ELVIE S.

SEGURA
Political Law Review

1. MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines

of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158,
codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in
1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046
reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the

UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one
baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main
reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence
undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our

claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just

a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA
9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as
geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international
community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact

legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international
law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both
passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal
states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state
can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by

RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover,
the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable

extent from the general configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll
breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.

2. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al . v . THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al .

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of

pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue
negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central
Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to
the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement
2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.)
rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations
were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be
signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition,
has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation
with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and
the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in
favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory
of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain
and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared
responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was
provided. The relationship was described as ―associative. With the
formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and
finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to
information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws.
Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory

provisions on public consultation and right to information 2) Whether or not
the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:

The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as

it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly
affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to
the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in
above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on
matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with
the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to
be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the
exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at
all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy
of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress
cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable
safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the
same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is
absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public
concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to
disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there
is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An
essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue
or process of communication between the government and the people. It is
in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive
to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information
and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a
public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the
―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose
information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda
and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause
of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution
of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the
people‘s participation. One of the three underlying principles of the
comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based,
reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and
―shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different
contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community. Included as
a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building
and empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on
both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and
process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the
peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a
plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’
position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No.
3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is
to ―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and
other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
progress of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the
establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential
Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from
the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on
both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive
peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3
establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general,
the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers
conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to
the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws,
and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of
the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it
would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to
the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law
concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this
concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in
mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph
11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last
mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro

juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and
responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative,
judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in
the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a
comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the
Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative
relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still
to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a
concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its
inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an
international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to
bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The
MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s
capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and
the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external
defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official
missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental
protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain,
resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to
be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting
them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any
rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality,
not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions,
therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional
provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from
that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it
is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably
in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming
that it is covered by the term ―autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under
paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present
geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao
del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite
– Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are
automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast
to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview.
That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned
municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render
another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because
what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the
BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision
states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development. An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity.
While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion
of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally
been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national
unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely,
the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between
the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001,
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is
worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP
Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation
of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

Article II- Declaration of Principles and State Policies

1. Bases Conversion and Development Authority v Commission of Audit

GR 178160 February 26, 2009

TOPIC: State Immunity: Estoppel, SC not estopped from correcting mistake

of public official regardless of
how long it has been practiced.
SUMMARY:
BCDA petitions CA ruling disallowing YEB to Board and Consultants and
asking them to pay said amount
back to government.
NATURE:
 On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 72273
creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Section 9 of RA No. 7227
states that the BCDA
Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and functions of the
BCDA...
(including)...adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least
equivalent to that of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the Board...adopted a
compensation and benefit
scheme for its officials and employees.
 On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation...scheme
which included a
P10,000 year-end benefit (approved by President Ramos)...In 1999, the
BSP gave a P30,000
year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the BSP increased
the year-end benefit
from P30,000 to P35,000...Pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which
states that the
compensation and benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be at least equivalent
to that of the BSP, the
Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees
from P10,000 to P30,000.
 On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Españo of the COA
issued Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-0047 stating that the grant of year-end
benefit to Board members
was contrary to DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002
(disallowing YEB to Board
Members/consultants).
 In a letter dated 20 February 2004, BCDA President and Chief Executive
Officer Rufo Colayco
requested the reconsideration of Decision No. 2004-013. In a Resolution
dated 22 June 2004,
Director Tablang denied the request. The BCDA filed a notice of appeal
dated 8 September 2004
and an appeal memorandum dated 23 December 2004 with the COA.
 COA RULING:
Affirmed disallowance of YEB. Presumption of good faith does not apply
because DBM issued
clarificatory memo and Board still proceeded to grant YEB after.
ISSUE:
1. Whether board members and consultants of BCDA entitled to YEB
2. Whether denial of YEB for Board and consultants by CA is against
Article III section 1 of Constitution
(RA 7227)
3. Whether SC is estopped from correcting the decision of Pres. Ramos
who approved of the YEB that
has been received by the Board and Consultants since 1997
HELD:
1. No. Board Members and consultants are not entitled to YEB as per DBM
circulars:
 DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, "Members of the Board of
Directors of agencies are
not salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried officials they are
not entitled to PERA,
ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.

2. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF

BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within

a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check
mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of
the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while
those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored

nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians
who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the

tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise
of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon
by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
 The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual
or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of

whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review
of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the
right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative

remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it

is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed
by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message

and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
 In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation
of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to

support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong
to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political

consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election

propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success
or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-
list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not

included, while sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a

contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and
civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based

on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as
time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based.

The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,

and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented

must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right
of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the
right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private
property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by
the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right
to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective

confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates

where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners
are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion

into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement
an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

2. G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014

Angel Naval
vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia

Facts:

Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of CamSur. On

October 12, 2009, RA 9716 was approved, reapportioning the legislative
district of Province of CamSur.
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form
the present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the
two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the
old First District.

In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the
Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the
Sanggunian, Third District.

Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in
the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of
Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian,
irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit
rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and
not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing
Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the
inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC,
which must be strictly construed.

COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC.

The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in
the instant case as the records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for
the 4th time for the same government post. To put things in a proper
perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the
case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or
not a municipal mayor, having been elected and had already served for three
(3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the conversion of the
municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed
out that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office
of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office
of the city mayor. The Court took into account the following circumstances:
(1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that of the
municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who
elected the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the
inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.

Ruling:

Court denies the petition.

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the

people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves
directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the
selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their
mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period
only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.

R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created, but
the Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The
terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers mean what they say.

The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to

achieve equality of representation among the districts. It is with this mindset
that the Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of
constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule,

does not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in
Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he
labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by
another eligible person.

4 Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational

Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented
by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the

country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the
government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to
“prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such
a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.

5. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O.

RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural
Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC
(PHILIPPINES) INC.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a

exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation
organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land
in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On
August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR
Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA
between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground
that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore
and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which
is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources,
an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the
FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The
latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the
DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the
(DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a
treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the
protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing

fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a
―service contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting
fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine
which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same
section also states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases
for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural
resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the
1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within
a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the
concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive
and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or
other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now
allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The management and the
operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature
of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA
7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although
the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat
these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in
a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all
the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed
beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a
circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as
conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some
parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional
or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations
are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for
large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-
products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the
same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken
together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that
properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens.
These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely
the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck
down.

6. Belgica v. Executive Secretary

* FACTS:

HISTORY

In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has

been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of
the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to
refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can
be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local
Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development
Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the
present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to
projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified
under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing
agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within
ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.

All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and

scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives
outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of the
member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary
legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by

legislators shall be as follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million

Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and
Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under
Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision
No. 1; and

b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft

programs and projects listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes
of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special
Provisions on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the
foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester and the remaining
fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed

once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment
received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects,
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category
as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for
the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of
the legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any
realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED,
That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same
classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision
1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments,
modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU
concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the
funds have been deposited back to the BTr.

Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall

be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by

the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the
implementing agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No.
1 and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the

Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund
was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910
by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The
Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869
(1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
* ISSUES:

A. Procedural Issues

1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy

2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy
subject to judicial review

3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of
the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget
and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality
of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”

WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

4.) …accountability

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

WON the phrases:

(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and

(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines”
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund,

are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of

legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:

A. Procedural Issues

No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental

act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with
the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these

cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied
by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of
the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases
are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910
for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for
the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a
result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto
had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by
respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the
useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the
2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being
a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither
will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF”
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
annul its legal existence.

Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates

that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide
cases, otherwise moot, if:

i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave
violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and
balances, accountability and local autonomy.

ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests
involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be
utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The
present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s
flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the
coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-
blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are
needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a
prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the
matter.

It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the
Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated
audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the
existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court
deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This
is applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the
government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in
accordance with constitutional principles.

iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called
for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national
budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain
public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are
capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is

not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government
are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty
to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).

3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the
coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel
System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public
funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in
these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as
matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves
“not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls”
amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.

4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits
in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind
a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists
an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This
required identity is not attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the
1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases
at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel
System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a
procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the
merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.

On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to
re-litigate where the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated
and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,
specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call
for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF
and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork
Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not
only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of
fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader
legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as
a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the
stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was
actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since
the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA
Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar
as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members
of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.

Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence,

has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the
substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”

1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be
funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects
post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second
paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded
post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision
5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4,
paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to

participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including
“the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the
“regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers
principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in
nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end,
the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court
also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that
the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.

In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions
of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also
declared that informal practices, through which legislators have
effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must
be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment.

2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability
since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in
Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation,
as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,
involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue
for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go
to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount
would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after
the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the
actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into
the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a
budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners
aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting
the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all
other legislators with legitimate projects.

Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013

PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum
amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical
missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s
power of item veto.

The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
“limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that
would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.”
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or
amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing
agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted

as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office
of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon
to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various
phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.

However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would
allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational
proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the
former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the process
of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and
does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality.
As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In
this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative
or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law
which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be
largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork
Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which
actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal”
(Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is
based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some
years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs,
policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as
it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the
limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose
he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law.

That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource

development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to –
things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be
treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase
also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has
used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is
limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government.”

However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally
effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as

amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be
used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and
[second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes
which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives
him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure
project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not
supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development
projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe
the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure”
is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any
kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects” must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

7. G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007 PHARMACEUTICAL AND

HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER
SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON,
ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J.
LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.

FACTS : Named as respondents are the Health Secretary,

Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health
(DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a
co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their
capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51
(Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986
by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by
the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In
1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of
the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH
issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules

and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not
constitutional;

Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19
and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they
consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires

that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law
is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the

WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by
the legislature.

8. G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002

Lim v. Executive Secretary

Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law,

Certiorari, Incorporation Clause, Treaties

Laws Applicable: Constitution

FACTS:

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999,

personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started
arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The
Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise
is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by
President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts
hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New
York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the
al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11,
2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng
Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the
operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is

based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference and
impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact
specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1”
and no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of
locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of
direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby

DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in
form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in
keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused
the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question

based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this
Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent
basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject
only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance
placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this
agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other activities,
in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31
SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of
international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal
rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise
dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which
it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be
taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to Professor
Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of
interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended
rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an
alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general
rule.
The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that way to
give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives
legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and intent of
the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that
combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one
subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I
stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except
in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that
in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the
United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves
only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear
pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered
opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated
in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in
all other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a
party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec.
2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this
case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the
Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on
Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign
troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct
exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations
arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law
has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the
primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of
international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over
municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence,
"[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed
to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of
Article VIII: “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower
courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the
police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited /
from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.
9. IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for
a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without
any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights
the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion
in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which
involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary
power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there
exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the

Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of
Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the
operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not
with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to
speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

10. JAMAR KULAYAN, et al.v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as

Governor of Sulu, et al.G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno,
J.)

The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusiveto

the President.
Anexercisebyanotherofficial,evenifheisthelocalchiefexecutive,isultravires,an
dmaynotbejustifiedbytheinvocationofSection465oftheLocalGovernmentCod
e.Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul,
Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were
purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail
when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later
renamed Sulu Crisis Management HELD:The Senate Committees’ power
of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Camilo L. Sabio which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as
follows: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”The
Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon
any committee of Congress, in this case, the respondents Senate
Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its
effective discharge. On this score, the Senate Committee cannot be said to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its
constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate
Committee be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed
resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect
to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI,
Section 21 would be rendered pointless.

Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping

incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent
Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan
issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency
in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a
ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to
the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during
man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and
lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions
necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al.
claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null
and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers
and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a

President

HELD: It has already been established that there is one repository of

executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means
that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only
the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well
as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article
VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3of the
Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military
leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,
Section 18, is that
a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the
armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be
possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he
has the power to direct military operations and to determine military
strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command
of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given
the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official,
even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified
by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

11. Gudani vs Senga, August 15, 2006

Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP,
including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before
the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to shed light on the
“Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief
of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said
Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the
Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and
Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG)
on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was
compulsorily retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG
recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on
willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President
Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be
quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons
acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from
proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before
the Senate.

Issue:

1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry?

2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative

inquiries even if the President desires otherwise?

3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his

retirement last 4 October 2005?

Held:

1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her

power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer
who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the
President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost
on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the
President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over
the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval
of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution
vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and
the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.
Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying
the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the
President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the
military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The
Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for
Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it
is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s
right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in
this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the
President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a
modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend
legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which
does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief.
The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of

government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons
summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable
interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal
courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one
branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The
judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar
dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever
weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national
policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch
empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the
other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be
considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military
justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his
service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues
until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen.
Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the
proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4
October 2005.

12. GONZALES vs. ABAYA

G.R. No. 164007

August 10, 2006

FACTS:

Some armed members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places
of assignment with an aim to destabilize the government.
Thereafter, they entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments in Makati City, led by Navy Lt. Triplanes, disarmed the security
guards, and planted explosive devices around the building.

DOJ filed with RTC of Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against
those soldiers while respondent General Abaya issued a Letter Order
creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of
filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War

The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that, following the "doctrine

of absorption," those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not
be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial
against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat."
In the meantime, the AFP approved the recommendation that those
involved be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article
96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their
answer to the charge but instead they filed with this Court the instant Petition
for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging
them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War maintaining that since
the RTC has made a determination in its Order that the offense for violation
of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed
in the crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit
to its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be charged
before military tribunal for violation of Articles of War. (YES)

HELD:

1) As to the jurisdiction of the court

GENERAL RULE: Members of the AFP and other persons subject to

military law who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court.

EXCEPTION: Where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined

the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be
tried by a court martial.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: Where the President of the

Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution
and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a
bearing of their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally
indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty
prescribed for the same (under Art. 96 of Articles of War) – dismissal from
the service –imposable only by the military court.

The RTC, in making the declaration that Art 96 of Articles of War as “not
sevice-connected, but rather absorbed and in furthenance of the crime of
coup d’etat”, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court
martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." It is only
the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal,
body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do
so. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

2) As to the Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes

Moreover, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law

and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike
here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies
only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offences. Here, Section
1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected
offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of
absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

13. A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-
1021-P) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR, Respondent.

FACTS : Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes,

Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad
Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They
allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not
personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed
the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the
judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in
1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son.
But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement
is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio
and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE : Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the

administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."

HELD : The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or

accommodationist - are anchored on a different reading of the "wall of
separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to
formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious institutions could
not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the
state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed
on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the
Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more
secular society Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes
that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States as
shown by many traditional government practices which An
accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes
constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and deliberate
efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the
strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also
constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy
even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist
interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment.
Second, the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the
First Amendment. Third, the accommodationist interpretation is particularly
necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable
effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and
overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the accommodationist position is
practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and
beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects
may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A
test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive
evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In applying the
test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has
been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her
employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on
the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious
practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of
religion The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief
and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the
Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are
strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for
immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the
proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government
should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state
interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection.

14. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF PHILIPPINES v. OFFICE OF

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF
PHILIPPINES, GR No. 153888, 2003-07-09

Facts:
petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for
the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the
prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive

Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the

subject EO.

operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License

No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary
services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim com... on account of
the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food
producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and
procedures based on the Qur'an[3] and the Sunnah[4] for the analysis of
food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications.

designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation.

OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal
certification since... those without said certification had not been subjected
to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives.
Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to
secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA

4109.[6] As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers

stopped securing certifications from it.

petition for prohibition.

According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with utter haste and
without even consulting Muslim people's organizations like petitioner before
it became effective.

Issues:

subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church

and State.

Ruling:

We grant the petition.

OMA deals with the... societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the
Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious
group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church
and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude... into
purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the
"free exercise of religion"... classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and
Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim...
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption... task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an... and Sunnah on halal food.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom.[11] If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is... constitutionally unacceptable.

we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a
product as halal,... The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos'
right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in
the... market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.

petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2001, is hereby declared

NULL AND VOID. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from
enforcing the same.

15. Parreno vs. COA G.R. No. 162224 |June 7, 2007|523 SCRA 390 AFP
RETIREMENT BENEFITS CASE CARPIO, J: D:

Petitioner retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not
constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension
vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility
with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of service. It is
only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever
they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Further,
the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature.
They are not similar to pension plans where employee participation is
mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual or vested rights in the
pension which forms part of the compensation. The constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable
classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class. FACTS
: 1.

Salvador Parreo (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines

(AFP) for 32 years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the
Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed,
and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years
pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to
P13,680. 2.

Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen.

In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioners monthly pension in
accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon
loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the
Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request. 3.

Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly
pension. However, this was denied for lack of jurisdiction. 4.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged that the COA
has the power and authority to incidentally rule on the constitutionality of
Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner alleged that a direct
recourse to the court would be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. However, this motion was denied. The COA ruled
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply if
the administrative body has, in the first place, no jurisdiction over the case.
The COA further ruled that even if it assumed jurisdiction over the claim,
petitioners entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously
receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship in
accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the petition
before this Court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has vested rights over the retirement benefits
and depriving him such constitutes deprivation of property and life.

Whether or not Section 27 of PD 1638 is contrary to public policy and

welfare, oppressive, discriminatory, and violative of the due process clause
and equal protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
Nooooo
RATIO:
1.

PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any vested right or interest of

petitioner. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by
the due processes clause. At the time of the approval of PD 1638 and at
the time of its amendment, petitioner was still in active service. Hence,
petitioner retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not
constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension
vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility
with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of service. It is
only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever
they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Further,
the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature.
They are not similar to pension plans where employee participation is
mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual or vested rights in the
pension which forms part of the compensation. 2.

The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is
subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification
(a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the
class. There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial
difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees
who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country, such
as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional right of the state to
require all citizens to render personal and military service necessarily
includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired from
military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already
renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be
compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the
need arises. Petitioners loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial
distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino
citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. 3.

There was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his
Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension
in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner had the
opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he requested for
reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees and the
termination of his pension. The Judge Advocate General denied the
request pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. 4.

Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he

reacquire his Filipino citizenship, in accordance with RA 9225, since he will
again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship
reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is
no legal obstacle to the resumption of his retirement benefits from the time
he complies again with the condition of the law, that is, he can receive his
retirement benefits provided he is a Filipino citizen.

16. G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A.

RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO,
JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract

between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The
contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration,
association, or joint venture.
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for
online lottery equipment and accessories on January 25, 1995. The
agreement are as follow:
4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at
which in no case be less than an annual rental computed at
P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
6. Term is 8 years.
7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the
facilities.
8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at
P25M.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid
because:
4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been
approved by the President and it is not most advantageous to
the government.
4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the
prior contract.
 1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the
exception provided in EO No. 301.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board
of Directors of PCSO.
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery
equipment.
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not
parties to the contract.

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal

standing to sue.
2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an
online lottery is valid.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.

1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining
the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional
issues were actually involved.
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal)
cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.,
the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of
this case”. The parties are the same but the cases are not.
3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still
apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and
determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in
any future action between the same parties involving a different
cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at
least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When
 the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in
the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding
to make an independent examination of the legal matters at
issue.
4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does
not preclude determination of the petitioner’s standing.
5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no
constitutional question is actually involved. The more
appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real parties of
interest’.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are
parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or are
prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively
result to them from the contract.
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest.
Questions to the nature or validity of public contracts maybe
made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
2. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
1. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears
all losses because the operation of the system is completely in
its hands.
2. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business
judgment and the Court is not inclined to review.
3. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a
maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is discussed in the dissenting
opinion of Feliciano, J.)
4. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their
agreement. Petitioners state that this would allow PGMC to
control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held
that the claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction of
statutes, the resumption is that in making contracts, the
government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the
possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power.
5. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not
have the power to enter into any contract which would involve it
in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for
the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that
 PCSO is prohibited from investing in any activities that would
compete in their own activities.
6. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does
not compete with their own activities. The Court held that is also
based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the
transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its
personnel in prohibited association with the PGMC.
7. O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for
the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment and not on
the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for
privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of
government owned buildings or spaces for private use.

Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for
reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.

17. RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, AM No. 10-4-19-SC, 2017-

03-07

Facts:

Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City
(QC) had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel

Judge Lutero opined that it is not the conduct of masses in public places
which the Constitution prohibited, but the passage of laws

Issues:

such practice violated the constitutional provision on the separation of

Church and State

WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT OF THE

QUEZON CITY HALL OF JUSTICE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Ruling:

The Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to
a Union of Church and State... the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but
merely accommodation.

Principles:

"our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the
union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise
when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon
in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims."

The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong

fences make good neighbors." The idea is to delineate the boundaries
between the two institutions and, thus, avoid encroachments by one
against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their
respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities
to "render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God
the things that are God's."

18. G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in

behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible

Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted
by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the

constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family
protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial

review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual
case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment

Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and
the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are
modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule
on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one
subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional

act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the
court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if
such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior
to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for
partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in
the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of

when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
 However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the

traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited
by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to
the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure
prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is
in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or”
in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs
or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec.
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.
This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason,
the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses
the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With
RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to
ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public.
In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered

“mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives

or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a
religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma
or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether
or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to
dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of
the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus,
the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law
even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs
of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even

with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV
of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
 spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The
RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and
endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a

procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the
RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors,
the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in
elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures)

about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental
guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist
her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the

RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators
might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education
program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be
filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of

Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role
of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term
“primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of
the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions
of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the
parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials,

and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could
very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of
the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in

relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health
service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7
should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation

to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense
of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the
nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s

RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it
is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states
that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number,
since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples
who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple
may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to
have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH

education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize
the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the
PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their

religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or
otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or

controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly
public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be
heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the

U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously

alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and
other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient
that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as
a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed

through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again
acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule
on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court
 has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition,

the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65,
over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this
case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows
that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the

human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and

“responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions
which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they:

a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his
or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR

insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR

insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one
which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer
who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act
that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding

the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they
affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they
are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of
the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

19. Saguisag v. Exec Secretary Ochoa July 26, 2016 G.R. No. 212426
EDCA, Treaty, Executive Agreement, International Agreement
August 22, 2018

FACTS:

This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse

the Decision of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated
12 January 2016.

Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the US was
not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in
the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction
under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military
bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on
the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.

The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently

petitioners’ disagreement with the Decision that EDCA implements the VFA
and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited
scope of the VFA and MDT because it provides a wider arrangement than
the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the
establishment of U.S. military bases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.

RULING:

Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original

petition, claiming that the VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the
following provisions:

1. Agreed Locations

2. Rotational presence of personnel

3. U.S. contractors

4. Activities of U.S. contractors

We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the
presence of these provisions. The very nature of EDCA, its provisions and
subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a
class of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25
restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate

concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded.

As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past

Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars, executive
agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing
policies, rules, laws, or agreements.

They are concluded

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the

Constitution.

The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or

legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic
variation in international agreements.

International practice has accepted the use of various forms and

designations of international agreements, ranging from the traditional
notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn instrument – to
engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer
necessitate ratification.

An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol,

agreement, concordat, compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant,
declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute,
memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.

Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and

an international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for
purposes of determining international rights and obligations.

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing
treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements is relegated
to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate
concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There
remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive
agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied

authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of
these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements
under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce
the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or
interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn, executive agreements
cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed
or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive

agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the
Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions.
Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded
as being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict,
a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive
agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both
types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy
of the Constitution.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of

EDCA’s validity, in that as an executive agreement it fell within the
parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole
web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices
to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty
status under the law.

We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully

conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also
fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to enhance our military
capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may
arise.

21. BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES (BFAR)

EMPLOYEES UNION v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169815, Aug. 13,
2008, 562 SCRA 134

Facts: The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Employees Union

requested for a Food Basket Allowance (FBA), with justifying the request
on the high cost of living, and also relying on the Employees Suggestions
and Incentive Awards System, which: “includes the granting of incentives
that will help employees overcome present economic difficulties, boost their
morale, and further commitment and dedication to public service.” On post-
audit, however, the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office
(COA-LAO) disallowed the grant of the FBA ruling that it had no legal basis
and violated the General Appropriations Act of 1999. The BFAR moved for
reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance, arguing that
the grant would enhance the welfare and productivity of the employees.
COA-LAO denied the motion. The petitioner appealed to the COA-LAO but
denied the decision, and likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the approval of the DA Undersecretary can authorize

the release of the FBA. Whether or not the disallowance is unconstitutional
as it contravened the fundamental principle of the State enshrined under
Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: The petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office dated April 8, 2005
and August 5, 2005, respectively, in LAO-N-2005-119, are AFFIRMED.

Reason: Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16, all agencies are prohibited
from granting “[…] any other form of incentives/allowances except those
authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the President.” In this
case, no Administrative Order has been issued, therefore the claim has no
merit. Further, State principles and policies enumerated in Article II of the
1987 Constitution are the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.“

22. Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC

of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be
a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being
threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it
would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied
the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is

discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of
the state to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and

unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it
may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled
that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally
to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate
extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The
grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to
due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s

contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the
State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is
so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay

officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

22. G.R. Nos. 180849 and 187143

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. DAN PADAO,

Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:

On August 21, 1981, Padao was hired by PNB as a clerk at its Dipolog City
Branch. He was later designated as a credit investigator in an acting
capacity on November 9, 1993. He was ultimately promoted to the position
of Loan and Credit Officer IV.

In 1994, PNB became embroiled in a scandal involving "behest loans" as

anomalous loans were being granted by its officers. In line with this, Padao
was administratively charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The case
against Padao was grounded on his having allegedly presented a
deceptively positive status of the business, credit standing/rating and
financial capability of 13 loan applicants. After due investigation, PNB found
Padao guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him
dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the banks Board of Directors.
Velasco, Padaos colleague, was also held guilty of the offenses charged,
and was similarly meted the penalty of dismissal. Her motion for
reconsideration, however, was later granted by the bank, and she was
reinstated.

ISSUES

I. Whether the position of a credit investigator is one imbued with the trust
and confidence of the employer

II. Whether the act of falsifying the credit and appraisal reports and that of
affixing ones signature in a false report by another is one and the same
degree of misconduct which warrants the same penalty

HELD:

While it is an employers basic right to freely select or discharge its

employees, if only as a measure of self-protection against acts
inimical to its interest, the law sets the valid grounds for termination
as well as the proper procedure to be followed when terminating the
services of an employee.

Thus, in cases of regular employment, the employer is prohibited from

terminating the services of an employee except for a just or authorized
cause. Such just causes for which an employer may terminate an
employee are enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code: (a) serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate family member of his
family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) Other causes
analogous to the foregoing. Further, due process requires that employers
follow the procedure set by the Labor Code. Under Art. 277, workers may
be dismissed only for a just cause and enjoy the right of due process which
includes notice and the ample opportunity to be heard and to defend his or
her side.

In this case, Padao was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect
of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties, while habitual
neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time,
depending on the circumstances. Padao was accused of having presented
a fraudulently positive evaluation of the business, credit standing/rating and
financial capability 13 loan applicants.

The role that a credit investigator plays in the conduct of a banks business
cannot be overestimated. The amount of loans to be extended by a bank
depends upon the report of the credit investigator on the collateral being
offered. If a loan is not fairly secured, the bank is at the mercy of the
borrower who may just opt to have the collateral foreclosed. If the scheme
is repeated a hundredfold, it may lead to the collapse of the bank.

Padao's repeated failure to discharge his duties as a credit investigator of

the bank amounted to gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article
282 (b) of the Labor Code. He not only failed to perform what he was
employed to do, but also did so repetitively and habitually, causing millions
of pesos in damage to PNB. Thus, PNB acted within the bounds of the law
by meting out the penalty of dismissal, which it deemed appropriate given
the circumstances.

The CA was correct in stating that when the violation of company policy or
breach of company rules and regulations is tolerated by management, it
cannot serve as a basis for termination. Such ruling, however, does not
apply here. The principle only applies when the breach or violation is one
which neither amounts to nor involves fraud or illegal activities. In such a
case, one cannot evade liability or culpability based on obedience to the
corporate chain of command.

Padao, in affixing his signature on the fraudulent reports, attested to the

falsehoods contained therein. Moreover, by doing so, he repeatedly failed
to perform his duties as a credit investigator.

24. Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections

GR No. 161872
April 13, 2004

FACTS

When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC)
refused to give the petition its due course. Pamatong requested a case for
reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied his request. The
COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance
candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC noted
that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered
political party with national constituency.” Pamatong argued that this was
against his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service,” citing
Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was
indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also stated
that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates” and
supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to
wage national and international campaigns, and his government platform.

ISSUES
1.Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for
presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the
right to equal access to opportunities for public service.

HELD
1.Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for
presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the
right to equal access to opportunities for public service.

– NO The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally
considered not-self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along
with the other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially
enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the policies
presented. Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public
office, one that is subject to limitations provided by law. As long as these
limitations are enforced without discrimination, then the equal access
clause is not violated.The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for
limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring rational,
objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations, the
election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone, including those who are
clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run. Note:
Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for
candidacy. The Court however stated that it is not within their power to
make such assessments