G.R. No.
88724 April 3, 1990 Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 29,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
C. Manalo for defendant-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 83-031-
B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information filed in the
said case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):
The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath by the offended
party, accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed as follows:
That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria St.,
Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently
provided himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S.
Abayan against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After the
witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted, the
prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence
and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):
WHEREFORE. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of the
crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same,
and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes on accused an
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY,PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12)
YEARS PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the amount of Four
Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
costs.
SO ORDERED.
1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p.
102, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant found guilty of the
crime of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988
decision and forwarded the case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9, paragraph 3 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at
Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates
had just brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her classmates had
left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody held her
and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another
boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door
which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant to use the back
door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his
right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid).
When they reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas
knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one
hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her
clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said
position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as
she kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a
small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands
flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and climbed the
partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased her.
She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of the
boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building
and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door,
they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see
her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat.
Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second
floor and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she
was physically examined.
Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a Medical Certificate
(Exhibit "A") which states:
Physical Examination — Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes;
appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.
PE Findings — Pertinent Findings only.
Neck- — Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
Breast — Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L)
breast.
Back — Multiple pinpoint marks.
Extremities — Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
Vulva — No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the
vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no
laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal
tight; no discharges noted.
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses; and
2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show remarkable
and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to
its candor, truth and validity." (p. 33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies
which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. Far
from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably
considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations also confirm
that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes
sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility (People v.
Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as adding credence and
veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-
41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details would be
a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829,
June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However, one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little
discussion which is, the testimony of the victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide his
penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her. According to the accused, this is strange because
"this is the only case where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out by the victim in order that
there will be a consumation of the act." (p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been meritorious
had the testimony of the victim ended there. The victim testified further that the accused was
holding a Batangas knife during the aggression. This is a material part of the victim's testimony
which the accused conveniently deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth
(People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court's finding
regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56, Rollo):
As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is not much to be desired as to
the sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. Her answer to every question
profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and straightforward. To the Court she was a
picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor.
It is inculcated into the mind of the Court that the accused had wronged her; had traversed illegally
her honor.
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her sincerity
and candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 487;
People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People v. Soterol G.R. No.
53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not only state that she was
raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. The victim's testimony from
the time she knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the
hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical
certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude)
declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees, linear abrasions below the left breast,
multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous area
surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against force and
violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-53, Rollo). The trial court even inspected the boarding house
and was fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is
true (p. 54, Rollo):
. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of
both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in the manner as narrated.
The partitions of every room were of strong materials, securedly nailed, and would not give way
even by hastily scaling the same.
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio, et
al., G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 55, Rollo):
. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground which
was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps occasion no injury to a
frightened individual being pursued. Common experience will tell us that in occasion of
conflagration especially occuring (sic) in high buildings, many have been saved by jumping from
some considerable heights without being injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl, like
the offended party to whom honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the
exposure of her private parts when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is
enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally deranged.
Sadly, nothing was adduced to show that she was out of her mind.
In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We ruled
that:
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely
naked by appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the latter and managed to
gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. All these acts she would not have
done nor would these facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she
narrated.
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate
the allegations in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who should be
presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity (Tugbang v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As
for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim, the trial
court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified inasmuch as the
medico-legal officer was no longer available. The accused did not bother to contradict this
statement.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat
on its face. Some were not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We are
convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that really
calls for discussion, is whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper. The trial
court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of
the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the
same view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxx xxx xxx
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman
(Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages
apply to the crime of rape.1âwphi1 Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies
to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209,
212, Justice Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily
understood even by law students:
. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of
the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of
the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of
the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to
stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as
a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which
should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it
can not be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony
is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the
beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been
performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such
intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should
produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary
desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed
the last act necessary to produce the crime.Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases
(People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-
31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA
505), We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or
lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to
warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia:
9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner
of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the
frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eriña 50 Phil. 998
[1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of
penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a "stray"
decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are
aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated
September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its
penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this
particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eriña case, supra, might have
prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments
introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim,
the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he "categorically declared that the
findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact, he
tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was penetration."
(p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as interpreted by
Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether there was
penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed
from the uncorroborated testimony of the offended party and that a medical certificate is not
necessary (People v. Royeras People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the people relied
upon cannot be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of the offended party is at variance
with the medical certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of the court.
It should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical
certificate, both should in all respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the testimony
alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of
mischievous results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist.
On the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which
means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and
tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the
victim. He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. Anent
this testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially (pp.
302, 304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):
Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?
A It entered but only a portion of it.
Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to, when you said
comply?
A I inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q And was it inserted?
A Yes only a little.
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the
victim's testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 65;
People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v. Taduyo, G.R.
Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora's testimony is merely
corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v.
Alfonso, supra).
Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the
accused because after a thorough review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape.
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The
trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution
and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited
Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death
penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the same
to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990). Reclusion
perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal
Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R.
No. L38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985,
136 SCRA 702).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito
Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita 1 finally did away with frustrated rape 2 and allowed only
attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the
threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost every
attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to
be adopted. The danger there is that that concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming
lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto, sans any
restraint, since after all any attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape and
punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then be considered a deadly fait
accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge
of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were already
present and nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary
to produce the crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential;
any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court
further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen
or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We
distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no penetration of the
female organ because not all acts of execution were performed as the offender merely commenced
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. 3The inference that may be derived therefrom is
that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be consummated. Any
penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or
lips of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to
warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female
organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora,
labia minora, etc.,4 the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in
light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere
touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration
itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid
because where entry into the labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the
crime committed amounts merely to attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed
either in its attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would
exist between the two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may
seem, irrevocably spells the difference between life and death for the accused — a reclusive life
that is not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life on
the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but
consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus
limited only to consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer
be possible in light of the view of those who disagree with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the
court a quo to the extreme penalty of death, 5 hence this case before us on automatic review under
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. 6
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down
from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At
the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water
to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata
Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters
cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan
inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty
were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and
pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out
and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their
compound, to chase the accused. 8 Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered
Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised
by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical
examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury
was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was
only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and
assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against
him for his refusal to run an errand for her. 9 He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing
mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to
fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became
hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained
himself from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her
brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente
punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards
the house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain
as he reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo
saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the
blow. At this moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to
the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him
guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his
victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues
that her narration should not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with
implausible statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He
claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel's younger
sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her
daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened
within the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and responded to,
would have been enough to deter him from committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room
was wide open for anybody to see what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost
inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact when
from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of
the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or
of penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she
saw Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and
panty were supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthel's
vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4)
years old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetuato death, to the
single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7)
years old. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full
penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen
necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. 10 But the act of touching should be
understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and
not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
In People v. De la Peña 11 we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker's
penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the
presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to
achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the
victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's
testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all
likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her
vulva, 12 or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. 13 Thus, touching
when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or
the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. 14 As the labias, which are required to
be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female
organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex
surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which
does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the
labia minora. 15 Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, 16 and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a
grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not
sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the
female organ," 17but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male
organ into the labia of the pudendum," 18 or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." 19 But, to our
mild, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier
stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion.
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of
proving that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we
grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we
seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and
Crysthel. When asked what she saw upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged into saying
that she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative
position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact
point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and Crysthel, the former was
allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning
down the victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the
legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo's kneeling position rendered an
unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the
victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo's penis supposedly reaching
Crysthel's external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and
arms of Primo would have hidden his movements from Corazon's sight, not to discount the fact that
Primo's right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazon's view. It is the
burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual contact and to
shove her account into the permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she
saw what was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to
inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint of
serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve
the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her
timely appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-preservation to remain where he
is and persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already
been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or
reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazon's presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid
being caught literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more
than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the question
of the court —
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus —
Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir. 20
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether
rape in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her
vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration, 27 obviously
induced by a question propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions
between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this reply of
a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her sex and whose language
is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis of the accused
touched her organ there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the
victim's organ the penis of the accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the
labia of her pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to
penetrate Crysthel. 22 Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he
responded with an erection. 23 On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his
penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate
his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close
together; 24 consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what
Primo did to her. 25 Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where
penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless
was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of
discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or
the hymenal tags were no longer visible. 26 None was shown in this case. Although a child's G.R. No. L-14128 December 10, 1918
testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the Court
endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of vs.
the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN, defendant-appellant.
sentenced to death.1âwphi1
Ariston Estrada for appellant.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
external signs of physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical
perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the
TORRES, J.:
absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she
clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused
and the victim. 27 This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney before the Court of First
Instance of this city, charging Severino Valdes y Guilgan and Hugo Labarro y Bunaladi, alias Hugo
Navarro y Bunadia, with the crime of arson, and, on the 20th of May of the present year, judgment
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all
was rendered whereby Severino or Faustino Valdes u Guilgan was sentenced to six years and one
respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter
day of presidio mayor and to pay one-half of the costs. From this judgment this defendant appealed.
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or
With respect to Hugo Labarro or Navarro, the proceedings were dismissed with the other half of the
even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in
costs de officio.
reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was
consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from consummated rape
will significantly disappear. Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning of April 28th of this year, when M. D. Lewin was absent
from the house in which he was living his family, at No. 328, San Rafael Street, San Miguel, Mrs.
Auckback, who appears to have been a resident of the neighborhood, called Mrs. Lewin and told her
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
that much smoke was issuing from the lower floor of the latter's house, for until then Mrs. Lewin
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
had not noticed it, and as soon as her attention was brought to the fact she ordered the servant
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident
Paulino Banal to look for the fire, as he did and he found, so asked with kerosene oil and placed
other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of
between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol, a piece of a jute sack and a rag which
attempted rape — are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for
were burning. At that moment the defendant Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of
it.
cleaning, while, the other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.

The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for
On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the defendants, having been called for
the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees
the purpose by telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the statement, Exhibit C,
lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
drawn up in the police station, admitted before several policemen that it was he who had set the
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or
fire to the sack and the rag, which had been noticed on the date mentioned. and he also who had
aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be
started the several other fires which had occurred in said house on previous days; that he had
taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years,
performed such acts through the inducement of the other prisoner, Hugo Labarro, for they felt
eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall
resentment against, or had trouble with, their masters, and that, as he and his coaccused were
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from
friends, he acted as he did under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such fire
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
that he should start. lawphi1.net

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO
The defendant Severino Valdes admitted, in an affidavit, that he made declarations in the police
guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead
station, although he denied having placed the rag and piece of jute sack, soaked with kerosene, in
found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
the place where they were found, and stated, that it was the servant Paulino who had done so. He
four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten
alleged that, on being arraigned, he stated that he had set fire to a pile of dry mango leaves that he
(10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
had gathered together, which is contrary to the statement he made in the police station, to wit, that
he had set the fire to the said rag and piece of sack under the house.
For lack of evidence and on his counsel's petition, the case was dismissed with respect to the other
defendant Hugo Labarro.
Owing to the repeated attempts made for about a month past, since Severino Valdes Began to serve
the Lewin family, to burn the house above mentioned. occupied by the latter and in which this
defendant was employed, some policemen were watching the building and one of them, Antonio
Garcia del Cid., one morning prior to the commission of the crime, according to his testimony, saw
the defendant Valdes climbing up the wall of the warehouse behind the dwelling house, in which
warehouse there was some straw that had previously been burned, and that, when the defendant
noticed the presence of the policeman, he desisted from climbing the wall and entering the
warehouse.
The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an
upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the burning of
the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion when
some of its inmates were inside of it.. This crime of provided for and punished by article 549, in
connection with articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and the sole proven perpetrator
of the same by direct participation is the defendant Severino Valdes, for, notwithstanding his denial
and unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses conclusive proof that it was he who
committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he who was guilty of having set the other fires that
occurred in said house. In an affidavit the defendant admitted having made declarations in the
police station, and though at the trial he denied that he set fire to the sacks and the rag which were
found soaked in kerosene and burning, and, without proof whatever, laid the blame unto his
codefendant, the fact is that confessed to having set fire to a pile of dry leaves whereby much
smoke arose from the lower part of the house, but which, however, did not forewarn his mistress,
Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he allowed the sack and the rag to continue
burning until Mrs. Auckback noticing a large volume of smoke in the house, gave the alarm. No
proof was submitted to substantiate the accusation he made against the servant Paulino, who
apparently is the same persons as the driver Hugo Labarro.
The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts
conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his will,
the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified
as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the
building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene
oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition might have started to burn, had the
fire not been put out on time.
There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in a connection with the
commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately inferior in
degree to that specified in article 549 of the Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium degree.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the modification
however, that the penalty imposed upon the defendant shall be given eight years and one day
of presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed in article 57 of the Code. The defendant
shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries, and
perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing
Law of 1995.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision1 and the October 8, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr.
(Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the
Information4 against the petitioners before the R TC, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on
or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
,City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and
present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity
is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal
violence upon one M4-RLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information5 which reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
name accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi
Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause,6 but it was denied
by the trial court because the ground cited therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence.
When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva (Villanueva)
was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal Hospital). Dr.
Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the emergency room,
observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried
to revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did not respond to the
resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the
left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that
Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer running through his body due to
lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on both legs,
which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion, or back of the
knees.
Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that
they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and
brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them answered
that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned them on how
they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men just said
that they were headed somewhere else.
Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.8 Due to the nature, extent and
location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing
injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also because of his
experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he
performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed down his findings
in an autopsy report.9 Upon examination of the body, he found various external injuries in the head,
trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external injuries, with various severity and
nature. He concluded that the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury
contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on the body, and his previous
examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were hazing-related. During
the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of Alpha Phi
Omega (APO) Fraternity.10
Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba City,
in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at around
8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a jeepney with more
than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person seated beside
the driver of the jeepney.11 She estimated the ages of these persons in the group to be between 20
to 30 years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white long-sleeved shirts.
Before entering the resort, the men and women shook hands and embraced each other. Three (3)
persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.
Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like
they were praying, and then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least
three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was
shown photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went to
her store.12 It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the policemen
visiting the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.
Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that at
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the comer
of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the resort
needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who needed a ride.
Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very weak, like a
vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being carried and sensed it was
cold.
Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much to
drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal
Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside the
emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go home.
Several days after, he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.
Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards on
duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00 o'clock in
the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men, who signed on
the logbook13 under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the lifeless body of a
person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the security guards did not
allow the two men to leave the hospital because they called the police station .so that an
investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital. During his testimony,
Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the two persons who brought Villanueva to the hospital.
PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock in the
early morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless body of a
man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva' s corpse with
contusions and bite marks all over his body. P02 Ignacio and his policemen companions then
brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what happened, but they
invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they knocked on the door and the
caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.
The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños)
students who rented the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added that
about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be renting the
resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following morning.
Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baños during the academic year
of 2005-2006 and a member of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in the UPLB Biological
Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away from her. She identified
the two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo.14 They were wearing black shirts with the logo of APO.
Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived and, with their heads bowed,
approached the three men. One of them was Villanueva, who was carrying a 5-gallon water
container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter did not report to him when he
was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just kept quiet with
his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.
Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates at
the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali Subdivision, Los
Baños, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva introduced him to Daryl Decena
(Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also to undergo final initiation rites on
January 13, 2006.
Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and Sibal
were both members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for
initiation or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.
McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a B.S.
Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los Baños,15 as evidenced by his official transcript of
record.16
Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the UP
Los Baños, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006 against the
APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of Villa Novaliches
Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses for the
complainant.17
Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified that he
met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to convince
her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her safety. She said
that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked and vandalized.
Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her son, her
family incurred actual damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the aggregate
amount of ₱140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts.18 Her husband also incurred travel
expenses in the amount of ₱7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his son's wake and
burial, as supported by a plane ticket.19 She further attested that she experienced mental anguish,
sleepless nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family relationship as a result of her son's
death.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their
testimonies are summarized as follow:
Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006, around
4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School. Dungo
asked him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in the negative
because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cornelio again
met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine along Raymundo
Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked Dungo if he would attend
the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would not because he and his girlfriend had
something to do.
Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at around 1
:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo
Street. Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School
and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed there from 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo Restaurant for
dinner and left at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her boarding house,
they encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and slept at her
boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, they were roused
from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in Pansol, Calamba City.
Dungo then left the boarding house.
Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at
the boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about the requirements for
a master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked about
their fraternity's ,final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo and Rivera
then reached the latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 7:00
o'clock in the evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near Crossing Junction, Los
Baños. They ate and stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half hours. Then they walked
back to the boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met Cornelio again at the Burger
Machine along Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he would attend their fraternity's final
initiation ceremony, to which he replied in the negative. Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding
house around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept there.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his sleep
because Sibal was palling him on his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to Villa
Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at the resort, Sibal led him inside.
There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and Villanueva, who was
unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to the hospital. They all agreed,
and Castillo called a tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself before the
security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his real name.
Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO -Theta Chapter for
years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the tambayan
of their fraternity in UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated that night. Around
8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños. He
noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a bruise on the left
side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol,
Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to the second floor of the resort. He
confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the
evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and accompany
Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes, Gopez left the resort and went back to
UP Los Baños.
Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up B.S.
Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in charge of
fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood donations.
On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's tambayan for
the final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for the initiation rites, Sibal,
together with some neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños, where he saw fellow fraternity
brother Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised face. Thereafter, they boarded a
jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he
accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A few minutes later, he went down
and confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's face. He was angry and irritated with
Castillo. He then stayed outside the resort until Gopez and the other neophytes came out and told
him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that they were returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal
wanted to go with them but ;he was ordered to stay with Villanueva and Castillo.
After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping on the
second; floor of the resort. Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who looked
unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about Villanueva's
condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the
resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name
to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
The RTC Ruling
On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of
the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court
stated that the prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los Banos
Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of Sunga and
(2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day by the
testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the
prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP Los
Bafios student, was a neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal were
members of the said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal, together
with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported Villanueva and
two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the final
initiation rites; that the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover
of darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members
and the other two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and that Dungo and Sibal boarded a
tricycle and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was
pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily
assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their
final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites,
but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.
The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The defense
of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend Rivera and
his co-fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by the defense
were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of denial of Sibal
likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect because they
had so much at stake in the outcome of the criminal action.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of violating
Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and order them to jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of Deceased Marlon Villanueva the
following sums of money:
1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual damages;
2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the
prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They
also assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere presence in
the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
The CA Ruling
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them
guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to
convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak,
could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on their presence in the
venue of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the final
initiation rites.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.21
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed
October 8, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THE OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND
PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES
ONE INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE OTHER.22
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Villanueva y Mejilla."23 Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049
because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present"24during the initiation rites. The crime of hazing by
inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual participation. Thus,
they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information. By reason
of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against them has been violated.
In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (DSG) asserted that
Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and convicted
for such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty members and
officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the
hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite would not have
been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the victim to be present
thereat and it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the others.26 In their Reply27 filed on
September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a variance between the, offense
charged of "actually participated in the infliction of physical harm," and the offense "knowingly
cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." 28 The
prosecution, moreover, failed to establish conspiracy because no act or circumstance was proved
pointing to a joint purpose and design between and among the petitioners and the other twenty
accused.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Matter
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher
court authority.29The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process.
It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law.30
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when
the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31 According to the said
provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been
imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter
of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties.32Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.33
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall
raise only questions of law.34Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons.35 In other words,
when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file
a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before
the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of
law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the
petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the
existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that would require an
examination of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty
of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review.37Substantive
Matter
In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children to
college or university. News of deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due to
hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and
pounded arms and shoulders of young men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare
undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the agony, cries
and ordeal of their families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter how
modem and sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric acts of initiation of fraternities,
sororities and other organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite grounds of the academe.
The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case of Villareal
v. People.38 It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of hazing were
transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century.39 Thus, a study of the laws
and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current predicament of
violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.
United States Laws and
Jurisprudence on Hazing
There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states.40 In the case of People
v. Lenti,41 the defendant therein challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining hazing on
the ground of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it would have been an
impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically
because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms of
hazing. Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally
abusing newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation.42
Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence, acts of
humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts.43 The physical form of hazing may include
beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing have
included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.44 Moreover, hazing does not only result in
physical injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and traumatic stress.45
Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing
through the passage of state laws that prohibit such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception of
Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-hazing
laws.47 The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for up to six
years.48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result in
death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a felony.49
In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named after a student who died in a hazing incident, was
enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person commits a third degree felony when he or she
intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily injury or
death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is categorized
as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in the Penal Law of New York. 51
Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its
effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas, the
law imposes a duty on school personnel to report hazing.52 In fact, in Alabama, no person is allowed
to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the offense of hazing, or
willfully acquiesces in its commission.53
Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of
hazing even if they have the consent of the victim.54 In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a
hazing charge, and its law permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable criminal
statutes.55 By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these states have
removed the subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts to
effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases.56
In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil
suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university or college concerned.57 Hazing, which threatens
to needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means are possible.58
In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was indicted for
complicity to hazing. The group physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand on their
heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates in the face and head. The
Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v. Grand
Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc.,60 a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of aspirating
his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation ritual. The
defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to the victim. The
court denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively contributed to the death of
the victim as part of their hazing.
Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School District,61 a tenth-grade
wrestler at William Tennet High School was subjected to various forms of hazing, including; a ritual
where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face with his buttocks
exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to prevent the incident
despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement of the parties in the
amount ofUS$151,000.00.
More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College62 involved the hazing of an 18-year old freshman,
who suffered physical and mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi Kappa Psi
fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a chokehold, until he
lost consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity because, even if the
student consented, the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its activities.
The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain redress
before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the distinct
dilemma of hazing.
Anti-Hazing Law in the
Philippines
R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other
forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to the
rising incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa.63 Despite
its passage, reports of deaths resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent victims were Guillo
Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin Reglos of the San', Beda
College - Manila, and Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the Philippines - Diliman. With the
continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for an answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a
sufficient deterrent against hazing?
To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect,
implication and application.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts
which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita.
This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule
on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial.64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public
welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.65
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be
mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended.66 Similarly,
there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.67
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
.omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is not immoral in
itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute.68
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show
that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows: SENATOR
GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be
murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical
injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized
under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the
crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or
any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific
acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without
being held criminally liable.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts
that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it
may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same
acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to
commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is
important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of
lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit.
Wala talaga silang intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero
dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay
na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am
again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that
resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in
proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create
the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any
crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense.
And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to
have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because
there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the
context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one
will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of
inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not
have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary
crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the
elements if they are separate offenses.
SENATOR LINA
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether it
is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants
to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.69
Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se
adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. 70 In Vedana v.
Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had spoken, through
the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal.72 The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same
to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is
immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its
prosecution.73
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte
or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations
such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise
subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice
performed by the fraternities, sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the
definition of these groups to those formed within academic colleges and universities. 74 In fact, the
second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include any club or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Military Academy
(PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. Even
the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a
requirement for employment are covered by the law.75 R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical,
mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance
the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the AFP and the
PNP, as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission, duly
recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director General of the PNP, shall not be
considered as hazing.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that
initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the following
requisites are met:
1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school authorities or
head of organization;
2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of such
initiation;
3. That the written notice shall indicate:
a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;
b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and
c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the school or organization or their
representatives that they must assign at least two (2) representatives, as the case may be, to be
present during these valid initiations. The duty of such representative, is to see to it that no physical
harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or organizations
that fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and organization
administrators do not have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the law,
which provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices.
The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to
hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the
officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any person
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein.76
The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the
victim.77 The penalties appear to be similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less serious
physical injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC,78 with the penalties for hazing increased
one degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which would aggravate the
imposable penalty.79
Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving physical or
psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of physical
harm. At best, the only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the victim.
Conversely, even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate him, there
is still a prescribed penalty.80
The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization,
group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing.81 Although these planners were not
present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals.
The provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the organization, such as their
former officers or alumni.
The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or
sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat.82 These officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct participation in the
infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to
attend the hazing.
The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when the
acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from
occurring.83 The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but
also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group,
or organization.84The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members. The
parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to take any
action to avoid the same from occurring.
The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including
faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to
take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices. 85 Likewise,
the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an accomplice to the
crime.86 The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the same. Recognizing the malum
prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged with the said crime
shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave
a wrong.87 Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a
defense in hazing. During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a punishable act
under the law, the issue of consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x x x
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the
consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable
because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent
of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass
this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering.
He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by
itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears
none; the same is approved.88
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different
courses of action. n '.'provides that the responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or
citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the
person or the persons charged under this provision even before their conviction.89 Necessarily, the
offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal actions against the offenders.90
The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and
disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the different participants and
contributors in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the penalties
imposed therein involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage would-be
offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law can be
effectively implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.
The Information properly
charged the offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended ,information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1
contention must fail. The Amended Information reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi
Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. 91
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly.92
The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information
included the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be
understood to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the
perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of
the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and
Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there.
They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the death of Villanueva.
The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that
induced the victim to be present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing.93 To require the
prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of
the criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task, if
not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).
The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of
hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity which
has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently informed
the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the planned initiation rite.
Conspiracy of the
offenders was duly proven
The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy.
The Court disagrees.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony.94 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.95
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.96Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined
to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.97
The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the conspiracy
between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died.
The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution
have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need
to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. 98
The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove
conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at
the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.99
R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption of
actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof
provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation
as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique
because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing,
which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the
hazing.
The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the
CA, hut did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the presumptive
innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still to
be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because precisely, it is merely
prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce."100
Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders are
not new, and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to
prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug;101 (2) the dishonor of the check for insufficient
funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit;102 and (3) the
possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.103
Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the
crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that
could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of
the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually
participate in the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because of
their presence in the venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during
the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She testified that
she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store, to wit:
MR. DIMACULANGAN
Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?
WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.
Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3 people or this
group of people coming from?
A: Inside the resort, sir.
Q: And around what time was this?
A: Around 9:00, sir.
Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?
A: They went to my store, sir.
Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?
A: "Meron po".
Q: Who were these visitors?
A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.
Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this Court.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial, can
you please look over this document carefully and see if any of the persons whom you said visited
your store is here?
A: "Siya rin po."
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left picture on
the first row.
ATIY. PAMAOS:
For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the witness has
been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted by the defense as referring to
Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case…104
Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the night
of the hazing, to wit:
COURT
Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures then how
would you know that these people are indeed those people you could identify?
WITNESS
A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka iyong
nagyakapan po ... "
Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to say that you
could identify those people?
A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng driver
bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod nagbaba-an din,
iyon po nagbati-an po sila."
Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?
A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa kabila
iyon."
Q: And who was that person?
A: "Siya po, iyon po."
Q: Who are you pointing to?
A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)
Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the driver came
out and subsequently embraced and shook hands with the other people from the jeepney, is that
your testimony?
A: Yes, your Honor.105
The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great weight
because she was a disinterested and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established the
presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of their
actual participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut and
overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving that they prevented the
commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that they
performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce
the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it based on the
prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.106 Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing,
unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
The guilt of the
petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing,
the petitioners? guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely
based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.107 In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.108
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct
evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in
secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on
under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or
secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.109 Needless to state, the crime of hazing is
shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in
nature and their members are reluctant to give any information regarding initiation rites.110 The
silence is only broken after someone has been injured so severely that medical attention is required.
It is only at this point that the secret is revealed and the activities become public.111 Bearing in mind
the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the
presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it.
The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.112 To
justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as
to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence
requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to
one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author
of the crime.113
The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which
established the petitioners' gult in the death of Villanueva as follows:
1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate Joey Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at their tambayan,
talking to her organization mates. Three men were seated two meters way from her. She identified
two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she did not know the third man. The three men
were wearing black shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology wing arrived
and approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the victim, Marlon Villanueva.
One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the two fraternity neophytes some money
and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He later took back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami
na lang."
4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant Dungo, stood up
and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him why he did not report to him
when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then continuously punched the victim on his arm. This
went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later,
the men left going towards the Entomology wing.
5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the evening of 13
January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation right [sic]. Marlon told
Joey that it was his "finals" night.
6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio saw more than
twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney.1âwphi1 She estimated
the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years old. Three (3) persons riding a single
motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who looked like
they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy
some items. She did not know their names but could identity [sic] their faces. After she was shown
colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified as Herald Christopher Braseros. She
also pointed out the man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that around
3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the corner of Villa
Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and told him that someone inside the resort needed
a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the two (2) men standing by the gate who will be
riding his tricycle.
9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the body of the
man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a vegetable.
10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal Hospital and
was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14,
2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad and hospital helper Danilo Glindo
a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency room containing four (4) passengers,
excluding the driver. He was an arm's length away from said tricycle. He identified two of the
passengers thereof as appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and Glinda helped the passengers
unload a body inside the tricycle and brought it to the emergency room.
11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification cards. The latter replied that they did
not bring with them any I.D. or wallet.1âwphi1 Instead of giving their true names, the appellants
listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y Lanzon and Jericho Paril y
Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not telling them that they secretly called the
police to report the incident which was their standard operating procedure when a dead body was
brought to the hospital.
12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency room, observed
that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.
13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the latter did not
respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion
hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He further
attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.
14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on both legs which
extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or the back of the
knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that he was a
victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having undergone hazing when he
was a student and also because of his experience treating victims of hazing incidents.
16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV, Camp Vicente
Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim
on January 14j 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt head trauma. From 1999 to 2006, he
was able to conduct post-mortem examination of the two (2) persons whose deaths were attributed
to hazing. These two (2) persons sustained multiple contusions and injuries on different parts of
their body, particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and lower extremities. Both persons died of
brain hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the injuries found on the victim's body, Dr.
Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva, sustained similar injuries to those two (2)
persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries and contusions on his body, he opined that
these injuries were hazing-related.114
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These
defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the
weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate.115 As properly held by the
RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the
petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses
also lacked credibility and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect
because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would stand
by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do
not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case. Stated
differently, the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested witnesses to substantiate
their defenses of denial and alibi.
After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the R TC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the
guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by the
CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They took
part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical
injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries
eventually took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young life lost.
With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven,
the moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.
Final Note
Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions and
communities. News of young men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites
supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No. 8049
was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were raised. The
Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in penalizing
the crime of hazing.
Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application of R.A.
No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the court, it is
not impossible for the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused to be
overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
must bear in mind the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of circumstantial
evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and substantiate the same through
credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties must also consider hazing as a malum
prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.
While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from
perfect. In Villareal v. People,116 the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the presence
of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the discussion earlier,
this Court suggests some further amendments to the law. First, there should be a penalty or liability
for noncompliance with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and with Section 3, or the
representation requirement. Second, the penalties under Section 4 should also consider the
psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these additional inputs on R.A. No. 8049, the
movement against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic response to the uproar
against hazing. It demonstrates that there must, and should, be another way of fostering
brotherhood, other than through the culture of violence and suffering. The senseless deaths of
these young men shall never be forgotten, for justice is the spark that lights the candles of their
graves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let
copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as guidance for
the proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the penalty for noncompliance with its Section 2 and
3, and the :penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.
EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT
PILOLA, Appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is the appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the Decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to
suffer reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa y
Rulloda in the amount of P50,000 for the latters death.
The Indictment
On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were
charged with murder in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of February, 1988 in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with one Ronnie Diamante who is still at-large and no fixed
address and mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with double-bladed knives and a
bolo and with intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault hack and stab one Joselito Capa y Rulloda, as a
result of which the latter sustained hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested3 and tried, and subsequently
convicted of murder.4 The decision of the trial court became final and executory. Accused Edmar
Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly died a month after the incident.
Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested. He was arraigned on March 9, 1994,
assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution[6
On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de
Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul,
Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian
invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers
obliged. In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar
nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the
protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon
left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned,
blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Elisa
shouted: Tama na. Tama na. Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached
Aling Soteras store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisas store.
For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and
Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselitos intervention
apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down
from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselitos neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the
appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided
to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could
not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The
victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to
stab him. Julian ran for dear life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him,
Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block
and with it bashed Joselitos head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck
Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to
Joselitos house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.7cräläwvirtualibräry
The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito and prepared Autopsy Report No. N-
88-375,8 with the following findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, conjunctivae and integument, marked and generalized.
Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x 3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x 8.0 cm.; back,
suprascapular region, left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid region, right, 1.0 x 3.0 cm.
Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital region, 4.0 cm.
Incised wounds: forehead, right side, 5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.
Stab wounds:
1. Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, medial extremity is sharp,
lateral extremity is blunt; located at the anterior chest wall, level of 3rd intercostal space, right, 5.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, non-penetrating, with an
approximate depth of 3.0 cm.;
2. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 3rd intercostal space, left, 3.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, into the left thoracic
cavity, penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 10.0 cm.;
3. Elliptical, 3.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 4th intercostal space, 12.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating upper lobe
of left lung with an approximate depth of 9.0 cm.;
4. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 5th intercostal space, left,
15.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating the
left thoracic cavity and then lower lobe of left lung and then penetrating the left ventricle of the
heart with an approximate depth of 11.0 cm.;
5. Elliptical, 1.3 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the lateral chest wall, level of 7th intercostal space, left, 16.0 cm. from
anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the left thoracic cavity and then
penetrating the lower lobe of left lung with an approximately depth of 10.0 cm.;
6. Elliptical, 4.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the lumbar region, left, 14.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed
backward, upward and medially, into the abdominal cavity and then penetrating ileum;
7. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower
extremity is blunt; located at the chest, lateral, level of 9th intercostal space, left; 14.0 cm. from
posterior median line; directed forward, upward and medially, non-penetrating with an
approximate depth of 4.0 cm.;
8. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower
extremity is sharp; located at the abdomen, postero-lateral aspect, 15.0 cm. from posterior median
line; directed forward, upward and laterally, into the abdominal cavity and then perforating the
spleen and pancreas with an approximate depth of 13.0 cm.;
9. Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower
extremity is sharp; located at the left arm, upper third, anterior; directed backward, downward and
medially, involving skin and underlying soft tissues with an approximate depth of 6.0 cm.;
10. Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower
extremity is blunt; located at the left forearm, upper third, anterior; directed backward, upward and
medially and communicating with another wound, arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0 cm.;
11. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity blunt, lower
extremity, sharp; located at the left arm, lower third, posterior aspect, directed forward, downward
and medially, communicating with another wound, arm, left, lower third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.
Hemothorax, left 900 c.c.
Hemopericardium 300 c.c.
Hemoperitoneum 750 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach-filled with rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple stab wounds.
The Evidence of the Appellant
The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that at
around 11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in the house of his cousin, Julian Cadion, at 606
Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City. He suddenly heard a commotion coming from outside.
Julian rushed out of the house to find out what was going on. The appellant remained inside the
house because he was suffering from ulcer and was experiencing excessive pain in his stomach. The
following morning, the appellant learned from their neighbor, Elisa Rolan, that Joselito had been
stabbed to death. The appellant did not bother to ask who was responsible for the
stabbing.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Julian alias Buboy Cadion corroborated the appellants testimony. He testified that the appellant was
in their house on the night of February 5, 1988, and was suffering from ulcer. The appellant stayed
home on the night of the incident.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard residing at Block 30, Nueve de Pebrero, 612, Int. 4, Allison
St., Mandaluyong City, testified that on February 5, 1988 at around 11:00 p.m., she heard a
commotion outside. Momentarily, she saw Ronnie rush into the kitchen of the house of her niece
Teresita; he took a knife and run towards Nueve de Pebrero Street where Edmar and Julian were
fighting. She then followed Ronnie and saw Joselito trying to pacify the protagonists. Ronnie
grabbed Joselito and instantly stabbed the latter, who for a while retreated and fell down the canal.
Not content, Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito. Thereafter, Ronnie ran towards the direction of
the mental hospital. Agripina did not see Odilon or the appellant anywhere within the vicinity of the
incident.11cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero Street, Mandaluyong
City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Pilola is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of deceased Joselito Capa alias
Jessie in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death jointly and
solidarily with Odilon Lagliba who was earlier convicted herein. With cost against the
accused.12cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I Q Now you also found out from the body of the victim eleven stab wounds?
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY ANENT THE ASSAILED
INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY
OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA ROLAN AND IN SETTING ASIDE THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.13cräläwvirtualibräry
The appellant avers that Elisa is not a credible witness and her testimony is barren of probative
weight. This is so because she contradicted herself when she testified on direct examination that
Ronnie struck the head of the victim with a hollow block. However, on cross-examination, she
stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim. The inconsistency in Elisas testimony impaired her
credibility.
The contention of the appellant does not hold water.
First. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance.
The victim died because of multiple wounds. The appellant is charged with murder for the killing of
the victim with a knife, in conspiracy with the other accused.
Second. The perceived inconsistency in Elisas account of events is a minor and collateral detail that
does not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even serves to strengthen rather than destroy
her credibility.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Third. Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men who
stabbed the victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon. Elisas testimony is corroborated by the
autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz and his testimony that the victim sustained eleven stab
wounds. The doctor testified that there were two or more assailants:
Q Could you tell the court what instrument could have been used by the perpetrator in inflicting
those two incise wounds?
A Those incise wounds were caused by a sharp instrument like a knife or any similar instrument.
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell the court in which part of the body of the victim where these eleven stab wounds [are]
located?
A Shall I go one by one, all the eleven stab wounds?
Q All the eleven stab wounds?
A One stab wound was located at the front portion of the chest, right side. Another stab wound was
located also on the chest left side, another stab wound was located at the antero lateral aspect, its
the front of the chest almost to the side. And also another one, also at the chest, another stab
wound was at the left side of the chest and another one was at the lumbar region of the abdomen
left side or where the left kidney is located, lumbar area. Another one at the side of the chest, left
side of the chest. Another stab wound in the abdomen, another stab wound at the left arm. Another
one at the left forearm and the last one in the autopsy report is located at the left arm. These are all
the eleven stab wounds sustained by the victim.
A The instrument used was a sharp pointed edge or a single bladed instrument like a knife, kitchen
knife, balisong or any similar instrument.
Q Considering the number of stab wounds, doctor, will you tell us whether there were several
assailants?
A In my opinion, there were more than one assailants (sic) here because of the presence of different
types of stab wounds and lacerated wounds. This lacerated wound could not have been inflicted by
the one holding the one which inflicted the instrument . . (discontinued) which inflicted the stab
wounds.
Q So there could have been two or three assailants?
A More than one.15
The physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Elisas
testimony.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Fourth. Even the appellant himself declared on the witness stand that he could not think of any
reason why Elisa pointed to him as one of the assailants. In a litany of cases, we have ruled that
when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against
the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime, as in the case at bar,
the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Fifth. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisas testimony. Case law has it that
the trial courts calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the credibility
of witnesses and the probative weight thereof is given high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held
appellate court. criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or
immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the
The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon Revised Penal Code:
in stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his participation in the
criminal resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the criminal acts. He Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
asserts that even if it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the
victim, it was Odilon who had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed the victim. He could not 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
have conspired with Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter between the victim, the which he intended.
appellant and his co-accused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as
a principal by direct participation. Elisa could not categorically and positively assert as to what part
In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if
of the victims body was hit by whom, and how many times the victim was stabbed by the appellant.
the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victims death. Both the offenders are criminally liable
He asserts that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation.
for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts.30 Absent
conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death
We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant. of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice, under
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it.18 Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate
same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal
they had acted with a common purpose and design.19Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that
design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
the latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were,
indispensable to the commission of the crime.31 Accomplices come to know about the criminal
in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to
of sentiment.20 There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the
commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution.
other offenders,21 and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan
not in on the scheme from the beginning.22 One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in
of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. 32 However, where one
furtherance of it.23 One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal
cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of
designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-
execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an
principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law,
accomplice.33cräläwvirtualibräry
the act of one would be the act of all.24 Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the
others.25cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were
on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives.
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.26 The mere presence of an
The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the
accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the
scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie
act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to
returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then
make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a
hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.27Conspiracy to exist does not require
stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.
an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the legal standpoint,
conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution.28 As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There is no
of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was
indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end. 29cräläwvirtualibräry already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in
stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated.
All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim;
hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latters death. The appellant is not merely an
accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.
Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the
appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The stab wounds
inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or contributed
materially thereto.34cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court correctly overruled the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest
of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to disprove. To serve as
basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. For it to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was absent from the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present then.35 In this
case, the appellant avers that at the time of the stabbing incident, he was resting in the house of his
cousin at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street as he was suffering from stomach pain due to his ulcer.36But
the appellant failed to adduce any medical certificate that he was suffering from the ailment.
Moreover, Elisa positively identified the appellant as one of the men who repeatedly stabbed the
victim. The appellants defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward
identification of the appellant as one of the victims assailants. The appellant himself admitted that
his cousins house, the place where he was allegedly resting when the victim was stabbed, was
merely ten to fifteen meters away from the scene of the stabbing. Indeed, the appellants defense of
denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of prosecution eyewitness
Elisa Rolan.37cräläwvirtualibräry
The appellants defenses must crumble in the face of evidence that he fled from the situs
criminis and later left his house. The records show that despite being informed that he was sought
after by the authorities as a suspect for the killing of the victim, the appellant suddenly and
inscrutably disappeared from his residence at Nueve de Pebrero. As early as May 5, 1988, a
subpoena for the appellant was returned unserved because he was out of town.38 The appellants
own witness, Julian Cadion, testified that the appellant had left and was no longer seen at Nueve de
Pebrero after the incident, thus:
Q So, how long did you stay at 606 Nueve de Pebrero after February 5, 1988?
A One week only, sir, and then three weeks after, I returned to Nueve de Pebrero.
Q The whole week after February 5, 1988, was Rene Pilola still living at 606 Nueve de Pebrero?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.
Q And then three weeks thereafter, you went back to Nueve de Pebrero. Is that what you were then
saying?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, at the time that you went back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero, was Rene Pilola there?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.39c
The records show that the appellant knew that he was charged for the stabbing of the victim.
However, instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he adroitly evaded arrest. The appellants
flight is evidence of guilt and, from the factual circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, no reason
can be deduced from it other than that he was driven by a strong sense of guilt and admission that
he had no tenable defense.40
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
and the Proper Penalty Therefor
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery. Abuse of superior
strength likewise attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift and
unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. 41 In this
case, the attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. Odilon, without provocation, suddenly placed
his arm around the victims neck and forthwith stabbed the latter. The victim had no inkling that he
would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify Edmar and Julian. Ronnie and the appellant, both
also armed with deadly weapons, rushed to the scene and stabbed the victim, giving no real
opportunity for the latter to defend himself. And even as the victim was already sprawled on the
canal, Ronnie bashed his head with a hollow block. The peacemaker became the victim of violence.
Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was executed in a
treacherous manner, preventing any means of defense on the part of the victim. As testified to by
Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, the victim was stabbed, not just once, but eleven times mostly on the chest
and the abdominal area. Six of the stab wounds were fatal, causing damage to the victims vital
internal organs.42cräläwvirtualibräry
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.43 There is no
mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the felony. The penalty for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since no aggravating and
mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
The trial court correctly directed the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselita Capa the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, in accord with current jurisprudence.44 The said
heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000, also conformably to current
jurisprudence.45 In addition, the heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.46cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby directed
to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity; the amount
of P50,000 as moral damages; and the amount of P25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.