec. 30, Art. VI, provides that no law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its concurrence.
Thus, in Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, Sec.
27, R.A. 6770, which provides that orders, directives and decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme
Court through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was declared
unconstitutional, because it expands the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence. See also Namuhe v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 124965, October 29, 1998, and Tirol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 135913, November 4, 1999; Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715,
February 13, 2000.

iv) In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135789, January 31, 2002, it

was held that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of
law. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.

c) Temporary assignment of judges of lower courts to other stations as

public interest may require; but the assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned.

d} Order change of venue or place of trial, to avoid miscarriage of justice.

See People v. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173.

e) Rule Making Power: Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. i)

i) Limitations on the rule-making power. The rules must provide a

simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases;
they must be uniform for all courts of the same grade; and must not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. See Primicias v.
Ocampo, 93 Phil. 451,

which is authority for the principle that trial by assessors is a

substantive right and may not be repealed by the Supreme Court.
Likewise, in First Lepanto Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
110571, 1994, it was held that Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91, which
orders that appeals from decisions of administrative bodies shall now be
filed with the Court of Appeals, did not repeal E.O. 226, and did not
diminish, increase or modify the substantive right to appeal. It merely
transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of said agencies to the
Court of Appeals, and provided a different period (15 days from notice),
both of which are merely procedural in character.

ii) In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1- 09-
SC, January 21, 2002, it was held that it is within the competence of the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules
governing the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights and
rules governing pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, to create a
Special Division in the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the
plunder case against former President Joseph Estrada.

iii) An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer

must belong, as distinguished from a bar association organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of
the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities, x x The integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine
qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court [In Re Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, 49 SCRA 22].

iiia) Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
long as one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in [Letter of
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP
Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005].

iiib) The enforcement of the penalty of removal does not amount to

deprivation of property without due process of law. The practice of law is
not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer's public responsibilities [In Re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C.
No. 1928, August 3, 1978],

iv) The writ of amparo. The nature and time-tested role of amparo has
shown that it is an effective and inexpensive instrument for the
protection of constitutional rights [Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A
Remedy to Enforce Fundamental Rights, 37 Ateneo L.J. 15 (1993)].
Amparo, literally “to protect”, originated in Mexico and spread
throughout the Western Hemisphere where it gradually evolved into
various forms, depending on the particular needs of each country.

iva) By Resolution in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Supreme Court

promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, and it took effect on
October 24, 2007. Section 1 thereof provides: “The petition for a writ of
amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity ”

ivb) An extraordinary feature is Section 14 of the Rule which allows the

grant by the court of interim reliefs, which may either be a temporary
protection order, inspection order, production order or a witness
protection order.

ivc) No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of

the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Petitioners right to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite
the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute
right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the
issuance of the writ of amparo [Canlas v. Napico Homeowners
Association, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008].

ivd) The writ of amparo shall not issue when applied for as a substitute
for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere
with these processes [Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, January
17, 2008].

v) The writ of habeas data. The writ of habeas data is an independent

remedy to protect the right to privacy, especially the right to
informational privacy. The essence of the constitutional right to
informational privacy goes to the very heart of a person’s individuality,
an exclusive and personal sphere upon which the State has no right to
intrude without any legitimate public concern. The basic attribute of an
effective rightto informational privacy is the right of the individual to
control the flow of information concerning or describing them.

vb) By Resolution in A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, the Supreme Court

promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, effective February 2,
2008. Section 1 thereof provides: “The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved party. ”

vi) Congress cannot amend the Rules of Court. In Echegaray v. Secretary

of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999, the Supreme Court
declared: “But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive.”

vii) Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall

remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court [Sec. 5 (5),
Art. VIII]..

f) Power of Appointment: The Supreme Court appoints all officials and

employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law [Sec.
5 (6), Art. VIII]..

g) Power of Administrative Supervision: The Supreme Court shall have

administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof [Sec.
6, Art. VIII].

i) The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or

administrative complaint before his office against a judge; he must first
indorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action [Fuentes v.
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23,
2001]. In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC
Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the former’s certificate of
service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into
the Supreme Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers
[Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 469; Dolalas v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 265 SCRA 819].

ii) Administrative proceedings before the Supreme Court are confidential

in nature in order to protect the respondent therein who may turn out to
be innocent of the charges; it can take years to build a reputation and
only a single accusation, although unfounded, to destroy it [Godinez v.
Alano, A.M. RTJ-98-1409, February 18, 1999],

h) Annual Report: Supreme Court to submit, within 30 days from the

opening of each regular session of Congress, to the President and to
Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the
Judiciary [Sec. 16, Art. VIII].
4. Consultations/Decisions of Supreme Court [Secs. 13 & 14, Art. VIII].

a) Conclusions in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached

in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice shall be issued. This requirement is applicable also to lower
collegiate courts.

i) But this requirement does not apply to administrative cases

[Prudential Bank v. Castro, 158 SCRA 646],

ii) When the votes are equally divided and the majority vote is not
obtained, then pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition shall be dismissed [Cruz v. Secretary, DENR, G.R.
No. 135385, December 6, 2000],

b) The decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.

i) But this requirement does not apply to a minute resolution dismissing

a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus, provided a legal
basis is given therein [Mendoza v. CFI, 66 SCRA 96; Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 1]. Neither will it apply to administrative cases
[Prudential Bank v. Castro, supra.].

ii) This constitutional mandate does not preclude the validity of

“memorandum decisions”, which adopt by reference the findings of fact
and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferiortribunals.
“Memorandum decisions” are a species of succinctly written decisions by
appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 40, B.P. 129,
as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and
docket status of our courts. But to be valid, it cannot incorporate the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by
means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision
is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed,
it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In
other words, the memorandum decision should actually embody the
findings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex
attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision [Solid Homes
v. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008].

iii) A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented.

So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth
supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is
valid. However, it is imperative that the decision not simply be limited to
the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize
the facts with reference to the record, and contain a statement of
applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal’s statement and
conclusions on the case. Thus, in Dizon v. Judge Lopez, AM. No. RTJ-96-
1338, September 5, 1997, the decision, which consisted only of the
dispositive portion (denominated a sin perjuicio judgment) was held
invalid.

iv) In People v. Baring, G.R. No. 137933, January 28, 2002, the Supreme
Court said that the trial court’s decision may cast doubt on the guilt of
the accused, not by the lack of direct evidence against the accused but
by the trial court’s failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the
weight or admissibility of the evidence, the assessments made from the
evidence, and the conclusion drawn therefrom, after applying the
pertinent law as basis of the decision. Likewise, in De Vera v. Judge
Dames, A.M. RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999, because the respondent judge
had precipitately concluded that the letter was defamatory without
sufficiently explaining why, he was deemed to have violated Sec. 14, Art.
VIII, and although there was no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration, the Judge must still be sanctioned.

c) No petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused

due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

i) In Fr. Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001,
the Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in
this wise: “Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and
arguments raised by the movants have been considered and passed upon
in the decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus, we find no reason to
disturb the same.” The Supreme Court held that there was adequate
compliance with the constitutional provision.

ii)In Prudential Bank v. Castro, supra., the Supreme Court ruled that
“lack of merit” is sufficient declaration of the legal basis for denial of
petition for review or motion for reconsideration. In Komatsu Industries
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998, it was held that
when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent
pleadings, manifestations, comments or motions, decides to deny due
course to a petition, and states — in a minute resolution — that the
questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent
court’s decision is shown or some other legal basis stated in the
resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. This is reiterated in Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
150629 June 30, 2004. ’
F. Tenure of Judges/Justices.1. Supreme Court: Justices may be
removed only by impeachment Sec

2, Art. XI].. '

a) In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, A.M. No. 88- 4-
5433, April 15, 1988, the Supreme Court said that the Special
Prosecutor (Tanodbayan) is without authority to conduct an investigation
on charges against a member of the Supreme Court with the end in view
of filing a criminal information against him with the Sandiganbayan. This
is so, because if convicted in the criminal case, the Justice would be
removed, and such removal would violate his security of tenure.

2. Lower Courts: Judges shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office [Sec. 11, Art. VIII],

a) The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges
of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and
voted thereon [Sec. 11, Art. VIII].

i) In People v. Judge Gacott, 246 SCRA 52, it was held that the first
clause in the said section is a declaration of the grant of the disciplinary
power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof
by, the Court en banc. It did not intend that all administrative
disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court. The
second clause, intentionally separated from the first by a comma,
declares that the Court en banc may order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority”. Thus, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts
are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc.

ii) In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC
Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificate of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the

Supreme Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and

its

personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers [Maceda v.

Vasquez, supra.]. In Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177,
July 17, 2001, it was held that because of Sec. 6, Art. VIII, vesting in the
Supreme Court exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself
whether a criminal complaint against a judge or court employee involves
an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all
cases against judges and court personnel filed before it referred to the
Supreme Court. See also Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001.

iii) In Office of the Judicial Administrator v. Pascual, A.M. No. MT- 93-
783, July 29, 1996, the Supreme Court, reiterating Raquiza v.
Castaneda, declared that the grounds for the removal of a judicial officer
should be established beyond reasonable doubt, particularly where the
charges on which the removal is sought are misconduct in office, willful
neglect, corruption, incompetence, etc.. Thus, in De Vera v. Dames, A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999, the Supreme Court said that judges
cannot be disciplined for every erroneous order or decision rendered in
the absence of a clear showing of ill motive, malice or bad faith. This,
however, is not license forthem to be negligent or abusive in performing
their adjudicatory prerogatives. The absence of bad faith or malice will
not totally exculpate them from charges of incompetence and ignorance
of the law when they render decisions that are totally bereft of factual
and legal bases. This was reiterated in Dayot v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No.
MTJ-00-1282, March 1, 2001, where the judge was nonetheless taken to
task for issuing an order discrediting the period served by the prisoner
outside the jail without giving the prisoner a chance to be heard, thus
betraying his ignorance of the cardinal principles of due process. In De
Guzman v. Judge Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001, the
Supreme Court said that the respondent had shamed the judiciary by
deliberately applying not only patently inapplicable but also already
repealed laws. The judge was dismissed from the service, because
according to the Court, when the law violated is elementary, the failure
to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. In Spouses
Antonio & Elsa Fortuna v. Judge Penaco-Sitaca, A.M. No. RTJ- 01-1633,
June 19, 2001, because the judge accepted at face value a mere machine
copy of the bail bond issued by another court, the judge was subjected to
administrative sanction, because it is highly imperative that judges
should be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-
settled authoritative doctrines. In Agulan v. Judge Fernandez, A.M. No.
MTJ- 01-1354, April 4, 2001, for receiving the deposit of cash as bail and
keeping the same in his office, the judge was held administratively liable,
even after the complainant executed an affidavit of desistance.

iv) However, in Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals

Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of A
Suspected Drug Queen, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001, the
Supreme Court said that although every office in government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness
and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and
a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the
people in the Judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be
preserved. There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot
meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. Similarly,
in Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC Branch 54, Manila, of an
Accused in a Non-Bailable Offense, A.M. No. 00-7-323-RTJ, October 17,
2001, where the judge, despite opposition from the prosecution, simply
issued an order submitting for resolution the motion and the opposition
without the same being heard, and later, granting the motion for
extension of medical confinement for two months, the Supreme Court
found the judge guilty of gross misconduct for being utterly inefficient
and for manifest partiality. And it is said that when the inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or
a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or he is
too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

b) No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines

the security of tenure of its members [Sec. 2, Art. VIII],

i) In De la Liana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294, it was held that B.P. 129 was a
valid reorganization law, and that, therefore, the abolition of then
existing judicial offices did not violate security of tenure. [NOTE; In view
of the clear declaration of Sec. 2, Art. VIII, the ruling in De la Liana, as
well as that in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, L-7918, January 18,
1955, may be said to have been modified accordingly.]

G. Salaries.Tixed by law; may not be decreased during their continuance

in office. In Nitafan v. Tan, 152 SCRA 284, it was held that imposition of
income tax on salaries of judges does not violate the constitutional
prohibition against decrease in salaries.

H. Periods for Decision [Sec. 15, Art. VIII].

1. All cases filed after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided
or resolved, from date of submission, within: 24 months - Supreme
Court; 12 months - lower collegiate courts; and 3 months - all other
lower courts; unless, in the two latter cases, the period is reduced by the
Supreme Court.

A certification to be signed by the Chief Justice or Presiding Justice shall

be issued stating the reason for delay. -

a) While it is truly the duty of the Judge to decide cases with good

dispatch, he must not sacrifice for expediency’s sake the fundamental

requirements of due process, nor forget that he must conscientiously

endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law,
and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially, all to the
end that justice is done to every party [Young v. Judge De Guzman, A.M.
No. RTJ-96-1365, Febmary 18, 1999],

b) In Dizon v. Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997,

respondent Judge was held to have violated Sec. 15, Art. VIII, because
although she promulgated her decision within three months from
submission, only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation,
and it took one year and 8 months more before a copy of the complete
decision was furnished the complainant. What respondent did was to
render a “sin perjuicio” judgment, which is a judgment without a
statement of the facts in support of its conclusions, to be later
supplemented by the final judgment. As early as 1923, the Supreme
Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering “sin
perjuicio” judgments. What should be promulgated must be the complete
decision.

c) Sec. 15, Art. VIII, is designed to prevent delay in the administration of

justice, and judges are repeatedly reminded that failure to decide cases
within the prescribed period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency which is a ground for administrative sanction against the
defaulting judge [Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC Branch 27 of
Lapulapu City. A.M. Case No. 97-9-282-RTC, April 22, 1998]. Thus, in
Sanchez v. Judge Vestil, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1419, October 13, 1998, the
Supreme Court said that judges who cannot comply with this mandate
should ask for additional time, explaining in their request the reasons for
the delay. In Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista, A.M. MTJ-98-1161, August 17,
1999, the Supreme Court said that a judge cannot be allowed to blame
her court personnel for her own incompetence or negligence. She ought
to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is
expected to keep her own record of cases so that she may act on them
promptly. Neither does delay in the transcription of stenographic notes
excuse such failure, nor do additional assignments or designations make
him less liable for the delay [Gonzales-Decano v. Judge Siapno, A.M. No.
MTJ-00-1279, March 1, 2001]. 2

2. Despite expiration of the mandatory period, the court, without

prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted
to it without a) The court does not lose jurisdiction over the case, despite
the lapse of the mandatory period, but the erring judge or justice may be
subjected to administrative sanctions for the delay.

3. Interpreting a similar provision in the 1973 Constitution, in Marcelino

v. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, reiterated in New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129
SCRA 502, the Supreme Court held that the provision is merely
directory, being procedural in nature. However, in Bernardo v. Judge
Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ- 99-1189, May 12, 1999, the Supreme Court said
that the failure of the judge to decide a case within the reglementary
period constitutes gross dereliction of duty the gravity of which depends
on several factors, including the number of cases not decided on time,
the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, and the
presence of other aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Other cases
where administrative sanctions were imposed by the Supreme Court on
judges for failure to decide/resolve cases/matters within the periods
prescribed in the Constitution: Pros. Robert Visbal v. Judge Ramos, A.M.
No. MTJ-00-1306, March 20m 2001; Atty. Montes v. Judge Bugtas, A.M.
No. RTJ- 01-1627, April 17, 2001; Maquiran v. Judge Lopez, A.M. No.
RTJ-00-1606; Canada v. Judge Montecillo, A.M. No. RTJ- 01-1664; In
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC Branch 69, Silay
City, Judge Arinday, respondent, A.M. No. 99-5-162-RTC, May 11, 2001;
Report on the Judicial Audit in the MTC’s of Calasiao, Binmaley, Sta.
Barbara and Mapandan and in the MCTC of Tayug-San Nicolas, all in
Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1375, November 13, 2001[Arap v. Judge
Mustafa, A.M. No. SCC-01-7, March 12 2002.’

a) In Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan,A. M. No.

00-8-05-SC, November 08, 2001, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena was fined P20,000 and was relieved of his powers,
functions and duties as Presiding Justice, so that he may devote himself
exclusively to decision-writing. His motion for reconsideration was denied
on January 31, 2002.