Bas Waterhout: Polycentric Development - What’s behind it?

This chapter is about the one and only substantive spatial planning concept in the
European Spatial Development Perspective with the potential of integrating the interests
of the many parties involved. Indeed, it will become clear that polycentric development
has formed this bridge between the perspectives of the Member States.
Obviously, in an unbalanced continent like Europe with only one economic core area in
the Northwest, interests diverge. With the Single Market and European Monetary Union
both aiming to create a Europe-wide level playing field, inevitably, competition
between cities and regions will intensify further. However, the situations of various
cities and regions are not the same. (CEC, 1999a) Spatial planners think that they can
help to alleviate this problem.
It is not for the first time that planners try to address themselves to the European scale.
(National Spatial Planning Agency 2000) Already in 1955, Northwest European
planners met at the so-called Conference of Regions of Northwest Europe (CRENWE;
see also the paper above by Philippe Doucet). Inspired by the concept of a
‘megalopolis’ introduced by Jean Gottman (1961), CRENWE identified its study area
as such a megalopolis, or at least as in the process of becoming one. At European level,
the Conférence Européenne des Ministres responsables de L’Aménagement du
Territoire (CEMAT) planners met since 1964. (See the paper by Derek Martin and
Jacques Robert above.) In 1986, a veritable Structural Outline for the Benelux saw the
light of day. What was common to all the initiatives was the conceptualization of
Europe in terms of a core and periphery. (Figure A.4) However, modest achievements in
the Benelux apart (Zonneveld, Faludi 1997; De Vries 2002) none of the initiatives was
successful in influencing policy.
Since 1989, the ESDP process is under way under the wings of Directorate-General
Regio. (See the Introduction.) For the first time the Member States have been able to
formulate a joint spatial planning document. This is the most promising attempt so far to
put spatial planning on the European policy map. However, the ESDP planners have no
real instruments to give their policies teeth. Their only chance is to formulate ideas that
the outside world finds interesting. Fortunately, the underlying objectives of the ESDP
correspond with those in the EU-Treaties: economic and social cohesion,
competitiveness and sustainability. However, whether this will be enough to attract the
interest of the outside world remains to be seen. What is needed is something new,
something that stirs up enthusiasm, like polycentric development.
In this chapter the analytical concept ‘policy theory’ will be used to explain what the
reasoning is behind polycentric development. In so doing, the world behind the plan
must be analyzed, thereby invoking two archetypes of spatial conceptualizations of
Europe: the ‘Blue Banana’ that portrays Europe as having a core and periphery and the
European ‘Bunch of Grapes’, which reflects a more diversified view of Europe.

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Based amongst others on research done jointly with Andreas Faludi in the context of EURBANET, a
project in the framework of the Community Initiative INTERREG IIC for the North-West Metropolitan
Area. The lead partner was the research institute OTB from Delft University of Technology.
What follows is, firstly, a short introduction of the policy theory. Secondly the paper
discusses what the ESDP says about polycentric development. Thirdly, the role of this
concept in the ESDP process will be analyzed. Fourthly, the paper discusses how it has
been taken up after the completion of the ESDP. The paper ends with conclusions.

Policy Theory: A Joint Construct

Reconstructing policy theory means laying bare the causal, final and normative
assumptions involved in giving reasons for proposing or adopting a specific policy. In a
widely read paper, Hoogerwerf introduced the concept, called ‘beleidstheorie’ in Dutch,
but not without referring to other authors invoking the same idea. (Hoogerwerf 1984,
495) He claims that, for academic as well as practical purposes, the assumptions
underlying policies are interesting to look at.
The complex of assumptions underlying a policy theory consists of various elements:
assumptions regarding characteristics of the phenomena concerned and others regarding
the relationships between these phenomena. The latter in particular make for policy
theory having the character of a theory. (Ibid. 501) Hoogerwerf distinguishes three types
of relationships:
• between principles and norms, either amongst each other, or between principles and
norms on the one hand and the existing or expected situation on the other hand
(normative relationships)
• between cause and effect (causal relationships)
• between ends and means (instrumental or final relationships)
Polycentricity as it is used in the ESDP involves all these relationships. The
assumptions behind the relationships can be broken down into conclusions and
arguments. The Dutch literature refines this further (Pröpper, Reneman 1993), but in
this paper this distinction will suffice. The conclusions are what the policy under
consideration, in this case the ESDP, says. They form the reference point for the
reconstruction of the policy theory. The policy-analyst’s task is to lay bare the
arguments behind these conclusions, in other words to say why it is that the policy
makers have concluded that the policy in question is the one they should adopt.
Now, there is no established model for reconstructing a policy theory. The analyst can
encounter various problems. A complicating factor is the fact that policy makers are not
always aware of the assumptions they make. In many cases the policy theory is just the,
perhaps unintended outcome of a complex process of interaction between various
stakeholders. This has certainly been the case with the ESDP. So what is clear is that the
final policy document provides an insufficient basis for understanding of the policy
theory behind it. Once again, the final text acts as the reference point though for
reconstructing the policy theory for the simple reason that it represents the conclusions
of a process. However, what should be borne in mind is that these conclusions are the
result of compromises or package deals that, if only up to a point, have succeeded in
satisfying the concerns of all participants in the process. Especially where, like in
European spatial planning, we are dealing with strategic policies, we often find a strong
correlation between the multi-interpretability of a policy text and the complexity of the
process that has led to it. (Teisman 2000) As a result, every stakeholder and also every
addressee can and must translate the often vague and abstract policy conclusions into

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terms amenable to his or her situation. (Perhaps though, this is true for any sort of text;
see Faludi & Korthals Altes 1994) The conclusion is that, reconstructing a policy theory
one needs to explore the ‘world behind the plan’ where various actors pursue various
interests. As has been shown in the Introduction, the world behind the ESDP is fifteen
EU Member States and the European Commission interacting with each other in a
highly politicized context.

Polycentricity: The Core Concept in the ESDP

Before turning to the ‘world behind the ESDP’ this section discusses the chief outcome
of the ESDP process, at the same time the key conclusion of the policy theory,
polycentricity. Davoudi (1999, 368) comes to the same conclusion: “One of the most
central yet least clear concepts in the ESDP is the concept of polycentricity.” A second
key conclusion is the concept of application, but this has more to do with the procedures
and is not the object of this chapter.
Why is polycentric development a key concept? Basically because it stands for a
balanced, sustainable form of development of the European territory, terms that figure
in the subtitle of the ESDP: ‘Towards Balanced and Sustainable Development of the
Territory of the European Union’. This encapsulates the three objectives underlying the
ESDP:
• Economic and social cohesion;
• Conservation of natural resources and cultural heritage;
• More balanced competitiveness of the European territory. (CEC 1999a, 10)
A second reason stems from chapter 3, ‘Policy aims and options for the territory of the
EU’ setting out the policy options for European spatial development under three ‘spatial
development guidelines’:
• Polycentric Spatial Development and a New Urban-Rural Partnership
• Parity of Access to Infrastructure and Knowledge
• Wise Management of the Natural and Cultural Heritage.
The ESDP variously refers to polycentricity, but makes no explicit study of it, so the
concept remains vague. However, in the second half of 2000 the French Presidency
made the concept the focus of its attention. (French Presidency 2000a) The outcome is
an analysis of ESDP policy options from the perspective of polycentricity. As usual in
the ESDP process, the document is based amongst others on the answers of CSD
delegations to a questionnaire. On this basis, the French document points out that
polycentricity relates not only to the first, but to all three of the spatial development
guidelines above.
Also, polycentricity can be defined on the continental, national and regional and the
urban and peri-urban scale, where the ESDP deals with functional relations between
towns and rural areas, and with cooperation within metropolitan areas. Just like this
paper, the French document is concerned first and foremost with the continental and
transnational scale as the most appropriate for any overall consideration of the ESDP.
This scale is what political options (1) and (2) of the ESDP are about:

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• “Strengthening of several larger zones of global economic integration in the EU,
equipped with high-quality, global functions and services, including the peripheral
areas, through transnational spatial development strategies.”
• “Strengthening a polycentric and more balanced system of metropolitan regions,
city clusters and city networks, through closer co-operation between structural
policy and the policy on the Trans-European Networks (TENs) and improvement of
the links between international/national and regional/local transport networks.”
(CEC 1999a, 21)
The two options are based on the notion that “[t]he concept of polycentric development
has to be pursued, to ensure regionally balanced development, because the EU is
becoming fully integrated in the global economy. Pursuit of this concept will help to
avoid further excessive economic and demographic concentration in the core area of the
EU. The economic potential of all regions of the EU can only be utilised through the
further development of a more polycentric European settlement structure. The greater
competitiveness of the EU on a global scale demands a stronger integration of the
European regions into the global economy.” (Ibid. 20)
Strengthening several world-ranking economic integration zones is the response to the
present, monocentric spatial structure of Europe. After all, the ESDP identifies “…only
one outstanding larger geographical zone of global economic integration: the core area
of the EU, the pentagon defined by the metropolises of London, Paris, Milan, Munich
and Hamburg.” (Ibid. 20) In this ‘pentagon’ about 50% of the EU's total GDP is
produced by 40% of the EU citizens on 20% of the total area of the EU. (Ibid. 8) Hence
the ‘20-40-50 pentagon,’ as a German expert called a map produced by himself after the
event. (Figure A.10) This is considered a problem. The distribution of such zones in
Europe “… differs from that of the USA, for instance, which has several outstanding
economic integration zones on a global scale: West Coast (California), East Coast,
Southwest (Texas), Mid West.” (Ibid. 20) Figure A.11 offers an interpretation of the
more balanced distribution of economic integration zones in the USA.
Now, achieving a more polycentric development depends on co-operation and
promoting complementarity. The ESDP is clear on whom should co-operate with
whom, but not on how to achieve this. “[W]ays and procedures must be found to enable
cities and regions to complement each other and co-operate. (…) As well as city
networks at regional level, the need for complementing co-operation also applies to city
networks at interregional, transnational or even European level. (…) Promoting
complementarity (…) means simultaneously building on the advantages and
overcoming of disadvantages of economic competition (…) However, complementarity
should not be focused solely on economic competition but be expanded to all urban
functions, such as culture, education and knowledge, and social infrastructure.” (Ibid.
21)
The document of the French Presidency elaborates upon the same theme. Accordingly, a
more balanced spatial organization of Europe is all the more necessary because
‘hyperconcentration’ results in diseconomies: congestion, pollution, property inflation,
and not to forget the negative impacts on peripheral areas. So, like the makers of the
ESDP, the French regard stimulation of new global economic integration zones in
peripheral areas and coastal zones as the fundamental ESDP strategy. At the level of the
European continent as a whole, this, then, is what polycentricity amounts to: stimulating

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areas outside the existing core to aspire to the status of global economic integration
zone.

Combining Interests
Having analyzed the ESDP, as far as the polycentricity is concerned, this section will
explain how that concept came into the ESDP. In so doing, two well-known
metaphorical conceptualizations of the organization of the European territory will be
used: the Blue Banana (Brunet 1989) and the Bunch of Grapes (Kunzmann, Wegener
1991; Kunzmann 1998). (See respectively Figures A.5 and A.6) We may consider these
as archetypes of how to conceptualize the spatial organization of Europe. The first
represents a one-dimensional view, paying regard only to indicators like densities and
economic performance. The view of Europe underlying the allocation of Structural
Funds, in particular those under Objective 1, is a good example. (Figure 4.1) The
second represents a more subtle, more diversified view, taking account of more
indicators. It demonstrates willingness to take a closer look at individual regions and
their specific characteristics. Economic performance is just one dimension neither more
nor less important than others. In other words, in a schematic way the Bunch of Grapes
illustrates physical and cultural diversity in Europe.
There is another difference as well. The Banana shows the situation ‘as is,’ while the
Bunch of Grapes represents an idea of how Europe should develop. In terms of the
policy theory, it is this normative relationship that underlies the policy conclusions of
the ESDP.

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Figure 4.1 Objective 1 investments 2001-2006 (Source: CEC)

The Italians, holding the first meeting after Nantes (see the Introduction), set the process
on a track of cohesion thinking. Having been a long-time recipient of EU funding, the
Italians conceptualized Europe in terms of the Banana, with a core and a periphery. In
their Presidency document they simply spoke of a circle with a radius of 500 km around
Luxembourg as the core. They pleaded for cohesion policy to remedy the continuing
division of Europe into a center and periphery and linked this to an investment strategy
for the Structural Funds based on one-dimensional view of Europe. (Presidenza
consiglio dei Ministri 1990) Clearly, with the Single Market in the offing they feared
further deterioration of their economic position in relation to the Northwest part of the
Community.
Many others shared this view of prosperous regions benefiting more from the Single
Market than the less favored ones. The disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the
opening up of new markets would lead to even greater disparities. So the Italians set the
ESDP process on its track of assuming a causal relationship between the Single Market
and increasing disparities which from then on would dominate the proceedings. As a
consequence the focus was mainly on developing final relationships aiming at economic
and social cohesion.
However, as could have been expected, Member States located in the core of Europe
were eager to shift attention towards their concerns, and so they introduced a new
discourse with final relationships aiming at a different goal. Thus, a year later the Dutch
Presidency raised attention for the problems in Europe’s highly urbanized core and for

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European global competitiveness. They had drawn inspiration from their ‘Fourth
National Spatial Planning Report’ of 1988 and from a follow-up study ‘Perspectives in
Europe’. (Verbaan et al. 1991) The latter focussed on Northwest Europe, trying to
identify suitable spatial planning strategies. The study was translated into English and
disseminated amongst the Member States, but failed to have much influence because of
the singularly Dutch viewpoints it represented. (National Spatial Planning Agency
2000) Be that as it may, both documents had a strong economic bias. “Spatial
planning,” it was said, “should aim at supporting and accommodating modern trends in
society and economic development. Good use must be made of the endogenous
potential of cities and regions.” (Verbaan et al. 1991, 127; translation BW) Economic
development, in this view, depended on many criteria like cultural and natural heritage,
quality of water, air and soil, diversity and many more that nowadays are often being
subsumed under the umbrella term ‘quality of life.’ So, as table 4.1 shows, while the
Italians had invoked the normative principle that European spatial planning policy
should support economic and social cohesion, the Dutch started from a different
normative position.
The complementary causal relationship was that European global competitiveness
largely depended on the wellbeing of its core area. At least this was what had been
learned from the domestic situation in the early eighties when The Netherlands had
suffered from severe economic recession. (Zonneveld 2000) As a reaction the Dutch
pursued a national policy called ‘Regions under their own steam’ based on the view that
regions, especially the peripheral ones, needed to make better use of their endogenous
potentials. A fundamental belief was that the national economy depended to a large
extent on the wellbeing of its economic core, the Randstad. By way of analogy, it was
assumed that this also applied to Europe. (Table 4.1)

Table 4.1 Italian and Dutch policy theories

Italian Presidency document (1990) Dutch Presidency (1991)

Normative relationship European Spatial Planning aims at social European Spatial Planning aims at
and economical cohesion accommodating modern trends in society
and economic development
Causal relationship Single Market will increase disparities Europe’s economic performance depends
between core and periphery on the wellbeing of its core area
Final relationship Peripheral regions must be better linked to Problems in the core need to be addressed
the core and their development should be and regions outside the core should use
encouraged by inward investment their endogenous potential and be linked
strategies to each other and the core

Of course the Dutch and Italian policy theories as summarized in Table 4.1 are
simplified. Still, in an abstract way they represent the two diametrically opposite views
with respect to which, generally speaking, Member States took positions. In order to
formulate a joint spatial planning strategy, somehow these had to be merged into one.
The Dutch took great strides in this direction. In their Presidency document ‘Urban
Networks in Europe’ (Minister of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment
1991) they forged a link between their own interests and the principle of social and
economic cohesion. In a European context, the latter, they had learned quickly (before
the ESDP process planners had no international experience whatsoever) could never be
neglected. What they proposed was to develop ‘urban networks’ throughout Europe.

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One out of many incarnations of polycentricity, this concept, according to the Dutch,
could capture both the objectives of cohesion and competitiveness. Also, this would
legitimize more balanced attention to prospering and lagging regions.
The Dutch based this on existing spatial conceptualizations of Europe by Brunet and
Europe 2000 (CEC 1991), indicating the Blue Banana and an emergent core zone, the
‘Sunbelt’ (Schmidt, Sinz 1993), i.e. an arc from Valencia and Madrid in Spain via
Barcelona and Marseilles in France to Tuscany and Venice in Italy. (See figure A.5)
Note though that its development potential does not go unquestioned. (Tönnies 2001)
Moreover, the Dutch had a differentiated view of Europe’s spatial organization. Not all
regions in the core were doing well, nor were all regions outside the core lagging. By
linking the primary urban regions of Europe to each other and by linking secondary
urban networks to them, regions outside the core were expected to become more
competitive, improving Europe’s competitiveness as a whole. (Figure 4.2)

Figure 4.2 European Urban Network (Source: Minister of Housing, Physical Planning and the
Environment 1991)

The Portuguese Presidency (1992) continued on the same lines. Inspired of course by
their own position, the Portuguese emphasized inadequate connections from the
periphery to the core. The next year the Danes stressed the importance of a high-quality
environment. All these objectives had been described partly or fully in terms of
European infrastructure networks, urban networks or a European urban network
consisting of various levels of integration and with a new rural-urban relationship.
Often, use was also made of terms like decentralization, de-concentration and
redistribution (of for instance seaports and airports). Especially the Danes and the Dutch
had carefully worked out their preferences, combining them with those of others into a
strategy wherein the concept of polycentric development (or a similar concept) played
an important role.

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After four-and-a-half years of discussions it appeared that almost all objectives of
various member states were easy to combine under the notion of polycentric
development, which had become a central concept in the Leipzig Principles of 1994,
too. The Leipzig Principles, officially named ‘Principles for a European Spatial
Development Policy’, were the joint product of the Committee on Spatial Development.
(Bundesministerium für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau 1995) They represent
interim conclusions of the ESDP process setting the agenda for future discussions.
The Leipzig document identified two of the three fundamental goals in the ESDP:
economic and social cohesion and sustainable development. The Dutch attempt to
introduce the issue of competitiveness was less clearly visible. Also, by then, the three
‘spatial development guidelines’, including the one on balanced polycentric
development, had been developed. In terms of the Blue Banana and the Bunch of
Grapes, the Leipzig document took an intermediate position. The Banana situation was
the point of reference and the Bunch of Grapes, although not explicitly mentioned, the
desired outcome. Developing a polycentric system of cities in Europe was seen as a way
to bring the periphery closer to the core, but there was as yet no suggestion as to how to
realize something akin to the Bunch of Grapes.
From then on the context changed. In comparison with the late-1980s and early 1990s,
the prospects for European integration worsened. The communautarian approach lost
out to the intergovernmental approach. There was growing reluctance as regards
transferring competencies to the European Community. Furthermore, there was more
and more conflict over the Community budget. Reacting to ‘Agenda 2000’, the so-
called net-contributors in the EU got more and more concerned about their financial
burden. (Laffan 2000, 739)
The successive French, Spanish and Italian Presidencies witnessed the effects, and so
there was little progress. As the Introduction shows, the status of the CSD and of the
ESDP in the making was unclear, causing problems. The moot point was whether the
ESDP (if it would ever come to pass) should influence the Structural Funds. This was
especially relevant for the South Europeans led by Spain. In Spain itself the government
took note of the ESDP process and limited the mandate of its delegation to a minimum.
Albeit less overtly, other Member States grew more reluctant, too.
With another Presidency in the offing, the Dutch were determined to make an end to the
wavering. In cahoots with the delegation of DG XVI, they introduced a set of new
working principles. Relief that the discussion would finally come to an end won from
distrust, and the other delegations agreed to let the troika (the previous, the next and the
present Presidency plus the Commission) write the actual document. Basing themselves
on previous Presidency and CSD documents the troika succeeded in preparing a
succession of drafts. Finally in June 1997 at Noordwijk the Dutch Presidency could
proudly present the ‘First Official Draft ESDP’. (CEC 1997b)
However, before the approval of this Noordwijk-document, more discussions were
needed. With respect to polycentric development, two debates were important.
The first was about a simple and on the face of it innocent map (Figure II.1 in the
Noordwijk Document). It shows the shape of the EU, the distances between Greece and
Ireland and Finland and Spain, the population densities and natural physical barriers like
seas and mountain ranges. The version that went before the CSD was the same as the
one that finally made it into the Noordwijk document, the difference being that the

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published version fails to depict the core of Europe. (Figure 4.3) The reason was that the
latter did not amuse Member States from Southern Europe. The proposed map reflected
a center-periphery model of Europe (an early version in the files even carried this title),
a juxtaposition of strong and weak regions. Now, in the beginning it had of course
always been Southern Europeans who had identified disparities as the central issue.
However, to represent this on a map was controversial. In the end, leaving the core of
Europe off the map, Figure II.1, ‘The shape of the European territory,’ in the ‘First
Official Draft’ represented a compromise. Apparently, the ‘Blue Banana’ thinking was
no longer acceptable.

Figure 4.3 Figure II.1 with elliptical shape indicating the core (Source: Archives Dutch National
Spatial Planning Agency; Faludi, Waterhout 2002)

There was a second debate going on simultaneously about competitiveness, and it may
have amplified the first. Since the meeting under the Dutch Presidency in 1991, the
issue of competitiveness had been crowded out by that of cohesion. Of course,
compared to the problems in the core, the problems in the periphery were much greater
and so this is perhaps why. However, the Dutch, whose planning philosophy had not
changed, re-introduced the issue of competitiveness. Located in the core of Europe they
could be trusted for doing so.
So, the Dutch and the other troika members (Ireland and Luxembourg) with them
proposed to add a third basic goal to the ESDP, namely ‘competitiveness of the
European territory’. It might have been this that made Southern Member States unhappy
about the elliptical shape on the map discussed above. Be that as it may, the Spanish
delegation was unhappy with the formulation of the third goal. Well aware of Dutch

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ideas, they probably judged the concept of ‘competitiveness’ dangerous in the sense that
it might lead to Northwest European claims on the Structural Funds. In addition,
contrary to the Dutch causal thinking, cohesion countries often argue that the
competitiveness of Europe as a whole depends on the quality of the competition
between its regions, which is what cohesion policy is designed to stimulate. In
consequence, Spain proposed successfully to add the word ‘balanced’ before
competitiveness, and so the third basic goal of the ESDP became ‘Balanced
competitiveness of the European territory’.
Balanced competitiveness surely has a more polycentric ring about it than just
competitiveness of the European territory. Now that the Banana thinking had definitely
been rejected, the ESDP planners moved closer to the philosophy behind the European
Bunch of Grapes. However, there was still no solution to how to portray Europe in its
true shape, which is that of a center and a periphery, whilst at the same time speaking
about cohesion strategy as well as strategies for improving Europe’s competitiveness.
Cohesion and competitiveness were still mutually exclusive when related to a core-
periphery model. The concept of polycentricity alone could not solve this, nor the
addition of the qualifier ‘balanced’ before competitiveness. Both objectives were
considered necessary, however, and therefore the makers of the First Official Draft of
the ESDP chose not to visualize the shape of Europe.
After Noordwijk the ESDP process was smooth. The Noordwijk document provided a
good basis for further elaboration. After the meeting in Glasgow in 1998 where the
Complete Draft ESDP had been approved it was up to the Germans to bring the process
to a good end under their Presidency in May 1999.
Who precisely made the proposal, whether the Germans or the Commission officials on
the troika (Commission officials always participated in troika meetings), is not clear,
but during this period the solution was finally found. As we already know the solution
was the concept of polycentric development combined with the development, based on
their endogenous potential, of global economic integration zones. In the ESDP, the
European territory is described in the vein of the Blue Banana, with a core, the
‘pentagon’, and a periphery. However, the ESDP vision (only described verbally)
reflects much more the idea of the European Bunch of Grapes, with several core zones.
In this way, the EDSP bridged the gap between two archetypes of European spatial
conceptualization: the Blue Banana and the European Bunch of Grapes.

Polycentric Development: A ‘Bridging Concept’

Obviously, polycentricity is the outcome of a political rather than a theoretical debate
between two normative viewpoints. As such, they have not changed but have rather
been linked to each other by invoking the concept of polycentricity. As a consequence,
the exact meaning of the concept in practice remains vague. Research conducted in
1999 pointed out that even amongst the members of the CSD there is no common
understanding of polycentricity. (Waterhout, Faludi 2001) This is hardly surprising,
given the sub-optimal conditions under which the CSD operates, leaving little room for
open discussions and mutual learning. “To be acceptable to delegates, concepts invoked
in the work of the CSD have to be broadly defined.” (Ibid. 107)

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The literature on European integration shows broad concepts accommodating different
objectives to be a means to avoid deadlock. “A (…) way to reach a consensus in
bargaining processes is to settle for a framework decision, phrased in such vague terms
as to allow actors with diverging views to interpret it according to their individual
interests.” (Héritier 1999, 17) Indeed, from the outset the ESDP was meant to be a
framework.
Vague concepts might thus be unavoidable in European policy-making. Considering its
heterogeneous composition and the complex institutional set-up, involving fifteen
Member States and the Commission as it does, it could hardly be otherwise. In such an
environment “…regimes around which actors (sic) expectations can converge are
needed: the European Community puts a premium on the ability to provide convincing
policy concepts and their interpretation.” (Eising, Kohler-Koch 1999, 275)
Eising and Kohler-Koch refer to belief systems revolving around broad orientations
towards solidarity and reciprocity and the search for consensus, following the
‘consociational ordering principle’. They distinguish between three types of concepts
and principles. ‘Substantial concepts’ relate to policy content, the goals to be attained
and the instruments to be employed. Procedural and distributive principles pertain to the
EC system as such. An example of the former is subsidiarity and of the latter the
cohesion principle. Clearly, polycentricity is a substantive concept, but includes
elements of a distributive concept too. Of necessity, such concepts are vague, and
“…their normative relevance as well as their prescriptive elements are often disputed
and subject to divergent interpretations...” (Ibid. 277)
So-called bridging concepts are needed to reconcile differences. “Even within the
European Commission or individual member state governments, actors are in need of
bridging concepts. Being responsible for different tasks within the administration, they
identify with exclusive policy philosophies. Environmental policy is a good example of
how a common denominator had to be found to break a deadlock. ‘Sustainability’ was
the formula used by environmentalists within the Commission in order to present their
strategies in a way which was also acceptable to their colleagues form other DGs...”
(Ibid. 278−9)
This is an example of an attempt to formulate what in her own paper Kohler-Koch
(1990, 30) calls ‘hegemonic concepts.’ It is also what the makers of the ESDP have
attempted to do: by supplying persuasive concepts to gain the ear of policy makers. But
in order to gain acceptance, they had to invoke flexible, and even amorphous concepts
like that of a polycentric system of cities in Europe. If successful, once again, such
albeit fuzzy bridging principles form the basis for further co-operation.

Polycentric Development Being Taken Seriously

With the ESDP on the books polycentricity receives much attention from policy makers,
European wide co-operation networks, consultants and academics. Debates on
polycentricity at the regional and transnational scale intensify (see for instance
Dieleman, Faludi 1998; Kloosterman, Musterd 2001; Albrechts 2001; Houtum,
Lagendijk 2001), and a whole new debate is starting on polycentricity at the continental
level. It is this debate that this section is concerned with.

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As regards the continental level, three documents are of importance: the French
Presidency document discussed before, its follow-up (French Presidency 2000b) and the
Second Cohesion Report of the European Commission. (CEC 2001) All of them have
drawn inspiration from the ESDP. In fact the French Presidency documents are direct
follow-ups to it.
As we know the first document aimed at a better understanding of the concept of
polycentricity as such. It will not be discussed again. Taking an approach based on
agglomeration rates and gateway functions, the second French document identifies
potential global economic integration zones. It has been drawn up by a small group of
independent consultants commissioned by the French planning agency DATAR and has
been presented to the CSD in December 2000. Going far beyond usual practices in the
ESDP process, where, as has been reported above, map-making has proven impossible,
the document offers a tentative long-term spatial vision of Europe complete with maps.
Figure A.12 shows this vision. Whether this will have a follow-up remains unclear
though.
The third policy document to be discussed is the ‘Second Report on Economic and
Social Cohesion’, a flagship report of the European Commission. (CEC 2001) With
regard to polycentricity, part 1.3, written by DG Regio officials of the same unit as
those who were previously involved in the ESDP process, is important. Its title is
‘Territorial cohesion: towards a more balanced development’. Interestingly, the ESDP is
used to legitimate the view of DG Regio. The focus, however, is mainly on the
challenges of the eastern enlargement of the EU. (See also the chapter by Jean-François
Drevet) Polycentric development is seen as the best way of achieving a more balanced
territory. However, the report does not present a strategy, like the ESDP does in
introducing the concept of global economic integration zones, let alone a spatial vision
Europe over say 20 years. What it promises though is to lift the concept of
polycentricity out of the small world of the ESDP and introduce it into all Directorates-
General of the European Commission. They in turn can take it further by injecting it
into all kinds of EU policies.
More bottom-up initiatives come from amongst others co-operation networks and
advisors. An example of the first is the network METREX standing for ‘Metropolitan
Regions Exchange’ comprising 36 European metropolitan regions and almost 60
individual authorities, that considers Europe as “…a number of transnational areas
within which there are, or could be, strong polycentric metropolitan relationships.”
(Read 2000, 740) (See: Figure A.13) This situation forms a good basis for further
development towards a better urban balance. An example of the latter is an alternative
development perspective for Europe (Figure A.14) that is meant to inspire actors within
the megalopolises indicated. It was drawn up by Peter Mehlbye (2000), an independent
consultant who formerly was involved in the ESDP process, first as an official of the
Danish Ministry of Environment and Energy, later as a national expert at DG Regio.
What is important in the context of this chapter is that both examples are witness to
some sort of belief in the possibilities of a polycentric approach.
As indicated, academics have always been interested in polycentricity at the regional
scale, but now, in the wake of the ESDP, they also focus on development at the scale of
Northwest Europe or even the EU as a whole. (See Kunzmann 1998; Böhme 1999;
Richardson, Jensen 2000; Richardson 2000; Krätke 2001; Copus 2001; Ache 2001) At

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the same time, there is a lot of skepticism. Feelings of unease have to do with the fact
that, as has been demonstrated, polycentricity is the outcome of a debate on normative
relationships. However, in the ESDP it is being presented as an instrument, a final
relationship so to say. To make things worse, it is based on rather questionable causal
relationships. At least the ESDP fails to provide the empirical evidence. This makes the
usefulness of a polycentric approach questionable.
It is exactly the bridging function of the concept of polycentricity that makes Krätke
(2001) doubt its value. According to him “…the ESDP might partly be judged as an
‘idealistic’ approach, particularly with regard to the notion of combining
competitiveness and cohesion.” (Ibid. 106) His argument is that current economic
developments intensify competition between cities and regions and that from a regional
economic perspective the European urban system can be understood as a system of
competing locations. Competition, he argues, results in winners and losers. Thus
“…strengthening the competitive position of certain centers in the European urban
system does not automatically entail a lasting improvement in the competitiveness of
the pan-European urban system.” (Ibid. 107)
Copus (2001) warns also that, as a consequence of the political tensions in the ESDP
process with civil servants acting within limited mandates, the theoretical underpinning
of the ESDP and especially the concept of polycentric development is rather weak.
Some of the proposals in the ESDP to promote polycentric development “…are closer
to ‘ends’ rather than ‘means’, and no theoretical arguments are provided to make the
case that such activities will stimulate the desired forms of ‘polycentric development’.”
(Ibid. 549)
The concept of global economic integration zones receives critical attention from some
other authors as well. For instance, Ache (2001) devotes a whole paper to discussing
whether the concept of ‘global economic integration zones’ is viable. One of his
conclusions is that such images as the pentagon can be extremely powerful but that
there is a danger of oversimplification. Krätke, for his part, is of the opinion that the
idea of “[d]eveloping additional world economic integration zones outside the core area
of the EU would appear unrealistic in the light of the existing imbalances.” (Ibid. 110)
It would be easy to quote more such comments on global economic integration zones
and more generally speaking on the ESDP, but this would go beyond the scope of this
paper. Suffice it to say that most authors try to help to fill the theoretical vacuum. Some
explicitly call for more critical research. (Richardson, Jensen 2000) In fact, this is
exactly what the makers of the ESDP, arguing that it is just a first simple step in an
ongoing process, have aimed for.

Conclusion

After ten years of discussing European spatial planning, in the absence of any
competitors, polycentric development has become the key substantive concept in the
ESDP. It serves as a bridging concept welding the views of various key actors together,
thereby giving them sufficient incentive for staying in the game. To fulfil this role, the
interpretation of the concept needed to be modified. So, the ESDP interpretation is
different from that used in a national context in that the concepts of endogenous
development and global economic integration zones form part of the package deal.

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According to the French Presidency document, polycentricity contributes to all three
ESDP objectives. Furthermore, by spanning the continent, it may also bind all European
regions together.
In the ESDP polycentricity is seen as the vehicle for moving towards a Europe that, in
the long term, develops from a highly centralized territory, indicated by the Blue
Banana, to a balanced territory, symbolized by the Bunch of Grapes. The Bunch of
Grapes represents an ideal and the ESDP vision described only verbally lies somewhere
on the route to that situation. However, the ESDP vision is couched in terms of cohesion
and competitiveness. The latter two are diametrically opposed normative principles held
by different groups of Member States that have shaped the ESDP discussions. Thanks to
the concept of polycentricity forming a bridge between both objectives could finally be
integrated in the ESDP, keeping the process on an even keel. Polycentricity is thus
much more the outcome of a debate on normative than on causal and final relationships.
Its prime function is therefore to keep the Member States in the process, a subsidiary
function being that of providing an instrument for reaching the situation described by
the Bunch of Grapes.
In the original meaning of the “Bunch of Grapes”-conceptualization, sustainability and
diversity have played an important role, too. They do so in the ESDP as well. However,
as has become clear, from the perspective of polycentricity, their role in the ESDP
debate has been a minor one. Because of the normative debate on cohesion and
competitiveness, with polycentricity the outcome, the ESDP has an urban bias, too.
Polycentricity is first and foremost a concept relating to urban development. And, given
the theoretical vacuum in the ESDP debate, whether polycentricity will be the right
instrument for reaching these objectives remains doubtful. However, there has been no
alternative concept relating to sustainability and diversity. In fact, as the French
Presidency document has shown, the belief is that polycentricity will automatically
serve these interests, too. From the ESDP discussions whether this assumption is
justified remains unclear. Anyway, it must not be forgotten that in first instance
polycentricity is the answer to the competing interests of Member States regarding
cohesion and competitiveness.
So, polycentricity is a vague concept. However, in a European context, precisely
because of their multi-interpretability, so-called bridging concepts provide the basis for
further co-operation. And for now we can conclude that, at least politically,
polycentricity does fulfil this function. Credit for this should go to the small group of
ESDP planners who showed courage, stamina and creativity. They paved the way for
further elaboration of polycentricity as a concept. So from the perspective of
understanding how polycentricity works the evolving academic debate on causal and
final relationships underlying the concept is welcome. From the perspective of
influencing European policy making it is positive, too, to see that, within the ESDP
process itself, follow-up actions are being taken and that the Second Cohesion Report
takes the ESDP and polycentricity on board. So, with polycentricity being the subject of
an academic debate and at the same time forming the basis for further co-operation, the
conclusion of this chapter is positive in a sense that, just like its makers intended it to
be, the process continues.

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