IV. Principles of Construction B.general Principles or Presumptions On The Interpretation of Certain Statutes

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
IV. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION

B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES/PRESUMPTIONS ON THE INTERPRETTAION OF CERTAIN STATUTES
1. PENAL LAWS
G.R. No. L-12891 October 19, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FILOMENO ESTAPIA ET AL., defendants-appellants.
J. A. Clarin for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The defendants took part, either as principals or as spectators, in an ihaway, the local name for a kind
of cockfight in which it is agreed that the losing cock is to be divided between the two owners of the
two birds engaged in the fight. The owners, with a few of their friends, were seen carrying the
gamecocks to a grove of buri palms near a recently constructed house; and were surprised by the
police, soon afterwards, standing, with some 8 or 10 onlookers, in a ring around the spot beneath a
buri palm where the fight had just taken place. There is nothing in the record which even tends to
indicate that the grove of buri palms where the fight took place had ever been used for such a
purpose on any occasion; or that on wager or bet was made on the fight, other than the agreement
that the losing bird should be killed and eaten by the owners of both cocks.
Upon proof of these facts judgment was entered in the court below convicting the defendants of a
violation of the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 480, and sentencing each of them to pay a fine of
P25 and the costs of the trial.
We agree with counsel for the appellants that the foregoing statement of the material facts developed
at the trial does not sustain this judgment of conviction.
The pertinent sections of Act No. 480 enacted October 15, 1902, reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall maintain a cockpit for the fighting of cocks, or who shall engage in
cockfighting in a cockpit, or who shall attend as a spectator of cockfighting is not lawfully licensed to
take place by the municipality in which the cockpit is situate, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two hundred dollars, in money of the United States, or by imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
SEC. 2. Any person who shall maintain or take part in a game of chance in a cockpit, whether the
cockpit be lawfully licensed or not, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, in
money of the United States, or by imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
This statute does not penalize all unlicensed cockfighting, but merely unlicensed cockfighting in a
cockpit. The statute does not impose penalties on those "who shall engage in cockfighting," but on
those who "shall engage cockfighting in a cockpit." It does not direct that the prescribed penalty shall
be imposed on one "who shall attend as a spectator of cockfighting," but on any person who "shall
attend as spectator of cockfighting in a cockpit." Manifestly, then, the penalties prescribed in this
statute cannot be imposed unless it affirmatively appears not only that the accused engaged in, or
were spectators of cockfighting, but also that this cockfighting took place in a cockpit.
We agree with counsel for the appellants that while it appears that the accused were participants in,
or spectators at an unlicensed cockfight, nevertheless, the evidence of the record fails utterly to
sustain a finding that this cockfight took place in a cockpit.
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The Attorney-General suggests that the term cockpit as used in the statute should be construed to
mean any place at which a cockfight takes place. His argument would seem to be that since, as he
contends, every place at which a cockfight occurs is a cockpit, proof that one engaged in, or was
present at, a cockfight proof that he was engaged in, or was present at a cockfight in a cockpit.
But this contention runs counter to the plain language of the statute and cannot be supported by any
sound rule of statutory construction.
(1) It violates the elementary rule that, when possible, all the words of a statute are to be given some
meaning so that when the legislator makes use of words of limitation, he must be presumed to have
intended to limit and restrict, in some way, the word or idea with reference to which such words of
limitation are applied.
If cockfighting means exactly the same thing as cockfighting in a cockpit, why did the legislator
carefully insert the words in a cockpit after the word cockfighting on both occasion when he made use
of that term in the first section of the statute?
(2) The penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly — a rule of construction which
emphatically forbids any attempt to hold that when the legislator penalizes the commission of an act
on certain specific occasions, he intends to penalize it on all occasions. A holding that the provisions
of section 1 of this Act penalize unlicensed cockfighting on all occasions and wherever it may take
place, despite the fact that these particular penalties are especially limited to unlicensed cockfighting
in a cockpit, would run counter to both the spirit and the letter of this rule.
(3) In construing particular words or terms used in a statute, due regard should be had for the context.
The provisions of the statute with relation to the maintenance of unlicensed cockpits, and the taking
part in games of chance in cockpits, licensed or not, quite clearly indicate that when the legislator
made use of the word cockpit, he had in mind some place especially designed for use by cockfighters,
or used by cockfighters more or less frequently as the scene of their encounters; and not merely a
place at which upon a single occasion, and without special preparation, a single encounter takes
place between two birds.
(4) The English word cockpit connotes something more than a place on the side of a road, in an open
field, beneath a tree, or in a barn, where a single encounter takes place between two birds. Originally
it referred, of course, to the specially prepared pits in which cocking-mains were fought. A main is
defined by Webster to be; "A match of several battles at cockfighting." In popular usage the word has
come to mean any place especially designed for use by cockfighters, or at which cockfighting battles
are had. But it would be a strained and unusual extension of the meaning of the word, as used in the
statute, to say that any and every place at which a single encounter is had between a couple of birds
is a cockpit. We are satisfied that if such a strained and unusual use of the word is permissible under
any circumstances, it was not in this sense that it was used by the legislator because, as we have
seen, it would be a vain and meaningless thing to make use of the term in this sense, as a word of
limitation upon the word cockfighting.
Webster, Funk and Wagnalls, and the Twentieth Century Dictionary define a cockpit to be, "A pit or
ring for cockfighting." This definition clearly connotes some idea of a place set apart for cockfighting or
for the use of cockfighters either by special adaptability or preparation therefor, or by more or less
frequent use. The meaning of the definition would not be wholly lost by substituting in the place of the
preposition "for," some such words as "adapted to," "appropriate to," "designed for," "intended for," or
"used for." But the use of the simple preposition "for" imports some suggestion of the dedication or
devotion of the place to the use indicated either by some specific form of preparation, or by its
repeated use to that end. It does not appear that the legislator had in mind any particular form or
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degree of preparation, or any definite number of cockfights which would be necessary to characterize
a given place set apart for cockpit; but we are satisfied that he contemplated that some preparation
for use for cockfighting, or that the celebration of more than one battle would be necessary to justify
the courts in characterizing a particular spot as a cockpit in the sense in which the word is used in this
statute. It may be that a grove of trees, a barn or shed, and even an open field or crossroads to which
a number of birds are brought to fight a main, or to which cockfighters more or less frequently resort to
engage in the sport, might fairly be included in the definition of the term as used in the statute — but
not a place to which, without any preparation, the owners of a couple of birds betake themselves on a
single occasion for a single encounter.
(5) The word gallera as used in the official Spanish version of the statute (to which we are expressly
authorized to look for aid in construing the English version in case of doubt) has a still more restricted
meaning than that which, as we have indicated, may be given to the English word cockpit for which it
is used as an imperfect equivalent. The Spanish word gallera clearly conveys the idea of a place
especially and expressly designed for the conduct of cockfighting; and no proper use of the word
lends itself to the meaning which the Attorney-General would place on the statute. Of course, the
broader definition of the word cockpit as found in the authoritative English version must prevail, but if
any doubt can be said to exist as to the sense in which that word is used in the statute, the use of the
word gallera as its equivalent in the Spanish version suggests that such doubt must be resolved
against the contention of the Attorney-General in the case at bar.
It is urged that the meaning given to the language of the statute by the trial judge is that which has
been given to it by the Collector of Internal Revenue and the Attorney-General since the date of its
enactment, and that the court should not disturb the uniform construction given a statute of this kind
by these executive authorities. It is to be observed, however, that this statute is not in any proper
sense a revenue measure, so that the rule, by virtue of which the courts pay marked respect to the
uniform and long continued construction placed upon the language of a revenue officers of the
government, has no special application in this case. We think that in view of the penal character of the
statute, the courts are not, and should not be bound, when the statute first comes before them for
interpretation, by any construction placed upon it by the executive officers of the government, even if
the language were fairly susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by those officers. But holding, as
we do, that the alleged construction placed upon the statute by the executive officers of the
government is manifestly in conflict with the plain meaning of the terms used and the evident intention
of the legislator in the use of these terms, we are of the opinion that the construction thus placed upon
the statute should be, and must be wholly disregarded. The rule relied upon by the prosecution is, at
best, a mere aid to construction or interpretation in cases where the language of a statute is fairly
susceptible of more than one meaning, so that substantial doubt arises as to the intent of the
legislator in the use of such ambiguous language.
It is urged, in support of the view taken by the executive authorities, that by applying this penal
provision to unlicensed cockfighting wherever it occurs, they have displayed commendable activity in
the repression of a reprehensible practice condemned by the enlightened opinion of the day. To this it
should be sufficient answer to say that neither the executive nor the judicial authorities are authorized
to impose fines and prison sentences in cases wherein such fines and prison sentences are not
clearly authorized by law, and this without regard to the end sought to be attained by the enforcement
of such unauthorized penalties.
It is a matter of general knowledge in the Philippine Islands that, ever since the change from Spanish
to American sovereignty, more or less active agitation has been maintained for the purpose of
securing legislation absolutely prohibiting and penalizing cockfighting in all its forms. The discussion
of the subject by the legislative and executive authorities of the government throughout that period
clearly discloses a desire on the part of these authorities to restrict and limit the practice, coupled,
however, with a full recognition of a grave question of public policy as to the measures which should
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be adopted to that end, and the extent to which the prohibitions should be carried. Thus we find the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands asserting in 1910 that "the government's policy as regards
cockfighting has been directed towards the gradual restriction thereof:" and an examination of the
statute book leaves no room for doubt that the steadfast policy of the legislator has been to restrict
and limit licensed or authorized cockfighting in cockpits to a limited number of holidays and feast
days, by the enactment of general legislation to that end; and to entrust all questions as to
enforcement of further restrictions or limitations upon the practice of cockfighting, to the local or
municipal authorities throughout the Islands. 1awphil.net
The law now in force on this subject, other than that found in Act No. 480, is set forth in the recently
enacted Administrative Code. Sections 2285 and 2389 restrict all cockfighting to authorized cockpits
upon prescribed legal holidays, but make no express provisions for the imposition of penalties for
violation of their provisions. But it will be found that the legislator has not left these legislative
prohibition wholly without sanction. Act No. 480 provides the appropriate penalties for violations of the
general law restricting cockfighting in cockpits to the legal holidays authorized by statute; and
subsection (i) of section 2243 of the Administrative Code confers authority upon the various municipal
councils throughout the Islands to adopt ordinances regulating or prohibiting altogether cockpits,
cockfighting and the keeping and training of fighting cocks within their respective jurisdictions, and to
provide such penalties for violations of these ordinances as they may deem proper.
It has been said that the alleged evils incident to a popular practice of this kind can be more
effectively dealt with by entrusting legislation on the subject to the awakening of an enlighted public
opinion, as it finds expression in the enactment of local ordinances and municipal registrations; rather
than by the enactment of general penal legislation, which takes no account of local sentiment or of
differences in the degree of culture and intelligence in the various communities scattered throughout
the Islands. This view would seem to have inspired the legislation heretofore enacted on this subject,
and who shall say that the lawmaker has acted wisely or unwisely in the adoption of the public policy
with regard to cockfighting which is disclosed by the laws on our statute books? Certainly not the
court, whose sworn duty it is to enforce the penal statutes as they are found upon the statute book,
and not otherwise.
We conclude that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and the accused acquitted of the
offense of which they were convicted in the court below, with the costs in both instances de officio. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
This appeal makes necessary a construction of Act No. 480, from its title a law punishing the
"unlawful maintenance of cockfighting and cockpits." The law reads:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall maintain a cockpit for the fighting of cocks, or who shall engage in
cockfighting in a cockpit, or who shall attend as a spectator of cockfighting in a cockpit, on any day
when cockfighting is not lawfully licensed to take place by the municipality in which the cockpit is
situate, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, in money of the United States,
or by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
SEC. 2. Any person who shall maintain or take part in a game of chance in a cockpit, whether the
cockpit be lawfully licensed or not, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, in
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money of the United States, or by imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
The defendants were caught fighting cocks in a grove of palms on a day not permitted by law and
without license. No bets as such were made; but the cockfighting was what is called ihaway, which
may be freely translated as a division of the losing bird among the spectators. Predicated on these
facts, counsel for appellants claim that there exist two fatal errors in the prosecution, one that betting
did not take place, and the other that the cockfighting was not done in a building.
As to the first, it is sufficient to point out that under section 1 Act No. 480, what is prohibited in the
maintenance of a cockpit for the fighting of cocks on any day when cockfighting is not lawfully
licensed to take place. The purpose of this section is absolutely to prohibit cockfighting, except on
certain specific days. Betting is not an essential element of the offense. (See U. S. vs. Rafael [1912],
23 Phil., 184.)
The second contention involves a construction of the word "cockpit." "Cockpit" is defined by Webster's
Dictionary as "a pit or area where gamecocks fight." The Attorney-General in numerous opinions has
held that it is not necessary for the fighting of cocks to be conducted inside of a building or inclosure
to bring the participants within the provisions of Act No. 480. The former Secretary of Finance and
Justice has held that "the conducting of a fight under a mango tree or at any other place is a
management of a cockpit within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Law. It is carrying on
cockfighting "in an area where gamecocks fight." The term, therefore, does not necessarily carry with
it the idea of a building or place maintained for the fighting of cocks.
The law contains other plain indicia pointing to the same conclusion. In Act No. 480 is found the
phrase "cockfighting in a cockpit." What does this signify? "Cockpit" we have already defined as "a pit
or area where gamecocks fight." The lexicographers also define "cockfighting" as "a battle between
cocks; specifically, a match between two gamecocks, in which the birds armed with artificial spurs of
steel are pitted against each other in a ring." Keeping, therefore, to the ordinary meaning of the law
and not indulging in any unwarranted inferences, a combination of the definitions is "a match between
two gamecocks in a pit or area." And this is the aspect of our present facts. To give such a
construction to the law, as is claimed by counsel for appellants, would be to deprive it to a large extent
of its force and effect. On the other hand, the interpretation above indicated keeps to the ordinary and
settled meaning of the words, while giving force to all the words of the statute.
What has been said is greatly reinforced when we note that the purpose of the Government has been,
and is, to restrict rather than to encourage cockfighting. The Governor-General, in an opinion in 1910,
said that, "the Government's policy as regards cockfighting has been directed towards the gradual
restriction thereof." The Administrative Code, which only recently went into effect and which should be
construed in connection with Act No. 480 in order to ascertain and to give effect to the legislative
intention, provides that "cockfighting shall take place only in licensed cockpits." (Secs. 2285, 2389.)
The attitude of the Government in this respect must meet with the approval of all good citizens.
Cockfighting is detrimental to public morality. Its influence is pernicious. It encourages cruelty to
animals. It disturbs the balance of society. It tends to bring forth idlers and gamblers. Restrictions and
ultimate prohibition should receive judicial sanction.
I have thus far considered the question at issue by means of independent research unrelated to and
uninfluenced by the majority decision. A few words only as to this decision. Its effect is this: To
reverse the carefully considered judgment of the trial court, to overturn the practice and policy of the
Executive Department of years duration, to brush aside the meaning of the law as disclosed by the
lexicographers and thus to nullify legislative intention, to put the seal of judicial approval on the
pernicious vice of cockfighting, and to give no consideration to what is for some the sole reason for
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law and is for all progressive thinkers an aspect never to be neglected, the sociological foundation of
jurisprudence. The majority decision discovers some peculiar sanctity in nature's canopy as opposed
to a covering of nipa suitably "prepared." It purifies "the single encounter . . . between two birds" and
reserves its wrath for "cockfighting battles" had "frequently." Under the majority decision, all that the
violator of the law has to do to escape punishment is either to be sure that on no two successive
occasions does he follow his sport in exactly the same spot, or that the place selected has undergone
no preparation, or that he has only two chickens together at the same time.
As diametrically opposed to this standpoint, there is for me in all cases a principle of statutory
construction not to be found in the books, but which for the Philippine Islands is all-important. In the
resolution of all questions, I begin with these queries: What is the best interest of the Filipino people?
How under the law can progress of the Philippine Islands be advanced? From this viewpoint, which as
a matter of fact is herein in accord with the logical interpretation of the law, there is but one possible
result — to assist the Legislature in its enactment of the law and the Executive in his enforcement of
the law by a judicial interpretation which will make legislative intention and executive action effective.
The judgment of the trial court sentencing each of the defendants to pay a fine of P25, or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, should be affirmed
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON
BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T.
DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B.
PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO
BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and
JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and
BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and
PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the
Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
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Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and
joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First
Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession
of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the
accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the
details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a
common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized
by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short)
No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not
being indispensable for the moment.
A — The Information filed by the People —
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN,

accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3,

Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
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That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4
inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence,
the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being
used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of
the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren
follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3,

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive
dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and
pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the same not being
used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and
place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 933
For:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
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DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the
crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the
President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and
23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of
Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his
residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as
could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the
accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. — The Orders of dismissal —
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense
that one essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the
carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or
on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside
residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that
the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the
conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated
and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not
necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration
suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9,
that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their
hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which
only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer
had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of
one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available
even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating
than the infamous paltik.
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For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can
never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who
are inclined to backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the
conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the
desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the
maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to
conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of
one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets
subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is
intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all
previously existing laws that also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not
contain any repealing clause or provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's
person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and
punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant
Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made
unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person
carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution
is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law enforcement officers
carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that the same may be
used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment
with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person
cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it
merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied
in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in
promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It
may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President intended
to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is
one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
10
1. PENAL LAWS
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information
filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should
be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No.
1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton
destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the
tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the
quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a
permit unless the same would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more
compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict
enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon
the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status
symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their
farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to
and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused.
In the criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the
same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the
three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on other charges.
C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of
deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22,
1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been
placed under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972
and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public
disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of
firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of

the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
11
1. PENAL LAWS
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon
conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,

Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is
attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the performance of
their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity causing
the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions
promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president,
manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private
firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms
owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other
explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or
other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents
containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that
ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the
compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of
causing injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by
imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife,"
"spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being
used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection
therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the
commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon
the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses
committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-two.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
D. — The arguments of the People —
12
1. PENAL LAWS
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal
of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of
dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of
paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that
the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused
who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that
P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the
commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to
eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information.2
E. — Our Ruling on the matter —
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a
complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the
statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the
charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is
essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-
called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus,
Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife,
dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall,
upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred
pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment,
in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on
December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not
more than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his
person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or
other deadly weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law
violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance
on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the
crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed
repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by
implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes
which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In
fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and
13
1. PENAL LAWS
their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a
police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential
decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with
the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become
an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action — a fear
understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are daily
exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the
body of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the
offense treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and
second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection
with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of
the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of
carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself.
What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that
motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the
circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction
given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries
outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of
motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is
ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true
meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be
construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases

— the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is
the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio
Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are
clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial
law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9;
and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos,
aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms
and explosives and other deadly weapons.
14
1. PENAL LAWS
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word
"whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent
defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the
decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as
such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the
decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the
purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can
be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are
to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West
Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis
supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which
otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and
Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that
'(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken
in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated.
Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other
provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of

the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms
and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to
Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government
and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and
rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage,
plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against innocent and
defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have seriously endangered and continue
to endanger public order and safety and the security of the nation, ...
15
1. PENAL LAWS
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos
and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces
of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations
because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations,
acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and
depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to
the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have
fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this
country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on
the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with
or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3),
and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T.
Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros,
107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the
measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no
intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression,
arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on.10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9,
that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their
hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which
only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer
had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of
one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available
even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating
than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in
absurdity at times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by
16
1. PENAL LAWS
profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor
who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter
upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a
violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such absurd,
unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the
rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to
escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who is
not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the
statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684,
692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that
the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined
solely by the facts alleged therein.13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements
of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the
complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that
the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief
Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts
recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other
available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is sustained
the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in
custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having
been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be
discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.
17
1. PENAL LAWS
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or
form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the
trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases,
viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to
include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges.
We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the
case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the
Information.16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act
No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928,
especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the
accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal
action or liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for
reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all
these cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the
present.
H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the
government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good
faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a
situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and
justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the
offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City
Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he
stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of carrying
bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may
not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9.17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is
however a judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the
law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in
18
1. PENAL LAWS
the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application
of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an
instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent
Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations
made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner
herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new
one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known
as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would
constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by
the petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon
were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise
him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga,
went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he
was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault.
19
1. PENAL LAWS
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no
longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to
withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High
School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High
School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel
Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct
Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where
to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the
then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the
Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should
receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant
to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened
to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan
and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to
one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the
appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and,
therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without
the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by
the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered
in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the
following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused
20
1. PENAL LAWS
Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term
"device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to
listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is
ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence.
The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third
party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the
conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension
was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused
Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only
one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with
the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar,
would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his
client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if
he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the
criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the
listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word
of the caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra
heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often
encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone
and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he
could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private
communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous
results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase
"any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement
as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory
21
1. PENAL LAWS
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private
secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or
recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman.
Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that
matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration
of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No.
9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension
telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication
device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor
of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in
the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie
talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight.
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete
set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus
consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which
can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be
plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other
party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of
Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may
be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different
from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code
provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d)
should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to
22
1. PENAL LAWS
comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general
expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that
usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities,
though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that
upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134
Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-
181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to
that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar
nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or
parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended
unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to
place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is
calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third
party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As
was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in
more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that
the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the
conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties
may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead
of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there
is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone
for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in
the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an
extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the
rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights
of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct
609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v.
Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable
a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of
forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory
Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of
the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the
inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance,
23
1. PENAL LAWS
they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a
telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is
made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the amendment
than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of
government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment, they would
have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact would have the right to tape record
their conversation.
Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore, the
court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In
these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside
listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to
record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the
evidence is not very much.
Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false testimony. If
we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be
wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic devices
to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such
as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to
gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over
the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly
be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the
view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated
August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
24

IV. Principles of Construction B.general Principles or Presumptions On The Interpretation of Certain Statutes

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IV. Principles of Construction B.general Principles or Presumptions On The Interpretation of Certain Statutes

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

IV. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

J. A. Clarin for appellants.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.

Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.

Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

A — The Information filed by the People —

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN,

Crim. Case No. 19639

VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3,

Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)

CRIM. CASE NO. 29677

No. 266 of the Chief

Executive dated April 1, 1975

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3,

Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.

CRIM. CASE NO. 933

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)

B. — The Orders of dismissal —

1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of

(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,

(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

Republic of the Philippines

D. — The arguments of the People —

E. — Our Ruling on the matter —

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be

4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases

NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of

xxx xxx xxx

F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:

xxx xxx xxx

Section 8. Rule 117 states that:

Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.

Aquino, J, took no part.

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;