ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs.

THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

FACTS:

Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the
register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction.
Krivenko appealed to the Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of
private ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. This means to say that,
under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of
urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void
per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed
that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained
in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except
"upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens
were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.

G.R. NO. L-36731: GODINEZ V. FONG PAK LUEN

Facts:
The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father Jose Godinez to
defendant Fong Pak Luen. Said defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of his co
defendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-
defendant Trinidad S. Navata. The latter is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak
Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and
disqualified to acquire real property; that Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in
said parcel of land as purported contract of sale by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law and
considered non-existent.The defendant filed her answer that the complaint does not state a cause
of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the name of Jose
Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of action has
been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose
Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result
of which a title was issued to said defendant; that under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an
action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of
action accrues; that the right of action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was
filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10-year period provided by law.The trial court
issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed by plaintiffs but
was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the
Constitution and the Civil Code.

Ruling: No
Prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we
see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale
executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely
prohibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is
unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on
imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against
whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply.As earlier mentioned, Fong
Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Navata, a Filipino citizen
qualified to acquire real property. Navata, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified
to own the subject property.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR
LAZO, respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Facts:

Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her husband before
their marriage. Geluz performed an abortion on Nita Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage, she
again became pregnant and since she was employed in the Commission on Elections, the
pregnancy was inconvenient and she had herself aborted again by Geluz. In less than two years,
she again became pregnant and had her two-month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum of fifty
pesos. Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his election and was aware and did not give
consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the award of damages. The trial court and
Court of Appeals predicated the award of damages in the sum of three thousand pesos for moral
damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses Lazo could recover damages from the physician who caused
the same.

Held:

The petition is meritorious.

The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that
is not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action
for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured,
no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The
damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for
the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations. In this case, however,
the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions of his wife, clearly indicative that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and expectations.

The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.