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Llamas vs.

Orbos
G.R. No. 99031. October 15, 1991
J. Paras
Facts:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. It is the contention of
respondent governor that "the funds were intended to generate livelihood projects among the residents of Tarlac
and the use of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. was authorized by law and considered the best alternative
as a matter of judgment." Trial on the merits ensued and Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for
office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office.

In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence
he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. The petitioner argues that
President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase “after
conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive
clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word
“conviction” refers only to criminal cases.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the President of the PH’s discretionary authority to exercise executive clemency is
beyond judicial review.
2. Whether or not the president has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.

Ruling:
1. No. While courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are
exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns
the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits presented by the
Constitution, the Court will not decline to exercise the power of judicial review. Such a rule does not hold
true in the case at bar. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's
discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when
the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within
the limits prescribed by the Constitution, the Court will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review.
And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it
constitute interference with the functions of the President.

In this connection the Court in Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., ruled that lsewhere in this
treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the
courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary
powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is
not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the
existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

2. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution. The
petitioner's contention that the president may only grant executive clemency to criminal cases based on
said provision is untenable because the Constitution does not distinguish between cases as to when the
executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases.
If the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly
recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases. One example of which is Sec. 43
of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may commute or remove administrative
penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, the intent of
the constitutional commission is to give the president the power to grant executive clemency and is not
to be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the constitution.

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