VICTORINO B. ALDABA et al. v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010, EN BANC, (CARPIO, J.)

1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First
Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos[1] and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan,
and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos' City Charter, by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely,
House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City
was 223,069. They projected that it will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between
1995 to 2000.”

Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed a petition contending that RA 9591
is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in
Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Is RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution for failing to meet the required population?

HELD:

YES.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal
effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is
also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any
event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately
following election" after the attainment of the 250,000 population.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified
have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional
Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states
that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal
demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every year." In addition, there is no showing that Regional
Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in
Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given
credence by this Court.

Motion for Reconsideration: DENIED

First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population
indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably
within the ambit of this Court's judicial review power,[5] then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary
questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to
representation in Congress.
 Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to measure
Malolos City's compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. On Miranda's
Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135's requirements that (a) for
intercensal years, the certification should bebased on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared official by
the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as
of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections, it
breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member."

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population
requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First
Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district.This
contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory."
 SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III AND MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793, April 07, 2010, EN BANC, (PEREZ, J.)

Petitioners filed by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition
of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District from such Reapportionment.”Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by
President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts
shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum
population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the1987 Constitution. It
was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be
stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by
law. Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to
assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second,
petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

ISSUE: Is Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?

HELD:

NO. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The
provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
 ROBERTO LACEDA, SR. v. RANDY L. LIMENA AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 182867, November 25, 2008, EN BANC, (QUISUMBING, J.)

Limena filed a petition for disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate against Laceda before
the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three
consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the fourth time under Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 91641. However, Laceda asserted that when he was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a
municipality, and that when he served his third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the
Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806.

COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified and cancelled his certificate of candidacy. Laceda moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this petition on certiorari.

ISSUE: Is Laceda entitled to run again for the same position since the Municipality of Sorsogon was converted into a
City?

HELD:
NO. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local Government Code from which it was taken,
is primarily intended to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse
new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years.
This Court has held that for the prohibition to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he or she has fully served three
consecutive terms.

In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were
merged and converted into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it
cannot be said that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office ofPunong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of
Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay
are the same. They are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive
terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did
not interrupt Laceda's term.

1SEC. 2. Term of Office.—The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act
shall be three (3) years.No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position:
Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.Voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
 SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI ET. AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 135927, June 26, 2000, EN BANC, (BUENA, J.)

Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor Hassan, in their respective capacity as former
Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus
urging us to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion declaring
that Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct. Hence, should be abolished.

ISSUE: Did respondent COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct?

HELD:
NO. It is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and
duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the
validity of the same. Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate
the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there
were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters
may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that
people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in
its automatic cessation as a unit of local government.

Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. In the case of a barangay,
except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebisciteconducted for the purpose in
the political units affected.The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari
particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain
the true results of an election by means available to it. The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's
administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-
existent, said order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is disenfranchised because
no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered when a list of fictitious
voters is excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are
qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all
the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage because the
"electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect
to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.
 ELPIDIO SALVA, et al., v. CA & HON. ROBERTO MAKALINTAL, et al.
G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000, EN BANC (Buena, J.)

Petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and COMELEC for annulment of Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay
Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required
plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of the LGC. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance
No. 05, thereby overriding the veto by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the Batangas
governor for being ultra vires as it was not shown that the essential requirements referring to the attestations or
certifications of the DOF, NSO and the LMB were obtained. The RTC denied the ex parte motion for the issuance of a
TRO and/or preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According to the RTC, the TRO/injunction sought by
petitioners is directed only to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The RTC ruled that any petition or action questioning
an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the SC.

ISSUE: Does the respondent court have jurisdiction to enjoin COMELEC from implementing its resolution which
provided the rules and regulations for the conduct of the plebiscite to decide on the abolition of Brgy. San Rafael and
its merger with Brgy. Dacanlao?

HELD:
Yes. In Filipinas, the Court has likewise affirmed that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on
the COMELEC may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those
which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character. As aptly explained by the Solicitor General,
after the COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of barangay San
Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in the affected barangays, pursuant
to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160. The Court agrees with the SolGen that the issuance of
Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its
administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let
alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and
duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws.
Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the
required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a
"final order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention that the power to review or reverse
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are simply not in point. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo speaks of
the power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of
the judiciary. In the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to enforce
and administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia refers to this Courts power to review administrative decisions,
particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy null and void, based on
Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution. In Macud vs. COMELEC, we reiterated that when a board of
canvassers rejects an election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board,
the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court. In both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall
within the purview of final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
 HERMIE HERRERA, et al., v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999, EN BANC (Purisima, J.)

In view of the addition of the 2 new municipalities, San Lorenzo and Sibunag to Guimaras, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Guimaras decided to have the province subdivided into 2 provincial districts. It passed Resolution No.
68 requesting the COMELEC to bring about the desired division. Acting upon the said Resolution, the Provincial
Election Supervisor in Guimaras conducted 2 consultative which later issued a Memorandum recommending the
division of the Province of Guimaras into 2 provincial districts. The Bureau of Local Government Finance of the DOF
issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-1 reclassifying several provinces including Guimaras, which was reclassified from
5th class to 4th class province. In line with such reclassification, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras, dividing it into 2 provincial districts. The division of provinces into
districts and the corresponding apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan are provided for by law. Under Republic Act No. 6636, allotment of elective members to provinces and
municipalities must be made on the basis of its classification as a province and/or municipality. Thus, a 4th class
province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members.

ISSUE: Is the apportionment of Guimaras into 2 districts not equitable due to disproportionate representation?

HELD:

NO. Under R.A. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division into districts shall be the
number of inhabitants of the province concerned and not the number of listed or registered voters as theorized upon
by petitioners. Thus, COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution because
clearly, the basis for the districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on
the official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the NSO.
 CITY OF PASIG v. COMELEC & MUN. OF CAINTA
G.R. Nos. 125646 & 128663, September 10, 1999, EN BANC (Ynares-Santiago, J.)

Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother Brgys.
Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Brgy.
Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21 creating Brgy. Karangalan in Pasig City.
Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was set. Pasig City similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating Brgy. Napico
and a plebiscite was also scheduled. Immediately upon learning of such ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to
suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled. The Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of
Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the
scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the
court.

ISSUE: Should the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Brgys. Karangalan and Napico be suspended or cancelled
in view of the pending boundary dispute between the 2 local governments?

HELD:
YES. The plebiscite on the creation of Brgy. Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of
the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the RTC. In the same vein, the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set
aside.

To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that the civil case involving the boundary dispute
between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig
vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it
can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by
metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue
raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction
of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for
potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.

Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in
abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed
barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig. Neither do we agree that merely because a
plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta
has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the
COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination
before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
 JUANITO MARIANO, JR., et al., v. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. Nos. 118577 & 118627, March 7, 1995, EN BANC (Puno, J.)

2 petitions assail certain provisions of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, “An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.” Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the
LGC. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land area of the proposed city of Makati which provided that
“The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati over which it
has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality
of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The foregoing provision shall be without
prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining LGUs.”

ISSUE: Did the delineation violate sections 7 and 450 of the LGC which requires that the area of a LGU should be
made by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions?

HELD:
NO. Any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers
which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare which is the evil sought to be avoided by the LGC. The Court cannot
perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The
said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did
not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2
stated that the city's land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.”

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed
Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No.
7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of government, the legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding
of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its
exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also
refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other LGUs with unsettled boundary disputes.

The Court holds that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty
which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a LGU. Congress
maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate
resolution by the courts. The Court is not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional.
Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to
those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition
sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the LGC seeks to serve. The manifest intent of
the Code is to empower LGUs and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make LGUs more responsive to the
needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No.
7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the
spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could
not be the intendment of the law.
 MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, RTC of Ormoc
City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
FACTS.
A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. However, no
amicable settlement was reached when they submitted the issue in a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc
City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga. Consequently, they elevated the issue to the RTC of Ormoc. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
1. The Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
2. There is no cause of action;
3. That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been complied with.

RTC denied the Motion and held that it had jurisdiction over the action under BP Blg.129. It further ruled
that Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had
the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via a
Resolution.

ISSUE. WON the RTC of Ormoc City may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute
between a municipality and an independent component city.

HELD.
YES; although Section 118 of the Local Government Code finds no application to the instant case, the general
rules governing jurisdiction should be applied. The applicable provision is found in BP Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Section 19(6) of this law provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.

Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of
boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, respondent court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate
all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take
judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other
courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.

Why is Section 118 inapplicable in the case at bar?

Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a
component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -- or between two or more
highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government
units involved.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a
boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a
municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not
apply to them.
 MUNICIPALITY OF STA. FE v. MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO
Settlement of Boundary Disputes

FACTS.
For the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan, the
Municipality of Sta. Fe submitted the issue before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. The trial was almost over
when the court realizing its oversight under existing law, ordered the suspension of the proceedings and the referral of
the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. The Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 64 which resolves to
adjudicate barangays Bantinan and Canabuan as parts of Aritao’s territorial jurisdiction. They then endorsed the dispute
to the RTC for further proceedings.

In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The RTC denied the motion
ruling that since there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a decision favoring a party.
Under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably settle with
the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court
proceedings shall be resumed. Respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction
since the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian.

The RTC granted the motion. The CA affirmed. According to the CA, a new legislation can be given
retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given
retroactive effect. Since the LGC of 1991 is the latest will of the people expressed through Congress on how boundary
disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the
creation of LGUs as well as settling boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to
time and the latest will of the people should always prevail.

ISSUE. WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that at the time of the filing of
the motion to dismiss the original jurisdiction to hear and decide, the case had been vested on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and no longer on the RTC..

HELD.
NO; This Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint when it was filed
on October 16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Sec. 1 of RA 6128. Said law granted the CFI the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving municipal boundary
disputes. The antecedents of the Municipality of Sogod case reveal that it dealt with the trial court‘s dismissal of cases
filed for lack of jurisdiction because at the time of the institution of the civil actions, the law in force was the old
provision of Sec. 2167 of the RAC, which empowered the provincial boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve
such cases.

Since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been the primary tribunal responsible in the
amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more municipalities located in the same province.

With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced – that in the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a
settlement, it shall not only issue a certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the
reglementary period. Under the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of
municipal boundary disputes.

The LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the Sanggunian concerned in resolving cases of municipal boundary
disputes. Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the
amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to
actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its implementing rules
and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No.
6128. Moreover, only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case.

Considering the foregoing, the RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was
the responsibility of the court to dismiss an action “whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.” Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of
jurisdiction was evident.
 MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA v. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE
Settlement of Boundary Disputes

FACTS.
By virtue of EO No.66, the Rancherias of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc,
Tibangran, and Uguis were united to form the township of Nueva Era. On the other hand, the Municipality of Marcos
was created by virtue of RA 3753. Section 1 of said Republic Act provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and
Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province ofIlocos Norte, are hereby separated from
the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as
the Municipalityof Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by
the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the
East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River
which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras;
on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and
Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the
mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos’ boundaries as stated in the
second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: “on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.” It must be
noted that the term “Mt. Province” stated in the above phrase refers to the present adjoining provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a single province.

Nueva Era was between Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east
by Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, it would necessarily traverse a part of Nueva Era.

The Sangguniang Panlalawian of Ilocos Norte dismissed Marcos’ claim for lack of merit. RTC affirmed SP’s ruling. On
appeal, CA expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal because the said case was appealable
only to the RTC. Nonetheless, they took cognizance of the issue and reversed the ruling of SP and RTC.

ISSUE. WON the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

HELD.
NO. No part of Nueva Era’s territory was taken for the creation of the Municipality of Marcos. As provided
in RA 3753, only those specifically enumerated barrios in Dingras will form part of Marcos’ territory. Nueva
Era’s territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate,
everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide to
probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind. Had the legislature
intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise
language.

In relation to the procedural aspect, SC held that the CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate
jurisdiction over SP’s judgment on settlement of boundary disputes. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among
others. CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass
upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

NOTE. At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government unit. Hence,
Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite.
 STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. CITY OF PASIG
Settlement of Boundary Disputes

FACTS.
Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. is the registered owners of several parcels of land located in Barrio
Tatlong Kawaayan. The City of Pasig filed a complaint against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes. According
to Sta. Lucia, the subject property is within the boundaries of Cainta. Sta. Lucia have been paying their real estate taxes
in Cainta like their predecessors-in-interest did although the TCTs of the subject property indicate that the properties
were in the locality of Pasig.

Cainta has already filed a petition for the settlement of boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC of
Antipolo when this complaint for collection of taxes was filed by Pasig. RTC ruled that the TCTs were conclusive
evidence as to ownership and location, therefore, the subject properties were ruled to be in Pasig. CA, however, set
aside the ruling of the RTC, and said that the boundary dispute case presented a “prejudicial question which must be
decided before Pasig can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties. Pasig sought to have the decision
reversed in a petition for certiorari, eventually, CA affirmed RTC’s ruling and held that “there can be on prejudicial
question when the cases involved are both civil.

ISSUE. WON Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always done, or
to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucia’s TCTs.

HELD.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IS PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.
While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not
preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. In Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente Coronado, we set aside the lower courts’ ruling that the property subject of the case was not
situated in the location stated and described in the TCT, for lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in line with the
doctrine that the TCT is conclusive evidence of ownership and location. However, we refused to simply uphold the
veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead, we remanded the case back to the trial court for the determination of the
exact location of the property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before it.

Although it is true that “Pasig” is the locality stated in the TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and
Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are
within Cainta’s boundaries. This only means that there may be a conflict between the location as stated and the
location as technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they
can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties’ locations if both the stated and described locations point to
the same area.

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in this civil
case, in view of the fact that the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect
both Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights. In fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not
that Sta. Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another local government unit. Evidently,
had the territorial boundaries of the contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there
would be no controversy at all.

In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the succeeding real property
taxes due on the subject properties, in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
 PLAZA v. CASION

FACTS.
The City of Butuan, through its Sanggunian, passed SP Resolution 427-92 authorizing the City Mayor to sign the
“Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the City of Butuan”. Pursuant to the MoA, Mayor
Plaza issued EO No. 06-92 reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding
thereto 19 additional DSWD employees headed by Virginia Tuazon as Officer-in-charge. Its office was transferred from
the original CSSDO building to the DSWD building.

Aggrieved by the development, Respondents refused to recognize Tuazon as their new head & to report at the DSWD
building contending that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 & Tuazon’s designation as the CSSDO’s Officer-in-charge are
illegal. Respondents failed to report for work despite Mayor Plaza’s series of orders directing them to do so. Thereafter,
they were administratively charged for grave misconduct & insubordination and were preventively suspended for 60
days.

Upon expiration of their suspension, the respondents informed the Mayor that they are willing to return to work but
only to their old office, not the DSWD building. They also failed to report to Tuazon at the DSWD building despite the
Mayor’s instructions to do so.

Mayor Plaza then dropped the respondents from the rolls pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of
1993 which provides that “officers & employees who are absent for at least 30 days without approved leave…may be
dropped from the service without prior notice.“

ISSUE.
1. Whether EO No. 06-92 directing the devolution of 19 national DSWD employees to the city DSWD to be headed by
petitioner Tuazon should be upheld as valid

2. Whether private respondents were denied due process when they were dropped from the rolls.

HELD.

1. Sec.17 of the LGC authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets & liabilities, records basic services, and facilities of
a national government agency to LGUs. Under this Code, the term “devolution” refers to the act by which the
government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions & responsibilities.
Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the LGC. As the
local chief executive of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel & may designate an employee to
take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head.
EO No. 06-92 did not violate respondents’ security of tenure as they were not transferred to another office without
their consent. Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without
break in service & may be imposed as an administrative penalty. The change of respondents’ place of work from the CSSDO to
the DSWD building is not a transfer. It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service.

2. Dropping from the rolls is not an administrative sanction. Thus, private respondents need not be notified or heard. Their
assertion that they were denied due process is, therefore, untenable.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. YU
 SPOUSES LEONOR AND ROSA BADUA V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION

In 1996.David Quema as the owner of 2 parcels of land in Lacaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra mortgaged said parcels
of land of 6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land of 22 years later, long after Dra. Valera had
already died. He allegedly was able to pay the redemption price of Dra. Valera’s heir. Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua
alleged however that Dra. Valera sold the land to her while she was still alive. However, Rosa could not produce the
deed of sale because it was allegedly in the possession of Vice-governor Benesa.

As Quema was prevented by Rosa from cultivating the land, he filed a case with the Maeng Tribal Court of the
Cordillera Bondong Administration (CBA) instead of provincial level court. In 1989, The tribal court rule in favor of
Quema. When spouses Badua refused to vacate the subject land, they received a warning order from the Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army. Spouses Badua later the filed for Special and Extraordinary relief with the SC, questioning
the jurisdiction and legal personality of the Maeng Tribal Court, the CBA and the CPLA.

Issue: Can a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration render a valid and executory decision in a land
dispute?

Held:
No. "Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an
autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null
and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended."

As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created Under Section 13 of
Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera
region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, as a regional police force or a
regional command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally
exist. Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not
constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary
tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.

Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower
courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power.
Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory
bodies whose principal objective to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace settle, and
compromise. An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably
repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only
through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or
arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a
tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may been enforced or set aside, in and
through the regular courts only.

Petition was GRANTED.