SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.

, in his capacity as Mayor of

the City of Manila G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

Facts

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated
in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to
remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer and
green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil
companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the scale down
program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue

Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local Government
Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.
He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if
these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
Rapanos vs. US

Facts

John Rapanos sought to fill in three wetland areas on his property in order to build a shopping center. Rapanos
ignored warnings from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality that the area was protected
wetlands under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any
pollutant (including dirt or sand) into "navigable waters," which the Act defines as "the waters of the United
States." Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA
as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. After Rapanos also
ignored cease-and-desist orders from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the government brought a
civil suit against him. Rapanos argued before the District Court that the CWA gives the government jurisdiction
to regulate only traditionally navigable waters. The government countered that Rapanos's lands were covered
by the CWA as "adjacent wetlands" under the Corps's interpretation of the Act; the sites drained into man-
made drains which eventually emptied into navigable rivers and lakes. The District Court rejected Rapanos's
argument and upheld the Corps's regulations including the wetlands as "waters of the United States." The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the "hydrological connection" of the wetlands to the
navigable waters qualifies them as "waters of the United States" under the Act.
The Carabells sought to fill in a wetland on their property in order to build a condominium, but were denied a
permit because the wetland was protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government
to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into "navigable waters," which the Act defines
as "the waters of the United States." Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps),
wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of
such waters. Carabell's site is separated from a nearby ditch by a 4-foot-wide berm (earthen barrier), but the
Corps's regulations specify that the wetland is nevertheless adjacent to the waterway. The ditch empties into
another ditch, which in turn empties into a creek and ultimately into Lake St. Clair, a navigable water. After
exhausting administrative appeals, Carabell sued in District Court. Carabell argued that the government lacked
jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate the relatively isolated wetland as part of the "waters of the United
States." The District Court disagreed, and upheld the Corps's expansive interpretation of the CWA. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled for the Corps, holding that as long as wetlands are "adjacent" to
tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and share a "significant nexus" with such waters, the wetlands
qualify as "waters of the United States" for purposes of the CWA.

Question

Does the phrase "waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act include a wetland that at least
occasionally empties into a tributary of a traditionally navigable water?

Conclusion

Unanswered. The closely-divided Court split 4-1-4, with Justice Anthony Kennedy providing the crucial fifth
vote to reject the Sixth Circuit's decision.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by three other Justices. The plurality
rejected the argument that only actually-navigable waters can be regulated by the Clean Water Act, but also
held that the word "navigable" in the Act cannot be divested of all meaning. The plurality held that the
definitional term "waters of the United States" can only refer to "relatively permanent, standing or flowing
bodies of water," not "occasional," "intermittent," or "ephemeral" flows. Furthermore, A mere "hydrological
connection" is not sufficient to qualify a wetland as covered by the CWA; it must have a "continuous surface
connection" with a "water of the United States" that makes it "difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and
the 'wetland' begins."
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, which disagreed with much of the plurality's reasoning.
In Justice Kennedy's view, wetlands need not have a continuous surface connection to a continuously flowing
body of water to be covered under the CWA, but mere adjacency to a tributary of a navigable water is not
sufficient. Instead, Wetlands that are not adjacent to a traditionally navigable water must have a "significant
nexus" with a one. This requirement is satisfied if the wetland has a significant effect on the water quality of
navigable waters. Justice Kennedy suggested that Rapanos's wetlands may be covered under the CWA if
more evidence of a significant nexus were presented.

Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent
argued that the Corps's regulations should be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. The inclusion of
all wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters was most consistent with the CWA's purpose of
eliminating pollution in the nation's waters.
Though the Court failed to obtain a majority on most of the legal issues presented by the case, the plurality and
Justice Kennedy agreed to send the case back to the Sixth Circuit for a new decision based on a different
analysis
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs brought suit requesting an injunction requiring the Secretary of the
Interior (Secretary) to reinstate an initial interpretation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).
The initial interpretation applied the Act to actions taken in foreign nations. The Secretary claimed
that the Plaintiffs lacked standing.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress cannot create standing when an injury in fact, a causal

Facts. The ESA was promulgated to protect endangered and threatened animals. Under the authority
of the ESA, the Secretary declared that the ESA applied to actions outside of the United States. Upon
further review, the Secretary reinterpreted the ESA to be applicable to actions only within the United
States or the high seas. The Plaintiffs, organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation, filed an action
against the Secretary seeking an injunction requiring the Secretary to reinstate the initial
interpretation of the ESA. The Secretary moved for summary judgment due to a lack of standing and
the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the merits. The District Court denied the Secretary’s
motion and affirmed the Plaintiffs motion. The Court of Appeals Affirmed the District Court.

Issue. Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Secretary’s interpretation of the ESA under either
traditional rules of standing or the individual cause of action created within the ESA?

Held. No. Judgment reversed.

The case and controversy requirement of Article III creates three minimal elements in order to have
standing. The plaintiff must have suffered (i) an “injury in fact”; (ii) there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (iii) it must be likely that this injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.
In this case, the Plaintiffs failed to establish injury in fact or redressability. Because of the limited
effect of the ESA, it is too speculative to claim that not enforcing an injunction on the Secretary would
result in an injury in fact to any of the Plaintiffs. Likewise, it is too speculative to assume that any
redress by the courts would have substantial impact on threatened species outside of the United
States.
The Plaintiff’s claim that they suffered a “procedural injury” established by a citizen-suit provision
within the ESA is also without merit. To permit standing based on this Congressional Act would usurp
the power of the Executive to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

Dissent. The Plaintiffs have raised genuine issues of fact as to both injury and redressability.
Additionally, the court’s enforcement of Congressional Acts through the citizen-suit provision do not
violate separation of powers
Concurrence. Congress does have the power to create standing where it had not existed before, but
must identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate that injury to those bringing suit.

Discussion. Congress’s citizen-suit provision in the ESA was unconstitutional because it created a law
where federal courts would be forced to recognize suits where no real world harm had occurred.

Lujan vs. Defenders of Wildlife

Facts
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the
Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or
threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it
scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other
organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that
the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.

Question
Do the respondents have standing to sue?

Conclusion
No. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed
species, there was no proof that these actions would produce "actual or imminent" injuries to
particular respondents who might someday wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court
disregarded the proposed theory of "ecosystem nexus" which claimed that any person who used any
part of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue.

Friends of the Earth, Incorporated v. Laidlaw Environmental Services

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant – respondent, Laidlaw Environmental Services (Defendant), contends
that its shutdown of a waste processing facility and its compliance efforts render a citizen suit under
the Clean Water Act moot.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a defendant argues that voluntary cessation of an activity renders a
suit moot, the defendant has the burden of proving that the allegedly wrong behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.

Facts. Defendant holds a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. Plaintiff –
Petitioner, Friends of Earth, Incorporated (Plaintiff), alleges Defendant was violating mercury
discharge limits of the Clean Water Act, and brought a citizen suit against Defendant. Defendant
argues that the suit is moot either because it achieved substantial compliance with the permit
guidelines by August 1992 or because of its shutdown of the facility in question.

Issue. Can Defendant’s voluntary conduct sustain a finding of mootness?

Held. Not in this case. Reversed and remanded.

A case compelling compliance requires the Plaintiff to establish the complained of behavior will
continue to occur. However, when a Defendant asserts mootness on the basis of his voluntary
conduct, the burden is on the Defendant to show the conduct cannot reasonably be expected to occur
in the future.
In the current case, the Defendant has not demonstrated why or how the complained of actions will
not reoccur in the future.

Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) carves out this mootness
exception for obvious reasons. If a defendant can make a case moot simply by ceasing the
complained of activity, the defendant could stop and restart the same activity for (theoretically) an
infinite amount of time without facing a judicial decision on the activity.
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND
REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB devotions) et al. G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

FACTS

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed
natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of
dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine
combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of
life. In addition, they allege that with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport
sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular
emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD);
that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed
more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due
to the emissions of PUVs.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to
order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987
Constitution, in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
“Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with power
to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are
curbed falls under respondents’ functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the
LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the function
of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law
only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as
alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up
with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
ISSUES
1. Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested alternative of requiring
public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas (cng)
2. Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use compressed natural
gas through a writ of mandamus
RULING
1. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here,
there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles
to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs
based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”
In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and
the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and
the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

2. No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that
will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems
bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No. 290, which implemented a
program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The court was assured that the implementation for a cleaner
environment is being addressed.

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST) GR No. 171947-48 18 December 2008

TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus, PD1152

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the
water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government agencies to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and
do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted
that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents?

2. Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty
to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay,
they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos
to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152)
and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to
public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that these government agencies
are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the
cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to
perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.

VICTORIA SEGOVIA v. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION GR No. 211010, Mar 07, 2017
CAGUIOA, J:

This is a petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to
compel the implementation of the following environmental laws and executive issuances
- Republic Act No. (RA) 9729 (Climate Change Act), and RA 8749 (Clean Air Act); Executive
Order No. 774 (EO 774); AO 254, s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s.
2007 (AO 171).

Accordingly, the Petitioners seek to compel: (a) the public respondents to: (1) implement
the Road Sharing Principle in all roads; (2) divide all roads lengthwise, one-half (1/2) for
all-weather sidewalk and bicycling, the other half for Filipino-made transport vehicles; ( 3)
submit a time-bound action plan to implement the Road Sharing Principle throughout the
country; (b) the Office of the President, Cabinet officials and public employees of Cabinet
members to reduce their fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%) and to take public
transportation fifty percent (50%) of the time; (c) Public respondent DPWH to demarcate
and delineate the road right-of-way in all roads and sidewalks; and ( d) Public respondent
DBM to instantly release funds for Road Users' Tax.

The Facts

To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on
Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through EO
774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members
of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the
"Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:

Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to
reform the transportation sector. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things
must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road."
For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective
transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train).
In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group on
Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport
Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned,
thus:

SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF - In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the
TGFF shall initiate and pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the
Philippines.
Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions:

Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new
paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those
(a) who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall
favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking,
bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train).

Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate
Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead
policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and
evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change.

Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the
Road Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in
the whole country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter-foremost, through
the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government fuel consumption by
fifty percent (50%). Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition.

The Petition

Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children,
who in tum represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have
cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and
reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due
to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by
environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.

These identified violations include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust"
as provided under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance
in the midst of acute public want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce
personal and official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent (50%); ( b) DOTC
and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's failure
to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads and parking lots to sustainable
urban farming as mandated by Section 12(b) of EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to coordinate
with local government units (LGUs) to guide them on the Road Sharing Principle under
Section 9(g) of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant emissions; and lastly, ( f)
DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for purposes stated in Section 9(e) of EO
774.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and
executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in
Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources
or "land, water, and air" by the government without due process of law. They also decry
the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-eight
percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two
percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated
for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike
lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the
outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts.[17] Moreover, respondents argue that petitioners are not entitled to
the reliefs prayed for.
Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan
because they failed to show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or
omission; state the environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities;
and prove that non-implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental
damage. Respondents likewise assert that petitioners are similarly not entitled to a
Continuing Mandamus because: (a) there is no showing of a direct or personal injury or a
clear legal right to the thing demanded; (b) the writ will not compel a discretionary act or
anything not in a public officer's duty to do (i.e. the manner by which the Road Sharing
Principle will be applied; and to compel DA to exercise jurisdiction over roadside lands);
and (c) DBM cannot be compelled to make an instant release of funds as the same
requires an appropriation made by law (Article VI, Section 29[1] of the Constitution) and
the use of the Road Users' Tax (more appropriately, the Motor Vehicle Users' Charge)
requires prior approval of the Road Board.

In any event, respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating
that they have taken and continue to take measures to improve the traffic situation in
Philippine roads and to improve the environment condition - through projects and
programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and
mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major
thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike
Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually and
jointly implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and
mitigate the effects of motorized vehicles on the environment. Contrary to petitioners'
claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact of the transport sector
on the environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on
Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution
improvement actions, greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise
pollution standards for the transport sector.

In response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they
raised in the Petition.

ISSUES

From the foregoing submissions, the main issues for resolution are:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;

2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts; and

3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.

RULING

The petition must be dismissed.

Procedural Issues

Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC),
respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite
standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector of
society and without a concrete interest or injury Petitioners counter that they filed the
suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been
relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal standing
is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.

The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements
on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and
obligations under environmental laws.[24] This has been confinned by this Court's rulings
in Arigo v. Swift, and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines). However, it bears noting
that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan,
wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the
environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the
unlawful act or omission.

Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners
failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for
the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of
the stations of the Court of Appeals, then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is
applicable. Petitioners, on the other hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct
recourse to this Court is available, and that the provision shows that the remedy to
environmental damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the lower
courts.

The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is
an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It
is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for
environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution
of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced
ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the very least, the
magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least
one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed
where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to this
Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions
brought directly before it.

Requisites for issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus

We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs
prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced

and healthful ecology;

2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a

public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and

3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage

of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two
or more cities or provinces.

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a
balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the
petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or
omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
While there can be no disagreement with the general propositions put forth by the
petitioners on the correlation of air quality and public health, petitioners have not been
able to show that respondents are guilty of violation or neglect of environmental laws
that causes or contributes to bad air quality. Notably, apart from bare allegations,
petitioners were not able to show that respondents failed to execute any of the laws
petitioners cited. In fact, apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of
air pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in
establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that
have a causal link or reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature.

Moreover, the National Air Quality Status Report for 2005-2007 (NAQSR) submitted by the
petitioners belies their claim that the DENR failed to reduce air pollutant emissions - in
fact, the NAQSR shows that the National Ambient Total Suspended Particulates (TSP)
value used to determine air quality has steadily declined from 2004 to 2007, and while
the values still exceed the air quality guideline value, it has remained on this same
downward trend until as recently as 2011.

On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully
refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed
by the petitioners. Projects and programs that seek to improve air quality were
undertaken by the respondents, jointly and in coordination with stakeholders, such as:
priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the
Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck
Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and
Urban Re-Greening Programs.

In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the petitioners show that the DENR was, and is,
taking concrete steps to improve national air quality, such as information campaigns,
free emission testing to complement the anti-smoke-belching program and other
programs to reduce emissions from industrial smokestacks and from open burning of
waste. The efforts of local governments and administrative regions in conjunction with
other executive agencies and stakeholders are also outlined.

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing
mandamus as follows:

RULES 8

WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any agency or instrumentality of

the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in
connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation
or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition
concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is
fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious
neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The
petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts
attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of
standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-
interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated a principle. It cannot

be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public
respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in
their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are
purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be
directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined
in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the
recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion,
the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one
way or the other.

This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the
respondents to act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all
roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to Filipino -
made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances that
require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good
intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's
discretion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to
perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoin the bifurcation
of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were
able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that
seek to improve air quality.

At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a
ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road
Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e. the
bifurcation of roads to devote for all - weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made
transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law
or executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to
the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of
discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance
relating to the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the determination of the means
to be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or
executive policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion.

Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice or palpable excess of authority, the general rule applies that discretion cannot
be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing mandamus
cannot issue.

Road Users' Tax

Finally, petitioners seek to compel DBM to release the Road Users' Tax to fund the reform
of the road and transportation system and the implementation of the Road Sharing
Principle.

It bears clarifying that the Road Users' Tax mentioned in Section 9(e) of EO 774,
apparently reiterated in Section 5 of AO 254 is the Special Vehicle Pollution Control Fund
component of the Motor Vehicle Users' Charge ("MVUC") imposed on owners of motor
vehicles in RA 8794, otherwise known as the Road Users' Tax Law. By the express
provisions of the aforementioned law, the amounts in the special trust accounts of the
MVUC are earmarked solely and used exclusively (1) for road maintenance and the
improvement of the road drainage, (2) for the installation of adequate and efficient traffic
lights and road safety devices, and (3) for the air pollution control, and their utilization
are subject to the management of the Road Board. Verily, the petitioners' demand for the
immediate and unilateral release of the Road Users' Tax by the DBM to support the
petitioners' operationalization of this Road Sharing Principle has no basis in law. The
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioner do not rise to the level of law that can
supplant the provisions of RA 8794 that require the approval of the Road Board for the
use of the monies in the trust fund. In other words, the provisions on the release of funds
by the DBM as provided in EO 774 and AO 254 are necessarily subject to the conditions
set forth in RA 8794. Notably, RA 9729, as amended by RA 10174, provides for the
establishment for the People's Survival Fund that may be tapped for adaptation activities,
which similarly require approval from the PSF Board.

That notwithstanding, the claim made by the petitioners that hardly any budget is
allotted to mitigating environmental pollution is belied by the priority given to programs
aimed at addressing and mitigating climate change that the DBM and the CCC had been
tagging and tracking as priority expenditures since 2013. With the coordination of the
DILG, this priority tagging and tracking is cascaded down to the local budget
management of local government units.
Other causes of action

As previously discussed, the petitioners' failure to show any violation on the part of the
respondents renders it unnecessary to rule on other allegations of violation that the
petitioners rely upon as causes of action against the public respondents.

In fine, the allegations and supporting evidence in the petition fall short in showing an
actual or threatened violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology arising from an unlawful act or omission by, or any unlawful neglect on
the part of, the respondents that would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.