Tumalad vs. Vicencio
By principle
G.R. No. L-30173 | September 30, 1970 | Reyes, JBL
Topic: Classification of property
Doctrine/s:
Although a building is by itself an immovable property, parties to a contract may
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property and it would
be valid and good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. By principle
of estoppel, the owner declaring his house to be a chattel may no longer
subsequently claim otherwise.
Emergency Recit:
Vicencio loaned 4800 pesos from Tumalad and secured it with a house of strong
materials as a chattel mortgage. Vicencio defaulted, and the house was extrajudicial
forclosed, MTC ruled in favor of Tumalad and ordered Vicencio to leave the house.
Facts:
 Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon received a loan of P4, 800 from
Gavino and Generosa Tumalad.
 To guaranty said loan, Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in favor of
Tumalad over their house of strong materials which stood on a land which
was rented from the Madrigal & Company, Inc.
 Vicencio defaulted on the loan
 Tumalad extrajudicially foreclosed on the house which Vicencio refused to
vacate
 MTC ruled in favor of Tumalad ordering VIcencio to vacate the house and
pay rent until they have completely vacated the house.
 Vicencio is questioning the legality of the chattel mortgage on the ground
that the mortgage is a house of strong materials which is an immovable
therefore can only be the subject of a REM.
 On appeal, the CFI found in favor of Tumalad, and since the Vicencio failed
to deposit the rent ordered, it issued a writ of execution, however the
house was already demolished pursuant to an order of the court in an
ejectment suit against Vicencio for non-payment of rentals.
Issue:
Whether or not the chattel mortgage is void since its subject is an immovable
HELD: NO.
Although a building is by itself an immovable property, parties to a contract may
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property and it would
be valid and good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.
of estoppel, the owner declaring his house to be a chattel may no longer
subsequently claim otherwise.
In the case of Manarang and Manarang vs. Ofilada,this Court stated that "it
is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as
personal property that which by nature would be real property", citing
Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Jaramillo.
When Vicencio executed the Chattel Mortgage, it specifically provides that the
mortgagor cedes, sells and transfers by way of Chattel mortgage. They intended to
treat it as chattel therefore are now estopped from claiming otherwise.
Also the house stood on rented land which was held in previous jurisprudence to be
personal since it was placed on the land by one who had only temporary right over
the property thus it does not become immobilized by attachment.
In a case, a mortgaged house built on a rented land was held to be a
personal property, not only because the deed of mortgage considered it as
such, but also because it did not form part of the land (Evangelists vs. Abad,
[CA]; 36 O.G. 2913)
Dispositive Portion:
It will be noted further that in the case at bar the period of redemption had not yet
expired when action was instituted in the court of origin,
Since plaintiffs-appellees' right to possess was not yet born at the filing of the
complaint, there could be no violation or breach thereof. Wherefore, the original
complaint stated no cause of action and was prematurely filed.
For this reason, the same should be ordered dismissed, even if there was no
assignment of error to that effect.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision appealed from is reversed and another
one entered, dismissing the complaint. With costs against plaintiffs-appellees.