Gonzales vs.

Macaraig “WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is hereby Disapproved and/or Reduced by

Facts:
PETITION for prohibition/mandamus
assailing mainly the constitutionality or
legality of Presidential veto of Section 55.
This constitutional controversy between
the legislative and executive
departments of government stemmed
from Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted
on 2 February 1989,
“Authorizing and Directing the
Committee on Finance to Bring in the
Name of the Senate of the Philippines the
Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the
Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the
President of Special and General
Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the
General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B.
No. 19186) and For Other Purposes.”
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed
House Bill No. 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989.
As passed, it eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed
budget submitted by the President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision on
the passage of bills, Congress presented
the said Bill to the President for
consideration and approval.
On 29 December 1988, the President
signed the Bill into law, and declared the
same to have become Rep. Act No.
6688. In the process, seven (7) Special
Provisions and Section 55, a “General
Provision,” were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the
same Resolution No. 381 mentioned at
the outset, further expressed:
Resolved, That the Senate express its
sense that the veto by the President of
Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of
the General Appropriation Bill of 1989
(H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and,
therefore, void and without any force
and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section
55 remains;
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators,
assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s
veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and
subsequently of its counterpart Section 16
of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY
’90). Gonzalez averred the following:
the President’s line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and
does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90)
which are provision;
when the President objects to a provision
of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should
veto the entire bill;
the item-veto power does not carry with
it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and
the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution,
has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the
exercise of that power.
“SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the
Restoration or Increase of
Recommended Appropriations
Congress: No item of appropriation
recommended by the President in the
Budget submitted to Congress pursuant
to Article VII, Section 22 of the
Constitution which has been disapproved
or reduced in this Act shall be restored or
increased by the use of appropriations
authorized for other purposes by
augmentation. An item of appropriation
for any purpose recommended by the
President in the Budget shall be deemed
to have been disapproved by Congress if
no corresponding appropriation for the
specific purpose is provided in this Act.”
We quote below the reason for the
Presidential veto:
“The provision violates Section 25 (5) of
Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed,
this Section would nullify not only the
constitutional and statutory authority of
the President, but also that of the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads
of Constitutional Commissions, to
augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. A careful
review of the legislative action on the
budget as submitted shows that in almost
all cases, the budgets of agencies as
recommended by the President, as well
as those of the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the Constitutional
Commissions, have been reduced. An
unwanted consequence of this provision
is the inability of the President, the
President of the Senate, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions to
augment any item of appropriation of
their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective
appropriations even in cases of calamity
or in the event of urgent need to
accelerate the implementation of
essential public services and
infrastructure projects.
“Furthermore, this provision is inconsistent
with Section 12 and other similar
provisions of this General Appropriations
Act.”
The Solicitor General, as counsel for
public respondents, counters that the
issue at bar is a political question beyond
the power of this Court to determine; that
petitioners had a political remedy, which
was to override the veto; that Section 55
is a “rider” because it is extraneous to the
Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits
the President’s veto
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President exceeded
the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto `provisions’
of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD:
The restrictive interpretation urged by
petitioners that the President may not
veto a provision without vetoing the
entire bill not only disregards the basic
principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the
Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill
shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation
to the appropriation to which it relates.
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in
a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in
separate legislation, and if it does that,
the inappropriate provisions inserted by it
must be treated as “item,” which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of
his item-veto power. The SC went one
step further and rules that even assuming
arguendo that “provisions” are beyond
the executive power to veto, and Section
55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were
not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of
the term, they are “inappropriate
provisions” that should be treated as
“items” for the purpose of the President’s
veto power.
But even assuming arguendo that
provisions are beyond the executive
power to veto, we are of the opinion that
Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90)
are not provisions in the budgetary sense
of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment
shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision
or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it
relates.”
Explicit is the requirement that a provision
in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some “particular
appropriation” therein. The challenged
“provisions” fall short of this requirement.
Firstly, the vetoed “provisions” do not
relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply generally to all
items disapproved or reduced by
Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
Secondly, the disapproved or reduced
items are nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. To discover them, resort
will have to be made to the original
recommendations made by the President
and to the source indicated by
petitioners themselves, i.e., the
“Legislative Budget Research and
Monitoring Office” (Annex B-1 and B-2,
Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are
more of an expression of Congressional
policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55
(FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) although
labelled as “provisions,” are actually
inappropriate provisions that should be
treated as items for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.
Gonzales v. Macaraig (G.R. No. 87636)
November 19, 1990 | 191 SCRA 133
Neptali Gonzales, et al., petitioners
Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., et al.,
respondents
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino vetoed
Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year
1989 and Section 16 of the GAA for the
fiscal year 1990. The reason cited by
President Aquino was that both of these
sections restrict or prevent the President,
the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House, the heads of the constitutional
commisions and the Chief Justice of the
SC from restoring or increasing items of
appropriation recommended by the
President, which recommendations have
already been reduced or disapproved
by Congress through the assailed GAAs.
In effect, these sections nullify the
statutory and constitutional authority of
the aforesaid officials to augment any
item in the GAA for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their
appropriation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential veto on
Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year
1989 and Section 16 of the GAA for the
fiscal year 1990 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, the presidential veto on Section 55 of
GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section
16 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1990 is
constitutional. These sections were
vetoed because they violate Section 5(5)
of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
grants the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House, the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the CJ of the SC the authority to
augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their
appropriations.
This constitutional mandate, also known
as the power of augmentation, finds
statutory basis in Sections 44 and 45 of PD
1177, which authorizes the President to
use savings to augment any
appropriation in the Executive
Department.
Congress had the power to override the
veto on both sections by having a 2/3
vote of approval by members of each
House, but Congress did not choose to
do so. At the same time, Section 55 of
GAA 1989 and Section 16 of GAA 1990
should not be construed as having
repealed PD 1177, mainly because
implied repeals are frowned upon.
BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April
15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
who are currently receiving pensions
under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797.
President Marcos issued a decree
repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which
authorized the adjustment of the pension
of retired justices and officers and
enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638
was eventually issued by Marcos which
provided for the automatic readjustment
of the pension of officers and enlisted
men was restored, while that of the
retired justices was not. RA 1797 was
restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When
her advisers gave the wrong information
that the questioned provisions in 1992
GAA were an attempt to overcome her
earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino
issued the veto now challenged in this
petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed
RA 1797 never became a valid law
absent its publication, thus there was no
law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in
effect and HB 16297 was superfluous
because it tried to restore benefits which
were never taken away validly. The veto
of HB 16297 did not also produce any
effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President
of certain provisions in the GAA of FY
1992 relating to the payment of the
adjusted pensions of retired Justices is
constitutional or valid.
HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the
GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized,
which is clearly repugnant to fiscal
autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove
special privileges given by law to former
Justices on the ground that there should
be no grant of distinct privileges or
“preferential treatment” to retired
Justices ignores these provisions of the
Constitution and in effect asks that these
Constitutional provisions on special
protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the
questioned veto is illegal and the
provisions of 1992 GAA are declared
valid and subsisting.
Veto Power of the President
FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions
of the Special Provision for the Supreme
Court and the Lower Court’s General
Appropriations were vetoed by the
President because a resolution by the
Court providing for appropriations for
retired justices has been enacted. The
vetoed bill provided for the increase of
the pensions of the retired justices of the
Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the
President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have
vested rights to the accrued pension that
is due to them in accordance to
Republic Act 1797. The president has no
power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither
does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by
her predecessors much less to the repeal
of existing laws. The veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items
in the appropriations bill does not grant
the authority to veto part of an item and
to approve the remaining portion of said
item.
NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed
Under the Constitution, the President
does not have the so-called pocket-veto
power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by
inaction on his part. The failure of the
President to communicate his veto of any
bill represented to him within 30 days
after the receipt thereof automatically
causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice
under the 1935 Constitution of releasing
veto messages long after he should have
acted on the bill. It also avoids
uncertainty as to what new laws are in
force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec
27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which
grants the President power to veto any
particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The
veto in such case shall not affect the item
or items to which he does not object.
3 ways how a bill becomes a law.
1. When the President signs it
2. When the President vetoes it but the
veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the
members of each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon
the measure within 30 days after it shall
have been presented to him.
Bengzon v. Drilon
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the
Special Provision for the Supreme Court
and the Lower Court’s General
Appropriations were vetoed by the
President because a resolution by the
Court providing for appropriations for
retired justices has been enacted. The
vetoed bill provided for the increase of
the pensions of the retired justices of the
Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission.
Issue:
whether the President may veto certain
provisions of the General Appropriatons
Act
Held:
The act of the Executive in vetoing the
particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even
as the Constitution grants the power, it
also provides limitations to its
exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in
its entirety or not at all. He or she is,
therefore, compelled to approve into law
the entire bill, including its undesirable
parts. It is for this reason that the
Constitution has wisely provided the
“item veto power” to avoid inexpedient
riders from being attached to an
indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure. What was done by the
President was the vetoing of a provision
and not an item.
Doctrine: Pocket Veto Power
Under the Constitution, the President
does not have the so-called pocket-veto
power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by
inaction on his part. The failure of the
President to communicate his veto of any
bill represented to him within 30 days
after the receipt thereof automatically
causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice
under the 1935 Constitution of releasing
veto messages long after he should have
acted on the bill. It also avoids
uncertainty as to what new laws are in
force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec
27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which
grants the President power to veto any
particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The
veto in such case shall not affect the item
or items to which he does not object.
3 ways how a bill becomes a law:
1. When the President signs it
2. When the President vetoes it but the
veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the
members of each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon
the measure within 30 days after it shall
have been presented to him.
235 SCRA 506
Philippine Constitution
Association, petitioner
vs.
Enriquez, respondent
Facts:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the
General Appropriations Bill of 1994)
entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for
the Operation of the Government of the
Philippines from January 1 to December
1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was
approved by the President and vetoed
some of the provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision
allowing a member of Congress to
realign his allocation for operational
expenses to any other expense category
claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of
the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality
were raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition
to declare unconstitutional and void a.)
Art 16 on the Countrywide Development
Fund and b.) The veto of the President of
the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the
GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the
issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus against the Exec.
Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and
Management and the National Treasurer
and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the
conditions imposed by the President in
the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special
provision in the appropriation for debt
services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same
respondents. Petitioners contest the
constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four
special provisions added to items in the
GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and
2.) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s,
DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the president
on four special provisions is constitutional
and valid?
Held:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling –
Congress provided for a debt-ceiling.
Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the
entire appropriation for debt service. The
said provisions are germane to & have
direct relation w/ debt service. They are
appropriate provisions & cannot be
vetoed w/o vetoing the entire
item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for
SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of
income & creation of revolving fund for
SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State
Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by
Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege
do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted
in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance –
Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for
maintenance of roads be contracted
according to guidelines set forth by
DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing
the entire appropriation. It is not an
inappropriate provision; it is not alien to
the subj. of road maintenance & cannot
be veoted w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military
Equip. – AFP modernization, prior
approval of Congress required before
release of modernization funds. It is the
so-called legislative veto. Any prov.
blocking an admin. action in
implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval must be subj. of a
separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for
AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to
augment pension funds through the use
of savings. According to the Consttution,
only the Pres. may exercise such power
pursuant to a specific law. Properly
vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-
activation of CAFGU’s – use of special
fund for the compensation of the said
CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior
approval. It is also an amendment to
existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758).
A provision in an appropriation act
cannot be used to repeal/amend
existing laws. VETO VALID
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General
Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994),
was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17,
1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It
also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the "pork
barrels" allotted to them and to realign
their respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President
signed the bill into law, making it as
Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the
same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the
provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions.
Petitioners assail the special provision
allowing a member of Congress to
realign his allocation for operational
expenses to any other expense category
claiming that it violates Section 25, Article
7 of the Constitution. Issues of
constitutionality were raised before the
Supreme Court.
Petition prayed for a writ of prohibition to
declare unconstitutional and void the
provision under Article 16 of the
Countrywide Development Fund and the
veto of the President of the Special
provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
There were 16 members of the Senate
who sought for the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Department of Budget and
Management and the National Treasurer
and questions the constitutionality of the
conditions imposed by the President in
the items of the GAA of 1994 as well as
the constitutionality of the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for
debt services.
Senator Tanada and Senator Romulo
sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against the
same respondents. Petitioners contest the
constitutionality of (1) the veto on four
special provisions added to items in the
GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and
(2) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s,
DPWH, and National Highway Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress have the
legal standing to question the validity of
acts of the Executive.
HELD:
The Court held that the members of
Congress have the legal standing to
question the validity of acts of the
Executive which injures them in their
person or the institution of Congress to
which they belong. In the latter case, the
acts cause derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury which can be
questioned by members of Congress. In
the absence of a claim that the contract
in question violated the rights of
petitioners or impermissibly intruded into
the domain of the Legislature, petitioners
have no legal standing to institute the
instant action in their capacity as
members of Congress.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly
AASJS)1OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO,
ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO
L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in
his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents
from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as
taxpayers filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law “transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the
system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these
officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the
scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such
a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government
agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law
unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter.
While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may
be dismissed from the service if their
revenue collections fall short of the target
by at least 7.5%, the law does not,
however, fix the revenue targets to be
achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It
will therefore be easy for the President to
fix an unrealistic and unattainable target
in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the
creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system
of rewards and incentives limitation to
officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly
delegation of power to fix revenue
targets to the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation
of powers has been violated in the
creation of a congressional oversight
committee.
Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling
of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union, which states that “the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause
of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is
the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. “
To determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power, it needs the following:
(1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v.
Commission on Elections, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power
to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers
as it prevents the over-accumulation of
power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a
valid classification, that is, a classification
that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With
respect to RA 9335, its expressed public
policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject
of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically
pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the
BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally
perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State
exercises one of its great inherent
functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the
BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy
and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out
the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and
4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has
recognized the following as sufficient
standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and
welfare” and “simplicity, economy and
welfare.”33 In this case, the declared
policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this
case. The Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee in RA 9335 was created for
the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR,
BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to
exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function
of implementing and enforcing the law
may be considered moot and
academic.
Facts:
RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to
encourage their officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of
Rewards and Incentives Fund and
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be
composed by their respective
Commissioners, DOF, DBM, and NEDA,
were tasked to prescribe the rules and
guidelines for the allocation, distribution
and release of the fund, to set criteria
and procedures for removing service
officials and employees whose revenue
collection fall short of the target; and
further, to issue rules and regulations. Also,
the law tasked the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR,
BOC and the CSC to promulgate and
issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created solely for
the purpose of approving the formulated
IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a
formulated IRR by the agencies, JCOO
became functus officio and ceased to
exist.
Petitioners, invoking their right as
taxpayers, filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335 and
sought to prevent herein respondents
from implementing and enforcing said
law.
Petitioners assail, among others, the
creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates
the doctrine of separation of powers, as it
permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the
law, when legislative function should
have been deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment of the
law. Respondents, through the OSG,
counter this by asserting that the creation
of the congressional oversight committee
under the law enhances rather than
violates separation of powers, as it
ensures the fulfillment of the legislative
policy.
Issue:
Whether the creation of the
congressional oversight committee
violates the doctrine of separation of
powers
Ruling: YES.
The Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee in RA 9335 having approved
the IRR formulated by the DOF, DBM,
NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22,
2006, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its
alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing
the law may be considered moot and
academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as
good a time as any for the Court to
confront the issue of the constitutionality
of the Joint Congressional.
Congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power
to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers
as it prevents the over-accumulation of
power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of
congressional encroachment “beyond
the legislative sphere,” the Constitution
imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest
itself, any of its committees or its members
with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures” specified under the
Constitution, including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional
measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined
to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘
power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it,
its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of
its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of
confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision
requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which,
by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a “right” or “power” to
approve or disapprove such regulations
before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in
the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash
(other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated
broad powers. It radically changes the
design or structure of the Constitution‘s
diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.
Administrative regulations enacted by
administrative agencies to implement
and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of
law and are entitled to respect.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the
role of an overseer, may not pass upon
their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto
itself, a power exclusively vested in this
Court by the Constitution.
From the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to
approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by
the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the
law.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially
granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
to approve the implementing rules and
regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL
and VOID. The constitutionality of the
remaining provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern as
well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to
publish various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative
orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the
respondents, moved for the dismissal of
the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official
Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude
the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.
It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638
reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette…. The word “shall”
therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of
public concern is to be given substance
and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances
of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general
application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the
decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made
between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be
made in publications of general
circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise
provided” refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or
in any other date, without its previous
publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would
be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra vires act of
the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest eve if
it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all, since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the
law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that
publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith,
or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the
clear light of the sun instead of skulking in
the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the
people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint,
parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF
LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR
IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL
CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code
partly provides that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws
to be effective only a publication thereof
in the Official Gazette will suffice has
entailed some problems, a point
recognized by the Supreme Court in
Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No.
63915, December 29, 1986) when it
observed that "[t]here is much to be said
of the view that the publication need not
be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic release and limited
readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that
"[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the
function of communicating the laws to
the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership,
and come out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing
premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should
accordingly be amended so the laws to
be effective must be published either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws
inconsistent with this Executive Order are
hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take
effect immediately after its publication in
the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day
of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-seven.
GARCIA V. COMELEC
Sept. 30, 1994
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a
petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambansang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which
includes the Municipaloty of Morong as
part of the Subic Special Economic Zone
in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action
on the petition within 30 days after its
submission; so, they resorted to their
power of initiative under the Local
Government Code of 1991. They solicited
the required number of signatures to
repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto
de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the
Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a
letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the
petition for local initiative and/or
referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the
petition for local initiative because its
subject is “merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.”
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg.
10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an
initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the
Comelec to deny the petition be set
aside?
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision
of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is
annulled and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the
power to the people regarding legislation
because of the event in February 1986.
The new Constitution became “less
trusting of public officials.”
Through initiative, the people were given
the power to amend the Constitution
under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides
“amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition
of at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by
at least 3% of the registered voter
therein.”
The Comelec was also empowered to
enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved
RA No. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for
a System of Initiative and Referendum
and Appropriating Funds Therefor.”
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the
Congress shall provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it
provided the 3 systems of initiative,
namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition
to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition
proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation – petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the
limitations on local initiatives, which is
“the power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year.”
MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus
FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)
Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago
ran for presidency and lost in the May
1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th
day of August in the year 1995, reiterated
in her comment of the 29th of August of
the same year, protestant Defensor-
Santiago prayed that the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
dispensed with and the revision process in
the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion
and required, instead, the protestant and
protestee to submit their respective
memoranda. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed
by Defensor-Santiago is moot and
academic by her election as a Senator in
the May 1995 election and her
assumption of office as such on the 30th
of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election
protest filed by Santiago has been
abandoned or considered withdrawn as
a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her
discharge of the duties and functions
thereof.
The protestant abandoned her
“determination to protest and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of
who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest
would serve public interest as it would
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the
results of the 1992 presidential elections,
thereby enhancing the all too crucial
political stability of the nation during this
period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering
the protestant to inform the PET within 10
days if after the completion of the
revision of the ballots from her pilot areas,
she still wishes to present evidence. Since
DS has not informed the Tribunal of any
such intention, such is a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to
do so.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald
Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name
to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated,
on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made
a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan
F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Fornier based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ
on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the
COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack
of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January
2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied
on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier
assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before the Supreme Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petition likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution
of the COMELEC resolutions. The other
petitions, later consolidated with GR
161824, would include GR 161434 and GR
161634, both challenging the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born
citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the
offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987
Constitution expresses that "No person
may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write,
at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined
to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the
date, month and year of birth of FPJ
appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had
been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and
jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to
being a “natural-born” citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector
of Customs (1912), did not last long. With
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become
the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Considering the reservations made by the
parties on the veracity of some of the
entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and
the marriage certificate of his parents,
the only conclusions that could be drawn
with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents
of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
(2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August
1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
were married to each other on 16
September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F.
Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time
of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ,
and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou
are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. But while the totality of the
evidence may not establish conclusively
that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove
whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
Tecson Vs. Comelec
424 SCRA 277
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner
initiated a petition before the COMELEC
to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course
or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born
Filipino citizen.
Held: It is necessary to take on the matter
of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon
his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code.
RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, protestee.
P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005
FACTS:
Past midnight, in the early hours of June
24, 2004, the Congress as the
representatives of the sovereign people
and acting as the National Board of
Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call
vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President
of the Philippines. She obtained
12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232
votes for the second-placer, the movie
actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took
her Oath of Office before the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30,
2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-
placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed
seasonably an election protest before this
Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs.
GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer
with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As
counsels for the parties exchanged lively
motions to rush the presentation of their
respective positions on the controversy,
an act of God intervened. On December
14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course
of his medical treatment at St. Lukes
Hospital.
However, neither the Protestee’s
proclamation by Congress nor the death
of her main rival as a fortuitous
intervening event, appears to abate the
present controversy in the public arena.
Instead, notice may be taken of periodic
mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies
raising an outcry for this Tribunal to
decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ
against Mrs. GMA once and for all.
Together with the formal Notice of the
Death of Protestant, his counsel has
submitted to the Tribunal, dated January
10, 2005, a MANIFESTATION with URGENT
PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT
FPJ, by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora
Poe claiming that because of the
untimely demise of her husband and in
representation not only of her deceased
husband but more so because of the
paramount interest of the Filipino people,
there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late
husband in the election protest initiated
by him to ascertain the true and genuine
will of the electorate in the 2004
elections.
In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs.
GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v.
Menciasand subsequent cases including
analogous cases decided by the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), asserts that the widow of a
deceased candidate is not the proper
party to replace the deceased
protestant since a public office is
personal and not a property that passes
on to the heirs.
Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot
substitute for her deceased husband
because under the Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the
registered candidates who obtained the
2nd and 3rd highest votes for the
presidency may contest the election of
the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did
not receive the 2nd and 3rd highest votes
for she was not even a candidate for the
presidency in the election that is being
contested.
Citing pertinent PET Rules, protestee also
stresses that this Tribunal has no
jurisdiction over actions of surviving
spouses to ascertain the vote of the
electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction
only over election protests and quo
warranto cases.
ISSUE: May the widow
substitute/intervene for the protestant
who died during the pendency of the
latter’s protest case?
RULING: NO.
The fundamental rule applicable in a
presidential election protest is Rule 14 of
the PET Rules.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the
2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the
election. By this express enumeration, the
rule makers have in effect determined
the real parties in interest concerning an
on-going election contest. It envisioned a
scenario where, if the declared winner
had not been truly voted upon by the
electorate, the candidate who received
that 2nd or the 3rdhighest number of
votes would be the legitimate beneficiary
in a successful election contest.
This Tribunal, however, does not have any
rule on substitution nor intervention but it
does allow for the analogous and
suppletory application of the Rules of
Court, decisions of the Supreme Court,
and the decision of the electoral
tribunals.
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on
substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule
allows substitution by a legal
representative. It can be gleaned from
the citation of this rule that
movant/intervenor seeks to appear
before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late
protestant prescribed by said Section 16.
However, in our application of this rule to
an election contest, we have every time
ruled that a public office is personal to
the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death.
Thus, we consistently rejected substitution
by the widow or the heirs in election
contests where the protestant dies during
the pendency of the protest.
Motion of movant/intervenor is DENIED for
lack of merit.
AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO
Facts: The signing of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the
Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in
September 2006 was hailed by both
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
and Philippine President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the
continuing cooperation and
collaboration, setting a new chapter of
strategic partnership for mutual
opportunity and growth (for both
countries).”
JPEPA which has been referred to as a
‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan
for opening up of markets in goods and
services as well as removing barriers and
restrictions on investments. It is a deal that
encompasses even our commitments to
the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the
more evident at the Senate hearing
conducted by the Committee on Trade
and Commerce last November 2006. The
committee, chaired by Senator Mar
Roxas, heard differing views and
perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the
committee heard Government’s rosy
projections on the economic benefits of
JPEPA and on the other hand the views
of environmental and trade activists who
raised there very serious concerns about
the country being turned into Japan’s
toxic waste basket. The discussion in the
Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an
issue concerning trade and economic
relations with Japan but one that touches
on broader national development
concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have
standing to bring this action for
mandamus in their capacity as citizens of
the Republic, as taxpayers, and as
members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise
primary jurisdiction of this case and take
cognizance of the instant petition.
3. Are the documents and information
being requested in relation to the JPEPA
exempted from the general rules on
transparency and full public disclosure
such that the Philippine government is
justified in denying access thereto.
Rulings:
The Supreme Court en banc
promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on
the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action
Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al”
(G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal
dismissed the Petition for mandamus and
prohibition, which sought to compel
respondents Department of Trade
Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas
Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full
text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the
lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process
and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the
full text of the JPEPA has been made
accessible to the public since 11
September 2006, and thus the demand
to be furnished with copy of the said
document has become moot and
academic. Notwithstanding this,
however, the Court lengthily discussed
the substatives issues, insofar as they
impinge on petitioners' demand for
access to the Philippine and Japanese Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our
offers in the course of the negotiations. people's right to information against any
abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal
The Court held: “Applying the principles that We fully share. The Court, however,
adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear in its endeavour to guard against the
that while the final text of the JPEPA may abuse of executive privilege, should be
not be kept perpetually confidential – careful not to veer towards the opposite
since there should be 'ample opportunity extreme, to the point that it would strike
for discussion before [a treaty] is down as invalid even a legitimate
approved' – the offers exchanged by the exercise thereof.”
parties during the negotiations continue
to be privileged even after the JPEPA is Facts:
published. It is reasonable to conclude
that the Japenese representatives Petitioners seek to obtain from
submitted their offers with the respondents the full text of the Japan-
understanding that 'historic Philippines Economic Partnership
confidentiality' would govern the same. Agreement (JPEPA) including the
Disclosing these offers could impair the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
ability of the Philippines to deal not only during the negotiation process and all
with Japan but with other foreign pertinent attachments and annexes
governments in future negotiations.” thereto.The JPEPA, which will be the first
bilateral free trade agreement to be
It also reasoned out that opening for entered into by the Philippines with
public scrutiny the Philippine offers in another country in the event the Senate
treaty negotiations would discourage grants its consent to it, covers a broad
future Philippine representatives from range of topics which includes trade in
frankly expressing their views during goods, rules of origin, customs
negotiations. The Highest Tribunal procedures, paperless trading, trade in
recognized that treaty negotiations services, investment, intellectual property
normally involve a process of quid pro rights, government procurement,
quo, where negotiators would willingly movement of natural persons,
grant concessions in an area of lesser cooperation, competition policy, mutual
importance in order to obtain more recognition, dispute avoidance and
favorable terms in an area of greater settlement, improvement of the business
national interest. environment, and general and final
provisions.
In the same Decision, the Court took time
to address the dissent of Chief Justice Issues:
Reynato S. Puno. It said: “We are aware
that behind the dissent of the Chief a. Whether or not the claim of the
petitioners is covered by the right to
information.
b. Whether the executive privilege
claimed by the respondents applies only
at certain stages of
the negotiation process.
c. Whether there is sufficient public
interest to overcome the claim of
privilege.
d. Whether the Respondents’ failed to
claim executive privilege on time.
Decision:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on
the following reasons:
1.To be covered by the right to
information, the information sought must
meet the threshold requirement that it be
a matter of public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is
no rigid test which can be applied.
‘Public concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both
terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is
for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an
international trade agreement, it is
evident that the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiations
towards its execution are matters of
public concern. This, respondents do not
dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine
of executive privilege, thus constituting
an exception to the right to information
and the policy of full public disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining
whether an information is covered by the
right to information, a specific “showing
of need” for such information is not a
relevant consideration, but only whether
the same is a matter of public concern.
When, however, the government has
claimed executive privilege, and it has
established that the information is indeed
covered by the same, then the party
demanding it, if it is to overcome the
privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for the
satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability
to effectively and reasonably participate
in social, political, and economic
decision-making.
2.Supreme Court stated that the
constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government
and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and
public order.
3.The deliberative process privilege is a
qualified privilege and can be overcome
by a sufficient showing of need. This need
determination is to be made flexibly on a
case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time
[the deliberative process privilege] is
asserted the district court must undertake
a fresh balancing of the competing
interests," taking into account factors
such as "the relevance of the evidence,"
"the availability of other evidence," "the
seriousness of the litigation," "the role of
the government," and the "possibility of
future timidity by government employees.
In the case at hand, Petitioners have
failed to present the strong and
“sufficient showing of need”. The
arguments they proffer to establish their
entitlement to the subject documents fall
short of this standard stated in the
decided cases.
There is no dispute that the information
subject of this case is a matter of public
concern. The Court has earlier concluded
that it is a matter of public concern, not
on the basis of any specific need shown
by petitioners, but from the very nature of
the JPEPA as an international trade
agreement.
Further, the text of the JPEPA having
been published, petitioners have failed to
convince this Court that they will not be
able to meaningfully exercise their right
to participate in decision-making unless
the initial offers are also published.
4.When the respondents invoked the
privilege for the first time only in their
Comment to the present petition does
not mean that the claim of privilege
should not be credited.
Respondents’ failure to claim the
privilege during the House Committee
hearings may not, however, be
construed as a waiver thereof by the
Executive branch. What respondents
received from the House Committee and
petitioner-Congressman Aguja were
mere requests for information. The House
Committee refrained from pursuing its
earlier resolution to issue a subpoena
duces tecum on account of then
Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged
request to Committee Chairperson
Congressman Teves to hold the same in
abeyance.
While it is a salutary and noble practice
for Congress to refrain from issuing
subpoenas to executive officials – out of
respect for their office – until resort to it
becomes necessary, the fact remains
that such requests are not a compulsory
process. Being mere requests, they do not
strictly call for an assertion of executive
privilege.
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY a letter dated 15 November to the
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 Committees requesting them to dispense
with Neri’s testimony on the ground of
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director executive privilege. Ermita invoked the
General of the National Economic and privilege on the ground that “the
Development Authority (NEDA), was information sought to be disclosed might
invited by the respondent Senate impair our diplomatic as well as
Committees to attend their joint economic relations with the People’s
investigation on the alleged anomalies in Republic of China,” and given the
the National Broadband Network (NBN) confidential nature in which these
Project. This project was contracted by information were conveyed to the
the Philippine Government with the President, Neri “cannot provide the
Chinese firm Zhong Xing Committee any further details of these
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), conversations, without disclosing the very
which involved the amount of thing the privilege is designed to
US$329,481,290. When he testified before protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did
the Senate Committees, he disclosed not appear before the respondent
that then Commission on Committees.
Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, On 22 November, respondents issued a
brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him
in exchange for his approval of the NBN to show cause why he should not be
Project. He further narrated that he cited for contempt for his failure to
informed President Gloria Macapagal- attend the scheduled hearing on 20
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and November. On 29 November, Neri replied
that she instructed him not to accept the to the Show Cause Letter and explained
bribe. However, when probed further on that he did not intend to snub the Senate
what they discussed about the NBN hearing, and requested that if there be
Project, petitioner refused to answer, new matters that were not yet taken up
invoking “executive privilege.” In during his first appearance, he be
particular, he refused to answer the informed in advance so he can prepare
questions on 1.) whether or not the himself. He added that his non-
President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) appearance was upon the order of the
whether or not she directed him to President, and that his conversation with
prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she her dealt with delicate and
directed him to approve it. sensitive national
Later on, respondent Committees issued security and diplomatic matters relating
a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to to the impact of the bribery scandal
petitioner, requiring him to appear and involving high government officials and
testify on 20 November 2007. However, the possible loss of confidence of foreign
investors and lenders in the Philippines.
Respondents found the explanation
unsatisfactory, and later on issued an
Order citing Neri in contempt and
consequently ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and
gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to
nullify both the Show Cause Letter and
the Contempt Order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and stressed that his refusal to
answer the three questions was anchored
on a valid claim to executive privilege in
accordance with the ruling in the
landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R.
No. 169777, 20 April 2006). For its part, the
Senate Committees argued that they did
not exceed their authority in issuing the
assailed orders because there is no valid
justification for Neri’s claim to executive
privilege. In addition, they claimed that
the refusal of petitioner to answer the
three questions violates the people’s right
to public information, and that the
executive is using the concept of
executive privilege as a means to
conceal the criminal act of bribery in the
highest levels of government.
Issue:
Whether or not the three questions that
petitioner Neri refused to answer were
covered by executive privilege, making
the arrest order issued by the respondent
Senate Committees void.
Discussion:
Citing the case of United States vs.
Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the
three elements needed to be complied
with in order for the claim to executive
privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the
protected communication must relate to
a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power; 2.) it must be
authored, solicited, and received by a
close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that
an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President; and, 3.) it
may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains
important evidence,” and by the
unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary
Ermita claimed executive privilege on the
argument that the communications
elicited by the three questions “fall under
conversation and correspondence
between the President and public
officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process,” and
that “the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China.” It is clear
then that the basis of the claim is a
matter related to the quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power of
diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the
communications were received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner
Neri can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of the President’s
Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. Presidential
communications are presumptive
privilege and that the presumption can
be overcome only by mere showing of
public need by the branch seeking
access to such conversations. In the
present case, respondent Committees
failed to show a compelling or critical
need for the answers to the three
questions in the enactment of any law
under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the
questions veer more towards the exercise
of the legislative oversight function under
Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs.
Ermita, “the oversight function
of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the
claim of executive privilege does not
violate the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern
simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution itself provides that this right is
“subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.”
Held:
The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-
6) was convinced that the three
questions are covered by presidential
communications privilege, and that this
privilege has been validly claimed by the
executive department, enough to shield
petitioner Neri from any arrest order the
Senate may issue against him for not
answering such questions.
The petition was granted. The subject
Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner in contempt of the Senate
Committee and directing his arrest and
detention was nullified.
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department
of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions
relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited
to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he
was interrogated for 11 hrs and during
which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M
in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed executive privilege. This is because this
him not to accept the bribe. concept has Constitutional
However, when probed further on what underpinnings.
they discussed about the NBN Project, The claim of executive privilege is highly
petitioner refused to answer, invoking recognized in cases where the subject of
“executive privilege”. In particular, he inquiry relates to a power textually
refused to answer the questions on: committed by the Constitution to the
(a) whether or not President Arroyo President, such as the area of military and
followed up the NBN Project, foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
(b) whether or not she directed him to the President is the repository of the
prioritize it, and commander-in-chief, appointing,
(c) whether or not she directed him to pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
approve. Consistent with the doctrine of separation
He later refused to attend the other of powers, the information relating to
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the these powers may enjoy greater
senate averring that the communications confidentiality than others.
between GMA and Neri are privileged Several jurisprudence cited provide the
and that the jurisprudence laid down in elements of presidential communications
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was privilege:
cited in contempt of respondent 1) The protected communication must
committees and an order for his arrest relate to a “quintessential and non-
and detention until such time that he delegable presidential power.”
would appear and give his testimony. 2) The communication must be authored
or “solicited and received” by a close
ISSUE: advisor of the President or the President
Are the communications elicited by the himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
subject three (3) questions covered by must be in “operational proximity” with
executive privilege? the President.
3) The presidential communications
HELD: privilege remains a qualified privilege that
The communications are covered by may be overcome by a showing of
executive privilege adequate need, such that the
The revocation of EO 464 (advised information sought “likely contains
executive officials and employees to important evidence” and by the
follow and abide by the Constitution, unavailability of the information
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, elsewhere by an appropriate
among others, the case of Senate v. investigating authority.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative In the case at bar, Executive Secretary
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in Ermita premised his claim of executive
any way diminish the concept of privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) Respondent Committees further contend particular, he refused to answer 3
questions “fall under conversation and that the grant of petitioner’s claim of questions:
correspondence between the President executive privilege violates the
and public officials” necessary in “her constitutional provisions on the right of (a) whether or not President Arroyo
executive and policy decision-making the people to information on matters of followed up the NBN Project
process” and, that “the information public concern.50 We might have (b) whether or not she directed him to
sought to be disclosed might impair our agreed with such contention if petitioner prioritize it
diplomatic as well as economic relations did not appear before them at all. But (c) whether or not she directed him to
with the People’s Republic of China.” petitioner made himself available to approve it
Simply put, the bases are presidential them during the September 26 hearing,
communications privilege and executive where he was questioned for eleven (11) Unrelenting, the Senate Committees
privilege on matters relating to hours. Not only that, he expressly issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
diplomacy or foreign relations. manifested his willingness to answer more Neri, requiring him to appear and testify
Using the above elements, we are questions from the Senators, with the on November 20, 2007. However,
convinced that, indeed, the exception only of those covered by his Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
communications elicited by the three (3) claim of executive privilege. requested the Senate Committees to
questions are covered by the presidential The right to public information, like any dispense with Neri’s testimony on the
communications privilege. First, the other right, is subject to limitation. Section ground of executive privilege. In his letter,
communications relate to a 7 of Article III provides: Ermita said “that the information sought
“quintessential and non-delegable The right of the people to information on to be disclosed might impair our
power” of the President, i.e. the power to matters of public concern shall be diplomatic as well as economic relations
enter into an executive agreement with recognized. Access to official records, with China.” Neri did not appear before
other countries. This authority of the and to documents, and papers the Committees. As a result, the Senate
President to enter into executive pertaining to official acts, transactions, or issued an Order citing him in contempt
agreements without the concurrence of decisions, as well as to government and ordered his arrest and detention until
the Legislature has traditionally been research data used as basis for policy such time that he would appear and
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. development, shall be afforded the give his testimony.
Second, the communications are citizen, subject to such limitations as may
“received” by a close advisor of the be provided by law. Are the communications elicited by the
President. Under the “operational subject three (3) questions covered by
proximity” test, petitioner can be Neri vs. Senate executive privilege?
considered a close advisor, being a G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. SUGGESTED ANSWER:
And third, there is no adequate showing Former NEDA Director General Romulo
of a compelling need that would justify Neri testified before the Senate for 11 Yes. The Communications elicited by the
the limitation of the privilege and of the hours relating to the ZTE-NBN mess. 3 Questions are covered by Executive
unavailability of the information However, when probed further on what Privilege. xxx “we are convinced that the
elsewhere by an appropriate he and the President discussed about the communications elicited by the questions
investigating authority. NBN Project, he refused to answer, are covered by the presidential
invoking “executive privilege”. In communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to
“quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing
of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
The Senate contends that the grant of
the executive privilege violates the “Right
of the people to information on matters
of public concern”. Is the senate correct?
ANSWER: No. While Congress is
composed of representatives elected by
the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every
exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to
information. The right of Congress or any
of its Committees to obtain information in
aid of legislation cannot be equated with
the people’s right to public information.
The distinction between such rights is laid
down in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear
distinctions between the right of Congress
a to information which underlies the power
of inquiry and the right of people to
information on matters of public concern.
For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his
right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a
citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers
belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen. (visit
fellester.blogspot.com)
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued
Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
E.O. 464. Is there a recognized claim of
executive privilege despite the
revocation of E.O. 464?
ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464
does not in any way diminish our concept
of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
In Senate v. Ermita, the executive
privilege should be invoked by the
President or through the Executive
Secretary “by order of the President.” Did
Executive Secretary Ermita correctly
invoke the principle of executive
privilege, by order of the President?
ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated
November 17, 2007 of Executive
Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement.
It serves as the formal claim of privilege.
There, he expressly states that “this Office
is constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined
in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously,
he is referring to the Office of the
President. That is more than enough
compliance.
May the Congress require the executive
to state the reasons for the claim with
particularity?
ANSWER: No. The Congress must not
require the executive to state the reasons
for the claim with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to protect.
This is a matter of respect to a coordinate
and co-equal department. (Senate v.
Ermita)
Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri
valid?
ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate
claim of executive privilege, the issuance
of the contempt Order suffers from
constitutional infirmity. The respondent
Committees did not comply with the
requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita
that the invitations should contain the
“possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry,”
along with “the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof.”
The SC also find merit in the argument of
the OSG that respondent Committees
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be
in accordance with the “duly published
rules of procedure.” The respondent
Committees’ issuance of the contempt
Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must
be pointed out that respondent
Committees did not first pass upon the
claim of executive privilege and inform
petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they
curtly dismissed his explanation as
“unsatisfactory” and simultaneously
issued the Order citing him in contempt
and ordering his immediate arrest and
detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No.
180643, March 25, 2008)
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
FACTS:
The two petitions in this case sought to
declare unconstitutional Executive Order
No. 284 issued by then President Corazon
C. Aquino.
The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2
and 3 of EO 284 contravenes the
provision of Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution
The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as
follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may in addition to his
primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and
government corporations and receive
the corresponding compensation
therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions
more than what is required in section 1,
they must relinquish the excess position in
favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any
official hold more than two positions
other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of
the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary,
or assistant secretary.
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
meanwhile, states that:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice
any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
civil degree of the President shall not,
during his tenure, be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds
exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII
other than those provided in the
constitution. According to the petitioners,
the only exceptions against holding any
other office or employment in
government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1. The Vice
President (may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3
par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-President
may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation.”) and the secretary of
justice (as an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec.
8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of
the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private
sector.”)
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is
unconstitutional
HELD: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The court said, by allowing Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries to hold at least two positions
in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them
to hold multiple offices or employment
which is a direct contravention of the
express mandate of Article VII, Section 13
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The explained that the phrase “unless
otherwise provided in this
constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the
constitution itself which are Section 3 of
Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article
VIII (for Secretary of Justice).
Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.
FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being
resolved jointly as both seek for the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284)
issued by former President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987.
EO No. 284 allows members of the
Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and
Assistant Secretaries to hold other than
their government positions in addition to
their primary positions.
Section 1: A Cabinet member,
Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his
primary position, hold not more than two
(2) positions in the government and
government corporations and receive
corresponding compensation thereof.
Section 2: If they hold more than the
requisites of Section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of
the subordinate official who is next in rank
but in no case shall any officer hold not
more than two (2) positions other than his
primary position.
Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of
the boards of such corporation should
either be a Secretary, Undersecretary or
Assistant Secretary.
Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's
unconstitutionality as its provisions are in
direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII
of the Constitution. According to the
petitioners, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment
in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President
may be appointed as a Cabinet member
under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The
Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8, Article VIII.
Constitutional provisions:
Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet
and their Deputies or Assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They
shall not, directly or indirectly, during their
tenure, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is
constitutional.
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.
It has been held that in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times and the condition
and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed.
The legislative intent of both
Constitutional provisions is to prevent
government officials from holding
multiple positions in the government for
self enrichment which is a betrayal of
public trust.
The provisions of EO No. 284 above-
mentioned are in direct contradiction to
the express mandate provided by the
Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII
and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the
fundamental law of the land, shall reign
supreme over any other statute. When
there is conflict, it shall be resolved in
favor of the highest law of the land. Thus,
the Court held that EO No. 284 is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR
Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF
Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary
Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary
Guillermo Carague are ordered to
immediately relinquish their offices and
employment.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications
stated, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 284 is hereby
declared null and void and is accordingly
set aside.
National Amnesty Commission vs. COA
Facts:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission
(NAC) is a government agency created
in 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos
through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is
tasked to receive, process and review
amnesty applications. It is composed of 7
members: a Chairperson, three regular
members appointed by the President,
and the Secretaries of Justice, National
Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
After personally attending the initial NAC
meetings, the three ex officio members
turned over said responsibility to their
representatives who were paid honoraria.
However, in 1997, NAC ex officio members
resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on
audit the payment of honoraria to these 3. Are the representatives de
representatives pursuant to COA facto officers and as such are entitled
Memorandum No. 97-038. to allowances?
Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed
Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Held:
Implementing Rules and Regulations of 1. No. COA Memorandum No. 97-038
Proclamation No. 347), which was does not need, for validity and effectivity,
approved by then President Joseph the publication required by Article 2 of
Estrada. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides the Civil Code:
that ex officio members may designate Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
their representatives to the Commission. days following the completion of their
Said Representatives shall be entitled to publication in the Official Gazette, unless
per diems, allowances, bonuses and it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
other benefits as may be authorized by take effect one year after such
law. publication.
We clarified this publication requirement
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order in Taada vs. Tuvera:
No. 2 in assailing before the COA the
rulings of the resident auditor and the [A]ll statutes, including those of local
National Government Audit Office application and private laws, shall be
disallowing payment of honoraria to the published as a condition for their
ex officio members' representatives, to no effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
avail. after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Issues:
Covered by this rule are presidential
1. Whether or not COA committed grave decrees and executive
abuse of discretion in implementing COA orders promulgated by the President in
Memorandum No. 97-038 without the the exercise of legislative powers
required notice and publication under whenever the same are
Article 2 of the Civil Code validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the
2. Whether or not COA committed grave Constitution. Administrative rules and
abuse of discretion disallowing the regulations must also be published if their
payment of honoraria on the ground of purpose is to enforce or implement
lack of authority of representatives to existing law pursuant to a
attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely
an internal and interpretative regulation
or letter of instruction which does not
need publication to be effective and
valid. It is not an implementing rule or
regulation of a statute but a directive
issued by the COA to its auditors to
enforce the self-executing prohibition
imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution on the President and his
official family, their deputies and
assistants, or their representatives from
holding multiple offices and receiving
double compensation.
2. No. The COA is correct that there is no
legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria
or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC
ex officio members' official
representatives.
The representatives in fact assumed their
responsibilities not by virtue of a new
appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members
who were themselves also designated as
such. other euphemism. Such additional
compensation is prohibited by the
There is a considerable difference Constitution.
between an appointment and
designation. An appointment is the Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA
selection by the proper authority of an and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld COA's
individual who is to exercise the powers disallowance of the payment of
and functions of a given office; a honoraria and per diems to the officers
designation merely connotes an concerned who sat as ex officio
imposition of additional duties, usually by members or alternates.
law, upon a person already in the public The agent, alternate or representative
service by virtue of an earlier cannot have a better right than his
appointment. principal, the ex officio member. The
laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that
Designation does not entail payment of cover the ex officio member apply with
additional benefits or grant upon the equal force to his representative. In short,
person so designated the right to claim since the ex officio member is prohibited
the salary attached to the position. from receiving additional compensation
Without an appointment, a designation for a position held in an ex officio
does not entitle the officer to receive the capacity, so is his representative likewise
salary of the position. The legal basis of restricted.
an employee's right to claim the salary
attached thereto is a duly issued and
approved appointment to the position, 3. No. The representatives cannot be
and not a mere designation. considered de facto officers because
they were not appointed but were
In Civil Liberties Union, we held merely designated to act as such.
that cabinet secretaries, including Furthermore, they are not entitled to
their deputies and assistants, who hold something their own principals are
positions in ex officio capacities, are prohibited from receiving.
proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services
are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to their principal
offices. Thus, in the attendance of the Bitonio vs COA
NAC meetings, the ex officio members
were not entitled to, and were in fact Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director
prohibited from, collecting extra IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the
compensation, whether it was called per DOLE. DOLE Acting Secretary Brilliantes
diem, honorarium, allowance or some designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE
representative to the Board of
Directors of PEZA. As representative of the
Secretary of Labor to the PEZA,
Bitonio was receiving a per diem for
every board meeting he attended during
the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit
of the PEZA's disbursement transactions,
the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to the petitioner pursuant to the
ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive
Secretary where Executive Order No. 284
allowing government officials to hold
multiple positions in government
was declared unconstitutional. Thus,
Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
and their Assistant Secretaries, are
prohibited to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions and to receive
compensation therefor, except in cases
where the Constitution expressly provides.
Bitonio filed an MR but the COA denied
the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled
to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No.
7916 specifically and categorically
provides for the payment of a per diem
for the attendance of the members of
the Board of Directorsat board
meetings of PEZA. The petitioner
contends that this law is presumed to be
valid; unless and until the law
is declared unconstitutional, it remains in
effect and binding for all intents and
purposes. Neither can this law be
rendered nugatory on the basis of a
mere memorandum circular COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the
COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A. No.
7916 is a statute more superior than an
administrative directive and the former
cannot just be repealed or amended by
the latter.
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was
enacted four (4) years after the case of
Civil Liberties Union was promulgated. It is,
therefore, assumed that the legislature,
before enacting a law, was aware of the
prior holdings of the courts. Since the
constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No.
7916 was never challenged, the provision
on the payment of per diems remains in
force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties
Union case. Nonetheless, the petitioner's
position as Director IV is not included in
the enumeration of officials prohibited to
receive additional compensation as
clarified in the Resolution of the Court
dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still
entitled to receive the per diems.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA correctly
disallowed the per diems received by the
petitioner for his attendance in the
PEZA Board of Directors meetings as
representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Held:
1. Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in
an ex officio capacity as member of
the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is
prohibited from receiving any
compensation for this additional office,
because his services are already paid for
and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. It follows
that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA
Board merely as representative of the
Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited
from receiving any compensation
therefor. Otherwise, the representative
would have a better right than his
principal, and the fact that the
petitioner’s position as Director IV of the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the
Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment.
After all, the petitioner attended
the board meetings by the authority
given to him by the Secretary of Labor to
sit as his representative. If it were not for
such designation, the petitioner would
not have been in the Board at all.
There is also no merit in the allegation
that the legislature was certainly aware
of the parameters set by the Court when
it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years
after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union
case. The payment of per diems was
clearly an express grant in favor of the
members of the Board of Directors which
the petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative
enactment must not be repugnant to the
highest law of the land which is the
Constitution. No law can render nugatory
the Constitution because the Constitution
is more superior to a statute. If a law
happens to infringe upon or violate the
fundamental law, courts of justice may
step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the
task of the Court to see to it that the law
must conform to the Constitution.
 incompatible offices. applicable to the PCGG Chairman or to
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have the CPLC?
realized the flaw in the law which is the Elma alleged that the strict prohibition
reason why the law was later amended against holding multiple positions 3. Does the ruling that
by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended provided under Section 13, Article VII of the concurrent appointments as PCGG
law, the members of the Board of the 1987 Constitution applies only to Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional,
Directors was increased from 8 to 13, heads of executive departments, their for being incompatible offices, render
specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries and assistant both appointments void?
undersecretaries of the secretaries; it does not cover other public
different Departments who should sit officials given the rank of Secretary, 4. Is there a need to refer the case to the
as board members of the PEZA. The Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. Court en banc?
option of designating his representative
to the Board by the different Cabinet He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Held:
Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that 1. No. The concurrent appointment to
paragraph as to the payment of per should be applied in his case. This these offices is in violation of Section 7,
diems to the members of the Board of provision, according to him, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Directors was also deleted, considering would allow a public officer to hold Constitution, since these
that such stipulation was clearly in multiple positions if (1) the law allows are incompatible offices. An
conflict with the proscription set by the the concurrent appointment of the said incompatibility exists between the
Constitution. official; and (2) the primary functions of positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
either position allows CPLC. The duties of the CPLC
Public Interest Center vs Elma such concurrent appointment. Since include giving independent and impartial
there exists a close relation between the legal advice on the actions of the heads
Elma was appointed as Chairman of the two positions and there is no of various executive departments and
PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, incompatibility between them, the agencies and to review investigations
during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he primary functions of either position involving heads of executive
was appointed as Chief Presidential would allow respondent departments and agencies, as well as
Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the Elma's concurrentappointments to both other Presidential appointees. The PCGG
second appointment, but waived any positions. He further add that the is, without question, an agency under the
renumeration that he may receive as appointment of the CPLC among Executive Department. Thus, the actions
CPLC. incumbent public officials is an accepted of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the
practice. review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent
Petitioner questions Elma will be required to give his
Elma's concurrent appointments as Issues: legal opinion on his own actions as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They PCGG Chairman and review any
contend that the appointments 1. Can the PCGG Chairman concurrently investigation conducted by the
contravene Section 13, Article VII and hold the position of CPLC? Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which
Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 may involve himself as PCGG Chairman.
Constitution. Petitioners also maintained 2. Is the strict prohibition under Section 13, In such cases, questions on his impartiality
that respondent Elma was holding Article VII of the 1987 Constitution will inevitably be raised. This is the
situation that the law seeks to avoid in
imposing the prohibition against holding
incompatible offices.
2. The strict prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not
applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to
the CPLC, as neither of them is
a secretary, undersecretary, nor
an assistant secretary, even if the former
may have the same rank as the latter
positions.
Granting that the prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is applicable to the present
case, the defect in respondent
Elma's concurrent appointments to the
incompatible offices of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC would even be
magnified when seen through the more
stringent requirements imposed by the
said constitutional provision. The said
section allows the concurrent holding of
positions only when: (1) provided for
under the Constitution, such as Section 3,
Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President
to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) the second post is required by the
primary functions of the first appointment
and is exercised in an ex-officio
capacity [which denotes an act done in
an official character, or as
a consequence of office, and without
any other appointment or authority than
that conferred by the office]. Although
respondent Elma waived receiving
renumeration for the second
appointment, the primary functions of the
PCGG Chairman do not require his
appointment as CPLC.
Appointment to the position of PCGG
Chairman is not required by the primary
functions of the CPLC, and vice versa.
The primary functions of the PCGG
Chairman involve the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family
and associates, the investigation of graft
and corruption cases assigned to him by
the President, and the adoption of
measures to prevent the occurrence of
corruption. On the other hand, the
primary functions of the CPLC
encompass a different matter, that is, the
review and/or drafting of legal orders
referred to him by the President. And
while respondent Elma did not receive
additional compensation in connection
with his position as CPLC, he did not act
as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an
ex-officio capacity. The fact that
a separate appointment had to be
made for respondent Elma to qualify as
CPLC negates the premise that he is
acting in an ex-officio capacity.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does
not apply to respondent Elma since
neither the PCGG Chairman nor the
CPLC is a Cabinet secretary,
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that
Section 13, Article VII is applicable to
respondent Elma, he still could not be
appointed concurrently to the offices of
the PCGG appointments in question are
not covered by Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, said appointments
are still prohibited under Section 7, Article
IX-B, which covers all appointive and
elective officials, due to the
incompatibility between the primary
functions of the offices of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC. (Public Interest
Center vs. Elma, G. R. No. 138965, June
30, 2006)
3. The ruling that
the concurrent appointments as PCGG
Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional,
for being incompatible offices, does not
render both appointments void. Following
the common-law rule on incompatibility
of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect,
vacated his first office as PCGG
Chairman when he accepted the
second office as CPLC.
4. There also is no merit in the
respondents’ motion to refer the case to
the Court en banc. What is in question in
the present case is the constitutionality of
respondent
Elma’s concurrent appointments, and not
the constitutionality of any treaty, law or
agreement. The mere application
of constitutional provisions does not
require the case to be heard and
decided en banc. (Public Interest Center
vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007)
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent “people power” revolution
and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philippines to die. But President
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return
at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various
directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due
to possible threats & following
supervening events:
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by
Marcos leaders
channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/
mercenaries aboard a chartered plane
of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to
prove that they can stir trouble from afar
Honasan’s failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus
and prohibition to order the respondents
to issue them their travel documents and
prevent the implementation of President
Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner
questions Aquino’s power to bar his return
in the country. He also questioned the
claim of the President that the decision
was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act
deprives them of their right to life, liberty,
property without due process and equal
protection of the laws. They also said that
it deprives them of their right to travel
which according to Section 6, Article 3 of
the constitution, may only be impaired by
a court order.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each
department has exclusive powers.
According to Section 1, Article VII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, “the
executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines.” However, it
does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same
article it touches on exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power
of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the
appointing power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons… (art VII
secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution
outlines tasks of the president, this list is
not defined & exclusive. She has residual
& discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the
people. She is obliged to protect the
people, promote their welfare &
advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5
of the Constitution). Residual powers,
according to Theodore Roosevelt,
dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the
Constitution (Corwin, supra at
153), inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President (Hyman,
American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during
times of emergency but also on the day-
to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not
absolute. They’re flexible depending on
the circumstances. The request of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the
light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare.
In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be
granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the
court to determine is whether or not there
exist factual basis for the President to
conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses
in the Philippines. It is proven that there
are factual bases in her decision. The
supervening events that happened
before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures
for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to
uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
The president’s power is not fixed. Limits
would depend on the imperatives of
events and not on abstract theories of
law. We are undergoing a critical time
and the current problem can only be
answerable by the President.
Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses
would pose a clear & present danger.
Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility &
obligation to prevent a grave & serious
threat to its safety from arising.
We can’t sacrifice public peace, order,
safety & our political & economic gains
to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the
country. Compassion must give way to
the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’
right to return, live & die in his own
country. It is a right guaranteed by the
Consti to all individuals, whether patriot,
homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
Military representatives failed to show
that Marcos’ return would pose a threat
to national security. Fears were mere
conjectures.
Residual powers – but the executive’s
powers were outlined to limit her powers
& not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
AFP has failed to prove danger which
would allow State to impair Marcos’ right
to return to the Philippines. .
Family can be put under house arrest & in
the event that one dies, he/she should be
buried w/in 10 days.
Untenable that without a legislation, right
to travel is absolute & state is powerless to
restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the
state to restrict this right if national
security, public safety/health demands
that such be restricted. It can’t be
absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t
be arbitrary & irrational.
No proof that Marcos’ return would
endanger national security or public
safety. Fears are speculative & military
admits that it’s under control. Filipinos
would know how to handle Marcos’
return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
President’s determination that Marcos’
return would threaten national security
should be agreed upon by the court.
Such threat must be clear & present.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989,
the Court by a vote of eight to seven,
dismissed the petition, after finding that
the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of former President Marcos
and his family pose a threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. On
September 28, 1989, Marcos died in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a
statement saying that in the interest of
the safety of those who will take the
death of Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the
tranquility and order of the state and
society, she did not allow the remains of
Marcos to be brought back in the
Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by
the petitioners raising the following
arguments:
Barring their return would deny them their
inherent right as citizens to return to their
country of birth and all other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to all
Filipinos.
The President has no power to bar a
Filipino from his own country; if she has,
she had exercised it arbitrarily.
There is no basis for barring the return of
the family of former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for
reconsideration that the Marcoses be
allowed to return in the Philippines be
granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to
return. Motion for Reconsideration denied
because of lack of merit.
Ratio:
Petitioners failed to show any compelling
reason to warrant reconsideration.
Factual scenario during the time Court
rendered its decision has not changed.
The threats to the government, to which
the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased.
Imelda Marcos also called President
Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is
Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.
President has unstated residual powers
implied from grant of executive power.
Enumerations are merely for specifying
principal articles implied in the definition;
leaving the rest to flow from general
grant that power, interpreted in
conformity with other parts of the
Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike
Congress can exercise power from
sources not enumerates so long as not
forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs.
US). This does not amount to dictatorship.
Amendment No. 6 expressly granted
Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987
Constitution granted Aquino with implied
powers.
It is within Aquino’s power to protect &
promote interest & welfare of the people.
She bound to comply w/ that duty and
there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL
MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed
from the presidency, he and his family
fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed,
petitioners are asking the court to order
the respondents to issue their travel
documents and enjoin the
implementation of the President’s
decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the
provision of the Bill of Rights that the
President is without power to impair their
liberty of abode because only a court
may do so “within the limits prescribed by
law.” Nor, according to the petitioners,
may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her
to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under
the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance
national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the
President’s power as protector of the
peace. The president is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-
to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of
the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the
conclusion that their return at this time
would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the state and
instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from
taking preemptive actions against threats
to its existence if, though still nascent they
are perceived as apt to become serious
and direct protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining
the return of the petitioners at the present
time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Ople v Torres 1998
The petitioner seek the attention of the
court to prevent the shrinking of the right
to privacy, Petitioner prays that the
court invalidate Administrative Order No.
308 entitled “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference
System” on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate, and two,
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s
protected zone.
Issue: Whether the implementation of AO
No. 308 violates the Rights to Privacy
enshrined in the constitution?
Held: Yes, A.O. No. 308 cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because facially it violates the
right to privacy. The essence of privacy is
the “right to be let alone.” The right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The potential for
misuse of the data to be gathered under
A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed.
The right to privacy is one of the most
threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various
sources — governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. In the
case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which
by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on
the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of
basic services. Given the record-keeping
power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger
that A.O. No. 308 gives the government
the power to compile a devastating
dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is
timely to take note of the well-worded
warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the disturbing
result could be that everyone will live
burdened by an unerasable record of his
past and his limitations. In a way, the
threat is that because of its record-
keeping, the society will have lost its
benign capacity to forget.” 89 Oblivious
to this counsel, the dissents still say we
should not be too quick in labelling the
right to privacy as a fundamental right.
We close with the statement that the
right to privacy was not engraved in our
Constitution for flattery
HELD:
Yes.
The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection.
The right of privacy is guaranteed in
several provisions of the Constitution:
"Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill
of Rights
Sec. 3. The privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it
is the burden of government to show that
A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations:
(1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and

(2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No.
308. Ople vs. Torres [Rights of Privacy]
But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O.
No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger.
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of
the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control
over what can be read or placed on his
ID, much less verify the correctness of the
data encoded.
They threaten the very abuses that the Bill
of Rights seeks to prevent.
The petition is granted and declared the
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" null and
void for being unconstitutional.
KMU VS Neda
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria
Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive
Order 420 requiring all government
agencies and government-owned
corporations to streamline and harmonize
their Identification Systems. The purposes
of the uniform ID data collection and ID
format are to reduce costs, achieve
efficiency and reliability and ensure
compatibility and provide convenience
to the people served by government
entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is
unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government.
Furthermore, they allege that EO420
infringes on the citizen’s rights to privacy.
ISSUE: In issuing EO 420, did the president
make, alter or repeal any laws?
RULING:
Legislative power is the authority to make
laws and to alter or repeal them. In
issuing EO 420, the President did not
make, alter or repeal any law but merely
implemented and executed existing laws.
EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures
efficiency, reliability, compatibility and
user-friendliness in the implementation of
current ID systems of government entities
under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply
an executive issuance and not an act of
legislation.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420
will violate their right to privacy.
Petitioners cannot show such violation by
a mere facial examination of EO 420
because EO 420 narrowly draws the data
collection, recording and exhibition while
prescribing comprehensive safeguards.
Ople v. Torres18 is not authority to hold
that EO 420 violates the right to privacy
because in that case the assailed
executive issuance, broadly drawn and
devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely
on the ground that the subject matter
required legislation. As then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban noted in his concurring
opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is
decisive only on the need for appropriate
legislation, and it is only on this ground
that the petition is granted by this Court."
EO 420 applies only to government
entities that already maintain ID systems
and issue ID cards pursuant to their
regular functions under existing laws. EO
420 does not grant such government
entities any power that they do not
already possess under existing laws. In
contrast, the assailed executive issuance
in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a
"National Computerized Identification
Reference System,"19 a national ID system
that did not exist prior to the assailed
executive issuance. Obviously, a national
ID card system requires legislation
because it creates a new national data
collection and card issuance system
where none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system but makes
the existing sectoral card systems of
government entities like GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth and LTO less costly, more
efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the
public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject
of executive issuance under the
President’s constitutional power of control
over government entities in the Executive
department, as well as under the
President’s constitutional duty to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed
. Justice can be
Bermudez vs Torres
Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-In-
Charge of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then
Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
for the position of Provincial Prosecutor.
Quiaoit, on the other hand, would
appear to have had the support of then
Representative Jose Yap of the Second
Legislative District of Tarlac. Quiaoit
emerged the victor when he was
appointed by President Ramos to the
coveted office. Quiaoit took his oath and
assumed office. Bermudez refused to
vacate. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed
the duties and functions of the Office of
Provincial Prosecutor.
Petitioner Bermudez filed a petition for
prohibition and/or injunction, and
mandamus, challenging the
appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice prescribed under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. Section
9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that “all
provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary.”
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a
recommendation of the Secretary of
held fatal to the
appointment of respondent Conrado
Quiaoit.
Held:
When the Constitution or the law clothes
the President with the power to appoint a
subordinate officer, such conferment
must be understood as necessarily
carrying with it an ample discretion of
whom to appoint. It should be here
pertinent to state that the President is the
head of government whose authority
includes the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Control means the authority of an
empowered officer to alter or modify, or
even nullify or set aside, what a
subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties, as well as to
substitute the judgment of the latter, as
and when the former deems it to be
appropriate. Expressed in another way,
the President has the power to assume
directly the functions of an executive
department, bureau and office. It can
accordingly be inferred therefrom that
the President can interfere in the exercise
of discretion of officials under him or
altogether ignore their
recommendations.
The phrase upon recommendation of the
Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II,
Title III, Book IV, of the Revised
Administrative Code, should be
interpreted, as it is normally so
understood, to be a mere advise,
exhortation or indorsement, which is
essentially persuasive in character
and not binding or obligatory upon the
party to whom it is made. The
recommendation is here nothing really
more than advisory in nature. The
President, being the head of the
Executive Department, could very
well disregard or do away with the action
of the departments, bureaus, or offices
even in the exercise of discretionary
authority, and in so opting, he cannot be
said as having acted beyond the scope
of his authority.
In the instant case, the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice and the
appointment of the President are acts of
the Executive Department itself, and
there is no sharing of power to speak of,
the latter being deemed for all intents
and purposes as being merely an
extension of the personality of the
President
Facts:
The Petitioner, Oscar Bermudez, and the
Respondent, Atty. Conrado Quiaoit, were
aiming for the vacant position in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac. Eventually, Respondent Quiaoit
was appointed by Pres. Ramos. Upon
receiving the certified photocopy of his
appointment, he took his office, assumed
and immediately informed it to the
President, the Secretary of Justice and
the Civil Service Commission. Even
though, Petitioner Bermudez refuses to
vacate the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, Respondent Quiaoit
performed his functions and duties. Both
the Bermudez and Quiaoit were
summoned to by then Justice Secretary
Teofisto Guigona Jr. in his office and
ordered Bermudez to wind up his cases
and to turn-over the contested office to
the Quiaoit. The Petitioners then filed a
petition challenging the appointment of
Quiaot on the ground that his
appointment lacks the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice prescribed
under the Revised Administrative Code of
1987. It was dismissed, as well as the
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a
recommendation from the Secretary of
Justice can be held fatal to the
appointment of the Respondent Quiaoit.
Ruling:
No, the phrase “upon recommendation
of the Secretary” found in Section 9,
Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised
Administrative Code should
interpreted as a mere advise which is
essentially persuasive in character and
not binding or obligatory upon the party
to whom it is made.
recommendation here is nothing really
more than advisory in nature. The
President, being the head of the
Executive Department, could very well
disregard or do away with the action of
the departments, bureaus or offices even
in the exercise of discretionary authority,
and in so opting, he cannot be said as
having acted beyond the scope of his
authority.
When the Constitution or the law clothes
the President with the power to appoint a
subordinate officer, such conferment
must be understood as necessarily
carrying with it an ample discretion of
whom to appoint. It should be pertinent
to state that the President is the head of
government whose authority includes the
power of control over all “executive
departments, bureaus and offices.”
Control means the authority of an
empowered officer to alter or modify, or
even nullify or set aside, what a
subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties, as well as to
substitute the judgment of the latter, as
and when the former deems it to be
appropriate. Expressed in another way,
the President has the power to assume
directly the functions of an executive
department, bureau and office. It can
accordingly be inferred therefrom that
the President can interfere in the exercise
of discretion of officials under him or
altogether ignore their
be recommendations.
The