CASE NO.

8. SPOUSES LEONOR and ROSA BADUA, petitioners, vs.

CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION, CORDILLERA
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, MANUEL TAO-IL, AMOGAO-EN
KISSIP, DALALO ILLIQUES, JUANITO GAYYED, PEDRO CABANTO,
VICENTE DAYEM and DAVID QUEMA, respondents.G.R. No. 92649
February 14, 1991

By: Abella, Allain Jon Carlo

Principle: An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration

award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D.
1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or
municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the
compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the
period to annul or repudiate it.

Facts: In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in

Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra, evidenced by Tax Declarations
Nos. 4997 and 4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000
to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-
two (22) years later, on August 14, 1988, long after the
mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption
price of P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg.

On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to
her by Dra. Erotida Valera when she was still alive. However, Rosa
could not produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly in the
possession of Vice-Governor Benesa.
As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land,
he filed a case before the Barangay Council, but it failed to settle
the dispute, A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his
complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in
the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe.

When Leonor and Rosa Badua did not immediately vacate the
land, they received on June 30, 1989 a “warning order” from Ka
Blantie, Zone Commander, Abra Zone-1 of the Cordillera People's
Liberation Army. Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into
hiding. In September 1989, his wife, Rosa, was arrested by the
Cordillera People's Liberation Army and detained for two days.

On April 2, 1990, the Baduas filed this petition “for Special and
Extraordinary Reliefs” (which may be treated as a petition for
certiorari and prohibition). Petitioners allege that the decision of
the Cordillera Bodong Administration is null and void because:
1. petitioners were denied due process or formal hearing; and
2. the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial
power nor jurisdiction over the petitioners nor over the
private respondent as neither of them are members of the
Maeng Tribe.

Respondents further allege that the proceedings and decisions of

the tribal courts are respected and obeyed by the parties, the
municipal and barangay officials, and the people in the locality,
ostracism being the penalty for disobedience of, or non-compliance
with, the decisions

of the council of elders in the areas where tribal courts operate.

Respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
over the tribal courts because they are not a part of the judicial
system.

Issue: Whether or not the tribal court had the authority to decide
and enforce the decision being a court authorized by the local
autonomous region

Ratio Decidendi: In Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander

P. Ordillo, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
93054, December 4, 1990, the Court en banc, found that in the
plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic
Act 6766, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was
rejected by all the provinces and city of the Cordillera region,
except Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region
did not come to be.

As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera

Bodong Administration created under Section 13 of Executive
Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the
indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1,
Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's Liberation
Army as a regional police force or a regional command of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A.
6766), do not legally exist.

Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal
existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an
indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng
Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs
and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.
Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system
which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which
have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or
conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they
are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to
bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make
peace, settle, and compromise.

An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award

rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but
it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to
which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise
settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to
annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions
of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided
in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the
regular courts today.

Ruling: No. Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come
into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted
into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence,
the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under
the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is

hereby GRANTED.

CASE NO. 53
53. CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU
CARCEL, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch II, and the CITY
OF BUTUAN, Respondents-Appellees.G.R. No. L-38429, June 30,
1988
By: Diola, Christian Dominic

PRINCIPLE: The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting

the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a
proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the courts.

FACTS: The Municipality of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640

which required that movie houses, public exhibitions, games,
contests, etc. charge only of the price of tickets to children between
seven and twelve. Petitioners who are managers of different
theaters filed a complaint that the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. They
attacked the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640
on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police
power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 640 passed by the

Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969 is valid
and constitutional grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power.
RATIO DECIDENDI:In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the
operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the
exercise of delegated police power by the local government.

To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that
the interest of the public generally requires an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the
guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to
what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a

valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the
negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is
equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of
reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and
its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A
lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and
operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate
and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold
or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such,
within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in
their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for
their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve
could stay away.

Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always

in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This maybe the rule but it
has already been held that although the presumption is always in
favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such
presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance Itself or is
established by 6 proper evidence. The exercise of police power by
the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental
law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against
public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating
or in derogation of a common right.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property

rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face,
the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations,
it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful
curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For
being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot,
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

RULING: No. The Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal

Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969 is not valid and
constitutional grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise
of police power.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case

No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment
is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately
executory. SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 99

99. GABRIEL DE GUIA vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL & THE

PROVINCIAL AUDITOR OF NORTHERN SAMARG.R. No. L-29824.
March 29, 1972

By: Krisjan Marie Osabel

PRINCIPLE: A municipality is not empowered to engage the services

of private counsel to represent it in a civil case unless the provincial
fiscal who by law is the legal adviser and counsel is disqualified to
represent the municipality.

FACTS: On September 15, 1964, the municipal council passed

Resolution No. 63 authorizing the municipal mayor, Olympio L. de
Guia (De Guia), to hire the services of a counsel to defend the
municipality in the collection of sum of money case against a
certain corporation, under contingent fee basis the same not to
exceed 15%. The mayor and petitioner agreed on the retention of
petitioner's services as attorney on a basis of 15% of whatever
claim the municipality can get from the plaintiff corporation the
municipal council confirmed the agreement for petitioner's services
as per its resolution.

Petitioner prepared and filed the brief on behalf of the municipality

as defendant-appellee in the appealed case, and thereafter the
appellate court rendered its judgment substantially affirming with
minor modification the appealed judgment and sentencing plaintiff
corporation to pay the defendant-municipality on its counterclaim
with legal interest plus attorney’s fees. After the judgment of the
appellate court rending the decision final and executory, the
municipal treasurer prepared the corresponding voucher to pay a
sum of money to petitioner as contractual contingent fee. However,
respondent provincial auditor suspended redemption thereof due to
the fact that pursuant to Section 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Memorandum Circular No. 269, all
litigations entered into by the province or any of its political
subdivisions should be handled by the Provincial Fiscal and of the
further fact that there is no Municipal Attorney for Mondragon
that had been legally appointed under Republic Act No. 2264.

Respondent Auditor-General sustained the provincial auditor's

action reiterating its consistent opinion that in view of the express
provisions of section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, a
municipality "is not empowered to engage the services of private
counsel to represent it in a civil case unless the provincial fiscal,
who by law is the legal adviser and counsel, is disqualified to
represent the municipality."

Petitioner's request for reconsideration has been denied, hence this

present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Auditor General erred in sustaining the

provincial auditor's disallowance in audit of petitioner's claim for
payment of his attorney's 15% contingent fee for services rendered
to the municipality of Mondragon, Northern Samar.

RATIO DECIDENDI :The applicable law, section 1683 of the Revised

Administrative Code, expressly provides:
"SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial
subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any
court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the
Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal
district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government
or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act
on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality

or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may
be employed by its council."

It may be seen therefrom that the municipality's authority to

employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations
where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve and represent it.

In Enriquez v. Jimenez, the Court herein expressly enumerated the

instances of the provincial fiscal's disqualification thus: "The
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality
if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the
municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality
is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality in the same province; and when in the case involving
the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise."

The extra-legal considerations invoked by petitioner that he

rendered services in good faith to the municipality which engaged
him as a private attorney "upon [its] policy of expediency and
economy," even if assumed for the nonce, have no relevance in the
face of respondents' finding, as herein armed by the Court, that
petitioner's contract for services was executed without authority of
law. Petitioner took the risk in rendering services upon such a
dubious contract — which had been previously consistently held to
be violative of law — and he cannot now complain, that the
illegality of his contract has been reiterated once again.

RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the decision under review is hereby

affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

CASE NO. 144

144. CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO,
AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 195649, July
02, 2013
By: Samad, Azisa A.

PRINCIPLE: It is the policy of the state that those who seek to run
for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To
allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport – which indicates the recognition
of a foreign state of the individual as its national – even after the
Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete
disregard of this policy.

FACTS: Rommel Arnado (Arnado) is a natural born Filipino citizen.

However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued
in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy

for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

On 28 April 2010, Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty

candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections. Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American, and presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record 11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating
that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and
departing the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after

renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for
public office

RATIO DECIDENDI: Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is

a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political
rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the
right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public
office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be
deserving of the public trust.

Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the

Republic and to no other. It is a continuing requirement that must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any
of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. Therefore, the Court held Arnando disqualified for any
local elective position as provided by express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Popular vote does not cure this ineligibility of the candidate.

Otherwise, substantive requirements set by the Constitution are
nugatory.

Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as

reiterated in the case of Jalosjos vs. Comelec, when the ineligibility
was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is produced. Hence
among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who
garnered the highest votes should be declared as winner.

Rommel Arnado Cagoco is disqualified from running for any local

elective position. Casan Macode Maquiling is hereby declared the
duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
2010 elections.

RULING: Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s

foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation
as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position
which makes him dual citizen.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with
finality.

CASE NO. 189

189. ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT y

TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE* y LANGA, FRANCISCO
MAYUMIS y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA y CUYAHEN, Petitioners,
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.G.R. No. 150194, March 6, 2007

By: Ypil, Gracelyn L.

PRINCIPLE: Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or

negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through
some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud.
FACTS: Petitioner Robert Tayaban,the Municipal Mayor of Tinoc,
Ifugao, proposed a project to the provincial governor Benjamin
Cappleman for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market.
Subsequently, Tayaban was informed by the Governor that his
proposal was approved and that the project shall be funded by the
Cordillera Executive Board (CEB). Subsequently, a bidding was
conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong (Pugong) won
the contract for the construction of the said public market.

On March 1, 1989, a formal contract4 was executed by and

between Pugong, as the contractor, and the CEB, as the project
owner. Actual construction of the public market was commenced in
June 1989. On August 15, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc
adopted Resolution No. 20 to demolish the erected structures for
the purpose of erecting the Public Market on the allegation that it
was constructed on the wrong site. The said Resolution was passed
only in the afternoon of August 15, 1989, after the subject
demolition was conducted in the morning of the same day.
Petitioners further contend that the demolition is a valid exercise
of police power and that their act is justified by the general welfare
clause under the LGC which empowers them to enact and
implement measures for the general well-being of their
constituents.

ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the criminal complaint filed against

them was merely a political harassment considering that the other
members of the Sangguniang Bayan who signed the questioned
Resolution but who are allies of Pugong were not included in the
complaint, while the members of the Sangguniang Bayan who
signed Resolution No. 20, they were not included in the complaint
because they did not take part in the demolition of the public
market
2. Whether or not RESOLUTION NO. 20 is a valid legislation and
that the demolition of the five posts was an implementation of LOI
NO. 19 and an exercise of the police power vested in local
government unit

RATIO DECIDENDI: 1. The Court finds the petition that criminal

complaint filed against them was merely a political harassment is
without merit. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The following indispensable elements must be established to
constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended:

1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative

or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy
with them;
 2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty in relation to his public
position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; andcralawlibrary
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any
private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties.

Herein petitioners' contention that the Sandiganbayan erred in

ruling that they are guilty of bad faith and that they caused undue
injury to the Government is not plausible.

The Court agrees with the findings of the Sandiganbayan that

petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition.

Evidence of this is the fact that Resolution No. 20 was

implemented on the same day that it was adopted without due
notice of the planned demolition given to the CEB and the private
contractor. In fact, Raymundo Madani, one of the Municipal
Councilors who signed Resolution No. 20, testified that the said
Resolution was passed only in the afternoon of August 15, 1989,
after the subject demolition was conducted in the morning of the
same day.

Proof of petitioners' bad faith is also shown by Pugong's testimony,

which was given credence by the Sandiganbayan, that the site
where his laborers began construction of the demolished public
market was pointed out by petitioner Tayaban himself when the
former asked the latter where they were going to erect the said
market.
It bears to reiterate that the injury suffered by the Government
consists in the fact that it had already disbursed the amount
of P134,632.80 for the purpose of commencing the construction
of the Tinoc Public Market which was reduced to nothing by reason
of petitioners' destruction of the structures built and the eventual
stoppage of the project. On this basis, the Court agrees with
the Sandiganbayan that petitioners are liable to reimburse the said
amount lost by the Government.

RULING: 1. No, the contention that the criminal complaint filed

against them was merely a political harassment has no merit

2. No. The municipal’s Resolution No. 20 is not a valid legislation as

well as an invalid exercise of police power vested in LGU.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the

Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The additional
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office is imposed
upon petitioners.

SO ORDERED.