Art. 1347.
IV. MARRIAGE
I. DEFINITION
Article 1. FAMILY CODE
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)
Art. 16. FAMILY CODE
In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties
concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate
issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this
Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect
that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said
certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a
period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the
marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative
sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice,
the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
Article 14. P.D. 1083
Nature. Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. Its nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation, except
that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
1. SPECIAL CONTRACT
Art. 1305.
A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. (1254a)
Art. 1306.
The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. (1255a)
Art. 1318.
There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. (1261)
Art. 1319.
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance
absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it came to
his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into in the place
where the offer was made. (1262a)
All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be
the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of
contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
may likewise be the object of a contract. (1271a)
Art. 1350. NCC
In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the
prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other; in remuneratory ones, the service or
benefit which is remunerated; and in contracts of pure beneficence, the mere liberality of the
benefactor. (1274)
2. PERMANENT UNION
Art. 149. FC
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
(216a, 218a)
Section 1. ART. XV 1987 CONST.
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. ART. XV 1987 CONST.
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
A. NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES
Art. 35. FC
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents
or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. FC
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. FC
Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. FC
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)
Art. 41. FC
A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
Art. 52. FC
The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. FC
Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
B. ANNULLABLE MARRIAGES
Art. 45. FC
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years
of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable. (85a)
C. ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
Art. 26. FC
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended
by Executive Order 227)
Art. 13. FC
In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit
setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death
of the deceased spouse. (61a)
Art. 45. FC
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years
of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. FC
Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time
of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing
at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)
Art. 47. FC
The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within
the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did
not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the
parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no
knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of
the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid
interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after
the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from
the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
after the marriage. (87a)
Art. 48. FC
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 49. FC
During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a
written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses
and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent
with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate
visitation rights of the other parent. (n)
Art. 50. FC
The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article
44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. FC
In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice
the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or
absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. FC
The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. FC
Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
PD 1083 ARTS. 45-53 (DIVORCE IN ISLAM)
Article 45.
Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in
accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of
reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
(b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila);
(c) Injurious assanilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);
(d) Acts of imprecation (li'an);
(e) Redemption by the wife (khul');
(f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwld); or
(g) Judicial decree (faskh).
Article 46.
Divorce by talaq. (f) Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next succeeding article; or

(1) A divorce by talaq may be affected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during
her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with
her. Any number of repudiations made during one tuhr shall constitute only one repudiation and
shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed 'idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to
take her back (ruju) within the prescribed 'idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a
new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable
(Talaq bain sugra).
(g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the dissolution of marriage by faskh either
at the instance of the wife or the proper wali.
Article 53.
Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. A decree of faskh on the ground of unusual
cruelty may be granted by the court upon petition of the wife if the husband:
(a)Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruel conduct even if this does not
result in physical injury;

Article 47. (b) Associates with persons of ill-repute or leads an infamous life or attempts to force the wife to
Divorce by Ila. Where a husband makes a vow to abstain from any carnal relations live an immoral life;
(ila) with his wife and keeps such ila for a period of not less than four months, she may be
granted a decree of divorce by the court after due notice and hearing. (c) Compels her to dispose of her exclusive property or prevents her from exercising her legal
rights over it;
Article 48.
Divorce by zihar. Where the husband has injuriously assimilated (zihar) his wife to any (d) Obstructs her in the observance of her religious practices; or
of his relatives within the prohibited degrees of marriage, they shall mutually refrain from having
carnal relation until he shall have performed the prescribed expiation. The wife may ask the (e) Does not treat her justly and equitably as enjoined by Islamic law.
court to require her husband to perform the expiationor to pronounce the a regular talaq should
he fail or refuse to do so, without prejudice to her right of seeking other appropriate remedies.
3. BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN
Article 49.
Divorce by li'an. Where the husband accuses his wife in court of adultery, a decree of Section 1. ART. III 1987 CONST.
perpetual divorce may be granted by the court after due hearing and after the parties shall have No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
performed the prescribed acts of imprecation (li'an). shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Article 50.
4. ENTERED INTO IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
Divorce by khul'. The wife may, after having offered to return or renounce her dower or
to pay any other lawful consideration for her release (khul') from the marriage bond, petition the
court for divorce. The court shall, in meritorious cases and after fixing the consideration, issue FAMILY CODE
the corresponding decree. 1987 CONSTITUTION
PD 1083
Article 51.
Divorce by tafwid. If the husband has delegated (tafwid) to the wife the right to effect a 5. FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONJUGAL AND FAMILY LIFE
talaq at the time of the celebration of the marriage or thereafter, she may repudiate the marriage
and the repudiation would have the same effect as if it were pronounced by the husband himself. Section 12. ART II 1987 CONST.
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
Article 52. family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
Divorce by faskh. The court may, upon petition of the wife, decree a divorce by faskh the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
on any of the following grounds : rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at least six consecutive
months; 6. INVIOLABLE SOCIAL INSTITUTION
(b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for at least one Section 2. ART XV 1987 CONST.
year; Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
(c) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without reasonable cause his marital
obligation in accordance with this code; II. PRESUMPTION
(d) Impotency of the husband;
SECTION 3(aa) RULE 131 ROC
That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
(e) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable disease which would make the
a lawful contract of marriage;
continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family;
 III. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
Art. 2. FC
No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
1. LEGAL CAPACITY OF PARTIES, WHO MUST BE MALE AND FEMALE
Article 1. FC
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)
Art. 2. FC
No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
Art. 4. FC
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (n)
Art. 5. FC
Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
Art. 21. FC
When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall
be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of
legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such
capacity to contract marriage.
Art. 26. FC
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Art. 35. FC
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents
or guardians;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 37. FC
Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. FC
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
spouse, or his or her own spouse.
Art. 40. FC
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Art. 41. FC
A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 45. FC
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years
of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable.
Art. 52. FC
The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. FC
Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 15. NCC
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Article 8. PD 1083
Legal capacity.
Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Art. 350. RPC
Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. — The penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being
included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or
that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.chanrobles virtual law library
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of
violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
provided in the next preceding paragraph.
2. CONSENT FREELY GIVEN
Art. 15. FC
Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged
to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such
advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months
following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the
contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written
advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents
or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. (62a)
Art. 16. FC
In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties
concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate
issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this
Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect
that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said
certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a
period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the
marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative
sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice,
the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Art. 35. FC
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
Art. 45. FC
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years
of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable.
Art. 1327. NCC
The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)
Art. 1328. NCC
Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a state
of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable. (n)
Art. 1329. The incapacity declared in Article 1327 is subject to the modifications determined by
law, and is understood to be without prejudice to special disqualifications established in the laws.
(1264)
Art. 1330. NCC
A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud is voidable. (1265a)
Art. 1331. NCC
In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the
thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one
or both parties to enter into the contract.
Mistake as to the identity or qualifications of one of the parties will vitiate consent only
when such identity or qualifications have been the principal cause of the contract.
A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction.
IV. FORMAL REQUISITES
Art. 3. FC
The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
1. AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
Art. 4. FC
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Art. 7. FC
Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his
church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of
the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the
contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the
latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.
Art. 10. FC
Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general,
consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license
and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the
celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official.
Art. 27. FC
In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage
may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives. (72a)
Art. 28. FC
If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a)
Art. 29. FC
In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall
state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized
to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of
either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that
the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting
parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a)
Art. 30. FC
The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the
legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to
the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days
after the performance of the marriage. (75a)
Art. 31. FC
A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be
solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane
is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a)
Art. 32. FC
A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 33. FC
Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may
be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)
Art. 34. FC
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath
that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
Art. 35. FC
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
2. VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE
Art. 9. FC
A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title. (58a)
Art. 11. FC
Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
(1) Full name of the contracting party;
(2) Place of birth;
(3) Age and date of birth;
(4) Civil status;
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
(6) Present residence and citizenship;
(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;
(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;
(9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and
(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the
contracting party has neither father nor mother and is under the age of twenty-one years.
The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence
certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license. (59a)
Art. 12. FC
The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation
of the original birth certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting
parties or copies of such documents duly attested by the persons having custody of the
originals. These certificates or certified copies of the documents by this Article need not be
sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of
the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity.
If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate
or a certified copy of either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by
an affidavit of such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not
yet been received though the same has been required of the person having custody thereof at
least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his
current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil
registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall
contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name,
residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the
place and date of birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be
preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the
locality.
The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of
the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to
the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local
civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before
him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age.
Art. 13. FC
In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit
setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death
of the deceased spouse. (61a)
Art. 14. FC
In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a
previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to
the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their
marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of
them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested
party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit
made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to
administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage
license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a)
Art. 15. FC
Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged
to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such
advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months
following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the
contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written
advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents
or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. (62a)
Art. 16. FC
In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties
concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate
issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this
Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect
that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said
certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a
period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the
marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative
sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice,
the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
Art. 17. FC
The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and
residences of the applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The
notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local
civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the general
public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the
completion of the period of publication. (63a)
Art. 18. FC
In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention,
he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage
license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication,
unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party.
No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond required for the
issuances of the order. (64a)
Art. 19. FC
The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or
regulations before the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the
nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued
free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or whose
income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath
before the local civil registrar. (65a) chan robles virtual law library
Art. 20. FC
The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred
twenty days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the
expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date
shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued. (65a)
Art. 21. FC
When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall
be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of
legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such
capacity to contract marriage. (66a)
Art. 22. FC
The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as
husband and wife, shall also state:
(1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;
(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;
(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
(5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in
appropriate cases;
(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement
regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and
(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
Art. 23. FC
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to
the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be
issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper
cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place
other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)
Art. 24. FC
It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this
Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The
documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n)
Art. 25. FC
The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses
filed with him in a registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall
record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the marriage license was
issued, and such other data as may be necessary.
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage
may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives. (72a)
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a)
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state
in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to
administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of
either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that
the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting
parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a)
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible
copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local
civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the
performance of the marriage. (75a)
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be
solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane
is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a)
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may
be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath
that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen
years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without
the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party
freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife
3. MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that
they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage
certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by
the solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the
marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the
name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul,
as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court
deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (619a)
Art. 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the testator written below his signature must be
dated and signed by him in order to make them valid as testamentary dispositions. (n)
Art. 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being
dated, and the last disposition has a signature and a date, such date validates the dispositions
preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions. (n)
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the
testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. (n)
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the
forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in
the Philippines. (n)
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n)
Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. (669)
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall
not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they
may have been executed. (733a)

SUBSECTION 4. - Witnesses to Wills
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not bind, deaf
or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in
Article 805 of this Code. (n)
Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
V. DIVORCE
Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to
ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such
advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months
following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the
contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written
advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents
or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
spouse, or his or her own spouse.
PD 1083
Article 45.
Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with
this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between
the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
(b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila);
(c) Injurious assanilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);
(d) Acts of imprecation (li'an);
(e) Redemption by the wife (khul');
(f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwld); or
(g) Judicial decree (faskh).
Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
(1) A divorce by talaq may be affected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during
her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with
her. Any number of repudiations made during one tuhr shall constitute only one repudiation and
shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed 'idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to
take her back (ruju) within the prescribed 'idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a
new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable
(Talaq bain sugra).
Article 47. Divorce by Ila. Where a husband makes a vow to abstain from any carnal relations
(ila) with his wife and keeps such ila for a period of not less than four months, she may be
granted a decree of divorce by the court after due notice and hearing.
Article 48. Divorce by zihar. Where the husband has injuriously assimilated (zihar) his wife to
any of his relatives within the prohibited degrees of marriage, they shall mutually refrain from
having carnal relation until he shall have performed the prescribed expiation. The wife may ask
the court to require her husband to perform the expiationor to pronounce the a regular talaq
should he fail or refuse to do so, without prejudice to her right of seeking other appropriate
remedies.
Article 49. Divorce by li'an. Where the husband accuses his wife in court of adultery, a decree of
perpetual divorce may be granted by the court after due hearing and after the parties shall have
performed the prescribed acts of imprecation (li'an).
Article 50. Divorce by khul'. The wife may, after having offered to return or renounce her dower
or to pay any other lawful consideration for her release (khul') from the marriage bond, petition
the court for divorce. The court shall, in meritorious cases and after fixing the consideration,
issue the corresponding decree.
Article 51. Divorce by tafwid. If the husband has delegated (tafwid) to the wife the right to effect a
talaq at the time of the celebration of the marriage or thereafter, she may repudiate the marriage
and the repudiation would have the same effect as if it were pronounced by the husband himself.
Article 52. Divorce by faskh. The court may, upon petition of the wife, decree a divorce by faskh
on any of the following grounds :
(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at least six consecutive
months;
(b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for at least one
year;
(c) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without reasonable cause his marital
obligation in accordance with this code;
(d) Impotency of the husband;
(e) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable disease which would make the
continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family;
(f) Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next succeeding article; or
(g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the dissolution of marriage by faskh either
at the instance of the wife or the proper wali.
Article 53. Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. A decree of faskh on the ground of unusual
cruelty may be granted by the court upon petition of the wife if the husband:
(a)Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruel conduct even if this does not
result in physical injury;
(b) Associates with persons of ill-repute or leads an infamous life or attempts to force the wife to
live an immoral life;
(c) Compels her to dispose of her exclusive property or prevents her from exercising her legal
rights over it;
(d) Obstructs her in the observance of her religious practices; or
(e) Does not treat her justly and equitably as enjoined by Islamic law.
RULE 132 ROC
Sec. 19 . Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents
are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b)Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c)Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered
therein.
All other writings are private.
Sec. 23 . Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (24a)
Sec. 24 . Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 29 . How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence
of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c)
fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.
RULE 39 ROC
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

CASES
3. BETWEEN MAN AND A WOMAN
FULL CASE: SILVERIO V REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came
two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s
sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change
of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to
the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their
dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It
ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and
sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as
clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in
case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as
used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that
has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning
are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36
Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret CASE DIGEST:
the law, not to make or amend it.
Facts:
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
statute-based.
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States. He
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
sex reassignment surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Congress.
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
of Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
by reason of sex... alteration.
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic.
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
Issues:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Costs against petitioner.
Ruling:
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
through surgery.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.[20] In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's first name
was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an... improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts... and judicial
decrees
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by... any law, expressly or impliedly.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the... correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Principles:
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.[11] A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for change of name
are controlled by statutes.[13] In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or... nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications... for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103... and 108... f the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1)
The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2)
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3)
The change will avoid confusion.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:[24]
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of...
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground... of sex reassignment.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term... status… include such
matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.[28] (emphasis supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the... civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen,
tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has
no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as
Republic of the Philippines
well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
SUPREME COURT
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
Manila
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
SECOND DIVISION
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
Petitioner,
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr.
- versus -
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because
Respondent.
of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because
G.R. No. 166676
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
Present:
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs
Carpio Morales,
prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs
for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner’s body produces male
Tinga,
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen
to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
VELASCO, JR., and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to
BRION, JJ.
make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of
the prescribed fees:
Promulgated:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
September 12, 2008
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal certificate, and
DECISION
other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
QUISUMBING, J.:
SO ORDERED.[3]
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law
and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
abovementioned ruling.
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff
The issues raised by petitioner are:
Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
The facts are as follows.
I.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT
BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
II.
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR
"GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION,
i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground
of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG
further contends respondent’s petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior
to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna
was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the
Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16,
2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,8 respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent
substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the
person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by
an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof,
and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for
three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province,
as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior
to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition.
The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that
such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the
court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall
be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation
of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment
shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise,
the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name
in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case
can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings,
the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.13 The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.14
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the
local civil registrar.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century,
medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as
either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex
individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the
rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male
or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who
are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony
and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in
the
subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.
It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose
not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal
more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
CASE DIGEST:
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CAGANDAHAN
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
Published by paul on August 12, 2013 | Leave a response
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name
FACTS:
is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of respondent’s
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to
Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his
Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
costs.
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
SO ORDERED.
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case,
the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court
made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent
thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.
CASE DIGEST: OBERGEFELL V HODGES reputable studies on the effects of LGBT parenting. Id. at 59-60. APA's amicus briefs filed in the
Sixth Circuit urged this conclusion.
Obergefell v. Hodges
Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. On Jan. 16,
Brief Filed: 5/1/2014
2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in all four cases on the following questions:
Court: 6th Circuit Court of Appeals
Year of Decision: 2014
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex?Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage
Read full-text amicus brief (PDF, 506KB)
between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed
out-of-state?
Issue
At issue is a federal challenge to the laws against same-sex marriage in Ohio.

Index Topics
Sexual Orientation (discrimination; same sex-marriage)

Facts
James Obergefell and John Arthur, a same-sex couple alleging that the state discriminates
against same-sex couples who have married lawfully out-of-state. Arthur, who was terminally ill
and suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), sought to identify Obergefell as his
surviving spouse on his death certificate based on their July 11, 2013, Maryland marriage. The
couple was granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting state officials from listing Arthur as
unmarried on his death certificate, in the event he died before the court could consider the case.
Arthur died on Oct. 22, 2013.

On Dec. 23, 2013, U.S. District Judge Timothy Black ordered Ohio authorities to recognize
same-sex marriages on death certificates, saying the state's ban on such unions is
unconstitutional and that states cannot discriminate against same-sex couples simply because
some voters “don't like homosexuality.” The narrow ruling applied only to death certificates. But
the State of Ohio appealed that ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

APA's Position
APA's amicus briefs present an accurate and comprehensive summary of the current state of
scientific and professional knowledge concerning sexual orientation, same-sex relationships,
and the children of same-sex couples. Drawing on the cumulative scientific knowledge in these
areas, APA makes four main arguments 1) that homosexuality is a normal expression of human
sexuality, is generally not chosen, and is highly resistant to change; 2) that same-sex
relationships are equivalent to heterosexual relationships in essential respects; and, that
excluding same-sex couples from the institution of marriage denies them social, psychological
and health benefits; 3) that there is no scientific basis for concluding that same-sex couples are
not fit parents or that children of same-sex couples are any less psychologically healthy and
well-adjusted than children of heterosexual couples; and 4) that denying same-sex couples
access to marriage is an instance of stigma.

Results
On Nov. 6, 2014, the court issued an opinion upholding the challenged laws in a 2-1 decision. In
doing so, it created a circuit split and became the first federal court of appeals to rule against
marriage equality in a post-Windsor case.

The Sixth Circuit's majority opinion did not address the APA's arguments. Judge Daughtrey's
dissent, however, focused on the negative effects of marriage bans on same-sex couples and
their children. See, e.g., Docket No. 130-2 at 45 (responding to “responsible procreation”
arguments and stating “[h]ow ironic that irresponsible, unmarried, opposite-sex couples in the
Sixth Circuit who produce unwanted offspring must be ‘channeled' into marriage and thus
rewarded with its many psychological and financial benefits, while same-sex couples who
become model parents are punished for their responsible behavior by being denied the right to
marry”). Like the Ohio district court below, Judge Daughtry found that the studies of Mark
Regnerus, Douglas Allen, and Loren Marks were “not credible” in contrast to other more
FULL CASE: BOLOS V BOLOS As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of
the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
vs.
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension
DECISION
of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the
Honorable Court’s Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11,
MENDOZA, J.:
2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2,
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of
Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion
the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari
for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage
following
between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
ISSUES
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code,
I
docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August
DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
2, 2006, with the following disposition:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as
FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT
IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M.
of this decision.
NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."
SO ORDERED.2
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of
OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
Appeal on September 11, 2006.
MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY
OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise
PROPER IN HIS CASE.
denied.
II
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to
III
Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the
September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2,
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE
2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE
of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or
not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before
the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its
decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a
decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the
factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to
be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the
effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case,
the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his
marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He
further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their
marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere
"failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital
obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is
explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9
As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or
verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words
of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty
and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the
Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be
faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to
orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded
as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.
The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since
then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time
did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final
judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15
the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is
an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This
constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence
and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid
and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
FULL CASE: LEUS V ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE
WESTGROVE
G.R. No. 187226 January 28, 2015
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner,
vs.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE and/or SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB,
Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a
Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual
relations, got pregnant out of wedlock, married the father of her child, and was dismissed by
SSCW, in that order. The question that has to be resolved is whether the petitioner's conduct
constitutes a ground for her dismissal.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution2 dated March 2,
2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188, which affirmed the
Resolutions dated February 28, 20073 and May 21, 20074 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC)in NLRC CA No. 049222-06.
The Facts
SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001, SSCW
hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community
Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When
SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s
Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the
petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just because
she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.5
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she
should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a
result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of
a Catholic school.6
In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock does
not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an employee. She averred that she
is unaware of any school policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a
serious misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal. Further, the petitioner requested a copy of
SSCW’s policy and guidelines so that she may better respond to the charge against her. On
June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the promulgation of a "Support
Staff Handbook," SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992
MRPS) on the causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS
cites "disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just causes for
termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code.8
On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a letter,9 which, in part,
reads:
To us, pre-marital sex between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry each
other who later on married each other does not fall within the contemplation of "disgraceful or
immoral conduct" and "serious misconduct" of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
and the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Your argument that what happened to our client would set a bad example to the students and
other employees of your school is speculative and is more imaginary than real. To dismiss her
on that sole ground constitutes grave abuse of management prerogatives.
Considering her untarnished service for two years, dismissing her with her present condition
would also mean depriving her to be more secure in terms of financial capacity to sustain
maternal needs.10
In a letter11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual
relations, evenif between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is considered
a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which are grounds for the
termination of employment under the 1992 MRPS and the Labor Code. That SSCW, as a
Catholic institution of learning, has the right to uphold the teaching of the Catholic Church and
expect its employees to abide by the same. They further asserted that the petitioner’s
indiscretion is further aggravated by the fact that she is the Assistant to the Director of the Lay
Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate, a position of responsibility that the students
look up to as rolemodel. The petitioner was again directed to submit a written explanation on
why she should not be dismissed.
On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she adopts her counsel’s letter
dated June 4, 2003 as her written explanation.12
Consequently, in her letter13 dated June 11, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that
her employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground of serious misconduct. She stressed
that pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults with no impediment to marry,
even if they subsequently married, amounts to immoral conduct. She further pointed out that
SSCW finds unacceptable the scandal brought about by the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock as it ran counter to the moral principles that SSCW stands for and teaches its students.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and Sr. Quiambao (respondents). In her
position paper,14 the petitioner claimed that SSCW gravely abused its management prerogative
as there was no just cause for her dismissal. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock
cannot be considered as serious misconduct since the same is a purely private affair and not
connected in any way with her duties as an employee of SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred
that she and her boyfriend eventually got married even prior to her dismissal.
For their part, SSCW claimed that there was just cause to terminate the petitioner’s employment
with SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of SSCW’s management prerogative. They
maintained that engaging in pre-marital sex, and getting pregnant as a result thereof, amounts to
a disgraceful or immoral conduct, which is a ground for the dismissal of an employee under the
1992 MRPS.
They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic educational institution, which caters exclusively to
young girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it would maintain employees who do not live
up to the values and teachings it inculcates to its students. SSCW further asserted that the
petitioner, being an employee of a Catholic educational institution, should have strived to
maintain the honor, dignity and reputation of SSCW as a Catholic school.15
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision,16 in NLRC Case No. 6-
17657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. The LA found that there was a
valid ground for the petitioner’s dismissal; that her pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a
"disgraceful and immoral conduct." The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic
educational institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the Catholic values taught by
SSCW to its students. Likewise, the LA opined that:
Further, a deep analysis of the facts would lead us to disagree with the complainant that she
was dismissed simply because she violate[d] a Catholic [teaching]. It should not be taken in
isolation but rather it should be analyzed in the lightof the surrounding circumstances as a
whole. We must also take into [consideration] the nature of her work and the nature of her
employer-school. For us, it is not just an ordinary violation. It was committed by the complainant
in an environment where her strict adherence to the same is called for and where the reputation
of the school is at stake. x x x.17
The LA further held that teachers and school employees, both in their official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior and act in a manner that is beyond reproach.
The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, insisting that there was no valid ground for the termination
of her employment. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as
"serious misconduct" under Article 282 of the Labor Code since the same was not of such a
grave and aggravated character. She asserted that SSCW did not present any evidence to
establish that her pregnancy out of wedlock indeed eroded the moral principles that it teaches its
students.18
The Ruling of the NLRC
On February 28, 2007, the NLRC issued a Resolution,19 which affirmed the LA Decision dated
February 28, 2006. The NLRC pointed out that the termination of the employment of the
personnel of private schools is governed by the 1992 MRPS; that Section 94(e) thereof cites
"disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a just cause for dismissal, in addition to the grounds for
termination of employment provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The NLRC held
that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is a "disgraceful or immoral conduct" within the
contemplation of Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS and, thus, SSCW had a valid reason to
terminate her employment.
The petitioner sought reconsideration20 of the Resolution dated February 28, 2007 but it was
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution21 dated May 21, 2007.
Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a petition22 for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was a valid ground for her dismissal. She
maintained that pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as a disgraceful or immoral
conduct; that SSCW failed to prove that its students were indeed gravely scandalized by her
pregnancy out of wedlock. She likewise asserted that the NLRC erred in applying Section 94(e)
of the 1992 MRPS.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 24, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,23 which denied the
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner. The CA held that it is the provisions of the 1992
MRPS and not the Labor Code which governs the termination of employment of teaching and
non-teaching personnel of private schools, explaining that:
It is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail. Petitioner was
employed by respondent private Catholic institution which undeniably follows the precepts or
norms of conduct set forth by the Catholic Church. Accordingly, the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools followed by it must prevail over the Labor Code, a general statute. The Manual
constitutes the private schools’ Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
232 or the Education Act of 1982. x x x.24
The CA further held that the petitioner’s dismissal was a valid exercise of SSCW’s management
prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring employees pursuant toits policies, rules
and regulations. The CA upheld the NLRC’s conclusion that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock is considered as a "disgraceful and immoral conduct" and, thus, a ground for dismissal
under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The CA likewise opined that the petitioner’s pregnancy
out of wedlock is scandalous per segiven the work environment and social milieu that she was
in, viz:
Under Section 94 (e) of the [MRPS], and even under Article 282 (serious misconduct) of the
Labor Code, "disgraceful and immoral conduct" is a basis for termination of employment.
xxxx
Petitioner contends that her pre-marital sexual relations with her boyfriend and her pregnancy
prior to marriage was not disgraceful or immoral conduct sufficient for her dismissal because she
was not a member of the school’s faculty and there is no evidence that her pregnancy
scandalized the school community.
We are not persuaded. Petitioner’s pregnancy prior to marriage is scandalous in itself given the
work environment and social milieu she was in. Respondent school for young ladies precisely
seeks to prevent its students from situations like this, inculcating in them strict moral values and
standards. Being part of the institution, petitioner’sprivate and public life could not be separated.
Her admitted pre-marital sexual relations was a violation of private respondent’s prescribed
standards of conduct that views pre-marital sex as immoral because sex between a man and a
woman must only take place within the bounds of marriage.
Finally, petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of the employer-school’s management
prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules
and regulations. x x x.25 (Citations omitted)
The petitioner moved for reconsideration26 but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution27 dated
March 2, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Essentially, the issues set forth by the petitioner for this Court’s decision are the following: first,
whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that it is the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor
Code that governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of
private schools; and second, whether the petitioner’spregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a
valid ground to terminate her employment.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court grants the petition.
First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS
The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling that there was a valid ground to dismiss her, erred
in applying Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially, she claims that the 1992 MRPS was
issued by the Secretary of Education as the revised implementing rules and regulations of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 232 (BP 232) or the "Education Act of 1982." That there is no provision in BP
232, which provides for the grounds for the termination of employment of teaching and non-
teaching personnel of private schools. Thus, Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS, which provides for
the causes of terminating an employment, isinvalid as it "widened the scope and coverage" of
BP 232.

The Court does not agree.
The Court notes that the argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94
thereof, is raised by the petitioner for the first time in the instant petition for review. Nowhere in
the proceedings before the LA, the NLRC or the CA did the petitioner assail the validity of the
provisions of the 1992 MRPS.
"It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the
proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged
facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair
play, justice, and due process."28
In any case, even if the Court were to disregard the petitioner’s belated claim of the invalidity of
the 1992 MRPS, the Court still finds the same untenable.
The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was issued by the
Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232. Section 7029 of BP 232 vests the Secretary of
Education with the authority to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of BP
232. Concomitantly, Section 5730 specifically empowers the Department of Education to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of
the educational system in accordance with the declared policy of BP 232.
The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, as well as the
causes for the termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the educational system
of private schools. Indubitably, ensuring that the teaching and non-teaching personnel of private
schools are not only qualified, but competent and efficient as well goes hand in hand with the
declared objective of BP 232 – establishing and maintaining relevant quality education.31 It is
thus within the authority of the Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the
dismissal of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools based on their
incompetence, inefficiency, or some other disqualification.
Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of Education to "prescribe
and impose such administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and appropriate in the
implementing rules and regulations" for the "[g]ross inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching
personnel" of private schools.32 Accordingly, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the Court sees
no reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94 thereof. Second
Issue: Validity of the Petitioner’s Dismissal
The validity of the petitioner’s dismissal hinges on the determination of whether pregnancy out of
wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of her
employment.
In resolving the foregoing question,the Court will assess the matter from a strictly neutral and
secular point of view – the relationship between SSCW as employer and the petitioner as an
employee, the causes provided for by law in the termination of suchrelationship, and the
evidence on record. The ground cited for the petitioner’s dismissal, i.e., pre-marital sexual
relations and, consequently, pregnancy outof wedlock, will be assessed as to whether the same
constitutes a valid ground for dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
The standard of review in a Rule 45
petition from the CA decision in
labor cases.
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such as the instant petition, where
the CA’s disposition in a labor case is sought to be calibrated, the Court’s review isquite limited.
In ruling for legal correctness, the Court has to view the CA decision in the same context that the
petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the Court has to examine the CA decision
from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the
merits of the case was correct.33
The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined in the Court’s jurisprudence. It exists
where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise
ofjudgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.34 The determination of the presence or absence of
grave abuse of discretion does not include an inquiry into the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence, which was the basis of the labor agency in reaching its conclusion.35
Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence (that was the basis of the labor tribunals in determining
their conclusion), the incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not result in negating the
requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a showing that the findings or
conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard
of the evidence on record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In particular, the CA can grant
the petition for certiorariif it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a
factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. A decision that is not supported by
substantial evidence is definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion.36
The labor tribunals’ respective
conclusions that the petitioner’s
pregnancy is a "disgraceful or
immoral conduct" were arrived at
arbitrarily.
The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal pursuant to
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides that:
Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment – In addition to the just causes enumerated in the
Labor Code, the employment of school personnel, including faculty, may be terminated for any
of the following causes:
xxxx
e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;
xxxx
The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is
"disgraceful and immoral"considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational institution.
In arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of the petitioner’s
pregnancy vis-à-visthe totality of the circumstances surrounding the same.
However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned conclusion
arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, without
more, is not enough to characterize the petitioner’s conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There
must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently,
pregnancy outof wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
The totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct alleged to
be disgraceful or immoral must be
assessed against the prevailing
norms of conduct.
In Chua-Qua v. Clave,37 the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of
each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing
norms of conductand applicable laws.38 Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the same is disgraceful
or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society as respectable or moral. If the
conduct does not conform to what society generally views as respectable or moral, then the
conduct is considered as disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence must be
presented, which would establish that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the prevailing
norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.
Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step
process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and
second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-visthe prevailing norms of conduct, i.e.,
what the society generally considers moral and respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not absolutely
determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral. There is still a
necessity to determine whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is considered
disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct.
Public and secular morality should
determine the prevailing norms of
conduct, not religious morality.
However, determining what the prevailing norms of conduct are considered disgraceful or
immoral is not an easy task. An individual’s perception of what is moral or respectable is a
confluence of a myriad of influences, such as religion, family, social status, and a cacophony of
others. In this regard, the Court’s ratiocination in Estrada v. Escritor39 is instructive.
In Estrada, an administrative case against a court interpreter charged with disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in determining whether a particular conduct can be
considered as disgraceful and immoral, the distinction between public and secular morality on
the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind.40 That the distinction
between public and secular morality and religious morality is important because the jurisdiction
of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.41 The Court further explained that:
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religiousx x x. "Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if
government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs
or agenda.The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or
endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views
that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom
for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-
class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in
matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in
criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes
this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might
have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would
be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents
of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on
them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in
a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses.x x x.42
(Citations omitted and emphases ours)
Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it pertains to
public and secular morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed because they are
detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society.
Thus, in Anonymous v. Radam,43 an administrative case involving a court utility worker likewise
charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct, applying the doctrines laid down in Estrada, the
Court held that:
For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral" behavior under civil service laws,
it must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be
judged based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be
grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the
realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the
constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent
that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.
Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an unmarried woman gives
birth out of wedlock:
(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause
complications for both mother and child but it does not give cause for administrative sanction.
There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of
her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons.
Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the
Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic
origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other thanthe
mother, then there is a cause for administrative sanction against either the father or the mother.
In sucha case, the "disgraceful and immoral conduct" consists of having extramarital relations
with a married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise
affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial
employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married persons or for their own
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child was unmarried.
Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct simply because
she gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out of wedlock.44 (Citations omitted and emphases
ours)
Both Estrada and Radamare administrative cases against employees in the civil service. The
Court, however, sees no reason not to apply the doctrines enunciated in Estrada and Radamin
the instant case. Estrada and Radamalso required the Court to delineate what conducts are
considered disgraceful and/or immoral as would constitute a ground for dismissal. More
importantly, as in the said administrative cases, the instant case involves an employee’s security
of tenure; this case likewise concerns employment, which is not merely a specie of property
right, but also the means by which the employee and those who depend on him live.45
It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the
Constitution. Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be dismissed unless for cause provided
under the Labor Code and other relevant laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS. As stated above,
when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not
religious morality. Thus, the proscription against "disgraceful or immoral conduct" under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to
public and secular morality. Accordingly, in order for a conduct tobe considered as disgraceful or
immoral, it must be "‘detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society’ and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other."
Thus, in Santos v. NLRC,46 the Court upheld the dismissal of a teacher who had an extra-
marital affair with his co-teacher, who is likewise married, on the ground of disgraceful and
immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The Court pointed out that extra-
marital affair is considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct is an afront to the sanctity of
marriage, which is a basic institution of society, viz:
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the sanctity of
marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our Family Code provides that husband
and wife must live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Our laws, in implementing this constitutional edict on marriage and the family underscore their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.47
The petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock is not a disgraceful or
immoral conduct since she and the
father of her child have no
impediment to marry each other.
In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not find any circumstance in this case which would
lead the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral conduct. It
bears stressing that the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no
legal impediment to marry. Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her
boyfriend, the father of her child. As the Court held in Radam, there is no law which penalizes an
unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental
state policy enshrined in the Constitution.
Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and
doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld
and taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of
wedlock, is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the
prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or
immoral; such conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual
arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment
to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely
public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal. The
labor tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s
pregnancy and its supposed effect on SSCW and its students without evaluating whether the
petitioner’s conduct is indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view of the prevailing norms
of conduct. In this regard, the labor tribunals’ respective haphazard evaluation of the evidence
amounts to grave abuse of discretion, which the Court will rectify.
The labor tribunals’ finding that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock despite the absence of
substantial evidence is not only arbitrary, but a grave abuse of discretion, which should have
been set right by the CA.
There is no substantial evidence to
prove that the petitioner’s pregnancy
out of wedlock caused grave scandal
to SSCW and its students.
SSCW claimed that the petitioner was primarily dismissed because her pregnancy out of
wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. That the scandal brought about by the
petitioner’s indiscretion prompted them to dismiss her. The LA upheld the respondents’ claim,
stating that:
In this particular case, an "objective" and "rational evaluation" of the facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case would lead us to focus our attention x x x on the impact of the act
committed by the complainant. The act of the complainant x x x eroded the moral principles
being taught and project[ed] by the respondent [C]atholic school to their young lady students.48
(Emphasis in the original)
On the other hand, the NLRC opined that:
In the instant case, when the complainant-appellant was already conceiving a child even before
she got married, such is considered a shameful and scandalous behavior, inimical to public
welfare and policy. It eroded the moral doctrines which the respondent Catholic school, an
exclusive school for girls, is teaching the young girls. Thus, when the respondent-appellee
school terminated complainant-appellant’s services, it was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative. Whether or not she was a teacher is of no moment. There is no separate set of
rules for non-teaching personnel. Respondents-appellees uphold the teachings of the Catholic
Church on pre-marital sex and that the complainant-appellant as an employee of the school was
expected to abide by this basic principle and to live up with the standards of their purely Catholic
values. Her subsequent marriage did not take away the fact that she had engaged in pre-marital
sex which the respondent-appellee school denounces as the same is opposed to the teachings
and doctrines it espouses.49 (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the labor tribunals’ declarations, the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce
substantial evidence to prove that the petitioner’s indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to
SSCW and its students. Other than the SSCW’s bare allegation, the records are bereft of any
evidence that would convincingly prove that the petitioner’s conduct indeed adversely affected
SSCW’s integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for. The petitioner is only a
non-teaching personnel; her interaction with SSCW’s students is very limited. Itis thus quite
impossible that her pregnancy out of wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by
SSCW, as to warranther dismissal.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the
employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. It is incumbent upon the
employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the
employees was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal is
not justified and therefore illegal.50 "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequateto
support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable mightconceivably opine
otherwise."51
Indubitably, bare allegations do not amount to substantial evidence. Considering that the
respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove their asserted cause for the
petitioner’s dismissal, the labor tribunals should not have upheld their allegations hook, line and
sinker. The labor tribunals’ respective findings, which were arrived at sans any substantial
evidence, amounts to a grave abuse of discretion, which the CA should have rectified. "Security
of tenure is a right which may not be denied on mere speculation of any unclearand nebulous
basis."52
The petitioner’s dismissal is not a
valid exercise of SSCW’s
management prerogative.
The CA be labored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its employees. The CA
opined that the petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of management prerogative to impose
penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations.
The Court does not agree.
The Court has held that "management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal
and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it
must beexercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor." Management cannot
exercise its prerogative in a cruel, repressive, or despotic manner.53
SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need be,
dismiss themif there is a valid cause to do so. However, as already explained, there is no cause
to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful or immoral.
Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy,
does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital sexual
relations and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no valid basis in law or even in
SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus,
not a valid exercise of management prerogative.
In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there was no just cause for
the termination of her employment. SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that
the petitioner’s conduct, i.e., engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and conceiving a child out
of wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or
immoral. The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in upholding the validity of the
petitioner’s dismissal as the charge against the petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on
the bare allegations of SSCW. In turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding the validity
of the petitioner’s dismissal, failing torecognize that the labor tribunals gravely abused their
discretion in ruling for the respondents.
The petitioner is entitled to
separation pay, in lieu of actual
reinstatement, full backwages and
attorney’s fees, but not to moral and
exemplary damages.
Having established that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, the Court now determines the
reliefs thatshe is entitled to and their extent. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, "an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right."54 Aside from the
instances provided under Articles 28355 and 28456 of the Labor Code, separation pay is,
however, granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations
between the employer and the employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine is
that separation pay is available in lieu of reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer
practical or in the best interest of the parties.57
In Divine Word High School v. NLRC,58 the Court ordered the employer Catholic school to pay
the illegally dismissed high school teacher separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement since
her continued presence as a teacher in the school "may well bemet with antipathy and
antagonism by some sectors in the school community."59
In view of the particular circumstances of this case, it would be more prudent to direct SSCW to
pay the petitioner separation pay inlieu of actual reinstatement. The continued employment of
the petitioner with SSCW would only serve to intensify the atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism between the parties. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay to the
petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six
(6) months considered as one (1) whole year, from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the
finality of this judgment, as an alternative to reinstatement.
Also, "employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if
reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their
illegal termination up to the finality of the decision."60 Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to an
award of full backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the finality of this
decision.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages. "A dismissed
employee isentitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or
constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good
customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."61
"Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.1âwphi1 It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, or a
breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud."62
"It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it"63 since basic
is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove
the same.64 "Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence."65
The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence showing that the
respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the petitioner.
That the petitioner was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may be
contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed
employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be justified
solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without cause.66
However, the petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary
award pursuant to Article 11167 of the Labor Code. "It is settled that where an employee was
forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of
attorney’s fees is legally and morally justifiable."68
Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annumfrom the finality of this judgment until fully paid.69
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution dated March 2, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent, St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, is hereby declared guilty of illegal
dismissal and is hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Cheryll Santos Leus, the following: (a)
separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year from the time
of her dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; (b) full backwages from the time of her illegal
dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; and (c) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the total monetary award. The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annumfrom the date of the finality of this Decision untilfully
paid. The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of petitioner’s monetary
awards.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
Facts:
petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic educational
institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations, got pregnant
out of wedlock... married the father of her child,... and was dismissed by SSCW, in that order.
petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the
petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao... advised her to file a resignation letter effective
June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner... informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign
from her employment just because she got pregnant... without the benefit of marriage.[
. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed
for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which
amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee... of a Catholic school.
In a letter[11] dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual
relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is
considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which... are grounds for
the termination of employmen... petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
Issues:
The validity of the petitioner's dismissal hinges on the determination of whether pregnancy out of
wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of her
employment.
The Ruling:
The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to
characterize the petitioner's conduct as disgraceful or immoral.
There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently,... pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral
The totality of the circumstances... surrounding the conduct alleged to be... disgraceful or
immoral must be assessed... against the prevailing norms of conduct.
consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an
assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the... prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the
society generally considers moral and respectable.
the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the Constitution.
when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not
religious morality. Thus, the proscription against "disgraceful or immoral conduct" under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily... refer to
public and secular morality.
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V ALBIOS him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
its inception.
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
DECISION
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
MENDOZA, J.:
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from
Ruling of the CA
the beginning.
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
The facts
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
Hence, this petition.
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
Assignment of Error
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
ensued.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
Ruling of the RTC
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
on certiorari.
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the
wife of respondent.
Ruling of the Court
xxxx
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on
SO ORDERED.6
the ground of lack of consent?
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
The Court resolves in the negative.
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the
subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned
with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary
into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to
a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence
of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent SO ORDERED.
was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
CASE DIGEST:
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
FACTS:
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
any intention of entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The
court even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage.
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
That the parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
by law, may validly support a marriage.
ISSUE:
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
continues to be valid and subsisting.
RULING:
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude;
it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
do so.
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
the marriage.
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and
vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
and undue influence. None of these are present in the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED
for utter lack of merit.
FULL CASE: NAVARRO V DOMAGTOY was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit,
the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
vs.
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
ROMERO, J.:p
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
of only two years shall be sufficient.
first wife.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
Surigao del Norte.
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person.
dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial
Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . .
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
marriages not falling under Article 41."
each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court,
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
malfeasance.
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to CASE DIGEST:
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
Facts:
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A.
the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
Sumaylo and Gemma D. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife ,
and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
paragraph I of the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
applies to the case in question.
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
Issue:
administrative liability. 5
Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
ignorance of the law.
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of
Held:
his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.
In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
comprehension of the law.
In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles
basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to
of civil law
know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
suspended for a period of six months.
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union
and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
FULL CASE: ARANES V OCCIANO On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with
the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
her conscience.
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage
PUNO, J.:
license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
record of their marriage.
jurisdiction.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia
to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
and sufferings.
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
We agree.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1âwphi1.nêt
solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held
could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
Nabua, to which request he acceded.
del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that:
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
Camarines Sur.
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further
held that:
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons."3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act
may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does
not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant
who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the
unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to
discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of
a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

FULL CASE: NINAL V BAYADOG Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
vs.
family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man
after his death?
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to
Article 47 of the Family Code.
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
resolve the following issues:
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially
sometime during the cohabitation period?
so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
void ab initio;
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years
their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
question of law.
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
petition for review. 4
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought
to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,
18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved
or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or
more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
"at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties
to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent
by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
FULL CASE: BORJA-MANZANO V SANCHEZ authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
must concur:
Pangasinan, respondent.
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
RESOLUTION
years before the marriage;
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent
marriage;
Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
children were born out of that marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
marriage.6cräläwvirtualibräry
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. 4 According to him,
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In fact, in his
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
severely.
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated,legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
the affirmative.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
two separate affidavits 5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period
member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda
of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels,
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
marriage.
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
We find merit in the complaint.
application to judges, 8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law transgressed is simple
and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
10cräläwvirtualibräry
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
ACCORDINGLY , the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with CASE DIGEST:
theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
Facts:
SO ORDERED.
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March
1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were “separated.”

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.

Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance
with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

Ruling:

No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the marriage of
a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on the
Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated
to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve
as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V DAYOT (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
without emolument.7
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
G.R. No. 179474
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
vs.
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
story as implausible, and rationalized that:
DECISION
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign
a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to
sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the
months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
a ride" by [Felisa.]
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable
as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
through fraud.10
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa.
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same,
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa,
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
the latter feigned ignorance.
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.12
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground
that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76
did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong
to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR
LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ,
District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife
in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name
as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30
This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license
did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after
the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39
They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established
by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man
and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes
that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration
of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after
the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in
June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent
by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least
five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if
any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FULL CASE: SEVILLA V. CARDENAS defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal
partnership in 1983.

Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he
made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious
vs.
wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7,
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and
received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated
DECISION
March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"),
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and
defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the
the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
1969."
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the
said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for
after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled
his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any
by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose
Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on
her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the
her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil
convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and
registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969,
before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
The trial court made the following findings:
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding,
which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98,
and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although
p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola,
called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months,
with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued
hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no.
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar,
2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed,
plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F")
take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away
with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for
from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often
the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the
moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her
church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose
mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an
Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and
English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became
defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital
unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their
relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical
marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United
student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling
States.
before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son
was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses
for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to
the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff
inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences
with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983
(Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain
Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony,
plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license
appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial
court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of
a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs.
"I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San
Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on
the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F")
was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence,
particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19,
1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the
registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered,"
for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot
therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was
not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce
a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was
issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong
possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential
requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on
record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals
denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the
contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license
was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in
the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null
and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of
the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is
null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of
an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing
requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated
11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was
filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent
it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded
work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from
the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to
locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work."
Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license
was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the
logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired.
Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on
record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony
could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the
material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things
the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring
with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office
maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued
by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if
the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the
record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued
or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing
the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that
an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome
by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by
the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several
years producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he
filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in
1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give
him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric;
hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.'
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FULL CASE: MARTINEZ V TAN
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
Domingo Franco, for appellant.
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on
the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of
Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is
written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on
the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that
they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace,
and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same
day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias
Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the
persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named;
that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had
there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the
presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the
wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the
witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which
it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in
the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally
married on the day named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document
itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who
testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named,
together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the
document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named
witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the
justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita
Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the
court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses
above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the
peace at the time mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared
before the justice of the peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she
signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it,
and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the
consent of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think,
when properly considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in
the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her
brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her company. But
she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning and that on
one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness
loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of
the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a
Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the mother
of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the
purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights
left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of
the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken
place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon
hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother
later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the
peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements
made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for
the defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his
brief. It appears that during her first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and
practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to a future day and was
completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse
was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice
of the peace was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house.
We do not think that the record justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the
location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we
are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not
telling the truth when she said she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence
consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9
is as follows:
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be
informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.
Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th
of September, is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law
will not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the
best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for
me at the Chinese store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.
The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.
Yours, ROSAL.
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her
meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also
undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as
follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9
or 10, when you see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the
purpose of loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate
the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-
house, inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and
that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must do it right.
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the
purpose of asking my father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we
shall do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you
must request his consent.
mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both
contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the
marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each
other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated
in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage
certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually
agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states
before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and
the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the
contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case
were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.
The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the
complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the
consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so
that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in
regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment.
After the trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it
should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to
the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely the
first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first
amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had
unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the
court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no
abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She
proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant.

Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
is a matter of no importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.

It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in
this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she
had no communication with the defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant
never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with
her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of
procuring the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly
preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared
before the justice of the peace at the time named.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting
all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General
orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and
wife.

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of
the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the
plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and
defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they
asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff,
the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
FULL CASE: MORIGO V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial
court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic)
among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage
to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled
that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which
held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or
both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed
to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the
law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is
the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence,
the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in
a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio,
then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he
cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS
AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if
so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further
argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case.
The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in
se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He
stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all
the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration
of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of
the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in
Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation
of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
CASE DIGEST:
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again
Morigo v. People
six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
FACTS:
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
he contracted second marriage in good faith.
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
ISSUE:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate
second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the
RULING:
charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the Bigamy
SO ORDERED.
case.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2 articles, Morigo’s first marriage is considered
void ab initio.

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and
is acquitted in the case filed.
FULL CASE: RONULO V PEOPLE petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that
in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage
Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated,
vs.
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
DECISION
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
BRION, J.:
₱200.00.12
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
The RTC Ruling
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act
of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
The Factual Antecedents
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
The CA Decision
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was
350 of the same Code.16
filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of
the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
authorities such as the RPC.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
The Petition
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC,
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner
as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that
wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.18
the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9
ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
The MTC Judgment
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven
by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony"
and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article
625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails
to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The
testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear
and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of
a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article
3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by
the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof
require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently CASE DIGEST:
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
BRION, J.:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating
both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day
39, of the Marriage Law.
where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1
As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for
marriage ceremony.
the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352
falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was
for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the
not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.
RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of
the Marriage Law.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
RULING: Yes.
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
SO ORDERED.
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
authority of the solemnizing officer; and
his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is
likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.
FULL CASE: VDA CHUA V CA Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox copy of the birth
certificate of each child is hereto attached as annex "A" and "B", respectively.
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both staying with
herein petitioner at her address at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City;
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned minors, died intestate on May
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th
28, 1992 in Davao City.
Judicial Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of the
late Roberto L. Chua, respondents.
5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and personal worth
P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:
KAPUNAN, J.:
a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
No. T-12835 with an area of 290 sq. m. estimated at P50,000.00
Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101, promulgated on 19 April 1994
b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Cotabato City in Special
No. T-12834 with an area of 323 sq. m. 50,000.00
Procedure Case No. 331.
c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
As culled from the records, the following facts have been established by evidence:
No. T-126583 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children,
No. T-126584 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued at 30,000.00
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
f) Residential house in Davao City valued at 600,000.00
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a
Petition1 which is reproduced hereunder:
g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3 AF6393 210,000.00
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION
h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor
No. 4G37-GB0165 545,000.00
OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER
i) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G52-52D75248 110,000.00
THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF
j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor
MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331
No. DA640-838635 350,000.00
and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all
k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100-T47148 350,000.00
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par value
estimated at 3,335,000.00
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
Total P5,000,000.00
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate descendants or
Petitioner
ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride
Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the
PETITION
deceased. (Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).
COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this Honorable Court most
7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors are the following,
respectfully states:
to wit:
1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her husband and residing at
Names Relationship Ages Residence
Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City, Philippines;
1. Carlos Chua Uncle 60 Quezon Avenue,
2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner lived with Roberto
Cotabato City
Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert
Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride
2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 Rosary Heights, (1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are
Cotabato City heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides;
3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas
Fishing Exporation (2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato City:
Co. Inc., Matina,
Davao City (3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor oppose in the
granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total stranger to the minors Robert Rafson
6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation of law are to Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.
succeed to the entire estate of Roberto Lim Chua under the provisions of Article 988 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines, it is necessary that for the protection of the rights and interest of (4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the father of the above-named
Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and heirs of minors with the petitioner in this case;
deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over the persons and properties of said minors be
appointed by this Honorable Court. (5) That movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto
L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage
7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said minors is also with any woman until he died.
competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard
Pride Alonzo Chua both staying and living with her; that petitioner possesses all the On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a guardian. Petition4 "in order that the designation of the case title can properly and appropriately capture or
capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed: confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition." The
amended petition5 contained identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus:.
1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring minors ROBERTO
RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA as heirs to the intestate IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ROBERTO L.
estate of deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA; CHUA, DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND
PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT AND RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the administration of OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and estate of minors Petitioner.
ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA;
Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read as follows:
4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua have been inventoried and
expenses and just debts, have been paid, the intestate estate of Roberto Lim Chua be 4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of
distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Article 988 of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.
the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
The petition contained exactly the same prayers as the original petition.
5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable Court may consider fit and
proper in the premises. Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of said motion on 24
July 1992, private respondent's counsel allegedly admitted that the sole intention of the original
Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992. petition was to secure guardianship over the persons and property of the minors.6

(Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO
(Petitioner)
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14 August 1992 and directed
that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of
Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the
surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss2 on the ground of improper venue.
Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence,
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum.
Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss3 dated July 20, 1992 based on
the following grounds:
On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order7 denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not
having proven her status as wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual
residence of the deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was concurrent
venue among the Regional Trial Courts where the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato
had already taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all
others. The pertinent portions of the order read:
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G.
Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the
decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1" was the
xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the petitioner. This cannot
be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that
the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot produce.
Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the following: a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever registered with them; a
letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage
that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2" through "18" consist among others
of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta
Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at
Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns
for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married;
passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City.
Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of Exhibits "2" through "18" if
the purpose is to establish the truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and
Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not object to
the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City was the business
residence of the decedent.
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to support her allegation that the
decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate
children with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in
Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was single; birth certificates of
the alleged two illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent
issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his
residence is Cotabato City.
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she
was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the
movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and
other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted
a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not
registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no personality to file the subject
motion to dismiss.
On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the decedent as a
businessman has many business residences from different parts of the country where he usually
stays to supervise and pursue his business ventures. Davao City is one of them. It cannot be
denied that Cotabato City is his actual residence where his alleged illegitimate children also
reside.
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of
letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It
is merely constitutive of venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502, November 29, 1976). Even assuming that
there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the places where the decedent
has residences, the Regional Trial Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule 73).
It was this Court which first took cognizance of the case when the petition was filed on July 2,
1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 331 and an order of publication issued by this Court
on July 13, 1992.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit.
On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an order appointing
Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the decedent's
estate.8
On the same day, the trial court, likewise, issued an Order appointing Florita Vallejo as guardian
over the persons and properties of the two minor children.9
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 199310 praying that the letters of
administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of administration be issued to
her. She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 November 199311 to declare the proceedings a
mistrial. Both motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 1993. 12
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the trial court in an Order
dated 13 December 1993.13
Assailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (Rule 65) with the respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. No. Sp. 33101,
alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in:
(1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship proceedings
into an intestate proceeding;
(2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without jurisdiction and without any
notice to herein petitioner whatsoever; and
(3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that herein petitioner has
no personality to intervene in SPL Proc. No. 331 questioning the highly anomalous orders
precipitately issued ex-parte by the public respondent R.T.C. without notice to the petitioners.
Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in her opposition to
petitioner's motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open court that the original petition she
filed is one for guardianship; hence, the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued
letters of administration over the estate of Roberto L. Chua, thereby converting the petition into
an intestate proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a newspaper of
general circulation as required by Section 3, Rule 79.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on 19 April 1994,14 denied the petition
ratiocinating that the original petition filed was one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of
the deceased as well as for administration of his intestate estate. While private respondent may
have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the
fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition unmistakably showed a twin
purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was
unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for the only reason stated in the
motion for leave: so that the "case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in
clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or
misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition," which was for
guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor children and for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the decedent who was their father. In other words, there being no change in
the material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the publication of the first in
a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal
requirements of notice.
Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from the orders
complained of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not certiorari and prohibition.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to this Court contending
that the appellate court committed the following errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL PETITION (Annex F, Petition) WAS FOR A TWIN PURPOSE,
TO WIT: FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THERE IS NO NEED TO PUBLISH THE AMENDED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTESTATE ESTATE THEREBY CONTRAVENING THE RULES OF COURT AND THE
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
NULLIFYING THE ORDERS (Annex "P" to "T") PRECIPITATELY ISSUED EX-PARTE BY THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS
WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING OR NOTICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER THEREBY DEPRIVING
THE LATTER (ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA ) OF DUE PROCESS AND
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
IV
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY IS APPEAL.15
In support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the original petition was one for guardianship and administration of the intestate
estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand, asserting that the original petition failed to allege
and state the jurisdictional facts required by the Rules of Court in petitions for administration of a
decedent's estate, such as: (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death;
(b) names, ages and residences of the heirs; and (c) the names and residences of the creditors
of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her argument regarding private respondent's alleged
admission that the original petition was one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters of
administration, pointing to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 20 July 1992, where the
private respondent alleged.
1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are
heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides.16
as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during the 24 July 1992
hearing on the motion to dismiss:
ATTY. RENDON:
We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this is a petition for
guardianship of minors, not for intestate proceedings. So this is a case where the mother wanted
to be appointed as guardian because she is also the litigant here. Because whenever there is an
intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the Rules of Court in any
guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the place where the minor is actually residing.17
The petition is devoid of merit.
The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which includes the
issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition reads:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE
PERSON AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.18
Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the administration of the
estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent'
(c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate;.
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed;
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. (emphasis
ours).
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of administration are: (1) the
death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is
located; and (3) if the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign
country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting.19
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died intestate on May
28, 1992 in Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the omission was cured
by the amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now reads:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of
Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.20 (Emphasis in the original.)
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be stated in the petition
for letters of administration. Consequently, there was no need to publish the amended petition as
petitioner would insist in her second assignment of errors.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not
related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise.
The Rules are explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration — Any interested person, may by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of incompetency of the person for whom
letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the
administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons
named in the opposition..
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An
interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is
only indirect or contingent.21
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof
of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to
produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate
which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other
worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents
cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from
the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged
marriage. . . .22
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining property not
to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to
initiate.
Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action before the lower
court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to
distribute the estate of the deceased. While in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court
was both for guardianship and settlement of estate.

Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued its orders, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antonietta Chua is hereby denied.
Annexes "P" to "T" without prior hearing or notice to her, thus, depriving her of due process.
SO ORDERED.
The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing Romulo Lim Uy,
first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the estate; Order dated 31 August 1992
appointing private respondent as guardian over the person and property of the minors; Order
dated 5 August 1993, directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from Davao City to
Cotabato City; Order dated 6 September 1993 directing petitioner to turn over a Mitsubishi
Gallant car owned by the estate of the deceased to the special administrator; and Order dated
28 September 1993, authorizing the sheriff to break open the deceased's house for the purpose
of conducting an inventory of the properties found therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to
the house by the driver and maid of petitioner.

Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings of the trial court,
not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the deceased, or of her interest in the
estate as creditor or otherwise, petitioner categorically stated in the instant petition that on 25
October 1993 she filed a motion praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued by
the trial court and another motion dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings conducted
by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders relative thereto be set aside and
nullified. Petitioner further stated that her motions were denied by the trial court in its Order
dated 22 November 21, 1993 and that on 30 November 1993 she filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 13 December
1993.

Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual hearing should
always and indispensably be held.23 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard.24 Here, even granting that the petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court
marked as Exhibits "P" to "T," inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall
letters of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a "mistrial," which
motions were denied in the Order dated 22 November 1993.25 A motion for the reconsideration
of this order of denial was also duly heard by the trial court but was denied in its Order of 13
December 1993.26

Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.27

As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the proper remedy
of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari;
which can be availed of if a party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Except for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inadequate,
nothing on record would indicate that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is
warranted.

Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the Court
of Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for both guardianship and settlement
of estate is in contravention of our ruling in Gomez vs. Imperial,28 which the petitioner quotes:
FULL CASE: TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B.
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-
in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño,"
respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu
City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27
years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and
a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.
The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were
deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had
planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they
started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor,
Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who
got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken
home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño
were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted
because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp.
1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the
standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for
the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because
on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does
not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an
amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter
to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day
in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous
of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was
aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She
fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days
passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta
had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred
in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel
Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was
dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left
for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October
1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce
from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while
her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting
his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of
Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this
Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena
Escaño liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic
priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the
separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which
was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27
of said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was
performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized
the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco
vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the
authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents
consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the
undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant
Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that
Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a
competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the
Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree
of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present
Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar.
1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in
effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad
and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in
the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of
private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of
a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs.
Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in
this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as
valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault,
for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither
an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the
Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to
the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur,
42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr.
Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is
wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated
and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded.
The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage
to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore,
justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage,
that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind
are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written
by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict
or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his
wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her
conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-
Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño
house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have
been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at
such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous
one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not
due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it.
That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute
in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money
while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to
live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-
132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in
the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being
always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the
right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents
and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for
alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices
his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously,
without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he
sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or
where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are
indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences
resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or
her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more
frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this
suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the
face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give
vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable
claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its
failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the
parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to
the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a
consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily
and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the
opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's
fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and
Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this
unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the
same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them,
lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not
guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
FULL CASE: VAN DORN V ROMILLO
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider
the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed
in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him
in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered CASE DIGEST:
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
Facts:
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton
is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be
Without costs.
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
SO ORDERED.
cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court
where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court denied
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

Held:

As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private
respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
FULL CASE: PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8
A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
vs.
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
REGALADO, J.:
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension
of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of
jurisdictional question.
both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
entered a plea of not guilty. 14
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
separation de facto between them.
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said
court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
foreign jurisdiction. 4
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the
State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted
de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is
without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue
as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a
criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as
possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry
;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time
of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia
with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer
has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can
have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in
cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as
of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an
offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter
filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property
and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the
right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated
the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree
of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is
decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There
being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated
and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage
was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in
the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two
(2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of
the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact
that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of
the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in
the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two
(2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of
the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact
that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of
the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
FULL CASE: QUITA V DANDAN
G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted
in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to
live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954
she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for
the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter.
Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon.
On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent
as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the
same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on
the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period
lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties
due to lack of judicial approval.3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the
alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As
regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 19874 only petitioner
and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the
net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.5cräläwvirtualibräry
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus
on 15 February 19886 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with
the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half.7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated
in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage
to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on
11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February
1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the
proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on
established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving
spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule.11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.12 Reading between the
lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in
her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the
case be set for hearing.14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue
on her citizenship.15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but
proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines."16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the
finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt
persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the
original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy
thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner
answered that she was since 1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo
was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to
erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err
in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
CASE DIGEST:
December 22, 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18,
1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final
judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving
no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the
marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues:

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited 1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Held:
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
a legitimate relationship.20cräläwvirtualibräry If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,21 the same
lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because
same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
matter and issue.22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
reason to declare the existence of forum shopping. a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab
inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half
(1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
FULL CASE: LLORENTE V CA
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F.
Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula")
were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed
in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an
accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with
his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and
the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew
a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and
support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by
Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November
27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five
(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by
Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and
lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal
properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-
Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines
Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could
only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of
age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s
Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and
my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively
to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo
was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration
over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving
spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will
disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and
1/2 share in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition
for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled
to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with
Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void
and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties,
and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and
then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in
equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon
her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the
court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any
other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and
charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be
performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its
earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987,
the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to
one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the
issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court
for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the
time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death,
is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where
the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in
the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law
follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer
to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is
no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State
law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of
Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated
as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of
the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the
same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43
We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to
the decedent's national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego,
made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V IYOY
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-
20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of
nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving
all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime
in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely
got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to
the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American
family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband
in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed,
it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint
that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein
that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly
had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as
respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert,
who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent
Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus
himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance
the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded
both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1)
his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on
the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s
surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls
of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that
it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely
failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October
1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus
deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage
of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.
As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties
such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From
the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically
abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married
another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous
situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for
that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the
marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there
is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law
and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its
Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible
error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of
his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…
… Philippines, reads –
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE
ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd
and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce
abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art.
26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to
the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does
not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the
trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds –
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and
Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this
Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of
cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23
which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as
a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment
of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American
family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the
root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this
Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than
the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In
the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time
she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor
General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked
to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government
and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute
to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought
before this Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who
actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case
is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable
and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the
Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the
State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State…37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003,
should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General
to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of
the said Rule are reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
…
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the
date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
…
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support
of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of
the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State.
No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the
period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
… Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by
any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City
but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American husband
in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25,
1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she
denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the
law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on
the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a
divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has established
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife
who is already married to another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING:
1st issue:
The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos,
Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under the said Article.
2nd issue:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In
the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time
she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-
Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V ORBECIDO
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply
to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in
the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed CASE DIGEST:
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE. Republic v. Orbecido
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III, respondent married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the

United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had 2
children. The wife went to the United States to work. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen, obtained a divorce decree and married another man.

Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower
court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United

States is valid and recognized in the Philippines

RULING:

Yes, the respondent can remarry. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be

interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the lattertoremarry.

However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as

to the claim of Orbecide that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in
his favor. Thus, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.
FULL CASE: SAN LUIS V SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal
and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11
denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration.
It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed
moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge
Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even
date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May
5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his
previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but
said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view —
sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not
be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by
the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous
with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo
never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They
argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested
rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the
surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down
the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless
to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence"
for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of
Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale
44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She
also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47
letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang
address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that
his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When
the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis
added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63
(Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68
the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of
its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted
to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails
to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs
the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held
that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as
follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies
to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall
be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.
San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with
whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17,
1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But
the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On
September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and
not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and,
hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws
of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion
to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
FULL CASE: YASIN V SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
Zamboanga City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition
to resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). The petition reads:
1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of Suterville,
Zamboanga City, Philippines, and is duly represented in this act by her elder brother and
attorney-in-fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special Power of
Attorney, original copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof;
2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in
accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo,
Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by
the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites
was officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984,
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof;
3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to
another woman;
WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083
in relation to Article 371 (2) of the New Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to resume the use of her
maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as follows:
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance in accordance
with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the
name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all
the names by which the petitioner has been known (Ng Yao Siong v. Republic of the Philippines,
L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25,
1977; Pabellar v. Republic, L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary amendment of the petition
within one (1) week from receipt hereof so as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to.
(Rollo, p. 9)
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is
not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her
maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former
husband to another woman.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the
ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the
provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be
granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court to the instant case.
In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others, contends:
5. . . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said petition is substantially
one for change of name, particularly of surname — Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the
latter being her maiden name and surname. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of her marriage,
and (2) her legal right to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. In effect, if petition is
granted, it will result in the resumption of the use of her surname.
Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code).
This is the substantive requirements. And as to procedural requirements, no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority (Art. 376, Civil Code of the Philippines) (Emphasis
supplied). Change of name under judicial authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Under Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name shall present
the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province (now RTC) in which he resides, or in the
City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." The State has an interest in the
names borne by individual and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a
privilege and not a matter of right. Therefore, before a person can be authorized to change his
name (given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry), he must show proper or compelling
reason, which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng
Oan v. Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See: Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, 8th
Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or
divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married
again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she
required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.
Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and
surname is also a petition for change of name.
The Court rules in the negative.
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v.
Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956]; Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483
[1966]; Rendora v. Republic, 35 SCRA 262 [1970]; Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]).
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true
and official name recorded in the Civil Register. Thus, this Court in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16
SCRA 483 [1966]), held:
In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to
be changed? By Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil
register. So it is, that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal
purposes, is his real name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the
civil status of persons. A name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which
he is known in the community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of
the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the
civil register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not
seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume
the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by
virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as
follows:
Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in
accordance with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of
reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Judicial decree ( faskh).
Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides:
Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. — A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become
irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage
in accordance with this Code;
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. 56, PD
1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce
(Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Under Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of
Court and other existing laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws), shall be applied suppletorily.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil
Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband
(Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art.
372, Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
"Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name
and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname,
unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
According to Tolentino:
. . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the
use of the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law
which provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage. This
is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a
married woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty,
to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724, 1983 ed.)
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil
Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of
the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p.
725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change
her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use
the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it.
In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name
filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since
the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right,
nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be
obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced
woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision
governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent
proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of
change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and
summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and
averment of concise statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action,
nevertheless, giving it a most liberal construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's
desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname on grounds of her divorce from her former
husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another woman.
The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of this case and
would not serve the public interest. We have consistently ruled that the remand of the case to a
lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the
dispute on the basis of the records before it (Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of
Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548 [1982]: Quisumbing v. CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990
and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden
name and surname.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J., concurring:
From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in
addressing him, he identifies himself with this name, such that in his mind, he not only has a
name but he is that name.
Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the
name his parents have given him from birth. Recognizing the implications of confused identities,
the law requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth
reflective of his civil status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from
usurpation1 or unauthorized or unlawful use by others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by
law from using different names and surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for
business purposes provided this is duly registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names
or stage names, this must be done in good faith and there should be no injury to third persons.5
During elections, only votes bearing names registered by a candidate are to be counted in his
favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the poet who rhetorically asks:
What's in a name?
A rose by any other name smells as sweet.
So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he
decides to change it, the law requires him to seek judicial permission to do so, even if it be
merely to rectify an error committed in one's birth or baptismal records, unless it be an
innocuous clerical error.6
On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an
additional name is the adoption by a woman who gets married of her husband's name. In certain
cultures, this signifies her formal joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the
other, her acceptance therein.
Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the
contracting of marriage, or its breakup, the Civil Code has provided for each eventuality. For
instance, Art. 370 gives a married woman certain options with respect to the change of name
reflective of the change of her civil status, without need of recourse to judicial process:
It provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
"Mrs." (Emphasis supplied)
It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the
mandatory "shall." Its obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to, need not
use her husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden
name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses
her husband's family name during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and no fraudulent
intent.
In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution
laid down the basic policy with respect to the standing of women and men in the eyes of the law,
thus:
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights
accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To
give substance and meaning to the policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the
integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and nation building. . . ."
Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to
ambiguity or implied from long-continued practice or custom, are now clearly granted to them,
such as the right to "enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men
under similar circumstance,"7 equal membership in clubs,8 admission to military schools,9
voluntary PAG-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.
Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active
collaboration of men, should we refuse to recognize their right to the continued used of their
(maiden) name and surname even after marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor
concession? Other than the bruising of the male ego, there can hardly be any legal injury or
damage resulting to personal, property or contractual rights of the husbands.
In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the
Philippines, the use of the title "Ms." to refer to women in general, whether single, married,
widowed or separated, has gained acceptance.
Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the
dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the
declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic
dropping of said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name. This is but in
recognition of the change of her civil status from "married" to "unmarried." Such right should not
be begrudged her, whether her former husband contracts another union or not.
I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a
Muslim like the petitioner, is in the best position to understand the customs, mores and
practices, as well as the feelings of the men and women of his faith.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written
ponencia. Allow me, nonetheless, to express my views, in general, on the use of surnames by
married women.
The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception
involves a married woman. When a woman marries, the law, or what I believe to be its
intendment, would appear to mandate, in brief outline, thusly —
A. During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following
names:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art.
370, Civil Code).
Notes:
(1) It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be
somehow used.
Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law
Center (participated in by Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo
Caguioa, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos, Dean Fortunato Gupit and
Dean Jose C. Vitug), a proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and
surname (after noting the provision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the
"fundamental equality before the law of women and men") was turned down by the Committee.
(2) In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname
employed before the decree of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will
revert to her maiden name and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 357).
ROMERO, J., concurring:
From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in
addressing him, he identifies himself with this name, such that in his mind, he not only has a
name but he is that name.
Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the
name his parents have given him from birth. Recognizing the implications of confused identities,
the law requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth
reflective of his civil status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from
usurpation1 or unauthorized or unlawful use by others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by
law from using different names and surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for
business purposes provided this is duly registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names
or stage names, this must be done in good faith and there should be no injury to third persons.5
During elections, only votes bearing names registered by a candidate are to be counted in his
favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the poet who rhetorically asks:
What's in a name?

B. In the event of annulment of marriage — A rose by any other name smells as sweet.

(1) If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he
surname, but decides to change it, the law requires him to seek judicial permission to do so, even if it be
merely to rectify an error committed in one's birth or baptismal records, unless it be an
(2) If the wife is the innocent party — innocuous clerical error.6

(i) She may resume her maiden name and surname, or On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an
additional name is the adoption by a woman who gets married of her husband's name. In certain
(ii) She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless — cultures, this signifies her formal joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the
other, her acceptance therein.
(a) The court decrees otherwise, or
Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the
(b) She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code). contracting of marriage, or its breakup, the Civil Code has provided for each eventuality. For
instance, Art. 370 gives a married woman certain options with respect to the change of name
C. In case of death of the husband — The widow may use her husband's surname (Art. reflective of the change of her civil status, without need of recourse to judicial process:
373, Civil Code), or resume her maiden name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).
It provides:
D. In case of divorce —
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's
surname (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
surname (general rule).
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment
where we would distinguish between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment) (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
and the instance when she is the innocent party. "Mrs." (Emphasis supplied)

E. In case of declaration of nullity of marriage — No marriage having, or being deemed to
have, technically existed, the general rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name and
surname, should apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the husband's surname, she
obviously should cease from such use upon the finality of the decree of nullity.
It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the
mandatory "shall." Its obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to, need not
use her husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden
name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses
her husband's family name during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and no fraudulent
intent.

In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution
laid down the basic policy with respect to the standing of women and men in the eyes of the law,
Separate Opinions thus:
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the (1) It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. somehow used.

If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights
accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To
give substance and meaning to the policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the
integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and nation building. . . ."
Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to
ambiguity or implied from long-continued practice or custom, are now clearly granted to them,
such as the right to "enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men
under similar circumstance,"7 equal membership in clubs,8 admission to military schools,9
voluntary PAG-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.
Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active
collaboration of men, should we refuse to recognize their right to the continued used of their
(maiden) name and surname even after marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor
concession? Other than the bruising of the male ego, there can hardly be any legal injury or
damage resulting to personal, property or contractual rights of the husbands.
Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law
Center (participated in by Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo
Caguioa, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos, Dean Fortunato Gupit and
Dean Jose C. Vitug), a proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and
surname (after noting the provision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the
"fundamental equality before the law of women and men") was turned down by the Committee.
(2) In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname
employed before the decree of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will
revert to her maiden name and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 357).
B. In the event of annulment of marriage —
(1) If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and
surname, but
(2) If the wife is the innocent party —

In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the (i) She may resume her maiden name and surname, or
Philippines, the use of the title "Ms." to refer to women in general, whether single, married,
widowed or separated, has gained acceptance. (ii) She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless —

Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the (a) The court decrees otherwise, or
dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the
declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic (b) She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code).
dropping of said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name. This is but in
recognition of the change of her civil status from "married" to "unmarried." Such right should not C. In case of death of the husband — The widow may use her husband's surname (Art.
be begrudged her, whether her former husband contracts another union or not. 373, Civil Code), or resume her maiden name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).

I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a D. In case of divorce —
Muslim like the petitioner, is in the best position to understand the customs, mores and
practices, as well as the feelings of the men and women of his faith. The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's
surname (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and
VITUG, J., concurring: surname (general rule).

I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment
ponencia. Allow me, nonetheless, to express my views, in general, on the use of surnames by where we would distinguish between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment)
married women. and the instance when she is the innocent party.

The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception
involves a married woman. When a woman marries, the law, or what I believe to be its
intendment, would appear to mandate, in brief outline, thusly —
A. During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following
names:
D. In case of declaration of nullity of marriage — No marriage having, or being deemed to
have, technically existed, the general rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name
and surname, should apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the husband's
surname, she obviously should cease from such use upon the finality of the decree of
nullity.

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art.
370, Civil Code).

Notes:
FULL CASE: GARCIA V RECIO
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,, Petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO,
respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, 5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of
Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. 7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
single and Filipino. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
9cräläwvirtualibräry
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. 11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;
12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.
13cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify
or annul.
Hence, this Petition. 18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2 Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners
marriage to the respondent
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent
in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of
the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.19cräläwvirtualibräry
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like
any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 22 and 17 23 of the Civil Code. 24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. 26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
27cräläwvirtualibräry
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 28
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -
- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself. 31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country. 32cräläwvirtualibräry
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested 33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34cräläwvirtualibräry
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38cräläwvirtualibräry
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected. 46cräläwvirtualibräry
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior. 47cräläwvirtualibräry
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.48cräläwvirtualibräry
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50cräläwvirtualibräry
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit C Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records; 54 and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;
55 (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995. 60cräläwvirtualibräry
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo
may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE , in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
Grace J. Garcia-Recio (2nd mariage) ----- Rederick A. Recio à Editha Samson (Wife)
March 1, 1987: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal
May 18, 1989: a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued
by an Australian family court
June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government
January 12, 1994: Recio married Grace j. Garcia, a Filipino, in Cabanatuan City.
Recio declared himself as "single" and "Filipino."
October 22, 1995: Recio and Grace J. Garcia ak.a. Garcia-Recio begun to live
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage
May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided
March 3, 1998: Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
on the ground of bigamy claiming she only learned of the prior marriage in November,
1997
Recio prayed in his answer that it be dismissed for no cause of action
RTC: marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson was valid and proven
HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy
Divorces:
1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it
o legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned
o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself
§ The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or
tribunal of a foreign country
o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
1. an official publication; or
2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
1. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept; and
2. authenticated by the seal of his office
Since the divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types:
1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates the marriage
2. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force
Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce
o On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
FULL CASE: ROEHR V RODRIGUEZ
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding
Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters
that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30,
1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati
Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of
marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The
assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for
the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the
custody of their children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of
their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25,
1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order8
dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded
the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The decree provides in part:
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van
Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
The parental custody for the children
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
is granted to the father.
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a
decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to
dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the
case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the
marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had
already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce
had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the
implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner with
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her
order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the
spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order
provides:
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by
petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order
227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse
though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a
divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of
the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same
Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and
custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to
these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed
by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
Germany.14
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of
the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated
September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and
retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a
divorce decree from a German court.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny
the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon
is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim,
denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July
14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the
motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or
final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order
accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear
to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or
only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant
reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order
upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that
has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still
be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or
alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying
or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so
when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant
to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not
been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the
trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent
the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody
of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to
a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as
res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children.
The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private
respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.
The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings25 nor has
she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by
two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More
importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code
provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is
deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending
spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children,
the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in
consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is
always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the
bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property
relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in
Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the
RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any
conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage."29
Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof.30 Given the factual admission by the parties in their
pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert
jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody
of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private
respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of
the parties, which is not at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby
declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has
parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne
and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial
court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
Roehr v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
FACTS:
Wife Rodriguez filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, which was subsequently moved for
dismissal by husband Roehr, a German national. Pending decision, the husband obtained a
decree of divorce from a German Court, providing for (1) the dissolution of their marriage and (2)
the grant of parental custody of the children to Roehr.
Thereafter, wife moved for partial reconsideration with a prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between the Roehr and Rodriguez. Motion was granted and thus challenged by Roehr.
ISSUE:
W/N there is nothing left to be tackled by the Court since there are no conjugal properties
alleged in the annulment and the divorce decree provides for the finality of the custody of
children.
RULING:
No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of
the children, must be determined by our courts. The Court held that before our courts can give
the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the
German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Moreover, Section 50 of the Rules of Court states that the effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
Since the proceedings in the German court were summary, the wife was not given opportunity to
challenge said judgment. Therefore, the divorce decree did not provide for the finality of the
custody of children.
FULL CASE: BAYOT V CA
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca
assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another
Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private
respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to
Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March
25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders
and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old,
to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil
Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that
she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and
that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it,
Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause
of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001,
Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship,
as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to
speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery
and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with
bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up
during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal
support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order,
Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing
the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction
bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002
resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued.
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated
September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being
assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to
the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the
following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-
admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27
Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no
cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract
another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the
foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also
did not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have
that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events
of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she
applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a
year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil
Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam,
USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an
American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her
citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse
was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance
of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as
follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN
HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE
PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER
HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT
ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning
point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured
by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the
questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether
the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative
of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli
is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she
stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification
(ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778
would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the
affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,
Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on
October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from
the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued
on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the
Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only
on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no
error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as
this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to
January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in
question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order
No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec.
3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services
and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau
is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen
clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13,
2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming
the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of
close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca
was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No.
RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8,
2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's
passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was
not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her
original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously
because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of
that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC
on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in
the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition
were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex
"B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995,
is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition,
the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No.
01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No.
RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective
attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but
represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose,
before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident
in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this
court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by
special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the
acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States
of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996
after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil
Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca
was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can
be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor
challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact
or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect
to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to
do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section
48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce
while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the
Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the
June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order
of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
the time a valid divorce is obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital
vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to
each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them
free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a
husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of
Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the
valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement
executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their
family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated
Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of
Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which,
per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that,
"THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996
in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged
and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of
said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus
estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's
conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under
the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept
and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim
for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to
support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had
discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any
rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on
November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had
been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement.
In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity
of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in
G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to
that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably
removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FULL CASE: CORPUZ V STO. TOMAS
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his
wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic
v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the
case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code
to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after
a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe
a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian
law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine
court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but
it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FULL CASE: VDA DE CATALAN V CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and
Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando
B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the
United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix
of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.)
No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee,
one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia,
considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case
No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a
second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12
December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial court ruled that since
the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial
court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered
the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime
of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio
Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between
petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without
expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her
cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.4
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been
dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of
administration may have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the
appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better
right to administer the decedent’s properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to
present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner
undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a
petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-
day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed
the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a
ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as
to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding.
A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or
a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no
defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the
applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be
barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both
petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the
petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party
to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention
of the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the
Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as
any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be
administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of
any other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As
a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy
and was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage
committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been
dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment
rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the
petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B.
Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to
deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding.
Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the
dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that the reasoning of the
CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the
other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her
acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of
the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus,
the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first
marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on
the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that
petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was
dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early
as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according
to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We
hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v.
Recio,9 to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon
the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception
of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of
the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain
the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the
Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid ac-cording to their
national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas
Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration
for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee,
one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged
that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal
case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that
divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took
note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered
the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found
that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of
private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and
Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party
who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters
of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that petitioner was never
married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with
Bristol still existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign
nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United
States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court
for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
FULL CASE: FUJIKI V MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10
In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights
of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese
Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy
of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in
the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20
Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the
provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because
he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its
ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x
as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by
the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the
case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court
held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz
concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment
also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them
to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45
She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the
RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules
of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained
a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s
right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is
a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that
a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which
is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected
in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to
REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code
of the Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of
its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus,
the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition
and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Principles:
Civil Law
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of
its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus,
the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition
and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to... the rules of evidence.