1.

People v Crisostomo ( 160 SCRA 47( ( 1998)

Facts: The case is about the accused who is found guilty of the crime of homicide for
killing a certain Romeo Geronimo by shooting the victim with a revolver when he refused
Crisostomo’s invitation to have a drink. The accused first entered a plea of not guilty but change
it to a plea of guilty to a lesser charge of homicide and prayed that he be allowed to prove the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and admission of guilt asserting that although
he hid himself from the authorities for ten days, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
thereafter upon the advice of his parents. The lower courts denied the petition and punished
the accused without mitigating circumstance and sentence him with reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

WON the petitioner should be granted with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and confession of guilt?

Held: NO

The requisites of voluntary surrender are:

(a) that the offender had not actually been arrested;

(b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and

(c) that the surrender was voluntary.

The testimony of the appellant is not disputed by the prosecution that while in hiding,
upon the advice of his parents, he voluntarily surrendered on January 4, 1968, so he was
detained in the municipal jail of Hagonoy. The Court agrees that the appellant is entitled to this
mitigating circumstance.

However, he cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty to a

lesser offense of the charge of homicide as invoked under the sixth assigned error. The
requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the offender
spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that
is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was
made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.

In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide only after some evidence of the prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his
offer after the prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating.
2. Heirs of Cabals v CA ( 316 SCRA 47 ) ( 1993)
Facts: During his lifetime, Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel of land situated. In
1954, Marcelo died; survive by his wife and children. It appears that in 1949, Marcelo allowed
his son, Marcellino, to built his house on a portion of the lot. Since then, Marcelino resided
thereon. Later on Marcellino’s son also built his house on the disputed property.

In 1964 Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the lot. In the interim,
based on a consolidated subdivision plan , it was reveal that Marcelino and his son occupied
and built their houses on the area located on the southern most portion of another lot and not
the adjacent lot designated to him. The spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal confronted Marcelino
on this matter which resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and swapping of lots for the
purpose of reconstruction of land titles. However, the agreed resurvey and swapping of lots did
not materialize.

Hence, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with Damages against
Marcelino. They alleged that Marcelino introduced improvements in bad faith on their land
with knowledge that the adjacent lot is titled in his name. Marcelino contends that respondents
have no cause of action against him because he has been in possession in good faith since 1949
with the respondents’ knowledge and acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive
prescription has set in. on 1997, during the pendency of the trial Lorenzo died. MTC ruled in
favor of Marcelino.

Respondent appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC’s ruling, stating that
Marcelino’s possession was in the concept of a co-owner and therefore prescription does not
run in his favor; that his possession, which was tolerated by his co-owners, does not ripen into
ownership.

CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issues:

WON the lot where Marcelino built his house was co-owned by Marcelo’s children

WON Marcelino is a builder in good faith

Held:

NO

It is undisputed that Marcelino built his house on the disputed property in !949 with the
consent of his father. Marcelino has been in possession of the disputed lot since then with the
knowledge of his co-heirs, such that even before his father died in 1945, when the co-
ownership was created, his inheritance in the co-ownership was already particularly
designated. Thus, even before the lot as subdivided, Marcelino already occupied the disputed
portion and even then co-ownership did not apply over the disputed lot. The rule is that there is
no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though
not technically described, or that said portion is still embraced in one and the same certificate
of title does make said portion less determinable or identifiable or distinguished, one from the
other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners.

2. Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was informed by
respondent of his encroachment on their property. Marcelino’s possession of the disputed lot
was based on a mistaken belief that the lot covered by his title is same lot on which he has built
his house with the consent of his father. There is no evidence , other than bare allegation, that
Marcelino was aware that he intrude on respondents’ property when he continued to occupy
and possess the disputed lot after partition was effected.

3. People v San Gabriel ( 253 SCRA 184( ( 1996)

Facts: The accused was found guilty of murder arising from a stabbing incident. The
prosecution witness positively identified the suspects, thus the conviction.

On appeal, the accused contends that entries in the Advance Information Sheet
prepared by police officer, Pat. Steve Casimiro, did not mention him at all and named only
Ramon Doe as the principal suspect. Such sheet however contains information acquired by said
police officer only after his interview of Camba, an alleged eyewitness.

Issue:
WON the Advance Information Sheet constitutes an official information, hence, is
admissible?

Held:
NO.

It could not be categorized as official information because in order to be

classified as such, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record. In
this case, the public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal
knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired from
Camba, an alleged eyewitness, who was not legally so obliged to give such statements.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.

But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur:

(a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and,
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

4. Feria v CA ( 325 SCRA 525) ( 2000)

Facts: Petitioner Norberto Feria has been under detention since May 21, 1981, by
reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide In Criminal Case No. 60677.

On June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed
the Presiding Judge that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.

It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the
judgment, were missing.

In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of RTC attested to the fact that the records of
Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries,
the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the
second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.

Petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme
Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal
and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

ISSUE:

WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy in this case.
 Held:

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to
exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the
detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that
tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by
reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of
the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.

Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention,
petitioner’s release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court.

Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly
appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and
purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction
of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not
subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order that a judgment may be
subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.

The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate
the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, the general law
governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to
reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise
to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case for
Illegal Possession of Firearm, the records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution
of the present case.

Petition is DENIED.
5 Meralco v Quisumbling ( 336 SCRA 172) eligibility
Facts: The court directed the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the terms among
which are the following modifications among others: Wages: PhP 1,900 for 1995-1996;
Retroactivity: December 28, 1996-Dec. 1999, etc. Dissatisfied, some members of the union filed
a motion for intervention/reconsideration. Petitioner warns that is the wage increase of
Php2,000.00 per month as ordered is allowed, it would pass the cost covering such increase to
the consumers through an increase rate of electricity. On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral
award, the parties reckon the period as when retroaction shall commence.
Issue:

WON retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commence at such time as granted by

Secretary.

Held:
In St. Luke’s Medical vs Torres, a deadlock developed during CBA negotiations
between management unions. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction
of the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous CBS. The Court ratiocinated thus: In the
absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code, public respondent is
deemed vested with the plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing
CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the
effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, the law is silent as to
the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement
of the parties but by intervention of the government. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s
determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral
awards shall control.
Wherefore, the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November
30, 1997; and the award of wage is increased from Php1,900 to Php2,000.