JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION
The 1997 Rules of Court, particularly under the Rules on Civil Procedure, would
show that when we speak of “judgment”, we are dealing with the acts of the court,
or the judge, making a determination of an important matter submitted for
adjudication or resolution or decision. We may be talking about an allegation in our
pleadings on a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court mentioned in
Sec. 6, Rule 8 or Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 34 or Summary Judgments
deals with in Rule 35 or Judgments, Final Orders and Entry thereof in Rule 36. Rule
38 deals with Relief from Judgments, Orders, or other proceedings; Rule 39 on
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments. And under the Rules of Procedure
on appealed cases in the Court of Appeals, Rule 47 talks about Annulment of
Judgments or Finals Orders and Resolutions and Rule 51 on Judgment on a case
submitted for decision as its title.
Under Part III of the 1997 Rules of Court pertaining to Criminal Procedure,
Judgment is provided for in Rule 120.
This joint paper does not intend to assume the gargantuan task of discussing all
of these matters comprehensively or in detail. It predominantly intends to present
and discuss “judgment” in a simplified manner, but substantially, as an important
stage of a civil proceeding that aims to resolve an action, dispute or controversy
determining the merits of a case. The previous discussions on filing of an action,
arraignment, pre-trial, mediation and Trial proper may all be an exercise in futility if
there is no judgment because said stages only form part of the beginning of a
procedural stride which constitutes half of the action while judgment or decision is
the concluding part, if not the most awaited end-part, that would mark the extent
and conclusion of the chain of every action. It is a fundamental principle in our
judicial system that every litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not deprived of the
fruits of the verdict.

I. NATURE AND CONCEPT

Judgment is normally synonymous with decision. [Tung Chin Hui vs. Rufus B. Rodriguez,
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. 137571. September 21, 2000].

In criminal procedure, judgment has been defined as the adjudication by the court that the
accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper
penalty and civil liability, if any. [Sec. 1, Rule 120 of the 1997 Rules of Court].

In civil procedure, judgment is quoted as the final ruling by a court of competent jurisdiction
regarding the rights or other matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. [Macahilig vs. Heirs
of Gracia M. Magalit, G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000]. It is the court’s official and final
consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties by
considering the ultimate facts and issues alleged or pleaded by the parties in appropriate
pleadings. In his Handbook on Civil Procedure and Pleadings, Dean Francisco Tan, said judgment
may be broadly defined as the decision or sentence of the law given by a court or other tribunal
as the result of proceedings instituted therein. It is a judicial act which settles the issues, fixes the
rights and liabilities of the parties, and determines the proceeding, and it is regarded as the
sentence of the law pronounced by the court on the action or question before it.
A Judgment has two (2) main parts:
1) Body of the judgment or the ratio decidendi 2) Dispositive portion of the judgment or fallo
- a Latin phrase meaning "the reason" or • The legal document setting the reasons
"the rationale for the decision." It is "[t]he for judicial decisions; the reasons for a
point in a case which determines the court’s judgment as opposed to the
judgment" or "the principle which the case decision itself.
establishes." • This refers to the operative part in every
In other words, it is a legal phrase which decision
refers to the legal, moral, political, and
social principles used by a court to It is that “portion of the decision that may be the
subject of execution. Whatever may be found in
compose the rationale/reason of a the body of the decision can only be considered
particular judgment. as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court
and serve only as guides to determine the ratio
decidendi."
As a general rule, the ratio decidendi is
binding on courts of lower and later It is settled rule that the operative part in every
decision is the dispositive portion or
jurisdiction—through the doctrine of stare the fallo, and where there is conflict between
decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule the fallo and the body of the decision, the
decisions of a court of co-ordinate fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that
the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the
jurisdiction—however out of interests of body is merely a statement, ordering nothing.
 judicial comity they generally try to follow It is a settled general principle that a writ of
execution must conform substantially to every
co-ordinate rationes. essential particular of the judgment
promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the
The process of determining the ratio judgment is bereft of validity. It must conform,
more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in
decidendi is correctly thought through the dispositive portion of the decision.
analysis of what the court actually decided
– essentially, based on the legal points
about which the parties in the case actually
fought. All other statements about the law
in the text of a court opinion – all
pronouncements that do not form a part of
the court’s rulings on the issues actually
decided in that particular case (whether
they are correct statements of law or not) -
- are obiter dicta, and are not rules for
which that particular case stands.

General Rule:
Where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body pf the
decision, the dispositive portion or fallo controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the
decision. While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the
manner of the court’s reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally
invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes
corresponding duties or obligation." [Florentino v. Rivera, 515 Phil. 494, 503 (2006)]

It must however be assumed that the dispositive part of the final decision is definite, clear and
unequivocal and can be wholly be given effect without need of intervention or construction.

What are the requisites for a judgment to be valid?

To become a valid judgment, the following requisites must exist:
Judgment in the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure
1) The court or tribunal must be clothed with 1) It must be written in the official language;
authority to hear and determine the 2) It must be personally and directly
matter before it; prepared by the judge and signed by him;
2) The court must have jurisdiction over the and
parties and the subject matter;
3) The parties must have been given an
opportunity to adduce evidence in their
behalf;
4) The evidence must have been considered
by the tribunal in deciding the case.
3) It must contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts and the law upon
which it is based.
[Sec. 1, Rule 120, Rules of Court]

Under Rule 36, it is required that a judgment

determining the merits of the case (not to
incidental matters) must be:
a) in writing; [A verbal judgment is not in esse
therefore ineffective]
b) personally and directly prepared by the
judge;
c) The judgment must state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based;
d) It must be signed by the judge; and
e) It must be filed with the clerk of court. (The
filing of the judgment or final order with
the clerk of court is what constitutes
rendition of judgment)

Kinds of judgment
There are different kinds of judgment but let us first focus on the main parts starting off with Rule
34 on Judgment on Pleadings.

Rule 34, Sec. 1 provides that a court may already direct judgment on the answer
a) where it fails to tender an issue or it tenders no issue at all;
b) Where the answer admits the material allegation of the adverse party’s pleading.

Here, the court may direct judgment on a pleading because there is no controversial issue
between the parties to the case. It is required however that prior motion of the claimant party
must be filed before the court. And that it presupposes the filing of an Answer.
However, in actions for declaration of nullity, annulment of marriage and legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

Rule 35 – Summary Judgment

In his book Civil Procedure, A Restatement for the Bar, Dean Willard Riano mentioned that
summary judgment is sometimes called accelerated judgment. Rule 35 provides that a court can
render summary judgment when the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact after the issues had been joined and on the basis of the pleadings and papers filed such as
affidavits, depositions and admissions, the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed.
The movant has the burden of demonstrating clearly that absence of any genuine issue of fact or
the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantiated so as not to constitute an issue for
trial.

One who invokes summary judgment must file a motion to this effect serving a notice to the
adverse party. And he must furnish copy of the affidavits, depositions and admissions together
with the pleading/motion.

Rule 36 – Judgments, Final Order and Entry thereof

a) Judgment upon a compromise - A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on

the merits. It is one whereby the adverse parties settle their differences amicably to avoid
litigation in court, or without court intervention, or to stop one that has already started. It
has the effect of res judicata, and is immediately final and executory unless set aside
because of falsity or vices of consent. [Gadrinab vs. Salamanca, G.R. No. 194560, June 11,
2014, Leonen, J.];

b) Judgment upon confession or cognovits actionem – a judgment rendered by a court when

a party expressly agrees to the claim of the other party or when a party acknowledges the
validity of the claim against him;
c) Judgment upon the merits – is a judgment that amounts to a legal declaration of the
respective rights and duties of the parties based upon the disclosed facts which must be
clearly stated to include the law on which it is based;
d) Clarificatory judgment – a judgment that seeks to remove the ambiguity in the terms of the
judgment and therefore is difficult to execute. Remedy is to file a motion for a clarificatry
judgment and not to assail the judgment as void.
e) Judgment nunc pro tunc - The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a
new judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing
in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it
speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct
judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in
place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply non-action by the court, however
 erroneous the judgment may have been. only exceptions to the rule on the immutability
of final judgments. A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of something
which was actually previously done, to have effect as
of the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to supply an
omission in the record of action really had, but omitted through inadvertence or mistake.
f) Judgment sin perjuico - is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its
conclusions. ... Thus, the party adversely affected would be unable to file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal the judgment for he has to speculate on the grounds upon which
the judge based his decision.
g) Judgment by default – Sec.3, Rule 9
h) Judgment on the pleadings – Rule 34
i) Summary judgment – Rule 35 - A court may grant a summary judgment to settle
expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved,
except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.4

In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the
pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the motion?5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial.6

j) Several judgment – Sec. 4, Rule 36

k) Separate judgment – Sec. 5, Rule 36
l) Special judgment – Sec. 11, Rule 39
m) Judgment for specific acts – Sec. 10, Rule 39
n) Judgment on demurrer to evidence – Rule 33
o) Conditional judgment
p) Final judgment

Finality of Judgment

• An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally dispose of a pending action, so that
nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends
the litigation in the lower court. On the contrary, an interlocutory order does not dispose of
the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the latter.
Modes of service of judgment, final orders or resolution – Sec. 9, Rule 13

Service of judgment shall be served either personally, or by registered mail or by publication.

When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders
or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the
prevailing party.

Period within which to render a decision

Cases filed before lower courts must be decided or resolved within 3 months [90 days], 24 months
for all lower collegiate courts and within 24 months by the Supreme Court [SC] from the date of
their submission for decision. A case is deemed submitted for resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum.

An extension of the period may be allowed by the SC upon request by the judge on account of
heavy caseload or by other reasonable excuse.

Without an extension granted, delay in the disposition of cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency.

Who must pen the decision or Judgment?

It is not necessary that the judge who heard the case or received the evidence shall be the judge to
pen/write the decision. In case of transfer, resignation, disability or death of the judge while the case is
being tried, the succeeding judge has to continue and finish the trial. He can evaluate the evidence already
presented or go over the transcript of stenographic notes [TSN] or the testimony of witnesses available
for consideration. Conduct and demeanor of witnesses is not the only consideration. The contents and
substance of testimonies and the object and documentary evidence submitted and made part of the
records are also vital.

However, a judgment or decision penned by a retiree judge (after his retirement) cannot acquire a
binding effect. Also, a decision penned by a judge during his incumbency cannot be promulgated after
his retirement.
When a judge retires, all his authority “retired” with him. A decision is void if promulgated after the
judge has ceased to be a judge.

In Jimenes vs. Republic, “xxx where the judge who signed the decision was no longer
a judge of the court at the time of the promulgation because he had already died or had
retired, or had been promoted to another position, and another judge promulgated it,
the judgment is invalid”. (Jimenez v. Republic, 22 SCRA 622). Therefore, a judgment
signed by a judge who ceased to be judge cannot be promulgated by another judge. Any
judgment or decision is valid and binding only if both [were] penned and promulgated
by the judge during his incumbency. (People v. Garcia, 313 SCRA 279).

On the other hand, a judgment penned by a judge who was transferred permanently to another court
of equal jurisdiction is valid.

Decisions of the Supreme Court [SC]

Decisions of the SC form part of the law of the legal system. All courts must take cognizance of SC
decisions. They are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice. Judges are enjoined to know, to
obey and to apply the latest holdings of the SC.

Rule on Stare decisis

This rule holds that when the SC has laid down a point of law or established a legal principle
applicable to a certain state of facts, and in the absence of countervailing considerations, it will
adhere to that principle and all courts shall apply it to all future or subsequent cases involving a
similar legal issue or where the facts are substantially the same. It may refer to a well-settled rule
on adherence to judicial precedents unless abandoned. The purpose is to secure certainty and
stability in the law.

Obiter Dictum
An obiter dictum is an opinion expressed by a court which is not necessary to the decision of the
case before it. It cannot be a source of a claim or an enforceable relief because said remark was
made only incidentally or collaterally and not binding.

When a judgment becomes final

2 senses:
a) It refers to a judgment that disposes of a case in such a way that there is nothing more to be
done by the court in relation thereto.
It is here where a final judgment is distinguished from an interlocutory order which does not
final terminate or dispose of the case.
Since the finality of a judgment has the effect of ending the litigation, an aggrieved party may
then appeal from the judgment as a remedy. Sec. 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides
that “an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable.”
Meanwhile, an appeal cannot be taken from an interlocutory order. The aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
b) In another sense, it may refer to a judgment that is no longer appealable and is already capable
of being executed because the period for appeal has elapsed and the party has not perfected an
appeal or there was an appeal but the case is resolved by the SC. Hence, said judgment is “final
and executory”.

Conclusiveness of judgments or immutability of judgments

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness or immutability of judgments, a judgment that has attained
finality can no longer be disturbed. Once a judgment attains finality, it therefore becomes
immutable or unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.

In Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, the rule on immutability of judgment was
discussed and the SC held that: “No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that
once a judgment becomes final, it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal,
except only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void. The underlying reason for the rule is
two-fold:
(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial
business, and
(2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as
controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.”

As the Court declared in Yau v. Silverio: “.Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about
that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any
attempt to prolong them.”

Indeed, just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by
the execution and satisfaction of the judgment. Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the
prevailing litigant his right to savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck down.
In Heirs of Wenceslao Samper v. Reciproco-Noble, we had occasion to emphasize the significance
of this rule, to wit: “It is an important fundamental principle in our Judicial system that every
litigation must come to an end x x x Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit
thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing
party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged,
then unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of
justice.”

Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher court has become final and executory
and has been returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of
carrying out the decision and issuing the writ of execution. In addition, a final and executory
judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief not originally included. In short,
once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the
issuance thereof becomes a court’s ministerial duty. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of
the superior court or reexamine it for any other purpose other than execution; much less may it
review the same upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it
further than to settle so much as has been demanded.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which
violates this principle must immediately be struck down.

EXCEPTIONS to the Rule of Immutability of Judgments

As a general rule, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable, except under
recognized exceptions, which have been applied in several cases in order to serve substantial
justice, grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk
of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.
(5) In cases of special and exceptional nature as when facts and circumstances transpire which
render the judgment’s execution impossible or unjust, when necessary in the interest of justice
 to direct its modification to harmonize the disposition with prevailing circumstances.
[Industrial Timber Corporation vs. Ababon, G.R. No. 164518, January 25, 2006]

Res Judicata effect of a final judgment or final order

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Sec. 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:

xxx

(b)In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c)In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto.

The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties
and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before
a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and
their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the
two suits are the same.[50] The first rule which corresponds to paragraph (b) of Section
47 above, is referred to as “bar by former judgment”; while the second rule, which is
embodied in paragraph (c), is known as “conclusiveness of judgment.”[51]
As what is involved in this case is a proceeding for the determination of probable cause
and an administrative case, necessarily involving different causes of action, the applicable
principle is conclusiveness of judgment. The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of
Quezon City[52] explained such, to wit:
The second concept – conclusiveness of judgment- states that a fact or question
which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far
as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot
be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same
court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause
of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held
that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus
v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but
merely identity of issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals (197
SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the
distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which
bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same
parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which
were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to
questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have
been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the
pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the
former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions
between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are
as conclusive as the judgment itself.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[53]
Although involving different causes of action, this administrative case and the proceeding
for probable cause are grounded on the same set of facts, involve the same issue of
falsification of official documents, and require the same quantum of evidence[54]–
substantial evidence, as was similarly found in Borlongan, and correctly relied upon by
De Jesus.
It was ruled in De Jesus that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite
criminal intent or mens rea was present. Although the presence of mens rea is indeed
unnecessary for a finding of guilt in an administrative case for falsification of official
documents,[55] it was expressly found by this Court in De Jesus that there was no
absolutely false narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers. The pertinent
portion is quoted hereunder as follows:
Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as
falsification. In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite
criminal intent or mens rea was present. The Ombudsman assails the first set of
documents with dates of appointment earlier than December 12, 2001. Clearly, the first
set of CSC Form No. 33 was prepared earlier as shown by the serial numbers. The first set
has serial numbers 168207, 168210, 168213, 168214, 168215, 168216, 168217, 168287 and
168288; while the second set has serial numbers 168292, 168293, 168294, 168295,
168297, 168298, 168299, 168301 and 168304. The Ombudsman also admits this
fact.Indeed, petitioner admits having signed two sets of appointment papers but nothing
in said documents constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts. The first
set was prepared and signed on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the
members of the Board appointing their respective confidential staff conformably with the
DBM approval. There was no untruthful statement made on said appointment papers as
the concerned personnel were in fact appointed earlier than December 12, 2001. In fact,
the DBM also clarified that the authority to hire confidential personnel may be
implemented retroactive to the date of actual service of the employee concerned.In any
case, Jamora authorized the issuance of the second set of appointment papers.Following
the CSC Rules, the second set of appointment papers should mean that the first set was
ineffective and that the appointing authority, in this case, the members of the Board, shall
be liable for the salaries of the appointee whose appointment
became ineffective.There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioner’s act warranting
his prosecution for falsification. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case
and it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the
petitioner’s guilt.[56] [Emphasis supplied]
Hence, the finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers constitutes
an absolutely false narration of facts is binding on this case, but only insofar as the issue
of falsification of public documents is concerned, and not on the other issues involved
herein, namely, the other acts of De Jesus and Parungao which may amount to dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as charged in the complaint.

Contrary to Tuason and LWUA’s contentions, the factual finding of this Court in De
Jesusas to the absence of falsification is based on the same evidence as in this
administrative case. There are, however, other evidence and admissions present in this
case as cited by Tuason and LWUA which pertain to other issues and not to the issue of
falsification.
Meanwhile the doctrine in Montemayor v. Bundalian[57] that res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers, has been abandoned in subsequent cases[58] which have since applied the
principle of res judicata to administrative cases. Hence, res judicata can likewise be
made applicable to the case at bench. Thus, given all the foregoing, the factual finding
in De Jesus that there was no false statement of facts in both sets of appointment papers,
is binding in this case.
Even granting that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable to the case
at bench, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings in De
Jesus based on a careful review of the evidence on record. The existence of malice or
criminal intent is not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official
documents as an administrative offense. What is simply required is a showing that De
Jesus and Parungao prepared and signed the appointment papers knowing fully well that
they were false.[59]
The Court, however, believes that in this case, at the time each set of appointment papers
were made, De Jesus and Parungao believed they were making true statements. They
prepared and signed the first set on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the
Board members appointing their respective confidential staff conformably with DBM
approval. The second set was prepared to correct the retroactive appointments to conform
to the CSC reportorial requirements, and the same was also approved by Administrator
Jamora. There was no reason for De Jesus and Parungao to believe such to be
false. Irregular it is perhaps, not being in conformity with the CSC rules on accreditation,
but not false. Therefore, this Court finds that no falsification of official documents
occured.