Possible Defenses

A. PROOF OF TRUTH

When is proof of truth a defense in libel?

Proof of truth is admissible as a defense in any of the following:

a. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether the offended
party is a private individual or a public officer;

b. When the offended party is a government employee, even if the act or omission does not
constitute a crime, provided it is related to the discharge of his official duties. (Art. 361, RPC)

But when the imputation involves the private life of a government employee which is not related
to the discharge of his official functions, the offender can not prove the truth thereof.

Is proof of truth sufficient to acquit an accused in an action for libel?

No, proof of the truth is not enough. It is also required that the matter charged as libelous was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends. (Art. 361, RPC)

B. FAIR COMMENT ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST

What is the rationale in making fair comment on matters of public interest privileged?

A matter of public interest is a common property, and hence anybody may express an opinion
on it. Thus, it is a defense to an action for libel or slander that the words complained of are fair
comment on a matter of public interest.

The conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties
are matters of public interest. Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of
public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if
the defendant proves the truth of the imputation. Public acts of public men may lawfully be made
the subjects of comment and criticism. If made in good faith, such criticism is privileged.

But any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters which are not related
to the discharge of their official functions may constitute libel (People vs. Del Fierro and Padilla,
C.A. G.R. No. 3599-R, July 27, 1950). The right to criticize public officers does not authorize
defamation. No one has the right to invade another’s privacy.
In defamation, where the acts imputed concern the private life of the individual, criminal intent is
presumed to arise from the publication of defamatory matters, because no one has a right to
invade another’s privacy; but where the imputation is based upon a matter of public interest, the
presumption of criminal intent does not arise from the mere publication of defamatory matter. A
matter of public interest is common property, and hence everybody may express an opinion on
it. The public conduct of every public man is a matter of public concern. Libelous remarks or
comments connected for one thing, with any speech or acts performed by officers in the
exercise of their functions are not actionable, unless malice is proved. If it is shown that the
imputation is either a false allegation of fact, or the expression of an opinion based upon mere
conjecture, malicious intent is established. In order that a discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must be either a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a
false supposition. If the comment is an expression of an opinion, based upon proven facts, then
it is no matter that the opinion happens to be mistaken so long as it might be reasonably
inferred from the facts. Comment may be fair, although wrong. So that the discreditable
imputation may not be actionable, the fact upon which the comment is reasonably based should
be actual facts, and not mere suppositions. (People vs. Velasco, C.A., 40 O.G. 3694)

Rule of Actual Malice

Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with malice – that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false or
not. This rule of actual malice was announced in New York Times vs Sullivan where the
prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that
he made them with the knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were
false or not.

A rule placing the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good
motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Article
361. It would above all else, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of of a self-governing
community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a
nation would be stifled (Vasquez vs CA).

What is the requirement before public officers can demand damages from the members
of the press?

It must be shown that the statement was made with actual malice – with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not (Rule of Actual Malic or New York
Times Test) (Flor vs People).