According to Kant, prostitution is morally

wrong. The second formulation of the

categorical imperative states that one should
never use themselves, or another as a mere
means. 1. I can see how prostitution would fail
to respect self, as it is using one's body as a
"mere means" to earn money. But how is that
different from a farmer, who use his body to
work in the fields to harvest crops for food and
money? 2. Prostitution also fails to respect
another, by using the person to satisfy his
sexual urges. However, by paying the
prostitute, isn't it also respecting her by
recognizing her dignity and worth and paying
her for her "work"? On the basis of these 2
points, can you please explain why prostitution
is morally wrong?
Michael CholbiMay 15, 2017
I'm not sure that most contemporary Kantian moral philosophers
agree with Kant on the morality of prostitution. As you note,
prostitution does not seem to make use of one's own humanity in a
way that's fundamentally different from other forms of work or
labor which are clearly morally permissible. Why think that
prostitution, unlike farming, involves the wrongful use of ourselves
merely as a means?
Much of the reason is that Kant was deeply skeptical about the
compatibility of sexual desire with the moral requirement to treat
rational agents as ends in themselves rather than merely as a means.
He writes: “Sexual union is the reciprocal use that one human
beings makes of the sexual organs and capacities of another” for the
purpose of enjoyment. As Kant saw it, sexual desire is not a desire
for a person's good but for the use of their body for one's own
physical pleasure. Hence, sexual desire is fundamentally at odds
with respect for others' rational natures. Sex is animalistic in that we
treat ourselves (and others) as animal-like:
"When a man wishes to satisfy his desire, a woman hers, they
stimulate each other’s desires; their inclinations meet, but their
object is not human nature but sex, and each of them dishonors the
human nature of the other. They make of humanity an instrument
for the satisfaction of their lusts and inclinations, and dishonor it by
placing it on a level with animal nature."
For Kant, objectification is therefore built into the nature of sex. Sex
invariably involves seeing oneself and one's sex partner merely as
means. There is a way for sex to be mutually respectful, according
to Kant, namely, through marital monogamy. (I won't go into the
complicated dynamics of how Kant thought marital monogamy
makes sex morally innocuous.) But Kant's opposition to prostitution
stems from the contention that sex as such treats the partners merely
as means.
Needless to say, Kant's view of the nature of sex is open to question.
He seems to think that sexual desire is by its nature an
uncontrollable impulse that can't be tamed by reason and is thus
inescapably a form of objectification. What I suspect Kant misses is
that some measure of objectification may nevertheless be
compatible with respect for rational agency. There is certainly a
sense in which prostitutes, by commodifying their bodies, are
treating their bodies as means (so too are their customers treating
prostitutes' bodies as means). But when such a transaction is
consensual, non-coercive, etc., one might think that this
'objectification' takes place against a background of respect for one's
own rational agency and that of others. (Note that Kantians are
likely to find non-consensual, coerced, exploitative sexual activity
to be particularly objectionable; sadly, prostitution all too often falls
into that category.)
So in the end, it's not clear that Kant's case for the immortality of
prostitution is that compelling. It rests on peculiar views about the
nature of sexual desire and its compatibility with respect for rational
agency that even Kantians might well reject.