G.R. No.

L-5 September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
TOPIC: Elements of a State; Kinds of Government; Ministrant vs Constituent Functions

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Co Kim Chan, who had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the
Court of First Instance of Manila filed for a writ of mandamus, seeking herein to continue the proceed-
ings of civil case 3012. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio
Dizon, herein the respondent judge, argued that hearings of the case be not continued as a proclamation
issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judg-
ments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of
the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

ISSUES

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that
“all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy oc-
cupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts
could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

RULINGS

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts a of a de facto government are valid
and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. The Philippine Executive Commis-
sion and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto
governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Mu-
nicipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection
 and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular admin-
istration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur
to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial pro-
ceedings (as not included in the phrase “processes of any other governments”) because such a con-
struction would violate the law of nations.
3. If according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto govern-
ments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated (in relation to
Ruling no. 1), then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which
would be in violation of international law. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law
once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED
MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates
a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and
the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating
and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same
courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.