LEGAL ETHICS – is a branch of moral science, which treats
of the duties which an attorney owes to the court, to the
client, to his colleagues in the profession and to the public
as embodied in the Constitution, Rules of Court, the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Canons of Professional
Ethics, jurisprudence, moral laws and special laws.
Original Bases of Legal Ethics:
Canons of Professional Ethics
Supreme court Decisions
Statistics
Constitution
Treatises and publications
Present Basis of the Philippine Legal System: Code of
Professional Responsibility.
BAR V. BENCH
BAR – Refers to the whole body of attorneys and body of
judges.
BENCH – denotes the whole body of counselors,
collectively the members of
the legal profession.
Practice of Law – any activity, in or out of court which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which or devise or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill (Cayetano v. Monsod,
201 SCRA 210).
Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod
October 17, 2012
Legal Ethics – Practice of Law
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman
of the Commission on Elections. His appointment was
affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s
appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the
ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the
Constitutional requirement which provides that the
chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in
the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm
for one year.
Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a
degree in economics and held various positions in various
foreign corporations.
In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive
jobs for various local corporations until 1986.
In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional
Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of
the COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor —
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not
limited to court appearances. The members of the bench
and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what is loosely described as business counseling than in
trying cases. In the course of a working day the average
general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. By no means will most of
this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this
work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation.
An amicus curiae educates the court on points of law that
are in doubt, gathers or organizes information, or raises
awareness about some aspect of the case that the court
might otherwise miss. The person is usually, but not
necessarily, an attorney, and is usually not paid for her or
his expertise. An amicus curiae must not be a party to the
case, nor an attorney in the case, but must have some
knowledge or perspective that makes her or his views
valuable to the court.
The most common arena for amici curiae is in cases that
are under appeal (are being reconsidered by the court)
and where issues of public interest—such as social
questions or civil liberties—are being debated. Cases that
have drawn participation from amici curiae are those
involving Civil Rights (such as 1952's brown v. board of
education), Capital Punishment, environmental protection,
gender equality, infant Adoption, and Affirmative Action.
Amici curiae have also informed the court about narrower
issues, such as the competency of a juror; or the correct
procedure for completing a deed or will; or evidence that a
case is collusive or fictitious—that is, that the parties are
not being honest with the court about their reasons for
being there.
The privilege that friends of the court are granted to
express their views in a case is just that: amici curiae have
no right to appear or to file briefs. Unless they represent
the government, amici curiae must obtain leave
(permission) to do so from the court, or consent of all
parties in the case, before filing. No court is obligated to
follow or even to consider the advice of an amicus curiae,
even one it has invited.
The principle that guides the appropriate role of a friend of
the court is that he or she should serve the court without
also acting as "friend" to either of the parties. Rules of
court and case law (past court decisions) have attempted
to spell out the sometimes tricky specifics of how an
amicus curiae should—and should not—participate in a
case.
The amicus curiae walks a fine line between providing
added information and advancing the cause of one of the
parties. For instance, she or he cannot raise issues that the
parties themselves do not raise, since that is the task of
the parties and their attorneys. If allowed by the court,
amici curiae can file briefs (called briefs amicus curiae or
amicus briefs), argue the case, and introduce evidence.
However, they may not make most motions, file pleadings,
or manage the case.
Whether participating by leave or by invitation, in an
appearance or with a brief amicus curiae, a friend of the
court is a resource person who has limited capacity to act
What is an 'Attorney In Fact'
An attorney in fact is a person who is authorized to
perform business-related transactions on behalf of
someone else (the principal). In order to become
someone's attorney in fact, a person must have the
principal sign a power of attorney document. This
document designates the person as an agent, allowing him
to perform actions in the principal's stead.
BREAKING DOWN 'Attorney In Fact'
An attorney in fact takes two forms. The first type is a
"general power of attorney," which allows the attorney in
fact to conduct all business and sign any document on
behalf of the principal. The second type is a "special power
of attorney," which allows the person to sign documents
and conduct business on the principal's behalf only in
specific situations. The power of attorney document, in the
case of a special power of attorney, outlines the matters in
which the attorney can act instead of the principal.
It's important to note that an attorney in fact does not
need to be a practicing attorney, also known as an
attorney at law. As long as the power of attorney
document is signed by the principal, it can appoint anyone
to be the attorney in fact, even family members.
The Powers and Duties of an Attorney in Fact
An attorney in fact, if designated as a general power of
attorney, is allowed to conduct any investment or
spending actions that the principal would reasonably take.
This means that an attorney in fact, in this case, would be
able to open and close bank accounts, withdraw funds,
trade stocks, pay bills or cash checks, all on the behalf of
the principal.
An example of this would be when an elderly person
grants general power of attorney to his child. This would
allow the child to help with bills and other financial
matters that may be outside the scope of ability of the
elderly person. This is especially beneficial if the older
person is immobile or otherwise bedridden and can't
travel to a bank for their financial matters.
If a principal believes that a general power of attorney
gives too much power to someone else, he can designate
an attorney in fact as a special power of attorney. Using
the same example as above, if an elderly person is
normally mobile but recently underwent surgery, he can
grant special power of attorney to his child to pay his bills
while he recovers. However, all attorneys in fact are
required to keep a fiduciary duty, meaning that the best
interest of the principal must be upheld.
Attorney-at-law/Counsel-at-law/Attorney/Counsel/
Abogado/Boceros: that class of persons who are licensed
officers of the courts, empowered to appear prosecute
and defend and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities, and liabilities are developed by law as a
consequence (Cui v. Cui, 120 Phil. 729).
Attorney in fact – an agent whose authority is strictly
limited by the instrument appointing him, though he may
do things not mentioned in his appointment necessary to
the performance of the duties specifically required of him
by the power of attorney appointing him, such authority
being necessarily implied. He is not necessarily a lawyer.
Pro Se
For one's own behalf; in person. Appearing for oneself, as
in the case of one who does not retain a lawyer and
appears for himself or herself in court.
Practice of law is a profession not a business. Explain.
People v. Hon. Bonifacio Maceda
January 24, 2000
This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s
motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990
decision holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private
respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the
Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time,
sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should not be
detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s
order specifically provided for private respondent’s
detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However,
private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam
around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said
residence. It was howevere found that the order was not
strictly complied with because Javellana was not detained
in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his
normal activities as if he were a free man, including
engaging in the practice of law.
Held:
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on
the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is
deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court
gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private
respondent Javellana with the obligation “to hold and
detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official
capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court.
Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he
ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana
and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the
custodian under the same undertaking.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense
is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency
of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the
court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or
hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
OCA v. LADAGA
A.M. No. P-99-1287 Jan. 26, 2001
Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga is the Branch Clerk of Court of
the Makati Regional Trial
Court and he appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his
cousin. Ladaga was on official
leave of absence and his Presiding Judge was aware of the
case he was handling. It has
been found that Ladaga did not obtain permission from
the Court that he can appear as
counsel for his cousin.
Issue: Is Ladaga guilty of violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of RA 6713,
for engaging in private
practice?
Held: No. Ladaga’s appearance as counsel for his cousin,
where he does not receive
any compensation, does not constitute as “private evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior authority from
practice” as contemplated by law. Supreme Court.

However, it cannot be denied that his appearance was He does not possess any discretion with respect to the
done without permission from the matter of admission of

Court. With that, the Supreme Court reprimands Atty. examinees to the bar. He does not a have any business
Ladaga with a stern warning. evaluating the answers of the examinees.

Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule

138 of the Revised Rules

of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar must

be of good moral character. Galang
IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO(former Bar confidant) has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he
RAMON GALANG committed perjury when he declared under

(1971 Bar Examinee) flunked in 1969, 1966-76, 1962-64 oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted
Bar exam him to revoked his license.

FACTS: In Re: Vicente Almacen

1. Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for September 11, 2012

disbarment. 31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize
2.Admitted having brought the five examination the Courts
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay
back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re- in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed
checking. a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing
party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and
3.The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re- place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was
checked the notebook denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied
his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to
to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed
authority to do the same an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
particular subject and was This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute
on the borderline of passing. resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s
4.Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to
because of Lanuevo’s continue practicing his profession when members of the
high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice,
move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
subjects namely in and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute
(Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without
5.Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of the
Slight Physical Injuries sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also
stated “that justice as administered by the present
on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU. members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.”
RULING
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s
:The court disbarred Lanuevo – has no authority to request
petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to
the examiners to re-
ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender
his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he
chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be
permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him . . . in an open and
public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that
the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot
accept every case or write full opinion for every petition
they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to
effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper
role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High
Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to
criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it
is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a
veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party
of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and
will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen
was suspended indefinitely.
10 initial requirements in admission to the bar.(
enumerate)
In Re: Vicente Ching
January 6, 2013
Legal Profession – Admission to the Bar – Citizenship
Requirement
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint
Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the
bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that
he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his
oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but
his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married
before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution,
a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner,
acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent.
Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as
a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a
councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying
that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching
should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon
reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7
years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21
years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935
Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when
he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after
reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-
General recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the
special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino
citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years
had lapsed and it’s way beyond the allowable 7 year
period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is
originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems
it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special
circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a
professional and a public officer (was) serving this country.
The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t
give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect
Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never
thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar).
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship
is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee,
Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar examinations and for
disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Melendrez.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee,
Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar examinations and for
disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Melendrez.
FACTS:
MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling)
from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on
him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of
the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take
the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
i. Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people.
ii. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.
Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in
his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of
the Bar.
MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former
professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled
because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them,
considered the three cases that arose from a single
incident as “closed and terminated.”
i. Denies the charges and
added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.
Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word “Attorney” as
they were typed by the office clerk.
Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling:
Meling should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired
judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against
Meling are still pending.
Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still
required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character.
ISSUE:
WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes
dishonesty. YES.
HELD:
PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take
effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar,
the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic (Meling did not pass the bar).
Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.”
He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was
no valid reason why he signed as “attorney” whoever may
have typed the letters. i.
Unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney” may
render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.
Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.
Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant that applicant to aver that he or she “has not
been charged with any act or omission punishable by law,
rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime
involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or
charge against him/her.”
Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal
cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment,
done under oath at that.
Alawi v Alauya
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi
City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of
his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an
administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds
was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which
only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly
use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the
assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have
a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
“attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for
“councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,”
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal,
he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can
use the title of Attorney
Held:
He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the
regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this
Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of
the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in
the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of
“attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Facts:
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto
Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers. In
less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra
driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for
work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that
he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With
respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners
on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed
passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed
him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went
to his home province to recuperate. In January, 1987,
Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver
under the same terms and conditions as when he was first
employed, but his working schedule was made on an
"alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day.
However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work
during his schedule. On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon
failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous
day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel
refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of
petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly
refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a
taxi for "Bulaklak Company." Sometime in 1989, Maldigan
requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily
cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him
that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these
were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the
repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the
practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses
incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When
Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners
terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that
his termination from employment was effected when he
refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. On
November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint
with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor
Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal
dismissal and illegal deductions, and asking for paying the
private respondent’s authorized representative’s
attorney’s fees.
RULING:
On the issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private
respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear
before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they
represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their
organization or the members thereof. While it may be
true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-
lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing
categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the
existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition
for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship
cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED
by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash
expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public
respondent to order and effect the computation and
payment by petitioners of the refund for private
respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal
interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution
up to the date of actual payment thereof.
PEOPLE VS. SANTOCILDES
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member
of the Philippine Bar during trial, the judgment should be
set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a
new trial. A person who misrepresents himself as a lawyer
shall be held liable for indirect contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated
October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party the
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the
crime of rape[1] of a girl less than nine (9) years old,
committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of
Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial ensued and the prosecution presented as its
witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old
playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the
victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales
and himself. Appellant denied committing the rape and
claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the
victim and her playmate, from quarreling.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision[2]
finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion
of the decision states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its
accessory penalty. The accused is ordered to pay the
amount of P50,000.00 to the complainant and another
amount for costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of
failure to pay the civil liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 6127, as amended, and he has agreed in
writing to abide by the same rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with the full
duration of his preventive imprisonment; otherwise, he
shall only be credited with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal.[3] In his
brief,[4] appellant made the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE
INSPITE OF CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON MATERIAL
POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED
THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN TO BE DEFENDED BY A
PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS."
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to
counsel, we shall now first resolve the issue of proper
representation by a member of the bar raised by
appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by
a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents
and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the
direct examination and cross-examinations of the
witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the
services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who
discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a
member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of
the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact.[5] Appellant
therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to
counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,
maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's
counsel during trial was not a member of the bar,
appellant was afforded due process since he has been
given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal
that said person "presented the evidence for the defense
with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in general
handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful
manner." However, the right of the accused to be heard by
himself and his counsel, in our view, goes much deeper
than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of
our adversarial system of justice. Where the interplay of
basic rights of the individual may collide with the awesome
forces of the state, we need a professional learned in the
law as well as ethically committed to defend the accused
by all means fair and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of
the bar, we had occasion to resolve a similar issue in the
case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals.[6] In Delgado,
petitioner and two others were convicted by the trial court
of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public and/or
official documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner
Delgado and her remaining co-accused appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed petitioner's conviction
but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of judgment,
petitioner discovered that her lawyer was not a member of
the bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence, she
filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court set
aside the assailed judgment and remanded the case to the
trial court for a new trial, explaining that -
"This is so because an accused person is entitled to be
represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed
against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is
represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any
defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate
considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the
court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due
process."[7]
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial
importance that even if an accused was represented by
three successive counsels from the Public Attorney's
Office, the Court has ordered the remand of a rape case
when it found that accused was given mere perfunctory
representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant
was not properly and effectively accorded the right to
counsel. In the recent en banc case of People v. Bermas,
G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking
through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers
for failing to genuinely protect the interests of the accused
and for having fallen much too short of their responsibility
as officers of the court and as members of the Bar. Verily,
we can do no less where the accused was not even duly
represented by a certified member of the Philippine Bar,
no matter how zealous his representation might have
been.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal
proceedings should never be taken lightly.[8] Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.[9] The right of an accused to counsel is
guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome
prosecutory machinery of the State.[10] Such a right
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a part
of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that
may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.[11]
The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less
than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987
Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in
Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the
trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings from the arraignment to the
promulgation of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution vests the power to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law to
the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice law in
the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides for
the requirements for all applicants for admission to the
bar. Jurisprudence has also held that "the right to practice
law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The right does not only
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege,
highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public
trust."[12] Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the practice
of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[13] a Bar candidate who
has already successfully hurdled the Bar examinations but
has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys,
and who was caught in the unauthorized practice of law
was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person who undertakes the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt
of court for assuming to be an attorney and acting as such
without authority.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the
case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the
person named Gualberto C. Ompong in connection with
this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt
and thorough investigation regarding this matter and to
report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90)
days from notice of this order. Let all concerned parties,
including the Office of the Bar Confidant, be each
furnished a copy of this Decision for their appropriate
action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS
petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING
respondents.
REYES, J.B.L.,
J.:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services
rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition
for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en
banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting
respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees
for professional services in the said case. The above-
named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-
Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar
Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations
rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the
reinstatement with back wages of complainants Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decisionbecame final.
On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of
record for the winning complainants,filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a
similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants
Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a
manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award
of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and,on the
same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award
of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid
& Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.The
records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was
filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio
Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at
first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent
Quintin Muning. On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial
Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation
for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned
as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates
............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning
......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis
................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer
according to the order, is sought to be voided in the
present petition.Respondent Muning moved in this Court
to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing
but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.
1)He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the
motion contained averments that go into the merits of the
case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for
reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to
the petitioner for review.
2)The case was considered submitted for decision without
respondent's brief.
4) that an agreement providing for the division of
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned
by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be
justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less
immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present
case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that
—In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be
represented by legal counsel ...is no justification for a
ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in
the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer,
is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds
that —it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or
Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses
on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly
presentation of evidence. thus making it clear that the
representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly
qualified members of the bar.The permission for a non-
member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the
said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself
entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24,

Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees.

— An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, ...imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's
fees. Such a

relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative

in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one,
he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU,and he
cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public
policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing
tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the
rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being
subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of
courts, clients and the public. On the present issue, the
rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is
stated: But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now
been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted
to the bar from practicing law, and under statutes of this
kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that
compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by
one who has not been admitted to practice before the
court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered.

5)No one is entitled to recover compensation for services

as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.

6)The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession

should not be violated;

7) that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes

contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both,

8) and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or
benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law;