B.

Taxation the evidence adduced before the Secretary of

Justice.
2. Procedure for Approving Tax Ordinance

Same; Local Government Code; Taxation;

Review by Secretary of Justice of Tax
3. Source of taxing power of LGU’s
Ordinances; A Memorandum issued by the
Justice Secretary directing the Chief State
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium
Counsel to refrain from acting on or
Corporation 474 SCRA 258 , October 25,
accepting appeals filed under Section 187 of
2005
the Local Government Code and to “inform
the appellants to file their appeal directly
Same; Constitutional Law; Local
with the courts” amounted to an abdication
Governments; The power of local
by the Secretary of Justice of his jurisdiction
government units to impose taxes within its
over the appeal such that any subsequent
territorial jurisdiction derives from the
action before the Regional Trial Court
Constitution itself, which recognizes the
cannot be deemed to be anything but an
power of these units “to create its own
original action whereby the function of the
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
trial court cannot be limited to reviewing the
and charges subject to such guidelines and
evidence adduced before the Secretary of
limitations as the Congress may provide,
Justice.—Consider, too, the circumstances
consistent with the basic policy of local
under which respondents sought relief from
autonomy.”—The power of local
the RTC. Perhaps doubting his jurisdiction
government units to impose taxes within its
to entertain respondents’ appeal as a result
territorial jurisdiction derives from the
of the filing of Drilon vs. Lim, supra, the
Constitution itself, which recognizes the
Justice Secretary issued a Memorandum
power of these units “to create its own
directing the Chief State Counsel to refrain
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
from acting on or accepting appeals filed
and charges subject to such guidelines and
under Section 187 of the Local Government
limitations as the Congress may provide,
Code and to “inform the appellants (herein
consistent with the basic policy of local
petitioners) to file their appeal directly with
autonomy.” These guidelines and limitations
the courts.” The Chief State Counsel,
as provided by Congress are in main
complying with the Memorandum, advised
contained in the Local Government Code of
in his letter to respondents to “file their
1991 (the “Code”), which provides for
appeal with the court of competent
comprehensive instances when and how
jurisdiction,” the “appeal” referring to an
local government units may impose taxes.
action to question the validity of the subject
The significant limitations are enumerated
ordinance. The Memorandum and the
primarily in Section 133 of the Code, which
accompanying letter thus amounted to an
include among others, a prohibition on the
abdication by the Secretary of Justice of his
imposition of income taxes except when
jurisdiction over the appeal, as conferred by
levied on banks and other financial
Section 187. Accordingly, the action before
institutions. None of the other general
the RTC cannot be deemed to be anything
limitations under Section 133 find
but an original action, and the function of
application to the case at bar.
the trial court cannot be limited to reviewing
City Government of Quezon City vs. Bayan
Telecommunications, Inc. 484 SCRA 169 ,
March 06, 2006
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to tax
is primarily vested in the Congress;
however, in our jurisdiction, it may be
exercised by local legislative bodies, no
longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation
as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the
Constitution.—Bayantel’s posture is well-
taken. While the system of local government
taxation has changed with the onset of the
1987 Constitution, the power of local
government units to tax is still limited. As
we explained in Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority: The power to tax is
primarily vested in the Congress; however,
in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by
local legislative bodies, no longer merely
by virtue of a valid delegation as before,
but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the
Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise
of the power may be subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress
may provide which, however, must be
consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. (at p. 680; Emphasis supplied.)
4. Limitations on Municipal Taxing power
(Sec 133, LGC)
Cases:
Province of Bulacan vs. Court of
Appeals 299 SCRA 442 ,
November 27, 1998
Taxation; Municipal
Corporations; Local Government Units; A
province has no authority to impose taxes
on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other
quarry resources extracted from private
lands.—In any case, the remaining issues
raised by petitioner are likewise devoid of
merit, a province having no authority to
impose taxes on stones, sand, gravel,
earth and other quarry resources
extracted from private lands.
Same; Same; Same; A province may
not levy excise taxes on articles already
taxed by the National Internal Revenue
Code.—The Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that a province can impose only the
taxes specifically mentioned under the
Local Government Code. As correctly
pointed out by petitioners, Section 186
allows a province to levy taxes other than
those specifically enumerated under the
Code, subject to the conditions specified
therein. This finding, nevertheless,
affords cold comfort to petitioners as they
are still prohibited from imposing taxes
on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other
quarry resources extracted from private
lands.The tax imposed by the Province of
Bulacan is an excise tax, being a tax upon
the perfor-mance, carrying on, or exercise
of an activity.
Same; Same; Same; A province may
not ordinarily impose taxes on stones,
sand, gravel, earth and other quarry
resources, as the same are already taxed
under the National Internal Revenue
Code.—It is clearly apparent from the
above provision that the National Internal
Revenue Code levies a tax on all quarry
resources, regardless of origin, whether
extracted from public or private land.
Thus, a province may not ordinarily
impose taxes on stones, sand, gravel,
earth and other quarry resources, as the
same are already taxed under the
National Internal Revenue Code. The
province can, however, impose a tax on
stones, sand, gravel, earth and other
quarry resources extracted from public
land because it is expressly empowered to
do so under the Local Government Code.
As to stones, sand, gravel, earth and other
quarry resources extracted from private
land, however, it may not do so, because
of the limitation provided by Section 133
of the Code in relation to Section 151 of
the National Internal Revenue Code.
Same; Same; Same; Natural
Resources; Regalian Doctrine; A province
may not invoke the Regalian doctrine to
extend the coverage of its ordinance to
quarry resources extracted from private
lands, for taxes, being burdens, are not to
be presumed beyond what the applicable
statute expressly and clearly declares, tax
statutes being construed strictissimi juris
against the government.—Section 21 of
Provincial Ordinance No. 3 is practically
only a reproduction of Section 138 of the
Local Government Code. A cursory
reading of both would show that both
refer to ordinary sand, stone, gravel, earth
and other quarry resources extracted
from public lands. Even if we disregard
the limitation set by Section 133 of the
Local Government Code, petitioners may
not impose taxes on stones, sand, gravel,
earth and other quarry resources
extracted from private lands on the basis
of Section 21 of Provincial Ordinance No.
3 as the latter clearly applies only to
quarry resources extracted from public
lands. Petitioners may not invoke the
Regalian doctrine to extend the coverage
of their ordinance to quarry resources
extracted from private lands, for taxes,
being burdens, are not to be presumed
beyond what the applicable statute
expressly and clearly declares, tax
statutes being construed strictissimi
juris against the government.
Palma Development Corporation
vs. Municipality of Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur 413 SCRA
572 , October 16, 2003
Taxation; Section 133(e) of RA No.
7160 prohibit the imposition, in the guise
of wharfage, of fees—as well as all other
taxes or charges in any form whatsoever.—
By express language of Sections 153 and
155 of RA No. 7160, local government
units, through their Sanggunian, may
prescribe the terms and conditions for the
imposition of toll fees or charges for the
use of any public road, pier or wharf
funded and constructed by them. A
service fee imposed on vehicles using
municipal roads leading to the wharf is
thus valid. However, Section 133(e) of RA
No. 7160 prohibits the imposition, in the
guise of wharfage, of fees—as well as all
other taxes or charges in any form
whatsoever—on goods or merchandise. It
is therefore irrelevant if the fees imposed
are actually for police surveillance on the
goods, because any other form of
imposition on goods passing through the
territorial jurisdiction of the municipality
is clearly prohibited by Section 133(e).
Same; A wharfage does not lose its
basic character by being labeled as a
service fee “for police surveillance on all
goods.”—Under Section 131 (y) of RA No.
7160, wharfage is defined as “a fee
assessed against the cargo of a vessel
engaged in foreign or domestic trade
based on quantity, weight, or measure
received and/or discharged by vessel.” It is
apparent that a wharfage does not lose its
basic character by being labeled as a
service fee “for police surveillance on all
goods.”
Same; Unjust Enrichment; Two
conditions for unjust enrichment to be
deemed present; There is no unjust
enrichment where the one receiving the
benefit has a legal right or entitlement
thereto, or when there is no causal relation
between one’s enrichment and the other’s
impoverishment.—Unpersuasive is the
contention of respondent that petitioner
would unjustly be enriched at the former’s
expense. Though the rules thereon apply
equally well to the government, for unjust
enrichment to be deemed present, two
conditions must generally concur: (a) a
person is unjustly benefited, and (b) such
benefit is derived at another’s expense or
damage. In the instant case, the benefits
from the use of the municipal roads and
the wharf were not unjustly derived by
petitioner. Those benefits resulted from
the infrastructure that the municipality
was mandated by law to provide. There is
no unjust enrichment where the one
receiving the benefit has a legal right or
entitlement thereto, or when there is no
causal relation between one’s enrichment
and the other’s impoverishment.
Manila Electric Company vs.
Province of Laguna 306 SCRA
750 , May 05, 1999
Taxation; Municipal
Corporations; Local Governments; Local
governments do not have the inherent
power to tax except to the extent that such
power might be delegated to them either by
the basic law or by statute.—Prefatorily, it
might be well to recall that local
governments do not have
the inherent power to tax except to the
extent that such power might
be delegated to them either by the basic
law or by statute. Presently, under Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, a general
delegation of that power has been given in
favor of local government units.
Same; Same; Same; Under the regime
of the 1935 Constitution local government
units derived their tax powers under a
limited statutory authority.—Under the
regime of the 1935 Constitution no similar
delegation of tax powers was provided,
and local government units instead
derived their tax powers under a limited
statutory authority. Whereas, then, the
delegation of tax powers granted at that
time by statute to local governments was
confined and defined (outside of which the
power was deemed withheld), the present
constitutional rule (starting with the 1973
Constitution), however, would broadly
confer such tax powers subject only to
specific exceptions that the law might
prescribe.
Same; Same; Same; Limitations on the
Exercise of Taxing Power by Local
Government Units; Under the now
prevailing Constitution, where there is
neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute,
the tax power must be deemed to exist
although Congress may provide statutory
limitations and guidelines.—Under the now
prevailing Constitution, where there is
neither a grant nor a prohibition
by statute, the tax power must be deemed to
exist although Congress may provide
statutory limitations and guidelines. The
basic rationale for the current rule is to
safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency
of local government units by directly
granting them general and broad tax powers.
Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not
intend the delegation to be absolute and
unconditional; the constitutional objective
obviously is to ensure that, while the local
government units are being strengthened and
made more autonomous, the legislature must
still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be
over-burdened or saddled with multiple and
unreasonable impositions; (b) each local
government unit will have its fair share of
available resources; (c) the resources of the
national government will not be unduly
disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair,
uniform, and just.
Same; Same; Same; Indicative of the
legislative intent to carry out the
Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax
powers to local government units, the Local
Government Code has effectively withdrawn
tax exemptions or incentives theretofore
enjoyed by certain entities.—Indicative of
the legislative intent to carry out the
Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax
powers to local government units, the Local
Government Code has effectively
withdrawn, under Section 193 thereof, tax
exemptions or incentives theretofore
enjoyed by certain entities. This law states: debentures, lawfully entered into by them
“Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption under enabling laws in which the
Privileges.—Unless otherwise provided in government, acting in its private capacity,
this Code, tax exemptions or incentives sheds its cloak of authority and waives its
granted to, or presently enjoyed by all governmental immunity, which
persons, whether natural or contractual tax exemptions, however, are
juridical, including government-owned or not to be confused with tax exemptions
controlled corporations, except local water granted under franchises.—While the
districts, cooperatives duly registered under Court has not too infrequently, referred to
R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit tax exemptions contained in special
franchises as being in the nature
hospitals and educational institutions, are
of contracts and a part of the inducement
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this
for carrying on the franchise, these
Code. (Italics supplied for emphasis)
exemptions, nevertheless, are far from
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme
being strictly contractual in
Court has viewed its previous rulings as
nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the
laying stress more on the legislative intent
real sense of the term and where the non-
of the amendatory law—whether the tax
impairment clause of the Constitution can
exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or
rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by
not—rather than on whether the law can
the taxing authority in contracts, such as
withdraw, without violating the
those contained in government bonds or
Constitution, the tax exemption or not.—In
debentures, lawfully entered into by them
the recent case of the City Government of
under enabling laws in which the
San Pablo, etc., et al. vs. Hon. Bienvenido
government, acting in its private capacity,
V. Reyes, et al., the Court has held that
sheds its cloak of authority and waives its
the phrase in lieu of all taxes“have to give
governmental immunity. Truly, tax
way to the peremptory language of the
exemptions of this kind may not be
Local Government Code specifically
revoked without impairing the obligations
providing for the withdrawal of such
of contracts. These contractual tax
exemptions, privileges,” and that “upon
exemptions, however, are not to be
the effectivity of the Local Government
confused with tax exemptions granted
Code all exemptions except only as
under franchises. A franchise partakes
provided therein can no longer be invoked
the nature of a grant which is beyond the
by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the
purview of the non-impairment clause of
local tax.” In fine, the Court has viewed its
the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII,
previous rulings as laying stress more on
Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like
the legislative intent of the amendatory
its precursor provisions in the 1935 and
law—whether the tax exemption privilege
the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no
is to be withdrawn or not—rather than on
franchise for the operation of a public
whether the law can withdraw, without
utility shall be granted except under the
violating the Constitution, the tax
condition that such privilege shall be
exemption or not.
subject to amendment, alteration or
Same; Same; Same; Non-Impairment
repeal by Congress as and when the
Clause; Contractual tax exemptions, in the
common good so requires.
real sense of the term and where the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution can
rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by
the taxing authority in contracts, such as
those contained in government bonds or
Ericsson Telecommunications,
Inc. vs. City of Pasig 538 SCRA
99 , November 22, 2007
Taxation; Business Taxes; Words and
Phrases; “Gross Receipts” Defined; Gross
receipts include money or its equivalent
actually or constructively received in
consideration of services rendered or
articles sold, exchanged or leased, whether
actual or constructive.—The above
provision specifically refers to gross
receipts which is defined under Section 131
of the Local Government Code, as follows:
x x x x (n) “Gross Sales or Receipts” include
the total amount of money or its equivalent
representing the contract price,
compensation or service fee, including the
amount charged or materials supplied with
the services and the deposits or advance
payments actually or constructively received
during the taxable quarter for the services
performed or to be performed for another
person excluding discounts if determinable
at the time of sales, sales return, excise tax,
and value-added tax (VAT); x x x x The law
is clear. Gross receipts include money or its
equivalent actually or constructively
received in consideration of services
rendered or articles sold, exchanged or
leased, whether actual or constructive.
Same; Same; Same; “Gross receipts”
includes those which are actually or
constructively received.—In Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Bank of Commerce,
459 SCRA 638 (2005), the Court
interpreted gross receipts as including
those which were actually or
constructively received, viz.: Actual
receipt of interest income is not limited to
physical receipt. Actual receipt may either
be physical receipt or constructive receipt.
When the depository bank withholds the
final tax to pay the tax liability of the
lending bank, there is prior to the
withholding a constructive receipt by the
lending bank of the amount withheld.
From the amount constructively received
by the lending bank, the depository bank
deducts the final withholding tax and
remits it to the government for the
account of the lending bank. Thus, the
interest income actually received by the
lending bank, both physically and
constructively, is the net interest plus the
amount withheld as final tax. The concept
of a withholding tax on incomeobviously
and necessarily implies that the amount of
the tax withheld comes from the income
earned by the taxpayer. Since the amount of
the tax withheld constitutes income earned
by the taxpayer, then that amount manifestly
forms part of the taxpayer’s gross receipts.
Because the amount withheld belongs to the
taxpayer, he can transfer its ownership to the
government in payment of his tax liability.
The amount withheld indubitably comes
from income of the taxpayer, and thus forms
part of his gross receipts. (Emphasis
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Constructive
receipt occurs when the money
consideration or its equivalent is placed at
the control of the person who rendered the
service without restrictions by the payor;
There is constructive receipt, when the
consideration for the articles sold,
exchanged or leased, or the services
rendered has already been placed under the
control of the person who sold the goods or
rendered the services without any restriction
by the payor.—Revenue Regulations No.
16-2005 dated September 1, 2005 defined
and gave examples of “constructive receipt,”
to wit: SEC. 4. 108-4. Definition of Gross
Receipts.—x x x “Constructive receipt”
occurs when the money consideration or its
equivalent is placed at the control of the
person who rendered the service without
restrictions by the payor. The following are
examples of constructive receipts: (1)
deposit in banks which are made available to
the seller of services without restrictions; (2)
issuance by the debtor of a notice to offset
any debt or obligation and acceptance
thereof by the seller as payment for services
rendered; and (3) transfer of the amounts
retained by the payor to the account of the
contractor. There is, therefore, constructive
receipt, when the consideration for the
articles sold, exchanged or leased, or the
services rendered has already been placed
under the control of the person who sold the
goods or rendered the services without any
restriction by the payor.
Same; Same; Same; “Gross Revenue”
Defined; Gross revenue covers money or its
equivalent actually or constructively
received, including the value of services
rendered or articles sold, exchanged or
leased, the payment of which is yet to be
received.—Gross revenue covers money or
its equivalent actually or constructively
received, including the value of
services rendered or articles sold,
exchanged or leased, the payment of
which is yet to be received. This is in
consonance with the International
Financial Re-porting Standards, which
defines revenue as the gross inflow of
economic benefits (cash, receivables, and
other assets) arising from the ordinary
operating activities of an enterprise (such
as sales of goods, sales of services,
interest, royalties, and dividends), which
is measured at the fair value of the
consideration received or receivable.
Same; Same; Double
Taxation; Municipal Corporations; The
imposition of local business tax based on
gross revenue inevitably results in double
taxation—taxing of the same person twice
by the same jurisdiction over the same
thing.—In petitioner’s case, its audited
financial statements reflect income or
revenue which accrued to it during the
taxable period although not yet actually
or constructively received or paid. This is
because petitioner uses the accrual
method of accounting, where income is
reportable when all the events have
occurred that fix the taxpayer’s right to
receive the income, and the amount can
be determined with reasonable accuracy;
the right to receive income, and not the
actual receipt, determines when to include
the amount in gross income. The
imposition of local business tax based on
petitioner’s gross revenue will inevitably
result in the constitutionally proscribed
double taxation—taxing of the same
person twice by the same jurisdiction for
the same thing—inasmuch as petitioner’s
revenue or income for a taxable year will
definitely include its gross receipts
already reported during the previous year
and for which local business tax has
already been paid. Thus, respondent
committed a palpable error when it
assessed petitioner’s local business tax
based on its gross revenue as reported in
its audited financial statements, as
Section 143 of the Local Government Code
and Section 22(e) of the Pasig Revenue
Code clearly provide that the tax should
be computed based on gross receipts.
Petron Corporation vs.
Tiangco 551 SCRA 484 , April 16,
2008
Taxation; Local Government Code;
Section 133 prescribes the limitations on
the capacity of local government units to
exercise their taxing powers otherwise
granted to them under the Local
Government Code (LGC); Two kinds of
taxes which cannot be imposed by local
government units.—Section 133 prescribes
the limitations on the capacity of local
government units to exercise their taxing
powers otherwise granted to them under
the LGC. Apparently, paragraph (h) of the
Section mentions two kinds of taxes which
cannot be imposed by local government
units, namely: “excise taxes on articles
enumerated under the National Internal
Revenue Code [(NIRC)], as amended”; and
“taxes, fees or charges on petroleum
products.”
Same; Same; Excise Tax; The current
definition of an excise tax is that of a tax
levied on a specific article rather than one
upon the performance, carrying on, or the
exercise of an activity.—It is evident
that Am Jur aside, the current definition
of an excise tax is that of a tax levied on a
specific article, rather than one “upon the
performance, carrying on, or the exercise
of an activity.” This current definition was
already in place when the LGC was
enacted in 1991, and we can only presume
that it was what the Congress had
intended as it specified that local
government units could not impose “excise
taxes on articles enumerated under the
[NIRC].” This prohibition must pertain to
the same kind of excise taxes as imposed
by the NIRC, and not those previously
defined “excise taxes” which were not
integrated or denominated as such in our
present tax law.
Same; Same; Same; Starting in 1986,
excise taxes in this jurisdiction refer
exclusively to specific or ad valorem taxes,
imposed under the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).—It is quite
apparent, therefore, that our current body
of taxation law does not explicitly
accommodate the traditional definition of
excise tax offered by Petron. In fact,
absent any statutory adoption of the
traditional definition, it may be said that
starting in 1986 excise taxes in this
jurisdiction refer exclusively to specific
or ad valorem taxes imposed under the
NIRC. At the very least, it is this concept
of excise tax which we can reasonably
assume that Congress had in mind and
actually adopted when it crafted the LGC.
The palpable absurdity that ensues
should the alternative interpretation
prevail all but strengthens this position.
Same; Same; Same; Congress has the
constitutional authority to impose
limitations on the power to tax of local
government units and Section 133 of the
Local Government Code (LGC) is one such
limitation.—Congress has the
constitutional authority to impose
limitations on the power to tax of local
government units, and Section 133 of the
LGC is one such limitation. Indeed, the
provision is the explicit statutory
impediment to the enjoyment of absolute
taxing power by local government units,
not to mention the reality that such power
is a delegated power. To cite one example,
under Section 133(g), local government
units are disallowed from levying
business taxes on “business enterprises
certified to by the Board of Investments as
pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six
(6) and (4) four years, respectively from
the date of registration.”
Same; Same; Same; The prohibition
with respect to petroleum products extends
not only to excise taxes thereon, but all
“taxes, fees and charges.”—The language
of Section 133(h) makes plain that the
prohibition with respect to petroleum
products extends not only to excise taxes
thereon, but all “taxes, fees and charges.”
The earlier reference in paragraph (h) to
excise taxes comprehends a wider range of
subjects of taxation: all articles already
covered by excise taxation under the
NIRC, such as alcohol products, tobacco
products, mineral products, automobiles,
and such non-essential goods as jewelry,
goods made of precious metals, perfumes,
and yachts and other vessels intended for
pleasure or sports. In contrast, the later
reference to “taxes, fees and charges”
pertains only to one class of articles of the
many subjects of excise taxes, specifically,
“petroleum products.” While local
government units are authorized to
burden all such other class of goods with
“taxes, fees and charges,” excepting excise
taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed
barring the levying of any other type of
taxes with respect to petroleum products.
Same; Same; Same; Even absent
Article 232, local government units cannot
impose business taxes on petroleum
products.—Assuming that the LGC does
not, in fact, prohibit the imposition of
business taxes on petroleum products, we
would agree that the IRR could not
impose such a prohibition. With our
ruling that Section 133(h) does indeed
prohibit the imposition of local business
taxes on petroleum products, however, the
RTC declaration that Article 232 was
invalid is, in turn, itself invalid. Even
absent Article 232, local government units
cannot impose business taxes on
petroleum products. If anything, Article
232 merely reiterates what the LGC itself
already provides, with the additional
explanation that such prohibition was “in
line with existing national policy.”
5. Franchise Taxes
Section137. Franchise Tax. - Education Fund; Presidential Decree No.
Notwithstanding any exemption granted
by any law or other special law, the
province may impose a tax on businesses
enjoying a franchise, at the rate not
exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one
percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts
for the preceding calendar year based on
the incoming receipt, or realized, within
its territorial jurisdiction.
In the case of a newly started business,
the tax shall not exceed one-twentieth
(1/20) of one percent (1%) of the capital
investment. In the succeeding calendar
year, regardless of when the business
started to operate, the tax shall be based
on the gross receipts for the preceding
calendar year, or any fraction thereon, as
provided herein.
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax
Exemption Privileges. - Unless otherwise
provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed
by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, except local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered
under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-
profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon
the effectivity of this Code.
Section 534. Repealing Clause. -
(a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code,
Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and
Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are
hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191,
1508 and such other decrees, orders,
instructions, memoranda and issuances
related to or concerning the barangay are
hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of
Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital
fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic
Act No. 5447 regarding the Special
144 as amended by Presidential Decree
Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree
No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree
No. 436 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree
Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and
1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of
no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby
repealed insofar as it governs locally-
funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby
repealed or amended insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Section 52,
53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended;
and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No.
972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which
are inconsistent with any of the provisions
of this Code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
(a) Definitions and Requisites of a
Franchise Tax
City of Iriga vs. Camarines Sur
III Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(CASURECO III) 680 SCRA 236 ,
September 05, 2012
Same; Franchise Tax; Words and
Phrases; A franchise tax is a tax on the
privilege of transacting business in the
state and exercising corporate franchises
granted by the state.—In National Power
Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, 401
SCRA 259 (2003), the Court declared that
“a franchise tax is ‘a tax on the privilege of
transacting business in the state and
exercising corporate franchises granted by
the state.’ ” It is not levied on the
corporation simply for existing as a
corporation, upon its property or its
income, but on its exercise of the rights or
privileges granted to it by the
government. “It is within this context that
the phrase tax on businesses enjoying a
franchise in Section 137 of the LGC
should be interpreted and understood.”
Same; Same; Requisites That Must
Concur in Order to be Liable for Local
Franchise Tax.—To be liable for local
franchise tax, the following requisites
should concur: (1) that one has a
“franchise” in the sense of a secondary or
special franchise; and (2) that it is
exercising its rights or privileges under
this franchise within the territory of the
pertinent local government unit.
Same; Same; Franchise tax shall be
based on gross receipts precisely because it
is a tax on business, rather than on
persons or property.—It should be stressed
that what the petitioner seeks to collect
from CASURECO III is a franchise tax,
which as defined, is a tax on the exercise
of a privilege. As Section 137 of the LGC
provides, franchise tax shall be based on
gross receipts precisely because it is a tax
on business, rather than on persons or
property. Since it partakes of the nature
of an excise tax, the situsof taxation is the
place where the privilege is exercised, in
this case in the City of Iriga, where
CASURECO III has its principal office
and from where it operates, regardless of
the place where its services or products
are delivered. Hence, franchise tax covers
all gross receipts from Iriga City and the
Rinconada area.
CASES
Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. (RCPI) vs. Provincial Assessor of South
Cotabato 456 SCRA 1 , April 13, 2005
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;
It is an elementary rule in taxation that
exemptions are strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority—it is the taxpayer’s duty to justify
the exemption by words too plain to be
mistaken and too categorical to be
misinterpreted.—RCPI cannot also invoke
the equality of treatment clause under
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925. The
franchises of Smart, Islacom, TeleTech,
Bell, Major Telecoms, Island Country, and
IslaTel, all expressly declare that the
franchisee shall pay the real estate tax,
using words similar to Section 14 of RA
2036, as amended. The provisions of these
subsequent telecommunication franchises
imposing the real estate tax on franchisees
only confirm that RCPI is subject to the real
estate tax. Otherwise, RCPI will stick out
like a sore thumb, being the only
telecommunications company exempt from
the real estate tax, in mockery of the spirit of
equality of treatment that RCPI is invoking,
not to mention the violation of the
constitutional rule on uniformity of taxation.
It is an elementary rule in taxation that
exemptions are strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. It is the taxpayer’s duty to justify
the exemption by words too plain to be
mistaken and too categorical to be
misinterpreted.
National Power Corporation vs. Province of
Isabela 491 SCRA 169 , June 16, 2006
Same; Tax exemptions should be granted
only by clear and unequivocal provision of
law on the basis of language too plain to be
mistaken; They cannot be extended by mere
implication or inference.—Indeed, taxation
is the rule and exemption is the exception.
The burden of proof rests upon the party
claiming exemption to prove that it is, in
fact, covered by the exemption so claimed.
Tax exemptions should be granted only by
clear and unequivocal provision of law on
the basis of language too plain to be
mistaken. They cannot be extended by mere
implication or inference. In this case,
petitioner relies solely on the exemption
granted to it by its charter, arguing that its
exemption from franchise tax remained
despite the enactment of the LGC.
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc.
vs. City of Cagayan de Oro 685 SCRA 609 ,
November 14, 2012
Same; Tax Exemptions; Franchise Tax; The
Local Government Code withdrew tax
exemption privileges previously given to
natural or juridical persons, and granted
local government units the power to impose
franchise tax.—The Local Government
Code withdrew tax exemption privileges
previously given to natural or juridical
persons, and granted local government units
the power to impose franchise tax, thus:
SEC. 137. Franchise Tax.—
Notwithstanding any exemption granted by
any law or other special law, the province
may impose a tax on businesses enjoying a
franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty
percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the
gross annual receipts for the preceding
calendar year based on the incoming receipt,
or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction.
x x x x SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax
Exemption Privileges.—Unless otherwise
provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed
by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No.
6938, non-stock and nonprofit hospitals and
educational institutions, are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
SEC. 534. Repealing Clause.—x x x. (f) All
general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of
the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
6. Payment of Taxesunder Protest
Olivares vs. Marquez 438 SCRA 679 ,
September 22, 2004
Taxation; Protest; Taxpayer should first pay
the tax before his protest can be
entertained.—Thus, should the taxpayer/real
property owner question the excessiveness
or reasonableness of the assessment, Section
252 directs that the taxpayer should first pay
the tax due before his protest can be
entertained. There shall be annotated on the
tax receipts the words “paid under protest.”
It is only after the taxpayer has paid the tax
due that he may file a protest in writing
within thirty days from payment of the tax to
the Provincial, City or Municipal Treasurer,
who shall decide the protest within sixty
days from receipt. In no case is the local
treasurer obliged to entertain the protest
unless the tax due has been paid.
Camp John Hay Development Corporation
vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
706 SCRA 547 , October 02, 2013
Same; Same; The burden of proving
exemption from local taxation is upon whom
the subject real property is declared; thus,
said person shall be considered by law as
the taxpayer thereof.—Section 206 of RA
No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991, categorically
provides that every person by or for whom
real property is declared, who shall claim
exemption from payment of real property
taxes imposed against said property, shall
file with the provincial, city or municipal
assessor sufficient documentary evidence in
support of such claim. Clearly, the burden of
proving exemption from local taxation is
upon whom the subject real property is
declared; thus, said person shall be
considered by law as the taxpayer thereof.
Failure to do so, said property shall be listed
as taxable in the assessment roll.
7. LGU cannot tax a government
instrumentality
Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority vs. Marcos 261 SCRA 667 ,
September 11, 1996
Same; Same; Same; Since the last
paragraph of Section 234 of the LGC
unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity
of the LGC, exemptions from payment of
real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, except as
provided in the said section, and Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority is a
government-owned corporation, it
necessarily follows that its exemption from
such tax granted it in Section 14 of its
Charter, R.A 6958, has been withdrawn.—
Since the last paragraph of Section 234
unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity
of the LGC, exemptions from payment of
real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, except as
provided in the said section, and the
petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-
owned corporation, it necessarily follows
that its exemption from such tax granted it in
Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has
been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary
can only be justified if the petitioner can
seek refuge under any of the exceptions
provided in Section 234, but not under
Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as
shown above, the said section is qualified by
Sections 232 and 234
Manila International Airport Authority vs.
Court of Appeals 495 SCRA 591 , July 20,
2006
Manila International Airport Authority;
Taxation; MIAA’s Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax
imposed by local governments.—We rule
that MIAA’s Airport Lands and Buildings
are exempt from real estate tax imposed by
local governments. First, MIAA is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation
but an instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local
taxation. Second, the real properties of
MIAA are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines and thus exempt from real estate
tax.
Same; Same; While there is no dispute that a
government-owned or controlled
corporation is not exempt from real estate
tax, MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation; A government-
owned or controlled corporation must be
“organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation,” of which MIAA is neither;
MIAA is not a stock corporation because it
has no capital stock divided into shares.—
There is no dispute that a government-
owned or controlled corporation is not
exempt from real estate tax. However,
MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation. Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 defines a
government-owned or controlled corporation
as follows: SEC. 2. General Terms
Defined.—x x x x (13) Government-owned
or controlled corporation refers to any
agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating
to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-
one (51) percent of its capital stock: x x x.
(Emphasis supplied) A government-owned
or controlled corporation must be
“organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation.” MIAA is not organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not
a stock corporation because it has no capital
stock divided into shares.
City of Manila vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. 595 SCRA 299 , August
04, 2009
Same; Double Taxation; Words and
Phrases; Double taxation means taxing the
same property twice when it should be taxed
only once, that is, “taxing the same person
twice by the same jurisdiction for the same
thing”; Otherwise described as “direct
duplicate taxation,” the two taxes must be
imposed on the same subject matter, for the
same purpose, by the same taxing authority,
within the same jurisdiction, during the
same taxing period, and the taxes must be of
the same kind or character.—Petitioners
obstinately ignore the exempting proviso in
Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, to
their own detriment. Said exempting proviso
was precisely included in said section so as
to avoid double taxation. Double taxation
means taxing the same property twice when
it should be taxed only once; that is, “taxing
the same person twice by the same
jurisdiction for the same thing.” It is
obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice,
when it should be but once. Otherwise
described as “direct duplicate taxation,” the
two taxes must be imposed on the same
subject matter, for the same purpose, by
the same taxing authority, within the
same jurisdiction, during the same taxing
period; and the taxes must be of the same
kind or character. Using the
aforementioned test, the Court finds that
there is indeed double taxation if respondent
is subjected to the taxes under both Sections
14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since
these are being imposed: (1) on the same
subject matter—the privilege of doing
business in the City of Manila; (2) for the
same purpose—to make persons conducting
business within the City of Manila
contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same
taxing authority—petitioner City of Manila;
(4) within the same taxing jurisdiction—
within the territorial jurisdiction of the City
of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods—
per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind
or character—a local business tax imposed
on gross sales or receipts of the business.
8. Tax Exemptions
C. Power to Open and Close
Roads (Sec. 21, LGC, Art. 34-45,
IRR)
1. Who controls and regulates use of roads
Figuracion vs. Libi 539 SCRA 50 ,
November 28, 2007
Eminent Domain; Reconveyance; Local
Government Units; The reconveyance of
property of the public domain is subject to
strict legal requirements, foremost among
the requirements being that the public
property sought to be reconveyed be
alienable; As a general rule, local roads
used for public service are considered
public property under the absolute control
of Congress, and while local governments
have no authority to control or regulate
their use, Congress has, however, under
Section 10, Chapter II of the Local
Government Code, delegated to political
subdivisions some control of local roads.—
Lot No. 899-D-2-A, being part of Lot No.
899-D, which was expropriated by Cebu
City for the construction of N. Escario
Street, is property of the public domain, the
reconveyance of which is subject to strict
legal requirements. Foremost among the
requirements is that the public property
sought to be reconveyed be alienable. As a
general rule, local roads used for public
service are considered public property under
the absolute control of Congress; hence,
local governments have no authority to
control or regulate their use. However, under
Section 10, Chapter II of the Local
Government Code, Congress delegated to
political subdivisions some control of local
roads.
Same; Same; Same; The other
requirement for a valid recon-veyance is
that it be established that the former
owner or his succes-sors-in-interest,
petitioners in this case, have the right to
repurchase said property; If land is
expropriated for a particular purpose, with
the condition that when the purpose is
ended or abandoned the property shall
return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires
the property so expropriated, but, if, upon
the contrary, however, the decree of
expropriation gives to the entity a fee
simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a
province, or municipality, and in that case
the non-user does not have the effect of
defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings.—The other
requirement for a valid reconveyance is
that it be established that the former
owner or his successors-in-interest,
petitioners in this case, have the right to
repurchase said property. As we explained
in Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, 42
Phil. 28 (1921): The question presented by
the petitioner and demurrer is this: When
private land is expropriated for a
particular public use, and that particular
public use is abandoned, does the land so
expropriated return to its former owner?
The answer to that question depends
upon the character of the title acquired by
the expropriator, whether it be the State,
a province, a municipality, or a
corporation which has the right to acquire
property under the power of eminent
domain. If, for example, land is
expropriated for a particular purpose, with
the condition that when that purpose is
ended or abandoned the property shall
return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires
the property so expropriated. If, for
example, land is expropriated for a public
street and the expropriation is granted
upon condition that the city can only use
it for a public street, then, of course, when
the city abandons its use as a public
street, it returns to the former owner,
unless there is some statutory provisions Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 126
to the contrary. Many other similar (2000), Reyes v. National Housing
examples might be given. If, upon the Authority, 395 SCRA 494 (2003), and Air
contrary, however, the decree of Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr., 462
expropriation gives to the entity a fee SCRA 544 (2005), that where there is
simple title, then, of course, the land insufficient evidence that the former
becomes the absolute property of the owners of expropriated properties were
expropriator, whether it be the State, a granted the right to repurchase the same,
province, or municipality, and in that case the latter may not insist on recovering
the non-user does not have the effect of their properties even when the public
defeating the title acquired by the purpose for which said properties were
expropriation proceedings. (10 R.C.L., 240, expropriated is abandoned.
sec. 202; 20 C.J., 1234, secs. 593-599, and
numerous cases cited; Reichling vs.
Covington Lumber Co., 57 Wash., 225; 135
Am. St. Rep., 976; McConlihay vs. Wright, 2. Factors to consider in vacating a
121 U.S., 201.) (Emphasis supplied.) The street
enunciated rule in Fery is still controlling
to this day. Favis vs. City of Baguio 27 SCRA
Same; Same; Same; Where there is 1060 , April 25, 1969
preponderant evidence of the existence of a
right to repurchase, the former owner of an
Same; Same; Power to vacate a, street
expropriated property is entitled to exercise
or alley discretionary with the city
such option once the public purpose for
council—So it is, that appellant may not
which the local government initially
challenge the city council’s act of
intended the expropriated property is
withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street
abandoned or not pursued but “where
at its dead end from public use and
there is insufficient evidence that the
converting the remainder thereof into an
former owners of expropriated properties
alley. These are acts well within the
were granted the right to repurchase the
ambit of the power to close a city street.
same, the latter may not insist on
The city council, is the authority
recovering their properties even when the
competent to determine whether or not a
public purpose for which said properties
certain property is still necessary for
were expropriated is abandoned.—
public use. Such power to vacate a street
In Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International
or alley is discretionary. And the
Airport Authority, 413 SCRA 502 (2003),
discretion will not ordinarily be controlled
we clarified that where there is
or interfered with by the courts, absent a
preponderant evidence of the existence of
plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion.
a right to repurchase, the former owner of
Faithfulness to the public trust will be
an expropriated property is entitled to
presumed. So the fact that some private
exercise such option once the public
interests may be served incidentally will
purpose for which the local government
not invalidate the vacation ordinance. (11
initially intended the expropriated
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd
property is abandoned or not pursued.
ed., p. 128, citing cases.)
Further elucidating on the right of the
former owner to repurchase the
expropriated property, we held in Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. 3. Who controls parking in local
streets

City of Ozamis vs. Lumapas 65
SCRA 33 , July 15, 1975
Same; Same; Municipalities are
empowered to regulate the use of street.—
The City of Ozamis has been clothed with
full power to control and regulate its
streets for the purpose of promoting
health, safety and welfare. Indeed,
municipal power to regulate the use of
streets is a delegation of the police power
of the national government, and in the
exercise of such power, a municipal
corporation can make all necessary and
desirable regulations which are
reasonable and manifestly in the interest
of public safety and convenience.
Same; Same; Municipality may
charge “parking fees” on vehicles that stop
and load or unload on public streets.—It
is not pretended that the public utility
vehicles are subject to the payment, if
they pass without stopping thru the
aforesaid sections of Zulueta Street.
Considering that the public utility
vehicles are only charged the fee when
said vehicles stop on “any portion of the
existing parking areas for the purpose of
loading or unloading passengers or
cargoes,” the fees collected are actually in
the nature of parking fees and not toll fees
for the use of Zulueta Street. This is clear
from the Stipulation of Facts which shows
that fees were not exacted for mere
passage thru the street but for stopping in
the designated parking areas therein to
unload or load passengers or cargoes. It
was not, therefore, a toll fee for the use of
public roads, within the context of Section
59[b] of Republic Act No. 4136, which
requires the authorization of the
President of the Philippines.
Constitutional law; Police
power; P1.00 maximum regulatory fee is a
reasonable charge for use by vehicles of
designated places for loading and
unloading.—The Municipal Board of
Ozamis City is expressly granted by its
Charter the power to regulate the use of
its streets. The ordinance in question
appears to have been enacted in
pursuance of this grant. The parking fee
imposed is minimal in amount, the
maximum being only P1.00 a day for each
passenger bus and P1.00 for each cargo
truck, the rates being lower for smaller
types of vehicles. This indicates that its
purpose is not for revenue but for
regulation. Moreover, it is undeniable
that by designating a specific place
wherein passenger and freight vehicles
may load and unload passengers and
cargoes, benefits are accorded to the city’s
residents in the form of increased safety
and convenience arising from the
decongestion of traffic.
4. Other cases
Macasiano vs. Diokno 212 SCRA 464 ,
August 10, 1992
Same; Same; Properties of public dominion
devoted to public use and made available to
the public in general are outside the
commerce of men and cannot be disposed of
or leased by the local government unit to
private persons.—However, the aforestated
legal provision which gives authority to
local government units to close roads and
other similar public places should be read
and interpreted in accordance with basic
principles already established by law. These
basic principles have the effect of limiting
such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or
thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code
lays down the basic principle that properties
of public dominion devoted to public use
and made available to the public in general
are outside the commerce of man and cannot
be disposed of or leased by the local
government unit to private persons. Aside
from the requirement of due process which
should be complied with before closing a
road, street or park, the closure should be for
the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or
other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no
longer intended or necessary for public use
or public service. When it is already
withdrawn from public use, the property
then becomes patrimonial property of the
local government unit concerned (Article
422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v.
Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August
29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that
the respondent municipality can “use or
convey them for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed” in accordance with the last
sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg.
337, known as Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Roads and streets which are
available to the public in general and
ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still
considered public property devoted to public
use.—However, those roads and streets
which are available to the public in general
and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are
still considered public property devoted to
public use. In such case, the local
government has no power to use it for
another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to
private persons.
Albon vs. Fernando 494 SCRA 141 , June
30, 2006
Same; Ownership of the sidewalks in a
private subdivision belongs to the
subdivision owner/developer until it is either
transferred to the government by way of
donation or acquired by the government
through expropriation.—Under subdivision
laws, lots allotted by subdivision developers
as road lots include roads, sidewalks, alleys
and planting strips. Thus, what is true for
subdivision roads or streets applies to
subdivision sidewalks as well. Ownership of
the sidewalks in a private subdivision
belongs to the subdivision owner/developer
until it is either transferred to the
government by way of donation or acquired
by the government through expropriation.
D. Corporate Powers
B. Exceptions
1. As provided by law (cases)
a) Art. 2189
City of Manila vs. Teotico 22 SCRA 267 ,
January 29, 1968
Civil Law; Damages; Liability of the City of
Manila for damages suffered by reason of
defective condition of streets and other
public works under their control or
supervision; Case at bar.—Where a person
"fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos
Avenue," which street is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila, the latter
is liable for damages for the injuries suffered
by the former. The liability of the City of
Manila in the case at bar is governed by
Article 2189 of the Civil Code which
provides that: "Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or
supervision."
Same; Section 4 of Republic Act 409
(Charter of Manila) and Article 2189 of the
Civil Code distinguished.—Section 4 of
Republic Act 409 refers to liability arising
from negligence, in general, regardless of
the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 of
the Civil Code governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular.
Same; Article 2189 of the Civil Code does
not require that the defective roads should
belong to the province, city or
municipality.—Under Article 2189 of the
Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or
municipality has either "control or
supervision" o ver said street or road.
Jimenez vs. City of Manila 150 SCRA 510 ,
May 29, 1987
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent City
of Manila failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family which is a defense
in quasi-delict.—As a defense against
liability on the basis of a quasidelict, one
must have exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil
Code). There is no argument that it is the
duty of the City of Manila to exercise
reasonable care to keep the public market
reasonably safe for people frequenting the
place for their marketing needs. While it
may be conceded that the fulfillment of such
duties is extremely difficult during storms
and floods, it must however, be admitted
that ordinary precautions could have been
taken during good weather to minimize the
dangers to life and limb under those difficult
circumstances. For instance,. the drainage
hole could have been placed under the stalls
instead of on the passage ways. Even more
important is the fact, that the City should
have seen to it that the openings were
covered. Sadly, the evidence in-
dicates that long before petitioner fell into
the opening, it was already uncovered, and
five (5) months after the incident happened,
the opening was still uncovered. (Rollo, pp.
57; 69). Moreover, while there are findings
that during floods the vendors remove the
iron grills to hasten the flow of water
(Decision, AC-G.R. CV No. 01387, Rollo,
p. 17), there is no showing that such practice
has ever been prohibited, much less
penalized by the City of Manila. Neither was
it shown that any sign had been placed
thereabouts to warn passers-by of the
impending danger.
SAMUEL DUMLAO, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
FLORANTE, PACIFICO, LEO,
ANGELES, CHRISTOPHER, JEAN,
LAURA, HANNIBAL and ROMULUS,
minors and all surnamed CERVANTES-
ELIZALDE, respondents. 114 SCRA 247 ,
May 31, 1982
Civil Law; Damages; A public official
becomes liable in his personal private
capacity for damages that may be caused by
his act done with malice and in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.—Nevertheless, it is a well-
settled principle of law that a public official
may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.
Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals 178 SCRA 94 , September
29, 1989
Same; Same; Same; Last Clear Chance;
Private respondent cannot recover
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes
to PLDT considering that he had the last
clear chance to avoid the injury.—The
presence of warning signs could not have
completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and
warn the public of the presence of
excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of
said excavations. It was not the lack of
knowledge of these excavations which
caused the jeep of respondents to fall into
the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound. As opined in
some quarters, the omission to perform a
duty, such as the placing of warning signs on
the site of the excavation, constitutes the
proximate cause only when the doing of the
said omitted act would have prevented the
injury. It is basic that private respondents
cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where
their own failure to exercise due and
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is
both a societal norm and necessity that one
should exercise a reasonable degree of
caution for his own protection. Furthermore,
respondent Antonio Esteban had the last
clear chance or opportunity to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of
Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost everyday and had knowledge of the
presence and location of the excavations
there. It was his negligence that exposed him
and his wife to danger, hence he is solely
responsible for the consequences of his
imprudence.
Same; Same; One who claims damages for
the negligence of another has the burden of
proof to show existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof.—A person
claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence
causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established
by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on
negligence for his cause of action has the
burden in the first instance of proving the
existence of the same if contested, otherwise
his action must fail.
b) Art. 2180, NCC
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
Palafox, et al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte,
District Engineer, and Provincial Treasurer
102 Phil. 1186 , January 31, 1958
ULEP NOTES
2. Liability for Torts, if engaged in
proprietary function
Torio vs. Fontanilla 85 SCRA 599 , October
23, 1978
Damages; Municipal corporations; In the
absence of a statutory law, municipal
corporations are not liable for damages for
acts done in the performance of
governmental functions.—If the injury is
caused in the course of the performance of a
governmental function or duty no recovery,
as a rule, can be had from the municipality
unless there is an existing statute on the
matter, nor from its officers, so long as they
performed their duties honestly and in good
faith or that they did not act wantonly and
maliciously. In Palafox, et al. v. Province of
Ilocos Norte, et al., 1958, a truck driver
employed by the provincial government of
Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the
course of his work at the construction of a
road. The Supreme Court in affirming the
trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for
damages held that the province could not be
made liable because its employee was in the
performance of a governmental function—
the construction and maintenance of roads—
and however tragic and deplorable it may
be, the death of Palafox imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary
consideration.
Same; Same; The rule is otherwise where it
is engaged in the exercise of proprietary
functions.—With respect to proprietary
functions, the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
Municipal corporations are subject to be
sued upon contracts and in tort.
Same; Same; The holding of a town fiesta by
a municipality is an exercise of a private
function of the municipality.—Coming to the
case before Us, and applying the general
tests given above, We hold that the holding
of the town fiesta in 1959 by the
Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was
an exercise of a private or proprietary
function of the municipality.
Same; Same; Under the doctrine of
respondent superior, a municipality may be
held liable for the acts of Us agent relative
to the exercise thereof of acts proprietary in
character.—Lastly, petitioner or appellant
Municipality cannot evade responsibility
and/or liability under the claim that it was
Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage.
The municipality acting through its
municipal council appointed, Macaraeg as
chairman of the sub-committee on
entertainment and in charge of the
construction of the “zarzuela” stage.
Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the
Municipality. Under the doctrine of
respondent superior mentioned earlier,
petitioner is responsible or liable for the
negligence of its agent acting within his
assigned tasks.
Same; Same; Article 27 of the Civil Code
providing indemnification for damages
where a public servant “refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official
duty” covers a case of non-feasance as
distinguished from negligence or
misfeasance in carrying out official duties.
Municipal councilors found negligent in
supervising safe use of a stage used in a
town fiesta are not liable under this article
of the Civil Code.—In their Petition for
review the municipal councilors allege that
the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
holding of a town fiesta is not a
governmental function and that there was
negligence on their part for not maintaining
and supervising the safe use of the stage, in
applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against
them, and in not holding Jose Macaraeg
liable for the collapse of the stage and the
consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. We
agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the
Civil Code against them, for this particular
article covers a case of non-feasance or non-
performance by a public officer of his
official duty; it does nof apply to a case of
negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an
official duty.
Same; Same; A municipal corporation
exercising proprietary functions is on the
same footing as a private corporation. Its
governing board or municipal council is not
liable solidarily for acts committed by its
employees unless there is bad faith or
wanton negligence on their part.—The
Court of Appeals in its decision now under
review held that the celebration of a town
fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was
not a governmental function. We upheld that
ruling. The legal consequence thereof is that
the Municipality stands on the same footing
as an ordinary private corporation with the
municipal council acting as its board of
directors. It is an elementary principle that a
corporation has a personality, separate and
distinct from its officers, directors, or
persons composing it and the latter are not
as a rule co-responsible in an action for
damages for tort or negligence (culpa
aquiliana) committed by the corporation’s
employees or agents unless there is a
showing of bad faith or gross or wanton
negligence on their part.
Liability for Contract
City of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court 179 SCRA 428 , November 15, 1989 .
Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Liability to
third persons ex contractu of a municipal
corporation.—Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla,
supra, the Court declared that with respect to
proprietary functions the settled rule is that a
municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons ex contractu (Municipality of
Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184
(1912) or ex delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon,
33 Phil. 508 (1916).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages;
The North Cemetery is a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila; Lease; A
lease contract executed by the lessor and
lessee remains as the law between them;
Breach of contractual provision entitles the
other party to damages.—Under the
foregoing considerations and in the absence
of a special law, the North Cemetery is a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila
which was created by resolution of the
Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and
January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo pp. 20-21
Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of
Manila). The administration and government
of the cemetery are under the City of Health
Officer (Ibid., Sec. 3189), the order and
police of the cemetery (Ibid., Sec. 319), the
opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the
exhuming of remains, and the purification of
the same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the
charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery. The City of
Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure
and guidelines for the use and dispositions
of burial lots and plots within the North
Cemetery through Administrative Order No.
5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts of
dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that
the North Cemetery is within the class of
property which the City of Manila owns in
its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the
burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract
executed by the lessor and lessee remains as
the law between them. (Henson v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11
[1987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual
provision entitles the other party to damages
even if no penalty for such breach is
prescribed in the contract. (Boysaw v.
Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 636
[1987]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Torts and
Damages; Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the City of Manila is liable for the
tortious act committed by its agents; Case at
bar.—Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra),
petitioner City of Manila is liable for the
tortious act committed by its agents who
failed to verify and check the duration of the
contract of lease. The contention of the
petitioner-city that the lease is covered by
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975
dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila
for five (5) years only beginning from June
6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases.
When subject lot was certified on January
25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease
contract for fifty (50) years was still in full
force and effect.
Quisimbing vs. Garcia 573 SCRA 266 ,
December 08, 2008 ***
Municipal Corporations; Local Government
Code; Contracts; Prior authorization by the
sanggunian concerned is required before the
local chief executive may enter into
contracts on behalf of the local government
unit.—Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160
provides: Sec. 22. Corporate Powers.—(a)
Every local government unit, as a
corporation, shall have the following
powers: x x x (c) Unless otherwise provided
in this Code, no contract may be entered into
by the local chief executive in behalf of the
local government unit without prior
authorization by the sanggunian concerned.
A legible copy of such contract shall be
posted at a conspicuous place in the
provincial capitol or the city, municipal or
barangay hall. As it clearly appears from the
foregoing provision, prior authorization by
the sanggunian concerned is required before
the local chief executive may enter into
contracts on behalf of the local government
unit.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;
To construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A.
No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would
render the requirement of prior sanggunian
authorization superfluous, useless and
irrelevant.—To construe Sections 306 and
346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec.
22(c) would render the requirement of prior
sanggunian authorization superfluous,
useless and irrelevant. There would be no
instance when such prior authorization
would be required, as in contracts involving
the disbursement of appropriated funds. Yet,
this is obviously not the effect Congress had
in mind when it required, as a condition to
the local chief executive’s representation of
the local government unit in business
transactions, the prior authorization of the
sanggunian concerned. The requirement was
deliberately added as a measure of check
and balance, to temper the authority of the
local chief executive, and in recognition of
the fact that the corporate powers of the
local government unit are wielded as much
by its chief executive as by its council.
However, as will be discussed later, the
sanggunian authorization may be in the
form of an appropriation ordinance passed
for the year which specifically covers the
project, cost or contract to be entered into by
the local government unit.
Same; Same; Same; Should the
appropriation ordinance already contain in
sufficient detail the project and cost of a
capital outlay such that all that the local
chief executive needs to do after undergoing
the requisite public bidding is to execute the
contract, no further authorization is
required, the appropriation ordinance
already being sufficient, but if the
appropriation ordinance describes the
projects in generic terms such as
“infrastructure projects,” “inter-municipal
waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood
control, and irrigation systems projects,”
“reclamation projects” or “roads and
bridges,” there is an obvious need for a
covering contract for every specific project
that in turn requires approval by the
sanggunian.—The question of whether a
sanggunian authorization separate from the
appropriation ordinance is required should
be resolved depending on the particular
circumstances of the case. Resort to the
appropriation ordinance is necessary in order
to determine if there is a provision therein
which specifically covers the expense to be
incurred or the contract to be entered into.
Should the appropriation ordinance, for
instance, already contain in sufficient detail
the project and cost of a capital outlay such
that all that the local chief executive needs
to do after undergoing the requisite public
bidding is to execute the contract, no further
authorization is required, the appropriation
ordinance already being sufficient. On the
other hand, should the appropriation
ordinance describe the projects in generic
terms such as “infrastructure projects,”
“inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and
sewerage, flood control, and irrigation
systems projects,” “reclamation projects” or
“roads and bridges,” there is an obvious
need for a covering contract for every
specific project that in turn requires approval
by the sanggunian. Specific sanggunian
approval may also be required for the
purchase of goods and services which are
neither specified in the appropriation
ordinance nor encompassed within the
regular personal services and maintenance
operating expenses.
Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability
contra personal liability
Inciong vs. Domingo 211 SCRA 139 , July
03, 1992
Same; Same; Employment of petitioner as
counsel even if unauthorized by the
Sangguniang Barangay is binding on
Barangay Caloocan.—The employment by
Barangay Caloocan of petitioner as its
counsel, even if allegedly unauthorized by
the Sangguniang Barangay, is binding on
Barangay Caloocan as it took no prompt
measure to repudiate petitioner’s
employment.
Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court 147 SCRA 447 , January 29, 1987
Attorneys; Local Governments; Private
attorneys cannot represent a province or
municipality in lawsuits; Exceptions.—The
above provision, complemented by Section
3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in
providing that only the provincial fiscal and
the municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in its lawsuits. The
provision is mandatory. The municipality’s
authority to employ a private lawyer is
expressly limited only to situations where
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel;
Employment of private attorney by the
Governor for the benefit of the province
even if ultra vires would estop the latter
from questioning its validity after having
reaped benefits from such representation.—
'The petitioner can not set up the plea that
the contract was ultra vires and still retain
benefits thereunder. Having regarded the
contract as valid for purposes of reaping
some benefits, the petitioner is estopped to
question its validity f or the purposes of
denying answerability.
Pilar vs. Sanguniang Bayan of Dasol,
Pangasinan 128 SCRA 173 , March 12,
1984
Damages; Local Governments; Public
Officers; Attorneys; Municipal Mayor is
personally liable for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees for having
vetoed in bad faith a resolution
appropriating funds for salary of vice-
mayor.—Nevertheless, We find and rule that
petitioner is entitled to damages and
attorney’s fees because the facts show that
petitioner was forced to litigate in order to
claim his lawful salary which was unduly
denied him for three (3) years and that the
Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith
in refusing to satisfy petitioners plainly
valid, just and demandable claim.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—That respondent
Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone
should be held liable and responsible for the
miserable plight of the petitioner is clear.
Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause
on October 26, 1982 the Resolution of the
Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary
of the petitioner. While “to veto or not to
veto involves the exercise of discretion” as
contended by respondents, respondent
Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in
an arbitrary manner when he vetoed the
resolution since there exists sufficient
municipal funds from which the salary of the
petitioner could be paid. Respondent
Mayor’s refusal, neglect or omission in
complying with the directives of the
Provincial Budget Officer and the Director
of the Bureau of Local Government that the
salary of the petitioner be provided for and
paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless
and oppressive, hence, by way of example or
correction for the public good, respondent
Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner
for exemplary or corrective damages.
Liability of Mayor if Driver assigned to him
commits negligence
Jayme vs. Apostol 572 SCRA 41 ,
November 27, 2008
State Immunity; The municipality may not be
sued because it is an agency of the State
engaged in governmental functions and,
hence, immune from suit.—As correctly held
by the trial court, the true and lawful
employer of Lozano is the Municipality of
Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses
Jayme, the municipality may not be sued
because it is an agency of the State engaged
in governmental functions and, hence,
immune from suit. This immunity is
illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union v. Firme, 195 SCRA 692 (1991),
where this Court held: It has already been
remarked that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge
of governmental functions and can only be
held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State
merely gives the claimant the right to show
that the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury was
committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this,
the claimant cannot recover.
Legislative Powers (see ulep notes)
3. Meaning of Quorum
Zamora vs. Caballero 419 SCRA 384 ,
January 14, 2004
Administrative Law; Local Government
Code; Words and Phrases; Definition of
Quorum and Majority.—“Quorum” is
defined as that number of members of a
body which, when legally assembled in their
proper places, will enable the body to
transact its proper business or that number
which makes a lawful body and gives it
power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do
any valid act. “Majority,” when required to
constitute a quorum, means the number
greater than half or more than half of any
total. In fine, the entire membership must be
taken into account in computing the quorum
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while
the constitution merely states that “majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum,”
Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it
requires that the “majority of all members of
the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified”
shall constitute a quorum.
Same; Same; Same; A temporary presiding
officer who merely steps into the shoes of the
presiding officer could not have greater
power than that possessed by the latter who
can vote only in case of a tie.—While acting
as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio
may not, at the same time, be allowed to
exercise the rights of a regular board
member including that of voting even when
there is no tie to break. A temporary
presiding officer who merely steps into the
shoes of the presiding officer could not have
greater power than that possessed by the
latter who can vote only in case of a tie.
4. Sangguniang panlungsod has no
contempt powers
Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
vs. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
155 SCRA 421 , November 05, 1987
Same; Same; Local Government; Contempt
power of the legislature sui generis and
local legislative bodies cannot correctly
claim to possess it.—The exercise of the
legislature of the contempt power is a matter
of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative
power, independently of the judicial branch,
asserts its authority and punishes contempts
thereof. The contempt power of the
legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and
local legislative bodies cannot correctly
claim to possess it for the same reasons that
the national legislature does. The power
attaches not to the discharge of legislative
functions per se but to the character of the
legislature as one of the three independent
and coordinate branches of government. The
same thing cannot be said of local legislative
bodies which are creations of law.
Same; Same; Same; No express provision
either in the 1973 Constitution or in the
Local Government Code granting local
legislative bodies the power to subpoena
witnesses and the power to punish non-
members for contempt; Contempt power and
subpoena power partake of a judicial
nature.—To begin with, there is no express
provision either in the 1973 Constitution or
in the Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local
legislative bodies, the power to subpoena
witnesses and the power to punish non-
members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the
exercise of these powers, the only possible
justification for the issuance of a subpoena
and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behaviour would be for said
power to be deemed implied in the statutory
grant of delegated legislative power. But, the
contempt power and the subpoena power
partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be
implied in the grant of legislative power.
Neither can they exist as mere incidents of
the performance of legislative functions. To
allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these
powers without express statutory basis
would run afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt power
and subpoena power cannot be deemed
implied in the delegation of certain
legislative functions to local legislative
bodies.—Thus, the contempt power, as well
as the subpoena power, which the framers of
the fundamental law did not expressly
provide for but which the then Congress has
asserted essentially for self-preservation as
one of three co-equal branches of the
government cannot be deemed implied in
the delegation of certain legislative functions
to local legislative bodies. These cannot be
presumed to exist in favor of the latter and
must be considered as an exception to Sec. 4
of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules
of interpretation in favor of local autonomy.
Since the existence of the contempt power in
conjunction with the subpoena power in any
government body inevitably poses a
potential derogation of individual rights, i.e.
compulsion of testimony and punishment for
refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally
construed to have impliedly granted such
powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot
be lightly presumed that the sovereign
people, the ultimate source of all
government powers, have reposed these
powers in all government agencies. The
intention of the sovereign people, through
their representatives in the legislature, to
share these unique and awesome powers
with the local legislative bodies must
therefore clearly appear in pertinent
legislation.
5. Other cases
Batangas CATV, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
439 SCRA 326 , September 29, 2004
Political Law; Local Governments;
Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the
laws or policy of the State.—Speaking for
the Court in the leading case of United
States vs. Abendan, Justice Moreland said:
“An ordinance enacted by virtue of the
general welfare clause is valid, unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands, or an Act of the
Philippine Legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of common right.” In De la Cruz
vs. Paras, we laid the general rule “that
ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the
laws or policy of the State.”
VII. REQUIREMENTS AND
PROHIBITIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL
LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
(See Ulep Notes)
RA 6636
AN ACT RESETTING THE LOCAL
ELECTIONS FROM NOVEMBER 9, 1987
TO JANUARY 18, 1988
Section 5. Term. - Local officials duly
elected shall assume office at noon on the
second day of February 1988 and shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
If no candidate has been elected and
qualified to assume office on the
aforementioned date and time, the officer-in-
charge shall continue to hold office until the
duly elected officer has qualified.
RA 7166
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
SYNCHRONIZED NATIONAL AND
LOCAL ELECTIONS AND FOR
ELECTORAL REFORMS,
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 2. Date of Elections. - In accordance
with the policy hereinbefore stated, there
shall be an election for President, Vice-
President, twenty-four (24) Senators, all
elective Members of the House of
Representatives, and all elective provincial,
city and municipal officials on the second
Monday of May, 1992. Thereafter, the
President and Vice-President shall be elected
on the same day every six (6) years; while
the Senators, elective Members of the House
of Representatives and all elective
provincial, city and municipal officials shall
be elected on the same day every three (3)
years, except that with respect to Senators,
only twelve (12) shall be elected.
RA 7887
AN ACT INSTITUTING ELECTORAL
REFORMS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
AMENDING SECTION 3, PARAGRAPHS
(C) AND (D) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7166
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 3, paragraphs (c) and
(d) of Republic Act No. 7166, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
“(c) The number and election of elective
members of the sangguniang panlungsod
and sangguniang bayan in the Metro Manila
area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any
other city with two (2) or more legislative
districts shall be elected by districts and in
accordance with the provisions of Sections 2
and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636: Provided,
That, all cities with one (1) legislative
district and all municipalities in the Metro
Manila area shall have twelve (12)
councilors each: Provided, further, That, the
Commission shall divide all cities with one
legislative district and each of the
municipalities in Metro Manila area into two
(2) districts by barangay for purposes of
representation in the sangguniang bayan as
nearly as practicable according to the
number of inhabitants, each district
comprising a compact, contiguous and
adjacent territory, and
“(d) For purposes of the regular elections on
May 11, 1992 and all general elections
thereafter, the regular elective members of
the sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan, shall be elected at large
in accordance with existing laws.
“The Commission shall promulgate rules
and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of law which may hereafter be
enacted providing for the election of sectoral
representatives.”
RA 8553
AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 41(B)
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Sec. 41(b) of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"(b) The regular members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, and
sangguniang bayan shall be elected
by district as follows:
"First and second-class provinces
shall have ten (10) regular members;
third and fourth-class provinces,
eight (8); and fifth and sixth-class
provinces, six (6): Provided, That in
provinces having more than five (5)
legislative districts, each district shall
have two (2) sangguniang
panlalawigan members, without
prejudice to the provisions of Sec. 2
of Republic Act No. 6637.
Sangguniang barangay members
shall be elected at large. The
presidents of the leagues of
sanggunian members of component
cities and municipalities shall serve
as ex officio members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned. The presidents of the liga
ng mga barangay and the pederasyon
ng mga sangguniang kabataan
elected by their respective chapters,
as provided in this Code, shall serve
as ex officio members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, and
sangguniang bayan."
Cases:
Teves vs. Sandiganbayan 447 SCRA 309 ,
December 17, 2004
Same; Same; Same; Local Government
Code; Cockpits; Since it is the Sangguniang
Bayan that has the authority to issue a
license for the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits, a mayor could not
be found to have intervened or taken part in
his official capacity in the issuance of a
cockpit license because he is not a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan, and if there is no
finding that the mayor is guilty, a fortiori,
there is no legal basis to convict an alleged
co-conspirator.—The Sandiganbayan found
that the charge against Mayor Teves for
causing the issuance of the business permit
or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center is “not well-
founded.” This it based, and rightly so, on
the additional finding that only the
Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a
permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the
year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of
the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan
that has the authority to issue a license for
the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old
LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the
municipal mayor was the presiding officer
of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC
of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is
not even a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have
intervened or taken part in his official
capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license
during the material time, as alleged in the
information, because he was not a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan. A fortiori, there
is no legal basis to convict Teresita Teves as
a co-conspirator in the absence of a finding
that Mayor Teves himself is guilty of the
offense charged. In short, the Sandiganbayan
correctly absolved the petitioners of the
charge based on the first mode. And there is
no need to belabor this point.
Asean Pacific Planners vs. City of Urdaneta
566 SCRA 219 , September 23, 2008
Same; Local Government Units; Attorneys;
The city legal officer is supposed to
represent the city in all civil actions and
special proceedings wherein the city or any
of its officials is a party, but where the
position is as yet vacant, the City Prosecutor
remains the city’s legal adviser and officer
for civil cases.—Section 481(a) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991 mandates
the appointment of a city legal officer.
Under Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC, the
city legal officer is supposed to represent the
city in all civil actions, as in this case, and
special proceedings wherein the city or any
of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court
of Appeals, 269 SCRA 34 (1997), we cited
that under Section 19 of Republic Act No.
5185, city governments may already create
the position of city legal officer to whom the
function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor)
as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of
the city shall be transferred. In the case of
Urdaneta City, however, the position of city
legal officer is still vacant, although its
charter was enacted way back in 1998.
Because of such vacancy, the City
Prosecutor’s appearance as counsel of
Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor
remains as the city’s legal adviser and
officer for civil cases, a function that could
not yet be transferred to the city legal
officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC
should not have allowed the entry of
appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the
City Prosecutor. Notably, the city’s Answer
was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by
Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared
the city’s pre-trial brief and represented the
city in the pre-trial conference. No question
was raised against the City Prosecutor’s
actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its
appearance and claimed that the city lacked
adequate legal representation.
Same; Same; Same; A local government unit
cannot be represented by private counsel as
only public officers may act for and in
behalf of public entities and public funds
should not be spent to hire private
lawyers.—The appearance of the Lazaro
Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is
against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the
LGC provides when a special legal officer
may be employed, that is, in actions or
proceedings where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government. But this case is not
between Urdaneta City and the Province of
Pangasinan. And we have consistently held
that a local government unit cannot be
represented by private counsel as only
public officers may act for and in behalf of
public entities and public funds should not
be spent to hire private lawyers. Pro bono
representation in collaboration with the
municipal attorney and prosecutor has not
even been allowed.

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
A. Qualification and Election
RA 9164
Section 6. Section 424 of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan.
– The katipunan ng kabataan shall be
composed of Filipino citizens
actually residing in the barangay for
at least six (6) months, who are
fifteen (15) but less than eighteen
(18) years of age on the day of the
election, and who are duly registered
in the list of the sangguniang
kabataan or in the official barangay
list in the custody of the barangay
secretary."
Section 7. Section 428 of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 428. Qualifications. – An
elective official of the sangguniang
kabataan must be a Filipino citizen, a
qualified voter of the katipunan ng
kabataan, a resident of the barangay
for at least one (1) year immediately
prior to election, at least fifteen (15)
years but less than eighteen (18)
years of age on the day of the
election, able to read and write
Filipino, English, or the local dialect,
and must not have been convicted of
any crime involving moral
turpitude."
RA 8171
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO
WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have
lost their Philippine citizenship, including
their minor children, on account of political
or economic necessity, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided
in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63,
as amended: Provided, That the applicant
is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold
and teach doctrines opposing organized
government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or associatEon for the predominance
of their ideas;
(3) Person convictad of crimes involving
moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental
alienation or incurablecontagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration
in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau
or Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration
shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino
citizen to the repatriated citizen.
RA 9165
Section 36.
(g) All candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory
drug test.
CASES
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections 257
SCRA 727 , June 28, 1996 – PRO HAC
VICE
Same; Same; The law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship unlike that for
residence and age.—From the above, it will
be noted that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one
year’s residency immediately preceding the
day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).
Same; Same; Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of Qualifications
of Elective Officials not of candidates.—So
too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted
that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of “Qualifications” of
“ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,” not of
candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of
election or at the time of the filing of the
certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists?
Literally, such qualifications—unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the
case of age and residence—should thus be
possessed when the “elective [or elected]
official” begins to govern, i.e., at the time he
is proclaimed and at the start of his term—in
this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing
this Court’s ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and
Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our
people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or
purpose would not be thwarted but instead
achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at
the start of his term.
Same; Same; Same; The Local Government
Code requires an elective official to be a
registered voter, it does not require him to
vote actually.—If the law intended the
citizenship qualification to be possessed
prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then
it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a
redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that
the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER,
even if being a voter presumes being a
citizen first. It also stands to reason that the
voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from “citizenship”), not
to reiterate the need for nationality but to
require that the official be registered as a
voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he
seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: “a
registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x where
he intends to be elected.” It should be
emphasized that the Local Government
Code requires an elective official to be a
registered voter. It does not require him to
vote actually. Hence, registration—not the
actual voting—is the core of this
“qualification.” In other words, the law’s
purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is
actually registered in the area he seeks to
govern—and not anywhere else.
Same; Same; The repatriation of Frivaldo
retroacted to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17, 1994.—But to
remove all doubts on this important issue,
we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the
filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
Same; Same; Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted
by his repatriation.—Being a former
Filipino who has served the people
repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted
by his repatriation.
Salomon vs. National Electrification
Administration 169 SCRA 507 , January 26,
1989
Administrative Law; Local Governments;
Disqualification mandated by provisions
which pertains to elective officers of the
government, except barrio captains and
councilors, is equally applicable to an
appointed member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan which is an elective office;
Purpose of disqualification.—Although the
disqualification mandated by the provisions
pertains to elective officers of the
government, except barrio captains and
councilors, the same is equally applicable to
an appointed member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan which is an elective office.
The prohibition should be construed to refer
to a person holding an office, the assumption
to which, while generally determined by an
election, is not precluded by appointment.
The purpose of the disqualification is to
prevent incumbents of elective offices from
exerting political influence and pressure on
the management of the affairs of the
cooperative. This purpose cannot be fully
achieved if one who is appointed to an
elective office is not made subject to the
same disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner having
been appointed as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan which is a
position above the rank of barangay
captain, cannot remain as director of an
electric cooperative.—Petitioner, having
been appointed as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union, a
position decidedly above the rank of
Barangay Captain, cannot remain as
Director of LUELCO without violating the
spirit and intent of Section 21 P.D. No. 269,
as amended, and Section 3(c) Article IV of
the By-laws of Electric Cooperatives.
Cayat vs. Commission on Elections 522
SCRA 23 , April 24, 2007
Same; Disqualification of Candidates;
Doctrine on Rejection of Second Placers;
Where one of two candidates for the position
of mayor was disqualified by final judgment
before election day, the remaining
candidate, as the only candidate, was not a
second placer even if he got lower number
of votes—he was the sole and only placer,
second to none.—The COMELEC First
Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004
cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy
due to disqualification became final and
executory on 17 April 2004 when Cayat
failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus,
Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor
of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004
elections. Twenty–three days before election
day, Cayat was already disqualified by
final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10
May 2004 elections. As the only candidate,
Palileng was not a second placer. On the
contrary, Palileng was the sole and only
placer, second to none. The doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer, which triggers
the rule on succession, does not apply in the
present case because Palileng is not a
second-placer but the only placer.
Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as
Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond
question.
Same; Same; Same; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,
211 SCRA 297 (1992), and the other cases
applying the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer have one common essential
condition—the disqualification of the
candidate had not become final before the
elections.—Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which
enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of
the second placer, does not apply to the
present case because in Labo there was no
final judgment of disqualification before the
elections. The doctrine on the rejection of
the second placer was applied in Labo and a
host of other cases because the judgment
declaring the candidate’s disqualification
in Labo and the other cases had not
become final before the elections. To
repeat, Labo and the other cases applying
the doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer have one common essential
condition—the disqualification of the
candidate had not become final before the
elections. This essential condition does not
exist in the present case.
Same; Same; Same; The law expressly
declares that a candidate disqualified by
final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be
counted—this is a mandatory provision of
law.—In Labo, Labo’s disqualification
became final only on 14 May 1992, three
days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On
election day itself, Labo was still legally a
candidate. In the present case, Cayat was
disqualified by final judgment 23 days
before the 10 May 2004 elections. On
election day, Cayat was no longer legally a
candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s
candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet
was legally non-existent in the 10 May
2004 elections. The law expressly declares
that a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted
for, and votes cast for him shall not be
counted. This is a mandatory provision of
law.
Jalover vs. Osmeña 736 SCRA 267 ,
September 23, 2014
Same; Residence; The law does not require
a person to be in his home twenty-four (24)
hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill
the residency requirement.—The petitioners,
in the present case, largely rely on
statements that Osmeña was “hardly seen”
in Toledo City, Cebu to support their claim
of error of jurisdiction. These affidavits,
however, deserve little consideration and
loudly speak of their inherent weakness as
evidence. The law does not require a person
to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a
day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the
residency requirement. In Fernandez v.
House Electoral Tribunal, 608 SCRA 733
(2009), we ruled that the “fact that a few
barangay health workers attested that they
had failed to see petitioner whenever they
allegedly made the rounds in Villa de
Toledo is of no moment, especially
considering that there were witnesses
(including petitioner’s neighbors in Villa de
Toledo) that were in turn presented by
petitioner to prove that he was actually a
resident of Villa de Toledo, in the address he
stated in his COC. x x x It may be that
whenever these health workers do their
rounds petitioner was out of the house to
attend to his own employment or business.”
Same; The fact that Osmeña has no
registered property under his name does not
belie his actual residence in Toledo City
because property ownership is not among
the qualifications required of candidates for
local election.—The fact that Osmeña has
no registered property under his name does
not belie his actual residence in Toledo City
because property ownership is not among
the qualifications required of candidates for
local election. It is enough that he should
live in the locality, even in a rented house or
that of a friend or relative. To use ownership
of property in the district as the
determinative indicium of permanence of
domicile or residence implies that only the
landed can establish compliance with the
residency requirement.
B. Disqualification
RA 8295
Section 4. Disqualification. – In addition to
the disqualifications mentioned in Sec.s 12
and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code,
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong, the
following persons are disqualified to run in a
special election called to fill the vacancy in
an elective office, to wit:
a) Any elective official who has
resigned from his office by accepting
an appointive office or for whatever
reason which he previously occupied
but has caused to become vacant due
to his resignation; and
b) Any person who, directly or
indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens,
harasses, intimidates or actually
causes, inflicts or produces any
violence, injury, punishment, torture,
damage, loss or disadvantage to any
person or persons aspiring to become
a candidate or that of the immediate
member of his family, his honor or
property that is meant to eliminate all
other potential candidate.
Section 5. Prohibited acts, election offenses
and penalties. – Any act of coercion,
bribery, threat, harassment, intimidation,
terrorism, or actually causing, inflicting or
producing violence, injury, punishment,
torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to
discourage any other person or persons from
filing a certificate of candidacy in order to
eliminate all other potential candidate from
running in a special election shall constitute
as an election offense. Violations of this
provision shall be prosecuted and penalized
in accordance with the provision of Sec. 264
of the Omnibus Election Code.
RA 9165
Section 27. Criminal Liability of a Public
Officer or Employee for Misappropriation,
Misapplication or Failure to Account for the
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment Including the
Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the
Unlawful Act Committed. – The penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute
perpetual disqualification from any public
office, shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who misappropriates,
misapplies or fails to account for
confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment including the proceeds
or properties obtained from the unlawful
acts as provided for in this Act.
Any elective local or national official found
to have benefited from the proceeds of the
trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed
in this Act, or have received any financial or
material contributions or donations from
natural or juridical persons found guilty of
trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in
this Act, shall be removed from office and
perpetually disqualified from holding any
elective or appointive positions in the
government, its divisions, subdivisions, and
intermediaries, including government-owned
or –controlled corporations.
Section 28. Criminal Liability of
Government Officials and Employees. – The
maximum penalties of the unlawful acts
provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in
addition to absolute perpetual
disqualification from any public office, if
those found guilty of such unlawful acts are
government officials and employees.
RA 9225
Section 3. Retention of Philippine
Citizenship - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________,
solemny swear (or affrim) that I will
support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that
I imposed this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The
unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of
this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines.
Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Election 176
SCRA 1 , August 01, 1989
Election Law; The qualifications for an
elective office are continuing requirements,
once any of them is lost during incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.—
The probability that many of those who
voted for the petitioner may have done so in
the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of
the election cannot nullify the qualifications
for the office now held by him. These
qualifications are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.
In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but
were not possessed at all in the first place on
the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.
Same; The candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes cannot
occupy the office that was vacated as a
result of the disqualification of the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes.—
Finally, there is the question of whether or
not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner
as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio City. The latest ruling of the Court
on this issue is Santos v. Commission on
Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his
winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the
Court then, with three dissenting and another
two reserving their vote. One was on official
leave. Re-examining that decision, the Court
finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of
Geronimo v. Ramos, which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case,
which reiterated the doctrine first announced
in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes, was
supported by ten members of the Court,
without any dissent, although one reserved
his vote, another took no part, and two
others were on leave. There the Court held:
“x x x it would be extremely repugnant to
the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him. Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled
by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast
in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243,
p. 676.) The fact that the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for
the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes
to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not
be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter,
if the votes were cast in the sincere belief
that the candidate was alive, qualified, or
eligible, they should not be treated as stray,
void or meaningless.
Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections
258 SCRA 483 , July 05, 1996
Criminal Procedure; Probation; The legal
effect of probation is only to suspend the
execution of the sentence.—Anent the
second issue where petitioner contends that
his probation had the effect of suspending
the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the
Local Government Code, suffice it to say
that the legal effect of probation is only to
suspend the execution of the sentence.
Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which we
have heretofore declared as a crime of moral
turpitude and thus falling squarely under the
disqualification found in Section 40(a),
subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation. In
fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal
case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is
not executory pending resolution of the
application for probation. Clearly then,
petitioner’s theory has no merit.
Mercado vs. Manzano 307 SCRA 630 , May
26, 1999
Under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, those holding dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby
declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
The disqualification of private respondent
Manzano is being sought under §40 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), which declares as “disqualified from
running for any elective local position: . . .
(d) Those with dual citizenship.” This
provision is incorporated in the Charter of
the City of Makati.8
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship”
in Republic Act No. 7160, §40(d) and in
Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be
understood as referring to “dual
allegiance.”—In including §5 in Article IV
on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates
with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states.
De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections
590 SCRA 149 , June 19, 2009
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9225
imposes an additional requirement on those
who wish to seek elective public office that
is, renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship.—In the instant case, there is no
question that petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship after taking the oath
of allegiance on September 6, 2006.
However, it must be emphasized that R.A.
No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement
on those who wish to seek elective public
office, as follows: x x x x (2) Those seeking
elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
Same; Same; Same; The filing of a
certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto
amount to a renunciation of his foreign
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.—
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the filing of
a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto
amount to a renunciation of his foreign
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our
rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado
are not applicable to the instant case because
R.A. No. 9225 provides for more
requirements.
Same; Same; Same; Section 5(2) of Republic
Act No. 9225 requires the twin requirements
of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship.—In Japzon v. COMELEC (576
SCRA 331 [2009]), the Court held that
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the
twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship, viz.: Breaking down the
afore-quoted provision, for a natural born
Filipino, who reacquired or retained his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, to run for public office, he must:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws; and (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
Justimbaste vs. Commission on Elections
572 SCRA 736 , November 28, 2008
Same; Same; Same; Same; The use of a
name other than that stated in the certificate
of birth is not a material misrepresentation,
as “material misrepresentation” under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
refers to “qualifications for elective
office.”—AT ALL EVENTS, the use of a
name other than that stated in the certificate
of birth is not a material misrepresentation,
as “material misrepresentation” under the
earlier-quoted Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code refers to “qualifications for
elective office.” It need not be emphasized
that there is no showing that there was an
intent to deceive the electorate as to private
respondent’s identity, nor that by using his
Filipino name the voting public was thereby
deceived.
Kare vs. Commission on Elections 428
SCRA 264 , April 28, 2004
Election Law; Election Code; The
COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the
candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes, should the winning
candidate be declared ineligible or
disqualified.—In every election, the choice
of the people is the paramount consideration,
and their expressed will must at all times be
given effect. When the majority speaks by
giving a candidate the highest number of
votes in the election for an office, no one
else can be declared elected in place of the
former. In a long line of cases, this Court has
definitively ruled that the Comelec cannot
proclaim as winner the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of
votes, should the winning candidate be
declared ineligible or disqualified.
Same; Same; Where an “ineligible”
candidate has garnered either a majority or
a plurality of votes, by no mathematical
formulation can the runner-up in the
election be construed to have obtained the
majority or the plurality of votes cast.—
There are instances in which the votes
received by the second placer may not be
considered numerically insignificant. In such
situations, if the equation changes because
of the disqualification of an ineligible
candidate, voters’ preferences would
nonetheless be so volatile and unpredictable
that the results for qualified candidates
would not be self-evident. The absence of
the apparent though ineligible winner among
the choices could lead to a shifting of votes
to candidates other than the second placer.
Where an “ineligible” candidate has
garnered either a majority or a plurality of
the votes, by no mathematical formulation
can the runner-up in the election be
construed to have obtained the majority or
the plurality of votes cast.
Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections 640
SCRA 473 , January 25, 2011
Same; Same; Laws prescribing
qualifications for and disqualifications from
office are liberally construed in favor of
eligibility since the privilege of holding an
office is a valuable one.—Apart from the
qualifications provided for in the
Constitution, the power to prescribe
additional qualifications for elective office
and grounds for disqualification therefrom,
consistent with the constitutional provisions,
is vested in Congress. However, laws
prescribing qualifications for and
disqualifications from office are liberally
construed in favor of eligibility since the
privilege of holding an office is a valuable
one. We cannot overemphasize the principle
that where a candidate has received popular
mandate, all possible doubts should be
resolved in favor of the candidate’s
eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat
the will of the people.
C. Term of office
Section 43. Term of Office. -
(a) The term of office of all local
elective officials elected after the
effectivity of this Code shall be three
(3) years, starting from noon of June
30, 1992 or such date as may be
provided for by law, except that of
elective barangay officials: Provided,
That all local officials first elected
during the local elections
immediately following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992.
(b) No local elective official shall
serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay
officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for
three (3) years, which shall begin
after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of
May 1994.
1987 Constitution Article X
Section 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
RA 8524
AN ACT CHANGING THE TERM OF
OFFICE OF BARANGAY OFFICIALS
AND MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN FROM
THREE (3) YEARS TO FIVE (5) YEARS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTION 43 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED SEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
RA 9164
Section 2. Term of Office. –The term of
office of all barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials after the effectivity of this
Act shall be three (3) years.
CASES
Lonzanida vs. Commission on Elections 311
SCRA 602 , July 28, 1999
Same; Same; Same; Same; Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the
threeterm limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service.—The petitioner cannot be deemed
to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term. The
respondents’ contention that the petitioner
should be deemed to have served one full
term from May 1995-1998 because he
served the greater portion of that term has no
legal basis to support it; it disregards the
second requisite for the application of the
disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. The second
sentence of the constitutional provision
under scrutiny states, “Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for
which he was elected.” The clear intent of
the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the people’s choice
and grant their elected official full service of
a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the
three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but
in compliance with the legal process of writ
of execution issued by the COMELEC to
that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Montebon vs. Commission on Elections 551
SCRA 50 , April 09, 2008
Election Law; Three-Term Limit; The two
conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and 2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.—In
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, 311
SCRA 602 (1999), the Court held that the
two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and 2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. In Borja, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections, 295 SCRA 157
(1998), the Court emphasized that the term
limit for elective officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve in the same elective position.
Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is
not enough that the official has been elected
three consecutive times; he must also have
served three consecutive terms in the same
position.
Same; Same; Succession in local
government offices is by operation of law;
The assumption of office as vice mayor by
the highest ranking municipal councilor in
accordance with law is not considered a
voluntary renunciation of his office as
municipal councilor.—Succession in local
government offices is by operation of law.
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member shall
become vice mayor. Thus: SEC. 44.
Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor.—(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs
in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice
mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice
mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as
defined herein. x x x In this case, a
permanent vacancy occurred in the office of
the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the
highest ranking municipal councilor,
succeeded him in accordance with law. It is
clear therefore that his assumption of office
as vice mayor can in no way be considered a
voluntary renunciation of his office as
municipal councilor.
D. Vacancies and succession( See Ulep
Notes p. 85)
CASES
Fariñas vs. Barba 256 SCRA 396 , April 19,
1996
Municipal Corporations; Local Government
Code; Vacancies; Appointments; Statutory
Construction; Reference to provisions of the
former Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
337) is appropriate because implicit in these
provisions is a policy to vest in the
President, the governor and the mayor in
descending order the exercise of an
executive power whether to appoint in order
to fill vacancies in local councils or to
suspend local officials.—Reference to these
provisions is appropriate not for the reason
advanced by petitioners, i.e., that the power
to appoint implies the power to remove, but
because implicit in these provisions is a
policy to vest in the President, the governor
and the mayor in descending order the
exercise of an executive power whether to
appoint in order to fill vacancies in local
councils or to suspend local officials. These
provisions are in pari materia with §45.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is only one
rule governing appointments to the
Sangguniang Barangay—any vacancy
therein caused by the cessation from office
of a member must be made by the mayor
upon the recommendation of that
Sanggunian.—There is only one rule
governing appointments to the Sangguniang
Barangay. Any vacancy therein caused by
the cessation from office of a member must
be made by the mayor upon the
recommendation of that Sanggunian. The
reason is that members of the Sangguniang
Barangay are not allowed to have party
affiliations.
E. Recall (See Ulep Notes p. 90)
CASES
Ong vs. Alegre 479 SCRA 473 , January 23,
2006
Election Law; Local Government Code;
Term of Office; Requisites for the Three-
Term Limit for Elective Local Government
Officials to Apply.—For the three-term limit
for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post,
and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner Francis’
contention that he was only a presumptive
winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not
make him less than a duly elected mayor.—
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines
Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No.
6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre)
who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and,
therefore, was the legally elected mayor of
San Vicente. However, that disposition, it
must be stressed, was without practical and
legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested
office has expired. Petitioner Francis’
contention that he was only a presumptive
winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not
make him less than a duly elected mayor.
His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office
and his continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term,
should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections 391
SCRA 457 , November 12, 2002
Same; Same; Same; Recall; A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election
but not an immediate reelection after the
third term.—Clearly, what the Constitution
prohibits is an immediate reelection for a
fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth
term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way
in the term following the third consecutive
term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The winner in the
recall election cannot be charged or
credited with the full term of three years for
purposes of counting the consecutiveness of
an elective official’s terms in office.—In
Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began
only from the date he assumed office after
winning the recall election. Talaga’s recall
term did not retroact to include the tenure in
office of his predecessor. If Talaga’s recall
term was made to so retroact, then he would
have been disqualified to run in the 2001
elections because he would already have
served three consecutive terms prior to the
2001 elections. One who wins and serves a
recall term does not serve the full term of his
predecessor but only the unexpired term.
The period of time prior to the recall term,
when another elective official holds office,
constitutes an interruption in continuity of
service. Clearly, Adormeo established the
rule that the winner in the recall election
cannot be charged or credited with the full
term of three years for purposes of counting
the consecutiveness of an elective official’s
terms in office.
Goh vs. Bayron 742 SCRA 303 , November
25, 2014
Same; Same; Same; When the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) receives a
budgetary appropriation for its “Current
Operating Expenditures,” such
appropriation includes expenditures to carry
out its constitutional functions, including the
conduct of recall elections.—Despite
Resolution No. 9882’s statement about the
alleged failure of the 2014 GAA to provide
for a line item appropriation for the conduct
of recall elections, we hold that the 2014
GAA actually expressly provides for a
line item appropriation for the conduct
and supervision of recall elections. This is
found in the Programs category of its 2014
budget, which the COMELEC admits in its
Resolution No. 9882 is a “line item for the
‘Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.’” In
addition, one of the specific constitutional
functions of the COMELEC is to conduct
recall elections. When the COMELEC
receives a budgetary appropriation for its
“Current Operating Expenditures,” such
appropriation includes expenditures to carry
out its constitutional functions, including the
conduct of recall elections. Thus, in Socrates
v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457 (2002)
(Socrates), recall elections were conducted
even without a specific appropriation for
recall elections in the 2002 GAA
F. Local Initiative and Referendum (See
Ulep Notes p. 94)
CASES
Lambino vs. Commission on Elections 505
SCRA 160 , October 25, 2006
Constitutional Law; Amendments and
Revisions of the Constitution; People’s
Initiative; The essence of amendments
“directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the
people—first, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal, and, second,
as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition; The full text
of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it, and if so attached, the petition
must state the fact of such attachment.—The
essence of amendments “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if
the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in
a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the
full text of the proposed amendments. The
full text of the proposed amendments may
be either written on the face of the petition,
or attached to it. If so attached, the petition
must state the fact of such attachment. This
is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had
seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is
physically impossible, given the time
constraint, to prove that every one of the
millions of signatories had seen the full text
of the proposed amendments before signing.
Same; Same; Same; “Amendment” and
“Revision,” Distinguished; Words and
Phrases; The framers of the Constitution
intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between “amendment” and “revision” of
the Constitution.—There can be no mistake
about it. The framers of the Constitution
intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between “amendment” and “revision” of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that a people’s initiative may propose
only amendments to the Constitution. Where
the intent and language of the Constitution
clearly withhold from the people the power
to propose revisions to the Constitution, the
people cannot propose revisions even as
they are empowered to propose
amendments.
Same; Same; Same; Initiative and
Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Judicial
Review; There is no need to revisit the
Court’s ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), declaring
R.A. No. 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions”
to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution—an affirmation or reversal of
Santiago will not change the outcome of the
present petition; The Court must avoid
revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case
before the Court can be resolved on some
other grounds.—The present petition
warrants dismissal for failure to comply with
the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this
Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to cover the
system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of
Santiago will not change the outcome of the
present petition. Thus, this Court must
decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with
the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution. This Court
must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case
before the Court can be resolved on some
other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical
consequence of the well-settled doctrine that
courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute if the case can
be resolved on some other grounds.
G. Disciplinary Action ( see Ulep notes
p. 96)
Rule X
Grounds for Administrative
Disciplinary Action
Section 1.
In addition to the grounds for
administrative disciplinary action
prescribed under existing laws, the
acts and omissions of any official or
employee, whether or not he holds
office or employment in a casual,
temporary, hold-over, permanent or
regular capacity, declared unlawful or
prohibited by the Code, shall
constitute the grounds for
administrative disciplinary action, and
without prejudice to criminal and civil
liabilities provided herein, such as:
(a) Directly or indirectly having
financial and material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of
his office. Financial and material
interest is defined as a pecuniary or
proprietary interest by which a person
will gain or lose something;
(b) Owning, controlling, managing or
accepting employment as officer,
employee, consultant, counsel, broker,
agent, trustee, or nominee in any
private enterprise regulated,
supervised or licensed by his office,
unless expressly allowed by law;
(c) Engaging in the private practice of
his profession unless authorized by the
Constitution, law or regulation,
provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with his
official functions;
(d) Recommending any person to any
position in a private enterprise which
has a regular or pending official
transaction with his office, unless such
recommendation or referral is
mandated by (1) law, or (2)
international agreements,
commitment and obligation, or as part
of the functions of his office;
These acts shall continue to be
prohibited for a period of one (1) year
after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in
the case of paragraph (c) above, but
the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he
used to be with, within one year after
such resignation, retirement, or
separation, provided that any violation
hereof shall be a ground for
administrative disciplinary action
upon re-entry to the government
service.
e) Disclosing or misusing confidential
or classified information officially
known to him by reason of his office
and not made available to the public,
to further his private interests or give
undue advantage to anyone, or to
prejudice the public interest;
(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or
indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of
monetary value which in the course of
his official duties or in connection with
any operation being regulated by, or
any transaction which may be affected
by the functions of, his office. The
propriety or impropriety of the
foregoing shall be determined by its
value, kinship or relationship between
giver and receiver and the motivation.
A thing of monetary value is one
which is evidently or manifestly
excessive by its very nature.
Gift refers to a thing or a right
disposed of gratuitously, or any act of
liberality, in favor of another who
accepts it, and shall include a
simulated sale or an ostensibly
onerous disposition thereof.
Loan covers simple loan and
commodatum as well as guarantees,
financing arrangement or
accommodation intended to ensure its
approval.
Commodatum refers to a
contract whereby one of the parties
delivers to another something not
consumable so that the latter may use
the same for a certain time and return
it.

CASES
Llamas vs. Orbos 202 SCRA 844 , October
15, 1991
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the Court's
considered view that if the President can
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons
and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal
cases with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative
cases.—In the same vein, We do not clearly
see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency
in administrative cases. It is Our considered
view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases,
with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases,
which are clearly less serious than. criminal
offenses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is
clearly within the power of the President not
only to grant executive clemency but also to
reverse or modify a ruling issued by a
subordinate against an erring public
official.—Under the doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency, the different executive
departments are mere adjuncts of the
President. Their acts are presumptively the
acts of the President until countermanded or
reprobated by her (Villena v. Secretary, 67
Phil. 451; Free Telephone Workers Union
vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 108
SCRA 757 [1981]). Relying upon this view,
it is urged by the Solicitor General that in
the present case, the President, in the
exercise of her power of supervision and
control over all executive departments, may
substitute her decision for that of her
subordinate, most especially where the basis
therefor would be to serve the greater public
interest. It is clearly within the power of the
President not only to grant "executive
clemency" but also to reverse or modify a
ruling issued by a subordinate against an
erring public official, where a
reconsideration of the facts alleged would
support the same. It is in this sense that the
alleged executive clemency was granted,
after adducing reasons that subserve the
public interest.
Same; Same; Same; When the Court says the
President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, the Court refers only
to all administrative cases in the Executive
branch of the government.—We wish to
stress however that when we say the
President can grant executive clemency in
administrative Cases, We refer only to all
administrative cases in the Executive
branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative
branches of the government.
Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) 774 SCRA 431 , November 10,
2015
Same; Same; Condonation Doctrine; The
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of
legal bases.—Section 52(a) of the RRACCS
provides that the penalty of dismissal from
service carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding
public office: Section 52. Administrative
Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.—
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office,
and bar from taking the civil service
examinations. In contrast, Section 66(b) of
the LGC states that the penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired
term of the elective local official nor
constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long
as he meets the qualifications required for
the office. Note, however, that the provision
only pertains to the duration of the penalty
and its effect on the official’s candidacy.
Nothing therein states that the
administrative liability therefor is
extinguished by the fact of reelection:
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision.—
x x x. x x x x (b) The penalty of suspension
shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
respondent or a period of six (6) months for
every administrative offense, nor shall said
penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the
respondent so suspended as long as he meets
the qualifications required for the office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with
the above cited legal provisions now leads
this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine
of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases.
Same; Same; Same; Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative
liability arising from an offense done during
a prior term.—The concept of public office
is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the
1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local official’s
administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped
off by the fact that he was elected to a
second term of office, or even another
elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability
arising from an offense done during a prior
term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
from administrative offenses may be
condoned by the President in light of
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in
Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991), to
apply to administrative offenses.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in Section
66(b) states that the elective local official’s
administrative liability is extinguished by the
fact of reelection. Thus, at all events, no
legal provision actually supports the theory
that the liability is condoned.—At best,
Section 66(b) of the LGC prohibits the
enforcement of the penalty of suspension
beyond the unexpired portion of the elective
local official’s prior term, and likewise
allows said official to still run for reelection.
This treatment is similar to People ex rel.
Bagshaw v. Thompson, (55 Cal. App. 2d
147; 130 P.2d.237 [1942]), and Montgomery
v. Nowell, (183 Ark. 1116; 40 S.W.2d 418
[1931]), both cited in Pascual, wherein it
was ruled that an officer cannot be
suspended for a misconduct committed
during a prior term. However, as previously
stated, nothing in Section 66(b) states that
the elective local official’s administrative
liability is extinguished by the fact of
reelection. Thus, at all events, no legal
provision actually supports the theory that
the liability is condoned.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s
(SC’s) abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.—This Court simply finds no
legal authority to sustain the condonation
doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen
from this discourse, it was a doctrine
adopted from one class of US rulings way
back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from —
and now rendered obsolete by — the current
legal regime. In consequence, it is high time
for this Court to abandon the condonation
doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same,
such as Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768
(1992), Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 257
SCRA 55 (1996), Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,
314 SCRA 207 (1999), and Governor
Garcia, Jr. v. CA, 586 SCRA 799 (2009),
which were all relied upon by the CA. It
should, however, be clarified that this
Court’s abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the
sole authority to interpret what the
Constitution means, and all persons are
bound to follow its interpretation. As
explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar
Council, 618 SCRA 639 (2010): Judicial
decisions assume the same authority as a
statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria
that must control the actuations, not only of
those called upon to abide by them, but also
of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
them.
Grego vs. Commission on Elections 274
SCRA 481 , June 19, 1997
Same; Civil Service Law; Words and
Phrases; Reinstatement; Under Presidential
Decree No. 807, the former Civil Service
Decree, the term “reinstatement” had a
technical meaning, referring only to an
appointive position—a public officer
administratively dismissed then was not
therefore barred from running for an
elective position.—Anent Basco’s alleged
circumvention of the prohibition in
Tordesillas against reinstatement to any
position in the national or local government,
including its agencies and instrumentalities,
as well as government-owned or controlled
corporations, we are of the view that
petitioner’s contention is baseless. Neither
does petitioner’s argument that the term
“any position” is broad enough to cover
without distinction both appointive and
elective positions merit any consideration.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the
Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from
running for any elective position. As can be
gleaned from the decretal portion of the said
decision, the Court couched the prohibition
in this wise: “x x x AND WITH
PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO
ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING
ITS AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.” In
this regard, particular attention is directed to
the use of the term “reinstatement.” Under
the former Civil Service Decree, the law
applicable at the time Basco, a public
officer, was administratively dismissed from
office, the term “reinstatement” had a
technical meaning, referring only to an
appointive position. In light of these
definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for
holding that Basco is likewise barred from
running for an elective position inasmuch as
what is contemplated by the prohibition in
Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive
position.
3. Procedure ( see Ulep Notes p. 99)
4. Kinds (same same same)
5. Rights of Respondent (see Ulep
notes p. 103)

6. Administrative Investigation
appeals (same same same)

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Sec 399-420 of LGC