INTRO TO LAW – HANNA BALBONA JD-1C

1. Tanada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code

Issue: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

Ruling: The clear object of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published
in the Official Gazette" The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not
be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
2. . Tanada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915, 1986

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a
number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were
to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24,
1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect."

Issue:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not as to their publication;

2. Questions about publication:

(i) Where is the publication to be made?
(ii) When is the publication to be made?

Ruling:
1. No. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as
a whole.

2. SC holds that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither
is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform
the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
That is not the function of the Supreme Court. That function belongs to the legislature. SC’s
task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently,
SC have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication
of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or in any other date, without its previous publication.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

3. Co vs. CA
Facts: A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the
salvage company against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in
petitioner’s conviction of the crime charged on the basis that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22.

Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from
application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which
ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he
sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court
but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction.
Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that
the Que doctrine ” Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or
secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally
liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22” did not amount to the passage of new law
but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on
April 3, 1979 From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this
Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court..

Issue: Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee
check will no longer be considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.

Ruling: No. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the
same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal
laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental
doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no
compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating
criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial
Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-
petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.

4. Jose Zulueta vs. Francisca Zulueta

FACTS: Heirs of the late Don Clemente Zulueta nominated each auditors and a separate
one as auditor umpire. The two auditors nominated by the heirs failed to agree and filed
separate reports. The auditor umpire had his side with the auditor of the plaintiff. The
opposition was filed by the defendant. The court directed actions to be followed and
forwarded to Doña Francisca for her to create her demands due to disagreements of both
parties. On May 7, on plaintiff’s demand, to change the 15 days to a 7 days within which she
must express her demands. The defendant filed another petition to suspend the proceedings
until the new Code of Procedure takes effect on June 5, citing it is more advantageous on
her rights. The court denied the petition as the term for filing has expired. Reason cited by
defendant is her mistake as to the term prescribed which prevented her from filing an
opposition for auto of June 22.

ISSUE: Whether or not Doña Francisca is entitled to relief against the consequences of her
failure to interpose her appeal against the auto of June 22 within the period fixed by the law.

HELD: No. It is shown that the party acted with mistake of law and ignorance and
misconception of the provisions of the law regarding the time within which the appeal should
be submitted. Ignoratia legis non excusat.

5. Cerrano vs. Tan Huco

Facts: Tan Chuco owns casco No. 1033 (a long almost rectangular barge with sails used in
PH).

Jan 1916: He rented it to Cerrano at a monthly rate of P70 with no express agreement as to
contract duration, payable at the end of each month. Contract was made in Manila.
May 1916: Tan told Cerrano that the casco would be sent to Malabon for repairs. Cerrano
told Tan that he would rent it again after. Tan agreed but said payment must be P80. Tan
contends he agreed but Cerrano says his offer was never accepted. Contended on behalf of
Cerrano & denied by Tan that according to the custom prevailing in Manila ports, a contract
for rental of a casco must run from the date of the contract until the casco has to be docked
for its annual repair. Cerrano says that contract was to commence again as soon as the
casco came off the dock & that its term was to be 10 months (period which is ordinarily
allowed from one docking to another). Tan says without an express stipulation regarding the
duration, it is deemed from month to month when a monthly rental is agreed upon.
Jun 1916: casco was taken to Malabon & stayed there until Jul 24, 1916. A week
before the end of the repair, Tan sold the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. J. Santos
(employed by Cerrano as patron of the casco) refused to hand over the casco & was
induced by Cerrano not to turn over the casco / not to take orders from the new owners. As a
result, Siy Cong Bieng broung an action of replevin against Santos for the recovery of the
casco. Sheriff confiscated the casco but redelivered it to Santos after Tan & wife gave a
delivery bond as sureties. After 3 months, the replevin suit was submitted to court for
decision upon a written stipulation admitting Siy Cong Bieng & Co. were the owners.
Cerrano paid the judgment in the replevin suit for which he has become liable under the
terms of the delivery bond. Cerrano has to pay the attorney he hired for the nominal
defendant Santos. Cerrano testified that the average profit he should have earned when he
should have been in possession of the casco during the 10-month rental period is
P60/month. Trial court ruled that Tan is liable to Cerrano for the breach of contract a sum of
P600 for the loss of profits Cerrano would have derived from the use of the casco + P457.98
paid as damages to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. + P500 Cerrano’s attorney who defended Santos.
Issue: WON Cerrano was entitled to damages
Ruling: Cerrano is entitled to recover as damages for the breach of the contract, the profit
which he would have been able to make had the contract been performed.
a. Article 1106, Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be
recovered as damages.
b. Article 1107, Civil Code provides that the damages recoverable for the
breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or
might have been foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. |
Unquestionable that Cerrano had foreseen losses.
c. When the existence of a loss is established, absolute certainty as to its
amount is not required.
d. The burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff might have
reduced damages. Tan made no effort to show Cerrano that similar cascos
were available to him.
e. Trial court ERRED in holding Cerrano liable for damages for breach of
contract. Proximate cause of the loss incurred for the unlawful acts of Santos
was not the breach of his contract by Tan Chuco. If Cerrano is unable to
recover from Santos paid by him upon his account, it is on Cerrano.Judgment
REVERSED. Cerrano is to recover from Tan Chuco P50 as damages, & costs
in the CFI.