Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Hon. Ceferino E.

Dulay
GR L-59603 April 29, 1987

Facts: Proclamation No. 1811 was issued reserving a certain parcel of land of the
public domain situated in Lapu-Lapu City, Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area
of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for an export processing zone by Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), the petitioner. The proclamation included four
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters which is owned
and registered in the name of the private respondent. EPZA offered to purchase the
parcels of land in accordance to with the valuation set in Section 92 of Presidential
Decree No. 464 but parties failed to reach an agreement in the sale of the parcels
of land.

EPZA filed a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
possession against the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of
land. The respondent judge issued a writ authorizing the possession of the parcels
of land and on February 17, 1981, declared that the petitioner had lawful right to the
properties, upon payment of just compensation. The respondent judge issued a
second order for the appointment of persons as commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation for the said properties sought to be expropriated.

The three commissioners submitted that the amount of P15.00 per square meter as
the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. The petitioner
objected the valuation and contented that under Presidential Decree No. 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by
the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

Issue: Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just
compensation under Presidential Decree No. 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes, the mode of determining just compensation under the Decree is
unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees

constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial

function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
Secretary of Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Spouses Heracleo
GR 179334 April 21, 2015

Facts: The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took the
respondent-movants’ subject property without the benefit of expropriation for the
construction of MacArthur Highway. In a letter, the respondent-movants’ demanded
the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Celestino R.
Contreras, then the District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of the
DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70)
per square meter in accordance to the Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal
Committee of Bulacan.

Unsatisfied, the respondent-movants demanded the return of their property, or the

payment of compensation at the current fair market value. Respondent-movants
were able to obtain favorable decisions in the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals, with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum.
Petitioners thus elevated the matter to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the taking of the private property without due process is
nullified.

Held: No.

The Court emphasized that the failure of the government to initiate the necessary
expropriation proceedings prior to the actual taking cannot simply invalidate the
State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of
expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use and public policy imposes upon
the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify
said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or
weaken one of the State's inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to
serve the greater good. Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not
necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the
landowner is the right of compensation.