DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VS. NATIONAL
The DFA must be
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996
FACTS:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal
dismissal case against ADB. Two summonses were served, one
sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of
Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent
Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers,
were covered by an immunity from legal process except for
borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant
to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the
Asian Development Bank in relation to Section 5 and Section 44
of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of
The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters.
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the
impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from
suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November
1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the
DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA
failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a
petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the
present petition
RULING:
1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB
enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well
as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of
all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter
and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and
privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily
assumed by the Philippine government, which must be
respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a
diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.
"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the
legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local
courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides,
such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of
such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of
its member-states."
2. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates,
the determination of persons and institutions covered by
diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged,
entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair
the conduct of the country's foreign relations.
allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to
enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government
before the international community. When
international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are
deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to
it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this
task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive
department with the competence and authority to so act in this
aspect of the international arena. In a jurisprudence, the Court
has explained the matter in good detail stating that:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency
wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign
court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or
the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic
immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission vs. Calleja, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer
could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was
submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through
their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass
the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make
their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved."
JUSMAG PHILS VS. NLRC
G.R. NO. 108813, Dec 15, 1994
FACTS:
Florento Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74
security assistance support personnel working at the Joint United
States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines He had been
with JUSMAG from 1969- 1992. When dismissed, he held the
position of illustrator 2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAG Phils.
Filipino Civilian Employees Association, a labor org. duly
registered with DOLE. His services were terminated allegedly
due to the abolition of his position. Sacramento filed a complaint
with DOLE on the ground that he was illegally suspended and
dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He asked for reinstatement.
JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity from suit.
The Labor Arbiter in an Order, dismissed the complaint for want
of jurisdiction. Sacramento appealed to the NLRC which held
that the petitioner had lost his right not to be sued because (1)
the principle of estoppel JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of
employer- employee relationship (2) Jusmag has waived its right
to immunity from suit when it hired the services to private
respondent. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not JUSMAG has immunity from suit.
RULING:
Yes.
When JUSMAG took the services of the private respondent, it
was performing a governmental function in behalf of the United
States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between
the Phils. and the US. JUSMAG consists of Air, Naval and Army
group and its primary task was to advise and assist the Phils. on
air force, army and naval matters. A suit against JUSMAG is one
against the United States government, and in the absence of any
waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot prosper. Immunity of State from suitis one of
these universally recognized principles. In international law,
"immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state
and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This
is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states
under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in
violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium(an equal
has no power over an equal).As it stands now, the application of
the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to
sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to
commercial, private and proprietary acts
SEAFDEC V ACOSTA,
G.R. No.s 97468-70, Sept. 2, 1993
FACTS:
SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization,
the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized
through an agreement in 1967 by the governments of Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with
Japan as the sponsoring country.
Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate on a
probationary basis by SEAFDEC-AQD. Lacanilao in his capacity
as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination
to Lazaga informing him that due to the financial constraints
being experienced by the department, his services shall be
terminated. SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay Lazaga his
separation pay forced him to file a case with the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of Lazaga. Thus
SEAFDEC-AQD appealed, claiming that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the case since it is immune from suit owing to its
international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against
the State which cannot be maintained without its consent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the NLRC have jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-
AQD
2. Whether or not the SEAFDEC-AQD estopped for its failure to
raise the issue of jurisdiction at the first instance?
RULING:
1. SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its
Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located.
Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies
have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of
States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social
and mainly non-political. In so far as they are autonomous and
beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical
personality independent of the municipal law of the State where
they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority
"they must be deemed to possess a species of international
personality of their own."
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the
legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local
courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in there operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides,
such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of
such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of
its member-states.
2. Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to
the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a
cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is
none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the
rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate
jurisdiction is null and void.
U.S. VS. HON. RODRIGO,
G.R. No. 79470, February 26, 1990
FACTS:
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Crtalla and Peter
Orascion for his dismissal as a cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center. Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion testified that
Genova poured urine into the soup stock that was served to
customers. Lamachia suspended him and referred the case to a
board of arbitrators who found Genove guilty and recommended
his dismissal. Genove then filed an MS complaint in the RTC of
Baguio against the individual petitioners, who moved to dismiss
the case in the basis that Lamachia was immune from suit as per
acts done in his official capacity as an officer of the US Air Force.
The motion was denied by the RTC, so the petitioners filed a
petition for Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can use State Immunity (Art. XVI,
Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution) as defense.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one
of the generally accepted principles of international law that were
have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such
affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is
that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit
must be regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract,
it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit
with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not
confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its
agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim
that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely
because they have acted as agents of the United States in the
discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial
acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure
imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.
In the case at bar, the restaurant services offered at the John
Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise
undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as
they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim
such immunity because by entering into the employment contract
with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But,
the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the
ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in
the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in
terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably
nauseating act.
EBRO III VS. NLRC,
G.R. No. 110187, Sept. 4, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent International Catholic Migration Commission
is a non-profit agency engaged in international humanitarian and
voluntary work. June 24, 1985, ICMC employed petitioner Jose
G. Ebro III to teach "English as a Second Language and Cultural
Orientation Training Program" at the refugee-processing center.
The employment contract provided in pertinent part that the
monthly salary for the first 6 months probationary period is
P3,155.00 inclusive of cost of living allowance. Upon being made
regular after successful completion of the six (6) months
probationary period your monthly salary will be adjusted to
P3,445.00 inclusive of cost of living allowance and if either party
wishes to terminate employment, a notice of two (2) weeks
should be given in writing to the party.
After six months, ICMC notified petitioner that effective December
21, 1985, the latter's services were terminated for his failure to
meet the requirements of classroom performance up to the
standards set in the Guide for Instruction; regular attendance in
the mandated teacher training, and in the schedule team
meetings, one-on-one conferences with the supervisor, etc.; and
compliance with ICMC and PRPC policies and procedures.
On February 4, 1986, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, accrued
leave pay, 14th month pay, damages, attorney's fees, and
expenses of litigation. Petitioner alleged that there was no
objective evaluation of his performance to warrant his dismissal
and that he should have been considered a regular employee
from the start because ICMC failed to acquaint him with the
standards under which he must qualify as such. He prayed for
reinstatement with backwages, moral, and exemplary, and
nominal damages plus interest on the above claims with
attorney's fees.
After the parties had formally offered their evidence, private
respondents submitted their memorandum on July 31, 1989 in
which, among other things, they invoked ICMC's diplomatic
immunity on the basis of the Memorandum of Agreement signed
on July 15, 1988 between the Philippines government and ICMC.
The Labor Arbiter held that ICMC's legal immunity under the
Memorandum could not be given retroactive effect since "[that
would] deprive complainant's property right without due process
and impair the obligation of contract of employment." He also
expressed doubt on the ground that it was provided for by
agreement and not through an act of Congress. Accordingly, the
Labor Arbiter ordered ICMC to reinstate petitioner as regular
teacher without loss of seniority rights and to pay him one year
backwages, other benefits, and ten percent attorney's fees for a
total sum of P70,944.85.
Both parties appealed to the NLRC. On August 13, 1990,
petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's appeal because
of the latter's failure to post a cash/surety bond. In its order of
October 13, 1992, however, the NLRC ordered the case
dismissed on the ground that, under the Memorandum of
Agreement between the Philippine government and ICMC, the
latter was immune from suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement executed on July
15, 1988 granted ICMC immunity from suit
RULING:
Yes.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly
necessitated by their international character and respective
purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and
interference by the host country in their internal workings. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these
instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to
shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance
with international practice, from political pressure or control by
the host country to the prejudice of member State of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions.
Art III §4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations requires that the
waiver of the privilege must be express. There was no such
waiver of immunity in this case. Nor can ICMC be estopped from
claiming diplomatic immunity since estoppel does not operate to
confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of
action.
Finally, neither can it be said that recognition of ICMC's immunity
from suit deprives petitioner of due process. As pointed out in
ICMC v. Calleja, petitioner is not exactly without remedy for
whatever violation of rights it may have suffered for the following
reason:
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that
"each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate
modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or
other disputes of private character to which the specialized
agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the
Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC and the Philippine
Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC,
the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities
accorded.