Pacifico Arceo vs.

People HELD: was payment, petitioner should have redeemed or taken the check back in
G.R. 142641 (July 17, 2006) the ordinary course of business. Instead, the check remained in the
Cenizal’s presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 possession of the payee who demanded the satisfaction of petitioner’s
days (four months) after its issue was still within the allowable period. obligation when the check became due as well as when the check was
FACTS:
Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient funds dishonored by the drawee bank.
in his account nor from liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.
On March 14, 1991, petitioner, obtained a loan from private
These findings (due notice to petitioner and non-payment of
complainant Josefino Cenizal in the amount ofP100,000.00. Several
Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in the obligation) were confirmed by the appellate court. This Court has no
weeks thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an additional loan
evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is reason to rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings
of P50,000.00 from Cenizal. Petitioner then issued in favor of Cenizal,
wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are not to be
Bank of the Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255, post dated
Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the disturbed.
August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizal’s house located at
rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the
70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, Cenizal did
inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or CONCEPCION CHUA GAW V. SUY BEN CHUA (2008)
not deposit the check immediately because [petitioner] promised [] that
the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
he would replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Facts:
seven (7) times. When his patience ran out, Cenizal brought the check to
the bank for encashment. The head office of the Bank of the Philippine
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing  Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were founders of 3 business
Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed Cenizal that
a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance enterprises: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and
the check bounced because of insufficient funds.
or execution of the check, not its content. Columbia Wood Industries. They had 7 children, including respondent
Suy Ben Chua and petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw. On June 19, 1986,
Thereafter, Cenizal went to the house of petitioner to inform
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were Chua Chin died leaving Chan Chi and his 7 children his only surviving
him of the dishonor of the check but Cenizal found out that [petitioner]
sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he presented the originals heirs. At that time, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415, 487.20.
had left the place. So, Cenizal referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote
of the check, the return slip and other pertinent documents before the
a letter giving [petitioner] three days from receipt thereof to pay the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his  On Dec. 8, 1986, the heirs execute a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
amount of the check. [Petitioner] still failed to make good the amount of
complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The City and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir, wherein the
the check. As a consequence, Cenizal executed on January 20, 1992
Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP heirs voluntarily renounced and waived their shares (including Chan
before the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and
22 and filed the corresponding information based on the Chi’s ½ share by virtue of her share in the conjugal partnership) in
submitted documents in support of his complaint for estafa and
documents. Although the check and the return slip were among the Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir Chua Sioc Huan.
violation of BP 22 against petitioner . After due investigation, this case
documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on
for violation of BP 22 was filed against [petitioner] on March 27, 1992.
September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the  In May 1988, petitioner Chua Gaw and her husband Antonio Gaw asked
The check in question and the return slip were however lost by Cenizal
due execution, existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an respondent Suy Ben to lend them P200T for the construction of their
as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16,
affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case. house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be
1992. Cenizal executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the
payable within 6 months w/o interest. Suy Ben issued in their favor a
check in question and the return slip. The trial court found that, contrary to petitioner’s check for P200T which he delivered to the couple’s house in Marilao.
claim, Cenizal’s counsel had informed petitioner in writing of the check’s
After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved,
dishonor and demanded payment of the value of the check. Despite  On Aug. 1990, Chua Sioc Huan executed a Deed of Sale over all her
he appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, on April 28, 1999, the
receipt of the notice of dishonor and demand for payment, petitioner still rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration of P255T in
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. Petitioner
failed to pay the amount of the check. favor of Suy Ben.
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition, Petitioner
claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of  Because the spouses Gaw failed to settle their obligation with Suy Ben,
the failure of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the five banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor within which to pay he filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the
trial. He also contends that he should not be held liable for the dishonor the amount of the check. While petitioner may have been given only three RTC.
of the check because it was presented beyond the 90-day period provided days to pay the value of the check, the trial court found that the amount
under the law. Petitioner further questions his conviction since the notice due thereon remained unpaid even after five banking days from his receipt  In their Answer (w/ Amended Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses
requirement was not complied with and he was given only three days to of the notice of dishonor. This negated his claim that he had already Gaw claimed that the P200T was not a loan but their share in the profits
pay, not five banking days as required by law. Finally, petitioner asserts paid Cenizal and should therefore be relieved of any liability. of Hagonoy Lumber. They insisted that Concepcion Chua Gaw, as one of
that he had already paid his obligation to Cenizal.
the compulsory heirs, is entitled to 1/6 of Hagonoy Lumber which Suy
Moreover, petitioner’s claim of payment was nothing more Ben arrogated to himself. They thus prayed that Suy Ben make an
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of B.P. 22 than a mere allegation. He presented no proof to support it. If indeed there

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accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and deliver to
Concepcion Gaw her 1/6 share thereof, which was estimated to be P500T.
 In his Answer to the Amended Counterclaim, Suy Ben explained that
his sister Chua Sioc Huan became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber
when they executed the Deed of Partition. In turn, he became the sole
owner when he bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as evidenced by the Deed
of Sale.
 During trial, the spouses Gaw called Suy Ben to testify as adverse
witness under Sec 10, Rule 132. On direct examination, Suy Ben testified
that Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his parents and that
he is the current owner of the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating.
On crossexamination, Suy Ben explained that he ceased to be a
stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares to the other
stockholders. He also testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy
Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua
Chin. In turn, he became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought
it from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale. On redirect examination,
Suy Ben stated that he sold his shares in Capitol Sawmill for P254T (in
cash) and paid the purchase price of P255T for Hagonoy Lumber (in cash)
but said payment was not covered by a separate receipt but merely
delivered the payment to Chua Sioc Huan at her house Valenzuela.
Although he maintains several accounts in 3 banks, the amount he paid to
Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them since he had enough
cash in his house because he was engaged in rediscounting checks of
people from the public market.
 On Dec. 1998, Antonio Gaw died.
 RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Suy Ben and denied Concepcion
Gaw’s counterclaim. The RTC held that the validity and due execution of
the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale was never impugned. It said
that even if Suy Ben failed to produce the originals of the document,
Concepcion Gaw judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of
Partition and acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constituting an
exception to the best evidence rule. As for the Deed of Sale, since the
contents thereof were not put in issue, the RTC said that non-presentation
of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well
as the truth of its contents.
 On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA found
petitioner’s argument that the RTC should have not included Suy Ben’s
testimony as part of her evidence baseless.
 Petitioner Concepcion Gaw filed this petition for review on certiorari
assailing the CA decision. Gaw contends that her case was unduly
prejudiced by the RTC’s treatment of Suy Ben’s testimony as adverse
witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of her
evidence.
Issues:
1. Whether there was error in the application of Rule 132 Section 10 (d)
and (e)? No.
2. Whether there was error in the application of the “best evidence rule”
under Rule 130 Section 3? No.
Held:
Petition denied. Rule 132 Section 10 (d) and (e) Gaw’s case
was not prejudiced by the RTC’s treatment of Suy Ben’s testimony during
cross-examination as her evidence.
The delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence
of one party or the other is only significant in determining whether the
party on whose shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the
quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. In civil cases, that
burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by
preponderance of evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of
evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety
of the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is
then determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the
case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily
mean that the calling party will not be bound by the former's testimony.
Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse
witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except
by evidence of his bad character. Under a rule permitting the
impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not
vouch for the witness' veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony
if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not
bound by the latter's testimony only in the sense that he may contradict
him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an
adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that
such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the
calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from
impeaching him. This, the petitioner failed to do. Petitioner, by her own
testimony, failed to discredit the respondent's testimony on how Hagonoy
Lumber became his sole property.
The “best evidence rule” under Rule 130 Section 3 The RTC's
finding that the P200T was as a loan is supported by the evidence on
record. The allegation that the P200T was advance on her share in the
profits of Hagonoy Lumber is implausible. When the Suy Ben delivered
to the petitioner the P200T check, it could not have been given as an
advance on petitioner's share in the business, because at that moment in
time both of them had no participation, interest or share in Hagonoy
Lumber.
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of Partition and the
Deed of Sale were acknowledged before a Notary Public. The
notarization of a private document converts it into a public document, and
makes it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. It is
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Such a document must be
given full force and effect absent a strong, complete and conclusive proof
of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects recognized by
law. A public document executed and attested through the intervention of
a notary public is, generally, evidence of the facts therein express in clear
unequivocal manner.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in admitting in
evidence a mere copy of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale in
violation of the best evidence rule. The "best evidence rule" as
encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the subject
of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is
likewise admissible without need to account for the original. Moreover,
production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's
discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents
of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not
applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms
of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies
of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution
and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition. As for the Deed of
Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution
when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules.
The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not express the true
agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional
paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.
SKUNAC CORPORATION v. ROBERTO and CAESAR
SYLIANTENG G.R. No. 205879 April 23, 2014
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FACTS:
The subject of controversy are two (2) parcels of land
identified as Lot 1, with an area of 1,250 square meters and Lot 2, with
an area of 990 square meters, both found in Block 2 of the Pujalte
Subdivision which are portions of a parcel of land previously registered
in the name of Luis A. Pujalte and covered by TCTNo. (-78865) (-2668)
-93165 ("Mother Title") of the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila.
Respondents Roberto and Caesar Sylianteng claim ownership
over the subject lots based on a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their
favor by their mother, Emerenciana Sylianteng on June 27, 1983. They
further allege that Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late Luis
Pujalte through a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1958 as reflected in Entry
No. P.E. 4023, annotated on the covering TCT, by virtue of which she
was issued TCT No. 42369. Then, when she sold the lots to appellants,
TCT No. 39488, covering the same, was issued in their names.
Petitioners Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F. Enriquez, on
the other hand, claim that a certain Romeo Pujalte who was declared by
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151 as the sole heir of Luis Pujalte, caused
the reconstitution of the Mother Title resulting to its cancellation and the
issuance of TCT No. 5760-R in his favor. Romeo Pujalte then allegedly
sold the lots to Skunac and Enriquez in 1992. Thus, from TCT No. 5760-
R, TCT No. 5888-R, for Lot 1 was issued in the name of Skunac, while
TCT No. 5889-R for Lot 2 was issued in the name of Enriquez.
Respondents contend that they have a better right to the lots in
question because the transactions conveying the same to them preceded
those claimed by petitioners as source of the latter's titles. They further
assert that petitioners could not be considered as innocent purchasers in
good faith and for value because they had prior notice of the previous
transactions as stated in the memorandum of encumbrances annotated on
the titles covering the subject lots. Petitioners, for their part, maintain that
respondents acquired the lots under questionable circumstances it
appearing that there was no copy of the Deed of Sale, between
Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte, on file with the Office of the Register of
Deeds.
ISSUES:
1) Is the provision of the Civil Code on Double Sale of registered land
(Art. 1544) applicable in the present case?
2) Is the best evidence rule applicable in the present case?
3) Is notarization an evidence of the authenticity and due execution of
the subject deed?
4) May Romeo, as sole heir of Luis, validly sell the subject land and
subsequently issue a TCT in favor of petitioners?
RULING:
1) NO. Reliance by the trial and appellate courts on Article 1544 of the
Civil Code is misplaced. The requisites that must concur for Article 1544
to apply are:
(a) The two (or more sales) transactions must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same
subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller.
Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales
involved were initiated not by just one but two vendors. In the present
case, the subject lots were sold to petitioners and respondents by two
different vendors – Emerenciana and Romeo Pujalte. Hence, Article 1544
of the Civil Code is not applicable.
2) NO. Petitioners assail the authenticity and due execution of the deed
of sale between Luis and Emerenciana contending that respondents'
presentation of the "duplicate/carbon" srcinal of the Deed of Sale dated
June 20, 1958 is in violation of the best evidence rule under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. However, the best evidence rule is
inapplicable to the present case. It only applies when the content of such
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence
rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other
substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account
for the srcinal.In the instant case, what is being questioned is the
authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no real
issue as to its contents.
3) YES. Evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the subject
deed is the fact that it was notarized. The notarization of a private
document converts it into a public document. Moreover, a notarized
instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due
execution, is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in
its favor the presumption of regularity. This presumption is affirmed if it
is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. To assail the
authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence
must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
In the present case, petitioners failed to present convincing
evidence to prove that the notarization of the subject deed was irregular
as to strip it of its public character. On the contrary, a certified copy of
page 26 of the notarial register of the notary public who notarized the
subject deed of sale, which was issued by the Records Management and
Archives Office of Manila, shows that the sale of the subject lots by Luis
to Emerenciana was indeed regularly notarized.
4) NO. Evidence shows that Romeo never became the owner of the
subject properties for two reasons. First, the disputed lots were already
sold by Luis during his lifetime. Thus, these parcels of land no longer
formed part of his estate when he died. As a consequence, Romeo's sale
of the disputed lots to petitioners was not affirmed by the estate court,
because the subject parcels of land were not among those included in the
said estate at the time that Romeo was appointed as the administrator
thereof. As shown in its October 11, 1993 Order, the RTC of Pasig, acting
as an estate court, denied Romeo's motion for approval of the sale of the
subject lots, because these properties were already sold to respondents per
report submitted by the Register of Deeds of San Juan.
Second, even granting that the subject lots formed part of the estate of
Luis, it was subsequently proven in a separate case that Romeo is not his
heir. In a criminal case for use of falsified documents filed against Romeo,
it was proven that his claim of heirship is spurious. In the said criminal
case, his birth certificate and the marriage certificate of his supposed
parents, which he presented before the estate court, to prove his claim that
he is the sole heir of Luis, were found by the criminal court to be falsified.
Indeed, not being an heir of Luis, Romeo never acquired any right
whatsoever over the subject lots, even if he was able to subsequently
obtain a title in his name. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give
what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what
one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right
than what the seller can transfer legally. Since Romeo has no right to the
subject lots, petitioners, who simply stepped into the shoes of Romeo, in
turn, acquired no rights to the same.
Title : Republic of the Phils vs. Imelda "Imee" Marcos- Manotoc
Doctrines:
1. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. ─ When the original of a document is in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
may be proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer
in custody thereof.
3
 2. Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as
the best evidence rule, mandates that the evidence must be the
original document itself.
3. Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the
death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that
the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is
the protection of the right to due process of every party to a
litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The
deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed
legal representatives of his estate. On that note, we take
judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
4. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as
public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary
public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence.
The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared
by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own
language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of which
may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the
affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.[36]
Facts:
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C.
Aquino created the Presidential Commission of Good Government
(PCGG). The PCGG filed a Complaint against Ferdinand Marcos, who
has later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and
herein respondents Imee Marcos Manotoc, Irene Marcos Araneta,
Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Marcos, and Gregorio Araneta III
Closely analyzing petitioners Complaint and the present Petition for
Review, it is clear that the Marcos siblings are being sued in two
capacities: first, as co-conspirators in the alleged accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth; and second, as the compulsory heirs of their father,
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In particular, as far as Imee Marcos-Manotoc was concerned, she was
accused of dollar salting by using Glorious Sun to import denim fabrics
from one supplier at prices much higher than those paid by other users of
similar materials. It was also alleged that the Marcoses personally
benefitted from the sequestered media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and
RPN-9, in which Imee Marcos had a substantial interest.
To prove the general allegations against the Marcos siblings, petitioner
primarily relied on the Sworn Statement and the Deposition of one of the
financial advisors of President Marcos, Rolando C. Gapud, taken in Hong
Kong on various dates.
Meanwhile, to prove the participation and interests of Imee Marcos-
Manotoc in De Soleil Apparel and the media networks, petitioner relied
on the Affidavits of Ramon S. Monzon, Yeung Kwok Ying, and Rodolfo
V. Puno; and the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) taken during the
PCGG hearing held on 8 June 1987.
Petitioner contends that these documents fall under the Rules third
exception, that is, these documents are public records in the custody of a
public officer or are recorded in a public office. It is its theory that since
these documents were collected by the PCGG, then, necessarily, the
conditions for the exception to apply had been met. Alternatively, it
asserts that the documents were offered to prove not only the truth of the
recitals of the documents, but also of other external or collateral facts.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s contention is meritorious.
HELD:
It is petitioners burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief
to be granted, the operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos
siblings participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos
couple must be clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence.
Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is constrained
and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed
by respondents.
First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents
of the documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the
original documents that could prove petitioners allegations.
Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the
Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which
mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. The
origin of the best evidence rule can be found and traced to as early as the
18th century in Omychund v. Barker, wherein the Court of Chancery said:
The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one
general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit.
The rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them,
they must be proved by those witnesses.
The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is
an absolute strict necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the case
of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if all are dead, the proof of one of
their hands is sufficient to establish the deed: where an original is lost, a
copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have
heard the deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit the memory
of man for evidence.
Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the
originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court
should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the
testimony of the witnesses who had executed them.
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall
under Sec. 7 of Rule 130, which states:
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. ─ When
the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved be a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide:
SECTION 19. Classes of documents. ─ For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
4
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
SECTION 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course
of its investigations does not make them per se public records referred to
in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno,
who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered
by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the
Commissions investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were
submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their
contents. To reiterate, [i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to
them, they must be proved by those witnesses. Witnesses can testify only
to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived
from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she
obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits
or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while
affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified
as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally
prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own
language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants.
For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.[36]
As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it
may be considered as a public document since it was taken in the course
of the PCGGs exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the legal
custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls short of
the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that
petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta
III collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and
participated in the first couples alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.
CIR vs. HANTEX TRADING CO., INC.G.R. No. 136975; March 31,
2005
Facts:
HantexTrading Co is a company organized under the
Philippines. It is engaged in the sale of plastic products, it imports
synthetic resin and other chemicals for the manufacture of its products.
For this purpose, it is required to file an Import Entry and Internal
Revenue Declaration (Consumption Entry) with the Bureau of Customs
under Section 1301 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Sometime in
October 1989, Lt. Vicente Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-
Intelligence Division of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), received confidential information that the respondent
had imported synthetic resin amounting to P115,599,018.00 but only
declared P45,538,694.57. Thus, Hentex receive a subpoena to present its
books of account which it failed to do. The bureau cannot find any
original copies of the products Hentex imported since the originals were
eaten by termites.
Thus, the Bureau relied on the certified copies of the
respondent‘s Profit and Loss Statement for 1987 and 1988 on file with
the SEC, the machine copies of the Consumption Entries, Series of
1987, submitted by the informer, as well as excerpts from the entries
certified by Tomas and Danganan.
The case was submitted to the CTA which ruled that Hentex
have tax deficiency and is ordered to pay, perinvestigation of the
Bureau. The CA ruled that the income and sales tax deficiency
assessments issued by the petitioner were unlawful and baseless since
the copies of the import entries relied upon in computing the
deficiency tax of the respondent were not duly authenticated by the
public officer charged with their custody, nor verified under oath by
the EIIB and the BIR investigators.
Issue:
Whether or not the final assessment of the petitioner against
the respondent for deficiency income tax and sales tax for the latter‘s
1987 importation of resins and calcium bicarbonate is based on
competent evidence and the law.
Held:
Central to the second issue is Section 16 of the NIRC of 1977,
as amended which provides that the CIR has the power to make
assessments and prescribe additional requirements for tax
administration and enforcement. Among such powers are those provided
in paragraph (b), which provides that ―Failure to submit required
returns, statements, reports and other documents. –When a report required
by law as a basis for the assessment of any national internal revenue
tax shall not be forthcoming within the time fixed by law or
regulation or when there is reason to believe that any such report
is false, incomplete or erroneous, the Commissioner shall assess the
proper tax on the best evidence obtainable.
This provision applies when the CIR undertakes to perform
her administrative duty of assessing the proper tax against a taxpayer,
to make a return in case of a taxpayer‘s failure to file one, or to amend a
return already filed in the BIR. The ―best evidence‖ envisaged in
Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as amended, includes the corporate
and accounting records of the taxpayer who is the subject of the
assessment process, the accounting records of other taxpayers
engaged in the same line of business, including their gross profit
and net profit sales. Such evidence also includes data, record, paper,
document or any evidence gathered by internal revenue officers from
other taxpayers who had personal transactions or from whom the subject
taxpayer received any income; and record, data, document and
information secured from government offices or agencies, such as
the SEC, the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Bureau of Customs,
and the Tariff and Customs Commission.
However, the best evidence obtainable under Section 16 of
the 1977 NIRC, as amended, does not include mere photocopies of
records/documents. The petitioner, in making a preliminary and final tax
deficiency assessment against a taxpayer, cannot anchor the said
assessment on mere machine copies of records/documents. Mere
photocopies of the Consumption Entries have no probative weight
if offered as proof of the contents thereof. The reason for this is that
such copies are mere scraps of paper and are of no probative value as
basis for any deficiency income or business taxes against a taxpayer.
Companies exempt from zero-rate tax.
5
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON. JESUS M. MUPAS
G.R. No. 181892 September 08, 2015
Facts:
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC)
submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government - through the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)and the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)- for the construction and
development of the NAIA-IPT III under a buildoperate-and-transfer
(BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to
submit competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC's unsolicited
proposal in accordance with the BOT Law and its implementing rules.
Paircargo consortium also submitted their competitive proposal to build
the NAIA-IPT III. Both AEDC and Paircargo offered to build, however,
Paircargo submitted a bid superior to AEDC’s unsolicited proposal, thus
DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO). PIATCO engaged the
services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan, both foreign corporations
organized in Japan, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however,
PIATCO defaulted on its obligations, and to settle the problem Takenaka
and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s payments until June 2003.
Trial ensued, there has been an issue as to the attendant costs of the
construction, PIATCO was required to submit the original documents to
the court, however PIATCO argues that his non-submission is justified
under Sec. 3 rule 130 of the ROC, referring to the submission of numerous
accounts.
Issue:
W/N the non-submission of original documents is justified.
Held:
The court held in the negative, that although the contention of
non-submission due to numerous accounts of the document is justifiable
under the rule. However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a
summary of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper
foundation for the admission of the original documents on which the
summary is based. The proponent must prove that the source documents
being summarized are also admissible if presented in court. Under the
best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the original
of the document must be produced in court.—Under the best evidence
rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In
proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document
must be produced in court. Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that
the photocopied documents he presented in courts are authentic, theses
photocopied documents are deemed as hearsay, and shall not be
admissible as evidence, or reference to the claimed attendant costs of the
project.
Republic vs Mupas, 769 SCRA 384
Facts:
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited
proposal to the Government – through the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) – for the construction and development of the NAIA-
IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement.
On the other hand, Paircargo Consortium – composed of People’s Air
Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Philippine Air and
Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS), and Security Bank Corporation (Security
Bank) – submitted its competitive proposal to the Prequalification Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC).Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the
Government a total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for 27 years
while AEDC offered to pay the Government a total of P135 million for
the same period. Hence, DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo
Consortium (that later organized itself as PIATCO). A Concession
Agreement with PIATCO for the construction, development, and
operation of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-transfer scheme
was made to authorized PIATCO to build, operate, and maintain the
NAIA-IPT III during the concession period of twenty-five (25) years.
On March 31, 2000, PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka and
Asahikosan to aid in constructing the project. However, PIATCO
defaulted on its obligation to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan pursuant to
their respective contracts. Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer
PIATCO’s payments until June 2003. In 2002, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that the Government would not
honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same day, Takenaka and
Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they were suspending the
construction of the NAIA-IPT III for PIATCO’s failure to provide
adequate security. September 17, 2002, petitioners Demosthenes Agan,
et al., asked the Court to nullify the PIATCO contracts, and to prohibit
the DOTC and the MIAA from implementing these contracts for being
contrary to law. The case, entitled Agan v. PIATCO, was docketed
as G.R. No. 15500.
May 5, 2003, the Court nullified the PIATCO contracts after finding that
Paircargo Consortium (that later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a
duly pre-qualified bidder for failure to meet the minimum equity
requirements for the NAIA-IPT III project.
Security Bank (member of the Paircargo Consortium) invested its entire
net worth in a single undertaking or enterprise in gross violation of
Section 21-B of the General Banking Act (which limits a commercial
bank’s equity investment, whether allied or non-allied, to fifteen percent
(15%) of its net worth).
PIATCO contracts contained provisions that substantially departed from
the draft Concession Agreement
December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III before the RTC of Pasay, Branch 11
RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government. Citing City
of Manila v. Serrano,23 the RTC held that that it had the ministerial duty
to issue a writ of possession upon: (1) the filing of the complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and (2) the Government’s
deposit of the amount equivalent to the property’s assessed value,
pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
January 4, 2005, the RTC modified its December 21, 2004 order and
directed: (1) the Land Bank to immediately release to PIATCO the
amount of US$62,343,175.7725cralawred that would be deducted from
the just compensation; (2) the Government to submit to the RTC a
Certificate of Availability of Funds for the payment of just compensation;
and (3) the Government to maintain and preserve the NAIA-IPT III
pending the expropriation proceedings and the full payment of just
compensation. The RTC likewise prohibited the Government from
performing acts of ownership over the NAIA-IPT III such as awarding
concessions or leasing any part of the NAIA-IPT III to other parties
RTC appointed three Commissioners28 to determine just compensation
without consulting the Government and PIATCO
Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
Government, et al., filed a petition for certiorari with the Court assailing
the validity of the January 4, 7, and 10, 2005 orders of the RTC in the
expropriation case
, the Court did not recognize the London awards in favor of Takenaka and
Asahikosan. Under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a foreign
judgment would not bind Philippine courts unless the judgment is
recognized and enforced in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts may annul
a foreign judgment for lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, clear mistake of law or fact, or when the foreign
judgment is contrary to public policy
PIATCO, as builder of the NAIA-IPT III, must first receive just
compensation in accordance with law and equity before the
Government may take over the NAIA-IPT
6
Government should not pay for the portions of the NAIA-IPT III that
were defective – as per rtc
 (a) failed structural elements in the NAIA-IPT III;
(b) inferior quality of material works;
(c) constructed areas that are unnecessary to the use of an
international airport terminal;
(d) cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the
failed elements;
(e) cost of completing the items listed in the JAC project status
summary report of February 28, 2003; and
(f) cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the
failed elements in the elevated roadway structures.
RTC stated that just compensation is limited to the value of the
improvement at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint. The
payment of just compensation does not include the right to be
compensated of the franchise to operate the airport, and the increased
value of improvements due to inflation rate.
PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan sought to nullify the RTC decision
for alleged violation of their right to due process. They complained that
they were only furnished copies of the BOC Final Report only after the
promulgation of the May 23, 2011 decision.103 They averred that the RTC
violated Sections 7 and 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court which provide
that the clerk of court shall serve copies of the commissioners’ report on
all interested parties, with notice that they be allowed ten days within
which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire
the offer to pay through an escrow account is not equivalent to direct
payment. PIATCO further denied the Government’s allegations that there
were several claimants on the just compensation
RTC ruled that it has residual jurisdiction to adjudicate the Government’s
Manifestation and Motion considering that the motion was filed prior to
the parties’ filing of the Notice of Appeal. The RTC opined that the
Manifestation and Motion was akin to a motion for execution pending
appeal. The Manifestation and Motion showed the Government’s intent
to voluntarily comply with the May 23, 2011 decision which was pending
appeal before the CA. Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the
RTC has the residual power to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the parties’ rights, and to order the execution of a decision
pending appeal. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court
provides that courts have incidental power to issue orders that are
necessary to effectuate their judgments.
The CA Rulings
CA upheld the validity of the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision. The CA
ruled that the parties did not need to be furnished the BOC Final Report
since RA 8974 is silent on the appointment of the BOC, as held
in Gingoyon.
However, the CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own
formula of the NAIA-IPT III’s replacement cost
The CA likewise observed that PIATCO’s summarized computation of
attendant costs was self-serving and unsubstantiated by relevant evidence.
CA further ordered Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the expenses of
the BOC. Since Takenaka and Asahikosan’s inputs on the construction
costs of the NAIA-IPT III were heard by the RTC, they should share in
the expenses of the BOC.
Upon finality of judgment, interest on the sum due by then shall be at 6%
per annum until fully paid pursuant to BSP Circular No. 799, series
of 2013 which took effect on 01 July 2013, and which effectively
modified the interest rate rulings in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals. Eastern Shipping was the basis of the Court’s
earlier imposition of a 12% interest from finality of judgment.
The Action to Enforce the London Awards, Civil Case No. 06-171
In a decision dated September 6, 2010, the RTC recognized the validity
of the London awards in Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 and
declared these awards as enforceable in the Philippine jurisdiction. The
RTC thus ordered PIATCO to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan the sum of
$85.7 million.124cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209917 is the Government’s petition for review
on certiorari128 to partially reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended
Decision129 and its October 29, 2013 Resolution130 in CA-G.R. CV No.
98029.
G.R. No. 209696 is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Takenaka
and Asahikosan to partially reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended
Decision and its October 29, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
98029.131cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209731 is PIATCO’s petition for review on certiorari to
reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision, and October 29,
2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 98029.132cralawrednad
G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696 & 209731 originally arose from the
Government’s complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III filed with
the RTC of Pasay, Branch 117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876. The main issue
before the Court in these petitions is the valuation of the just
compensation due for the Government’s expropriation of the NAIA-IPT
III.
G.R. No. 181892 is the Government’s petition for certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,133 assailing the May 3,
2007, May 18, 2008; and January 7, 2008 orders of the RTC of Pasay
City, Branch 117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876.134cralawrednad
This petition likewise arose from the Government’s complaint for
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III. The main issue in this petition is the
propriety of the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III.
G.R. No. 202166 is PIATCO’s petition for review on certiorari135 to
assail the CA’s March 13, 2012 decision136 and May 31, 2012
Resolution137 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96502. The petition arose from
Takenaka and Asahikosan’s action to enforce the London awards before
the RTC of Makati, Branch 143 in Civil Case No. 06-171. As previously
mentioned, this case was not consolidated with the four (4) cases above
and shall thus be separately ruled upon by the Court.
The Government’s Position (G.R. Nos. 209917, 209731, and 209696)
partially reverse the CA rulings and to deduct from the replacement
cost of US$300,206,693.00 the following items: (a) depreciation in the
amount of US$36,814,612.00; and (b) PIATCO’s non-compliance with
contract specifications in the amount of US$113,944,044.0
Whether the Government may take property for public purpose or public
use upon the issuance and the effectivity of the writ of possession
Held:
The parties were afforded procedural
due process despite their non-receipt
of the BOC Final Report prior to
7
the promulgation of the RTC’s The decision to exercise the power of eminent domain rests with the ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 124 of
May 23, 2011 Decision. legislature which has the exclusive power to prescribe how and by whom the rules of Court; and
the power of eminent domain is to be exercised. Thus, the Executive
Department cannot condemn properties for its own use without direct (d) In appeals involving claims for damages arising from provisional
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that the clerk of court shall serve authority from the Congress. remedies. (Emphasis supplied)
copies of the commissioners’ final report on all interested parties upon
the filing of the report. Each party shall have ten days within which to file Just compensation is the full and
their objections to the report’s findings fair equivalent of the property taken from the This provision qualifies the CA’s power to receive evidence in the
owner by the condemnor. exercise of its original and appellate jurisdiction under Section 9 of BP
Upon the expiration of the ten-day period or after all the parties have filed 129, as amended:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
their objections and after hearing, the trial court may: (a) accept the report
and render judgment in accordance therewith; (b) for cause shown, Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall
recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; (c) In cases where the fair market value of the property is difficult to exercise:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; (d) partially accept ascertain, the court may use other just and equitable market methods
the report; and (e) make such order or render such judgment as shall of valuation in order to estimate the fair market value of a property xxxx
secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of
expropriation; and to the defendant, the just compensation for the The Court cannot consider
property so taken. the additional evidence submitted by Takenaka The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
and Asahikosan before the Court of Appeals hearings, receive evidence, and perform any and all acts necessary to
We rule that the parties’ failure to receive the Final Report did not resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
render the May 23, 2011 Decision null and void. At the outset, we rule that we cannot consider Takenaka and Asahikosan’s appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials
attachments in their (1) Motion for Submission of Additional Documents or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
The essence of procedural due process is the right to be heard.172 The dated July 30, 2013;260 (2) Supplemental Motion for Submission of continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless
procedural due process requirements in an eminent domain case are Additional Documents dated October 3, 2012; 261 and (3) Second extended by the Chief Justice.
satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to present their evidence Supplemental Motion for Submission of Additional Documents dated
before the commissioners whose findings (together with the pleadings, April 11, 2013 in CA G.R. No. CV-98029.262 These attachments sought
evidence of the parties, and the entire record of the case) are reviewed and to refute the Government’s position that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from Since Takenaka and Asahikosan filed an ordinary appeal pursuant to
considered by the expropriation court. It is the parties’ total failure to massive structural defects. Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the CA could only
present evidence on just compensation that renders the trial court’s ruling have admitted newly discovered evidence. Contrary to Takenaka and
void. The opportunity to present evidence during the trial remains to be Takenaka and Asahikosan posit that they could have submitted reports Asahikosan’s claim, the attachments to the motions are not newly
the vital requirement in the observance of due process before the trial court to show that the design of the NAIA-IPT III was discovered evidence. Newly discovered evidence is evidence that could
structurally sound if the RTC had only furnished the parties copies of the not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the
The mere failure of the RTC’s clerk of court to send the parties copies of BOC Final Report and afforded them the opportunity to file a Comment trial, and which, if presented, would probably alter the
the BOC Final Report is not substantial enough under the attendant on the Final Report. result.263cralawrednad
circumstances to affect and nullify the whole proceedings. Litigation is
not a game of technicalities Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules of the CA, the CA may We find it hard to believe that Takenaka and Asahikosan could only have
receive evidence in the following cases:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary possibly secured the attachments after the trial court had rendered its
The power of eminent domain is decision. With the exercise of reasonable diligence, Takenaka and
a fundamental state power that is (a) In actions falling within its original jurisdiction, such as (1) certiorari, Asahikosan could have produced these documents before the BOC since
inseparable from sovereignty.Eminent domain is a fundamental state prohibition and mandamus, (2) annulment of judgment or final order, (3) they were fully aware that the Government presented evidence on the
power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the power of a sovereign quo warranto, (4) habeas corpus, (5) amparo, (6) habeas data, (7) anti- alleged structural defects of the NAIA-IPT III.
state to appropriate private property within its territorial sovereignty to money laundering, and (8) application for judicial authorization under the
promote public welfare. The exercise of this power is based on the State’s Human Security Act of 2007;
primary duty to serve the common need and advance the general Equiponderance of evidence on
welfare.174 It is an inherent power and is not conferred by the (b) In appeals in civil cases where the Court grants a new trial on the the alleged structural defects of the NAIA-IPT
Constitution.175 It is inalienable and no legislative act or agreement can ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 53 of III favors PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan.
serve to abrogate the power of eminent domain when public necessity and the Rules of Court;
convenience require its exercise.176cralawrednad Nonetheless, even without considering and/or giving probative value to
(c) In appeals in criminal cases where the Court grants a new trial on the the additional evidence presented by Takenaka and Asahikosan before the

8
CA, this Court finds that the Government failed to establish by
preponderance of evidence that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from
structural defects.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a
person is innocent of wrong;265 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns;266that private transactions have been fair and regular;267 and
that the ordinary course of business has been followed. 268cralawrednad
Based on these presumptions, we presume that Takenaka and Asahikosan
built the NAIA-IPT III in accordance with the specifications required
under the Onshore Construction Contract and Offshore Procurement
Contract. We also presume that the NAIA-IPT III is structurally sound
and compliant with the applicable building codes and other laws at the
time it was designed and built.
However, these presumptions are merely disputable presumptions and
may be overcome by contradicting evidence. The burden of proof lies
with the Government to prove by preponderance of evidence that the
NAIA-IPT III suffered from structural defects. “Preponderance of
evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
“greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of credible
evidence.”269cralawrednad
In determining where the preponderance of evidence or superior weight
of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts
and circumstances of the case, the witness’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which
they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility in so far as the same may legitimately appear
during trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
although preponderance does not necessarily lie with the greater
number.270cralawrednad
The Government’s burden of proof to show that the NAIA-IPT III is
indeed defective does not shift to its adverse parties. The burden of proof
remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed.
It is the burden of evidence that shifts from party to party during
trial.271 This means that the burden of going forward with the evidence is
met by the countervailing evidence of PIATCO, Takenaka and
Asahikosan which, in turn, balances the evidence introduced by the
Government. Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifts back to the
Government.
In the present case, the experts and consultants of the Government,
PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosa arrived at conflicting findings
regarding the structural integrity of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government’s
experts detailed with particularity the alleged defects of the NAIA-IPT
III, which allegations the experts of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan
refuted with particularity.
Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when the scale of justice shall
stand on equipoise and nothing in the evidence inclines a conclusion to
one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. 272cralawrednad
If the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the allegations of the plaintiff and the
other consistent with the defense of the defendant, the evidence does not
fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence. When the evidence
of the parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the
preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof
fails. 273cralawrednad
The reason for this rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of
his evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. Thus, even
if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant,
there is no preponderance of evidence on his side when this evidence is
insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.274cralawrednad
In the present case, PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan, met the
Government’s allegations regarding the structural integrity of the
NAIA-IPT III.
A reading of the reports of the parties’ respective experts shows that each
party presented an equally persuasive case regarding the structural
soundness or defect of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government’s case on the
alleged structural defect of the NAIA-IPT III has been met by equally
persuasive refutations by the experts of PIATCO, Takenaka and
Asahikosan.
As a matter of law and evidence, the Government’s case regarding this
matter must fail. Since PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan presented
equally relevant and sufficient countervailing evidence on the structural
soundness of the NAIA-IPT III, the scales of justice tilt in their favor.
Neither party successfully established a case by preponderance of
evidence in its favor; neither side was able to establish its cause of action
and prevail with the evidence it had. As a consequence, we can only leave
them as they are.275cralawrednad
PIATCO’s attendant costs
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the
original of the document must be produced in court.
The best evidence rule ensures that the exact contents of a document are
brought before the court. In deeds, wills, and contracts, a slight variation
in words may mean a great difference in the rights and obligations of the
parties. A substantial hazard of inaccuracy exists in the human process of
making a copy by handwriting or typewriting. Moreover, with respect to
oral testimony purporting to give the terms of a document from memory,
a special risk of error is present, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally.286cralawrednad
The best evidence rule likewise acts as an insurance against fraud. If a
party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks
to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally
arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its
production would expose and defeat. The rule likewise protects against
misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional
introduction of selected portions of a larger set of
writings.287cralawrednad
As exceptions to the best evidence rule, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court provides that non-original documents may be produced in court
in the following cases:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b)When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the
fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d)When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory
that the original cannot be produced by the party who offers the evidence
within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.288cralawrednad
PIATCO argues that its non-submission of original documents before the
trial court is justified under Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
It points out that a party need not submit the original when it consists of
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numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole. PIATCO insists that the lower
courts erred in not giving probative value to the report prepared by Reyes
Tacandong & Co., an auditing firm, validating PIATCO’s computation of
attendant costs. Significantly, Reyes Tacandong & Co. failed to state
that it examined the original documents in validating PIATCO’s
computation of attendant costs.
We agree with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and voluminous
invoices, official receipts, and other relevant documents before the trial
court to prove the attendant costs that it incurred in the construction of the
NAIA-IPT III. The trial court may admit a summary of voluminous
original documents, in lieu of original documents, if the party has shown
that the underlying writings are numerous and that an in-court
examination of these documents would be inconvenient. In other words,
Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away with the item-
by-item court identification and authentication of voluminous
exhibits which would only be burdensome and tedious for the parties
and the court.
However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of
numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation for
the admission of the original documents on which the summary is
based. The proponent must prove that the source documents being
summarized are also admissible if presented in court.289cralawrednad
In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be
original, and not secondary. Furthermore, the source documents must
likewise be accessible to the opposing party so that the correctness of the
summary of the voluminous records may be tested on cross-examination
and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary trial-type proceedings, a
proper foundation for the introduction of a summary may be established
through the “testimony of the person who is responsible for the summary's
preparation, or the person who supervised the preparation of the
summary.”290cralawrednad
The primary reason for these procedural foundations is that the summary
of numerous documents is, in strict terms, hearsay evidence. The trial
court should not haphazardly allow a party to present a summary of
numerous documents and immediately admit and give probative value to
such summary without sufficiently laying these foundations. If the source
documents of the summary are non-original, the trial court would commit
a grave error in admitting and/or giving probative value to the summary
of non-original documents; the evidence admitted would be double
hearsay.291cralawrednad
Furthermore, when a party invokes Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, he does not similarly invoke Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. He does not likewise claim that the original Tacandong & Co. for being double hearsay. Reyes Tacandong & Co.,
documents have been lost or destroyed. The party merely asserts that the whose letter was addressed to PIATCO and not to the trial court, did not
numerous documents cannot be examined in court without great loss of state in its report that it examined the original documents allegedly
time and that the fact sought to be established from these documents is proving attendant costs. Moreover, in a letter dated December 14, 2010,
only the general result of the whole. Reyes Tacandong & Co stated it does not “express any assurance on the
attendant costs:”
Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule
pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he asks We have performed the procedures agreed with Philippine International
permission from the trial court to produce a summary of numerous Air Terminals, Co., (“the Company”) with respect to the Company’s
documents, whose originals are available to the adverse party for attendant costs incurred in building NAIA Terminal 3 from 1997 to 2004.
inspection. He does not ask permission from the trial court to present Our engagement was undertaken in accordance with the Philippine
in evidence the numerous non-original documents. Otherwise, the very Standard on Related Services applicable to agreed-upon procedures
purpose of Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court would be engagements.
defeated. In that case, every exhibit of non-original documents would be
identified, authenticated, and cross-examined, leading to a tedious and xxxx
protracted litigation.
Thus, if a party desires to present photocopies of the original The sufficiency of the procedures is solely the responsibility of the
documents, he must first establish that the presentation of specified users of the report. Consequently, we make no representation
photocopies is justified under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 regarding the sufficiency of the procedures either for the purpose for
of the Rules of Court. He must establish the presence of all the elements which this report has been requested or for any other purpose.
under these provisions.
Because the procedures do not constitute either an audit or a review of
In the case of lost or destroyed documents, the offeror of non-original financial statements made in accordance with Philippine Standards on
documents must first prove the following elements before secondary Auditing, we do not express any assurance on the attendant
evidence is admitted before the court: (a) the existence or due execution costs. (Emphasis supplied)
of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason
for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part
of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
To conclude otherwise is to allow the party to circumvent the best
evidence rule and the requirements under Section 3 (a), (b), and (d), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court by merely invoking Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
In the present case, PIATCO attached to its Compliance dated
December 14, 2010, the photocopies of numerous documents, and the
validation of PIATCO’s computation of attendant costs prepared by
Reyes Tacandong & Co., among others. PIATCO justifies the non-
presentment of original documents pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
We affirm the lower courts’ uniform findings that PIATCO failed to
establish its attendant costs. PIATCO failed to establish that the
photocopied documents fall under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. These photocopied documents are hearsay
evidence. They are mere scraps of paper and have no weight as basis for
the attendant costs of the NAIA-IPT III.
We likewise cannot give weight to the summary prepared by Reyes
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