PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et.al v. HON.
EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, et.al
G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)
The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will
not risk the Philippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign
power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to
comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February
27, 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline, optimized the
location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan Island Ground
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands” whose
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, in their capacities as “citizens, taxpayers or
legislators” assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their
arguments contending that the law unconstitutionally “converts”
internal waters into archipelagic waters, thus subjecting these waters
to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III,
including overflight. Petitioners have contended that these passage
rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internal
waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting
internal waters into archipelagic waters
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with
the Philippine’s national interest. Aside from being a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones, the law also allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters into
archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the
Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign
power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is
further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will
not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of
sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the
resources therein.
Furthermore, due to the absence of its own legislation
regarding routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent
and sea lanes passage, the Philippines has no choice but to comply
with the international law norms. The Philippines is subject to
UNCLOS III, which grants innocent passage rights over the territorial
sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and
conditions for their exercise, thus, the right of innocent passage,
being a customary international law, is automatically incorporated in
the corpus of Philippine law. If the Philippines or any country shall
invoke its sovereignty to forbid innocent passage, it shall risk
retaliatory measures from the international community. With
compliance to UNCLOS III and the enactment of R.A. 9522, the
Congress has avoided such conflict.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the compliance
to UNCLOS III through the R.A. 9522 will not expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. As a matter
of fact, if the Philippines did not comply with the baselines law, it will
find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where
the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured
and which will produce two-fronted disaster: (1) open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the
waters and submarine areas around the archipelago and (2) it shall
weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. Such disaster was avoided through the R.A. 9522.
Topic: Administrative Regions and Autonomous Regions
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962
October 14, 2008
FACTS:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel
and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP),
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled
to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that
creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the
GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral
domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as
the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and
Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del
Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001
plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build,
develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also
described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as
“associative,” characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring
“amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect
upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North
Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and
furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as
well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right
to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent
petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from
the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and
their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the
MOA-AD.
Overview of the MOA-AD:
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all
Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves
and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people"
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of
conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of
full blood, including their spouses.30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the
MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by
Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro
homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not
form part of the public domain.33
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First
Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having
entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land
mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present
geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi
City. Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories,
Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a
plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other.
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction
over all natural resources within its "internalwaters," defined as
extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area;42
that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch
beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of
the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao;
and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central
Government" shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources.Notably, the jurisdiction over the
internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."There is no similar
provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect
to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have
the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such
relationships and understandings, however, are not to include
aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into
environmental cooperation agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of
the Central Government. The sharing between the Central Government
and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be
75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber
licenses, etc. granted by the Philippine Government, including those
issued by the present ARMM.
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to
observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive
Compact. The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central
Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of
governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the
existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid
amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the
Comprehensive Compact.
ISSUE:
Main Issue: WON the MOA-AD is constitutional?
RULING:
The MOA-AD is UNCONSTITUTIONAL since the powers
granted to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) exceeds
those granted to local governments and even go beyond
those of the present ARMM. It cannot be reconciled with
the Constitution and existing laws.
Sub-issues:
Is the “associative” relationship envisioned between the
GRP and BJE unconstitutional?
YES, the “associative” relationship between the GRP and
the BJE is UNCONSTITUTIONAL since the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that same is on its way to independence and the
concept of “association” is NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION

An ASSOCIATION is formed when two states of unequal
power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model,
one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities
to the other, the principal, while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free associations represent
a middle ground between integration and independence.
In international practice, the associated state arrangement
has usually been used as a transitional device of former
colonies on their way to full independence.
MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent
with the international legal concept of association:
· BJEs capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of
the Central Government to ensure the BJEs
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN
and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government
over external defense
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that
the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an associative
relationship with the national government.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
Can the BJE be considered a state under international
law?
YES, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention:
permanent population, defined territory, government &
capacity to enter into relations with other state.
The BJE is a far MORE POWERFUL ENTITY than the
ARMM recognized under the Constitution. The spirit
animating it RUNS COUNTER to national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.
Does the MOA-AD violate Article X, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution on the creation of Autonomous Regions?
YES, the MOA-AD violated Article X, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution on the creation of autonomous regions since
the BJE is MORE OF A STATE than an autonomous region.
Even assuming that it can be covered by the term
“autonomous region”, it would still be contrary to the
Constitution.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the
present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM
during the 2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan
and Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned
earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and
the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001,
however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under
the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for
then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Does the MOA-AD violate Section 20, Article X of the 1987
Constitution on the Powers of Autonomous Regions?
YES, the MOA-AD does not comply with Section 20, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution. The MOA-AD would require an
AMENDMENT that would EXPAND the powers granted to
autonomous regions under the Constitution.
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject
to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws,
the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for
the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region.
The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9
of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that
might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself,
comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for
instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making
power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on
RESOURCES which states: The BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided,
however, that such relationships and understandings do not include
aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
since only the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if
the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That
constitutional provision states: The State recognizes and promotes the
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development. (Underscoring supplied) An
associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While
there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice,
has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
Is the MOA-AD consistent with statutory law (RA 9054 –
Organic Act of ARMM and the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Act)?
NO, besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the
MOA-AD is also INCONSISTENT with prevailing statutory
law, among which are R.A. 9054 or the Organic Act of
ARMM and the IPRA.
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in
the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping
together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples
living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro
people and Tribal peoples, as follows:
As used in this Organic Act, the phrase indigenous
cultural community refers to Filipino citizens residing
in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social,
cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from
other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are
believers in Islam and who have retained some or all
of their own social, economic, cultural, and political
institutions.
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-ADs
manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people
is a clear departure from that procedure.
By paragraph 1 of TERRITORY, the Parties simply agree that, subject
to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, [t]he Bangsamoro
homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as
the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial
domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed
procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. The identification
and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. The process of delineating a
specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the
consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition
for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the
members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. The official delineation of
ancestral domain boundaries including census of all
community members therein, shall be immediately
undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing
of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned.
Delineation will be done in coordination with the
community concerned and shall at all times include
genuine involvement and participation by the members
of the communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims
shall include the testimony of elders or community under
oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting
to the possession or occupation of the area since time
immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners
which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic
documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and
traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political
structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such
as those of old improvements, burial grounds,
sacred places and old villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and
agreements concerning boundaries entered
into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other
ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional
communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional
landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks,
ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from
the native dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. On the basis of such
investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the
Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a
perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and
a description of the natural features and landmarks
embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. A
complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of
investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral
Domains Office of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. A copy of each document,
including a translation in the native language of the
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place
therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the
document shall also be posted at the local, provincial
and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for
two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file
opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of
such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such
newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be
a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting
shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio
station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. Within fifteen (15) days from
publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP
endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is
deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is
deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
require the submission of additional evidence: Provided,
That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim
that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after
inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in
case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give
the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned,
containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be
appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in
cases where there are conflicting claims among
ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims,
the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending
parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a
preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to
its full adjudication according to the section below.
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000 sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.
Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Petitioners also content thatan all-encompassing definition of "ancestral
Facts: The constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. domains" and "ancestral lands" which might include private lands found
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights within said areas is violative of the rights of private landowners.
Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations Issue: Whether or not the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 or
(Implementing Rules) is being assailed by petitioners Isagani Cruz and R.A. 8371 is constitutional
Cesar Europa. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is Held: As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However,
natural resources to indigenous peoples. On the contrary, the CHR after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the petition is DISMISSED.
rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be dismissed.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution: Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides
that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples; Section 6 in
relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands; Section 7 which recognizes and
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains; Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands; Section 57 which provides
for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources
within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development
and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and Section 58 which
gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which
are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
Collado vs. CA G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 120.0766
hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to
the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the
Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey is inside
IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." Then petitioner Collado filed an Amended
Application to include additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more
applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners" for brevity).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time
immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in
the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando
Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22,
1902.

ISSUES:
Whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as
all natural resources belong to the State. Watersheds are considered
natural resources which are not susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. The statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State.
Secretary of DENR vs Yap government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
FACTS: ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
Boracay for titling purposes. to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801
declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve.
Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application
for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to
section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are

automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands
alienable.

HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC. vs REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 152570, September 27, 2006
Facts:
On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for
Free Patent of a lot located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu.
Thereafter, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a
Free Patent over the said lot and the he Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT).
Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc.
(petitioner) by one of Orcullos heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, filed a complaint for annulment of title and reversion of the lot
to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that the issuance of the
said free patent and title for said lot was irregular and erroneous,
following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland
and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after
Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the Regional Executive.
The trial court upheld the free patent. It ruled that respondent failed to
show that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve or
that it has been classified as such before the issuance of the free
patent and the original title.
The CA revesed the trial court decision. Invalidated the sale of the lot,
holding the lot to be inalienable.
Contention of the petitioner:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the DENR officers
testimony. It claims that the testimony was a mere opinion to the effect
that if there was no classification yet of an area, such area should be
considered as a public forest.
2. Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on 19 May 1975, or
long after the issuance of the free patent and title in question and
should not be applied retroactively to prejudice their vested rights.
3. Even the Republic designated the lot as a Cadastral Lot.
4. The land classification map presented by the respondent was held
inadmissible by the lower courts, it is neither a certified true copy nor
one attested to be a true copy by any DENR official
5. The survey conducted by the DENR is not clear because they used
an unreliable and inaccurate instrument.
Issue: Whether or not respondent property showed that the subject lot
is a timberland block.
Ruling:
1. No. Respondent failed to prove that the free patent and original
title were truly erroneously and irregularly obtained.
It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious
controversy, involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation
committed against the government and it is aimed at the return of
the disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the
original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate
of title, including the transfer certificate of title of the
successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through
fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, the State, as the party alleging
the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the application of the
free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and
annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved
 by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of mangroves when they surveyed it, there is no proof that it was not
evidence not even being adequate planted with trees and crops at the time Orcullo applied for free patent.

2. The Court finds that the findings of the trial court rather than 6. The delineation of the areas as timberland or forests reserve was
those of the appellate court are more in accord with the law and made nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the
jurisprudence. subject lot.

3. There shall be no retroactive effect of P.D. 705.
A portion of Section 13 of P.D. No. 705 states:
“….Those still to be classified under the Present system shall
continue to remain as part of the public forest.”
The Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as
the basic foundation of the State's property regime. Nevertheless, in
applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in every
claim or right by the Government against one of its citizens, the
paramount considerations of fairness and due process must be
observed.

Prior forestry laws, including P.D. No. 389, which was revised by P.D.
No. 705, does not contain a similar provision. Article 4 of the Civil Code
provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided. The Court does not infer any intention on the part of then
President Marcos to ordain the retroactive application of Sec. 13 of P.D.
No. 705.

Thus, even assuming for the nonce that subject parcel was unclassified
at the time Orcullo applied for a free patent thereto, the fact remains
that when the free patent and title were issued thereon in 1971,
respondent in essence segregated said parcel from the mass of public
domain. Thus, it can no longer be considered unclassified and forming
part of the public forest as provided in P.D. No. 705.

4. The Land Classification Map submitted is a mere photocopy. A mere

photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence of the existence of
the L.C. Map.

5. The testimony of the foresters who conducted the survey are not
conclusive as to the nature of the land at present or at the time the free
patent and title were issued. Assuming that the area is covered by
 naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
GR L-21289, 4 October 1971 considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a
living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the
Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in
the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the
prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung
appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen
upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Held:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to
an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman
requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990
JOSE B. AZNAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER
OSMEÑA, respondents.
Ponente: PARAS, J.:
Petitioner: Aznar – provincial chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu
Respondent: COMELEC and Osmena – candidate for provincial
governor of Cebu
FACTS:
1) On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC
for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in
the January 18, 1988 local elections.
2) On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino
citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation
submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago
certifying that private respondent is an American and is a
holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448
and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911,
issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
(Annex "B-1").
4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent,
maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is
the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and
son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No.
0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has
not gone out of the country for more than six months; and
that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since
1965.
5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been
timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for
Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by
acquiring dual-citizenship?
HELD:
SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision.
The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had
lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A.
No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From
the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by
any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken
the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the
electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a
voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino
and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of
Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there
can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no
renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
EXPRESS RENUNCIATION/EXPATRIATION – PIA
YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989.*
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, WILLIE YU,
petitioner, vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P.
ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY
HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES AND JUN ESPIRITU SANTO,
respondents
THE CASE Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus (right to due
process) with a prayer to be released from arbitrary detention as he
claims that his continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
FACTS
● Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired a Philippine
citizenship by naturalization on Feb. 10, 1978.
● Despite naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied
for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies
that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.
● Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed
commercial documents stating his citizenship as
Portuguese without the authentication of an appropriate
Philippine Consul
● Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a Foreign
passport while (at the same time) holding a Filipino citizenship
as well
● Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full knowledge
and legal capacity when he applied for A Philippine
citizenship through naturalization he consequently
recognizes, identifies and agrees to the oath taken which
states to renounce ‘absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty”
and pledged to “maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines,". Hence, petitioner then knows
the limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said oath and it
succeeding consequences should they be violated.
ISSUE Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yu’s acts constitute
a renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship? YES
SC RULING
Petitioner’s motion for release from detention is DENIED (along with
other motions filed).
COURT HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine
citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese
citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
represented himself as such in official documents even after he had
become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship
While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,"
he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents
he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd.
filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
Further Reference:
How Philippine Citizenship obtained/reacquired:

1.) By direct act of Congress
2.) By naturalization- take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic Act 9225
3.) By administrative repatriation—take the oath of Allegiance
to the Republic and register the same in the local civil
registry or in the place where the person resides/last
resided; original citizenship is acquired
denial by the division compelling petitioner to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
Petitioners Tecson, Desiderio Jr., and Velez filed their petitions directly
before the Supreme Court citing Article 7, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution.
Issues:
1) Is respondent a natural-born Filipino citizen?

2) Is respondent guilty of material misrepresentation in his

certificate of candidacy?
Maria Jeanette Tecson vs. Comelec
March 3, 2004 Ruling:
Facts: Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Accordingly, his
The case was a consolidated case where the petitioners
grandfather Lorenzo Pou/Poe who was a Spaniard and born around
moved to deny due course the certificate of candidacy for President for
1870 acquired Filipino citizenship due to the en masse Filipinization to
the 2004 elections filed by Ronald Allan Poe (Fernando Poe Jr.) They
inhabitants of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Petitioners failed to prove that
allege material misrepresentation of respondent where the latter stated
the late Lorenzo Poe/Pou was a resident of some other place other
that he was a natural-born citizen when in fact according to the
than San Carlos Pangasinan which was the place of his death in 1954.
petitioners, he was not for he was born to an American mother, Bessie
This conferment of citizenship to Lorenzo Poe would be transmitted to
Kelley who was not married to his father Allan F. Poe (Fernando Poe
his son Allan, father of respondent. Even if respondent was an
Sr.) when he was born. Accordingly, Allan F. Poe was married to a
illegitimate child of his father, he could still claim Filipino citizenship
Paulita Poe y Gomez before he had a relationship with Bessie Kelley.
through his father for Article 3, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1935
Said Paulita Poe in an affidavit in Spanish stated that she had sued
Philippine Constitution provides that children whose fathers were
Allan after finding out his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley. Also
Filipino citizens are considered Filipino citizens also. Said provision did
it is alleged that even respondent’s father is not a Filipino citizen for
not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate child of the Filipino
respondent’s grandfather was a Spaniard who resided here in the
father. FPJ’s filiation with his late father Allan F. Poe/Fernando Poe Sr.
Philippines and died in San Carlos, Pangasinan on September 11,
was proven by a notarized affidavit executed by his aunt Ruby Kelley
1954. Petitioner Fornier filed the petition to deny due course/cancel the
Mangahas, sister of his late mother Bessie Kelley Poe, that respondent
certificate of candidacy of respondent before the Comelec Third
was the child of his late sister with Fernando Poe, Sr., that Bessie
Division which denied the same. The Comelec en banc sustained the
Kelley and Fernando Poe Sr. were married on September 16, 1940,
that the couple lived together as a family together with the affiant and
her mother until the liberation of Manila in 1945, and attested to the fact
that respondent is a natural born Filipino and legitimate child if
Fernando Poe Sr. Said evidence was considered in accordance with
Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The allegation that
Fernando Poe was married to a certain Paulita Poe prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley was doubtful, and was not proven by the
petitioners.
Respondent is not liable for material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy. Such was not proven by the petitioners
evidence, and proving such material misrepresentation must show that
such misrepresentation be material, deliberate, and willful.
Gargaritano, Angelo Ibañez
Jose Tan Chong vs Secretary of Labor GR No. 47616
Lam Swee Sang vs The Commonwealth of the Philippines GR No.
47623
79 Phil 249 - September 16, 1947
Facts:
The petitioner in the first case, Jose Tan Chong, is born in San Pablo,
Laguna, on July 1915. He had a Chinese father and a Filipino mother,
lawfully married, and left for China in 1925. He returned to the
Philippines on January 25, 1940. The applicant in the second case,
Lam Swee Sang, was born in Jolo, Sulu, on May 8, 1900. He had a
Chinese father and Filipino mother, whose marital status cannot be
ascertained. From the date of his birth up to the date of filing his
application for naturalization, and up to the date of hearing, he had
been residing in the Philippines. He is married to a Filipino woman and
they have three children. He speaks the local dialect and the Spanish
and English languages.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI and granted the
petition of Tan Chong for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he
is a native of the Philippines. Swee Sang's petition for naturalization
was dismissed as there was no need for such, as the Court recognized
him as a Filipino citizen.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration and contended that
although the petitioner in the second case and the applicant in the
second were born in the Philippines, they are not citizens of the
Philippines under the laws in force at the time of their birth. The OSG
prayed that the judgements appealed be reversed.
The Court held that the principle of jus soli applied in the Philippines'
jurisdiction. It is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which provided that "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside."
The case of Roa vs Collector of Customs, brought up as one of the
precedents, held that a person born in the Philippines of a Chinese
father and Filipino mother, legally married, is a citizen thereof.
Issues:
Whether or not the ruling of the precedent should be upheld in the
application of the principle of Stare Decisis.
Whether or not the principle of the principle of Jus Soli should be
applied in the case at bar.
Held:
No.
The Court, held that the principle of Stare Decisis does not mean blind
adherence to precedents. The doctrines or rule laid down, which has
been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be
contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of Stare Decisis
does not and should not apply when there is conflict between the
precedent and the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon
any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.
Considering that the common law principle or law of jus soli as
embodied in the fourteenth amendment is to the Constitution of the
United States, and has not been intended to the Philippines' jurisdiction;
and considering the law in force at the time petitioner's and applicant's
birth which is Sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill as amended by Act 23 of
March 1912 that provides "Inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day
of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands," the Court opined and so held that the petitioner and
the applicant are not Filipino citizens.
 constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. CA decided,
Lee vs. Director of Lands
declaring the judgment of reconstitution to be void. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Facts:

Sometime in March 1936, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes,

1. Whether Lot No. 398 is entitled to the widows of the heirs of Lee
Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal, and
Liong despite the fact that he acquired said lot in Pari Delicto. > In pari
Jimmy, alll surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, A Chinese citizen, a
delicto (potior/melior est conditio possidentis), Latin for "in equal fault
parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters,
(better is the condition of the possessor)", is a legal term used to
designed as lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
indicate that two persons or entities are equally at fault, whether the
3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas
malfeasance in question is a crime or tort.
City. However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First
Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment Decision:
of sale and recovery of land.4 The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the
The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March
sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring
1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935
ownership of private agriculture land, including residential, commercial
Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in
or industrial land. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and ruled
cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a chinese citizen, was
thus: pari delicto (in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding
disqualified to acquire the land in question. The fact that the Court did
title thereto by virtue of provision of the Constitution, both the vendor
not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the
and vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation
transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription
and thus the courts will not afford protection to either party). On July 1,
against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However,
1968, the same former owners (Dinglasans) filed with the Court of First
the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction was not the
Instance and action for recovery of the same parcel of land. On Sept.
parties to the transaction. "In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of
23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong file with the trial. Both cases were
holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both
elevated to the Supreme Court but were dismissed holding the suit
the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the
barred by res judicata. On Sept. 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and
constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not
Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC, Roxas City a petition for reconstitution
afford protection to either party." The proper party to assail the sale is
of title of Lot No. 398 of Capiz. They were the widows of the heirs of
the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when the
Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. Both widows received a parcel of land
Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of
through succession from their deceased husbands. RTC ordered the
reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to
reconstitution of the lost and destroyed certificate of said title of lot. On
assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription
Jan. 25, 1995, OSG filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
never against the State. In this case, subsequent circumstances militate
annulment of judgment of reconstitution alleging that petitioners were
against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of
not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since Lee Liong did
Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land
not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was
has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners
herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does
not dispute. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands
of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would
be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of
Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. "If land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers
it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus, the subsequent
transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be
impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.34 The
objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved. Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 183133 : July 26, 2010
BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND
VALERIANO CABILING MA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F.
FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B.
CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOSE DL.
CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO B.
DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z.
LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board of
Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL,
Respondents.
FACTS:
petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano are 2 of the children of
Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,1 a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a
Filipina.2
Records reveal that petitioners were children born under the 1935
Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country
for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and
received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do
not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even
traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families
in the Philippines.4
who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took
their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of
majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election
with the nearest civil registry, and were considered foreign nationals
subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien
certificates of registration.
Issue:
whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship
as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as
Filipinos.
HOLDING:
No.
The Court is guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973
Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as
natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the
conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of
registration of the documents of election should not result in the
obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.1avvphi1
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the
petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine
citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in
the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate
the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking
requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they
submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered
with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for
validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau
of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative
orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the
Department of Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.

G.R. No. 202809, July 02, 2014 - DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law. Aside from his
presentation of all other requirements, petitioner presented, as
witnesses, Dr. Anlacan, Dr. Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, Teresita Go, and
Juan Go.
Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he
conducted on petitioner, he had no psychiatric abnormality at the time
of the test. Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that petitioner’s
medical examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s
family, said that he had known petitioner since childhood through his
association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita described
him as a peace-loving person who participated in activities sponsored
by his school and the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by
profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner personally.
The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization
ruling that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law.
But the CA reversed and set aside said decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Go’s petition for naturalization should be granted.
Ruling: No. Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the
application must show substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No.
473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional
requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at
least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations.
In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court listed the requirements
for character witnesses, namely:
1. That they are citizens of the Philippines; 

2. That they are “credible persons”; 

3. That they personally know the petitioner; 

4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by law; 

5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute; 

6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable; 

7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines; and 

8. That he “is not in any way disqualified under the provisions” of
the Naturalization Law. 

The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by
petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand
as such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present
evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. In the
words of the CA, “he did not prove that his witnesses had good
standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to
be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word may be taken at face
value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of petitioner.”
Furthermore, the background checks done on petitioner yielded
negative results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of
his household. In fact, petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an
interview by BOI agents. To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to
embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals.
Finally, it is noteworthy that petitioner’s failure to state his former
residence in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization.
Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case.
Hence, the petition for naturalization is dismissed without prejudice.

LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009
Facts:
In its April 1, 2009 Decision in G.R. No. 179120, the Supreme Court
reversed the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated
May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying
Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the First
District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.
Biraogo filed the instant motion for reconsideration with prayer for oral
argument.
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of
Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the
position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The
contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is
not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement
in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that
ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and
garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the
winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as
Member of the House of Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is
not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at
the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to
procedural and substantial defects.
Issues:
1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned
in an election case
2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules
apply to disqualification based on citizenship
Held:
1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding
should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
which provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon
motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his
representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge
may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in
the Civil Register:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained
fraudulently or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the
issuance of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or
to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there:
Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than
one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality, or
two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima
facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in
the same:
3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed
to graduate from a public or private high school recognized by the
Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as
part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by
neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or
schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization
certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of
Interior [now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now
Office of the Solicitor General];
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be
used as a dummy in violation of the constitutional or legal provisions
requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the
proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal
or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of
the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly
invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such
procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section
1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon
motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his
representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the
initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous
investigation in each particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be
raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized
citizen’s descendant.
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold
an office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and
questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper
proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the
law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her
citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be
observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold
office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents
would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on
through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is
that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide,
without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers,
she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially
assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the
COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification
cases.
x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now
present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's
election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the
OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction
over election contests relating to its members.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case,
was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the
HRET of its jurisdiction.

3. No. The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of
filing either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a
Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that
the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not
apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications
is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987
Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives
must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but
during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who
assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same
at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.
G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007
KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA
• Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice
of the Supreme Court
• Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration)
declaring one a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when
there are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings
FACTS:
records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have
to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino
citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged
ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from
doing so.

This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by

Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that
respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese
parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven
years after respondent Ong’s birth, his father was finally granted Filipino
citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent
Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that
he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
RULING:

xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged

subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial
court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized
along with his father.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the

nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births,
marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN
G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012
Facts:
• Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized
Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
Condon.
• In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.
o It was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines
• In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
• Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the
highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate.
• Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s
eligibility were filed before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground
that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225.
• Petitioner argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and
not a mandatory requirement.
Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to hold her elective post
Held: Yes
• R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
• The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores
one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section
5
• Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner
has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
o Before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia, which was
not under oath, contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.
• When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no
occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for
application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance.
o In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single
meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any
elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally
swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who
is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal
terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
• Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the
exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a
dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.
Maquiling vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of USA, he
lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegianceto the RP on 10 July
2008. On the same day an order of approval of his citizenship retention
and re-acquisition was issued in his favour. In 2009, Arnado again took
his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of renunciation
of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte.
Respondent Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition
to disqualify Arnado and presented a record indicating that Arnado
has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines.
COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to personally file
his answer. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to
declare him in default. In 2010 election, Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed
his answer.
COMELEC first division ruled for his disqualification. Petitioner
Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kausawagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case
and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, him, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest lawful votes should be proclaimed as the winner.
COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue with the trial and hearing.
However, it reversed and set aside the ruling of first division and
granted Arnado’s MR.
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring
Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a
US passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner in the
2010 mayoralty race.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amount to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
xxx
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a
public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became
eligible to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of
such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is
open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship. Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to
attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to
use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to
determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him
eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship,
and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US
passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American,
in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that
he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America. The renunciation of foreign
citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport
is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United States of America."
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion
was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a
foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the
foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that
comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to
its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek
election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no
other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the
public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his

certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the
elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the
winner.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not
have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC Case Digest (G.R. Nos. 221697
Septembe Mary Grace Natividad S.
& 221698-700)
r 3, 1968 Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was
found abandoned as a newborn
POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro,
G.R. Nos. 221697
Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar.
& 221698-700
Custody over petitioner was passed
on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar and his wife.
THE PETITION:
Septembe Emiliano Militar reported and
The petition is composed of two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in r 6, 1968 registered petitioner as a foundling
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent with the Office of the Civil Registrar
application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo).
order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the following: 1973 When petitioner was five (5) years
old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan
1. DECEMBER 1, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe,
ELECTIONS SECOND DIVISION (Cancelled petitioner’s certificate Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan
of candidacy); Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial
2. DECEMBER 23, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC EN Court
BANC (MTC) of San Juan City.
(Denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration); and
May 13, The Poe spouses’ petition for
3. DECEMBER 11, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST 1974 adoption was granted by the trial
DIVISION court and ordered that petitioner's
(Declared that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to name be changed from "Mary Grace
complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary
committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of
December Having reached the age of 18,
ten 10 years and 11 months as of the day of the elections on 9 May
13, 1986 petitioner registered as a voter with
2016)
the local COMELEC Office in San
Juan City.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

April 4, Petitioner applied for and was
1988 issued Philippine Passport No.
F9272876 by the Department of
Foreign Affairs
1988-199 Initially, the petitioner enrolled and
1 pursued a degree in Development
Studies at the University of the
Philippines but opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the U.S.
in 1988.
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from
Boston College in Chestnuts Hill
July 27, Petitioner married Teodoro Misael
1991 Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in
San Juan City.
July 29, Desirous of being with her husband
1991 who was then based in the U.S., the
couple flew back to the U.S.
April16, Petitioner gave birth to her eldest
1992 child Brian Daniel
April 5, Renewed her Philippines passport.
1993
May 19, Renewed her Philippines passport.
1998
July 10, Petitioner gave birth to daughter
1998 Hanna MacKenzie.
October Petitioner became a naturalized
18, 2001 American citizen
April 8, Petitioner came back to the
2004 – Philippines together with Hanna to
July 8, support her father's candidacy for
2004 President in the May 2004 elections.
It was during this time that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter
Anika.
December Petitioner rushed back to the
13, 2004 Philippines upon learning of her
– father's deteriorating medical
February condition who died shortly.
3, 2005
2005 Petitioner and husband began
preparing for their resettlement
including notification of their
children's schools that they will be
transferring to Philippine schools
May 24, Petitioner came home to the
2005 Philippines and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number
from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
March The petitioner's husband officially
2006 informed the U.S. Postal Service of
the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the
U.S. petitioner and her husband
acquired a 509-square meter lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
they built their family home.
July 7, Petitioner took her Oath of
2006 Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.
July 18, The Bureau of Immigration acted
2006 favorably on petitioner's petitions
and declared that she is deemed to
have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.
August Again, petitioner registered as a
31, 2006 voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San
Juan City. She also secured from
the DFA a new Philippine Passport
bearing the No. XX4731999.
October 6, President Benigno S. Aquino III
2010 appointed petitioner as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB).
October Before assuming her post, petitioner
20, 2010 executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and
Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in
Pasig City.
October Petitioner submitted the said
21, 2010 affidavit to the Bureau of
Immigration and took her oath of
office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB. From then on, petitioner
stopped using her American
passport.
July 12, The petitioner executed before the
2011 Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States" and stated that she in
the Philippines, from 3 September
1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May
2005 to present.
December The U.S. Vice Consul issued to
9, 2011 petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States"
effective 21 October 2010.
October 2, The petitioner filed with the
2012 COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to
the question "Period of residence in
the Philippines before May 13,
2013."
October Petitioner filed her COC for the
15, 2015 Presidency for the May 2016
Elections.
In her COC, the petitioner declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines
up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months counted from 24 May
2005.

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections
triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were
the subject of these consolidated cases.
ISSUES:
1. With regard to: a) being a foundling, and b) her repatriation, is the
petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines? YES TO BOTH.
2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for
running as president? YES.
Did the petitioner commit material misrepresentation in her Certificate
of Candidacy? NO.
RATIONALE:
1. Is petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?
ON BEING A FOUNDLING:
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity
and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that
petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their
identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under
Section 4, Rule 128:
Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show
that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should
have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission
that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such
status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability
that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in
the first place to be adopted.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents
are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat
nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond-shaped eyes and an oval face.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been
interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right
of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them
stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one
among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just
one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and
unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty -
99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial
of their birthright. There is no reason to sacrifice the fundamental
political rights of an entire class of human beings.
While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either.
ON PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION
The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
According to the Supreme Court, the COMELEC's ruling disregarded
consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained
as follows:
…Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-bom Filipino.
Also, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous
was already rejected in Bengson vs. HRET where the phrase "from
birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the
time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof."
2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for
running as president?
ON RESIDENCE
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have 10 years
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections.
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her
family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines
for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport
showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines
every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in
March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for
the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to
the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry
inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her
children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005
and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on
July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February
2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006;
receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S.
acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006
e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of
address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance
Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July
2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where
petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May
2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with
affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from
petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work
and to
sell the family home).
The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
actual continuous stay taken together, lead to no other conclusion that
when she came here on May 24 2005, her intention was to permanently
abandon the United States. Petitioner also actually re-established her
residence here on 24 May 2005.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood
the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the
day she submitted that COC in 2012.
Her explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of
residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the
time she submitted the COC, is strengthened by the change which the
COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge
that the first version was vague.
Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the
2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner.
CONCLUSION:
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned
Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

ON MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10)

years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was
false because she put six ( 6) years and six (6) months as "period of
residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus,
according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident
only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically
assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as
false.

DAVID vs SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FACTS: Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a foundling whose
biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was later adopted and raised by
spouses FPJ and Susan Roces. She took her college degree in the
USA. She returns to the Philippines frequently.
On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe decided to settle in the US with her
husband and children and lived there for some time. She was
naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. She
was subsequently given a United States passport.
When FPJ ran for President in 2004, she returned to support her
father's candidacy. After the Elections, she returned to the United
States on July 8, 2004.
On December 14, 2004, FPJ died. She stayed in the country until
February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to the
settling of his estate.
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States and
decided to return home in 2005. She came back on May 24, 2005. On
July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines
In July 2006, her Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of
Philippine Citizenship and derivative citizenship on behalf of her three
children were granted. Senator Poe became a registered voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006.
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America
between 2006 and 2009 using her United States Passport. She used
her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American
citizenship on 20 October 2010.
On October 6, 2010, President Aquino appointed Senator Poe as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB). On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship.
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States on July 12, 2011.
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections and
eventually won.
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6,
2015. He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply
with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the
Constitution.
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its
assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a Senator
HELD: Voting 9-3, the high court ruled in favor of Poe.
From the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention on
citizenship, it was never the intention of the framers to exclude
foundlings from natural-born citizenship status. “Children or people born
in a country of unknown parents are citizens of this nation” and the only
reason that there was no specific reference to foundlings in the 1935
provision was that these cases “are few and far in between.” Evident
intent was to adopt the concept found in the Spanish Code “wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered
Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown
parentage is the son of a Spaniard.”
Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930 (on Conflict of
Nationality Laws), a foundling is presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found until the contrary is proved.
Although the Philippines is not a signatory to said convention, its
provisions are binding as they form part of the law of the land pursuant
to the incorporation clause. Senator Roxas in the 1934 Constitutional
Convention remarked “By international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation
is recognized…” By referring to this rule in international law (which was
no other than Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930), what was
effectively created in the Constitution itself, was an exception to the
general rule of natural-born citizenship based on blood descent.
Hence, foundlings (children born in the Philippines with unknown
parentage) were, by birth, accorded natural-born citizenship by the
Constitution. “natural-born citizens by legal fiction”The framers of the
Constitution were sufficiently empowered to create a class of
natural-born citizens by legal fiction, as an exception to the jus
sanguinis rule. This is evident from Art. 1 (State to determine who are
its nationals) and Art. 2 (questions on nationality to be determined by
the law of that State) of the 1930 Hague Convention.
Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking
her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, as required under Section 3,
R.A. No. 9225. Before assuming her position as MTRCB Chairman,
Poe executed an affidavit of renunciation of foreign citizenship. This
was sufficient to qualify her for her appointive position, and later, her
elective office as R.A. No. 9225 did not require that her Certificate of
Loss of Nationality filed before the U.S. Embassy be first approved in
order that she may qualify for office. Records of the Bureau of
Immigration show that Poe still used her U.S. passport after having
taken her Oath of Allegiance but not after she has renounced her U.S.
Citizenship.
MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 (1999)
G.R. No. 135083
Facts:
· Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were
candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City during the May 11,
1998 elections.
· A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification
on Manzano contending that Manzano is an American
citizen thus suspending the proclamation of the private
respondent.
· COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition cancelling
the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on May 7, 1998 on
the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec 40
of the Local Goverment Code from running any elective
position.
· Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998
and the motion remained pending even after the election.
· The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification which was opposed by the private
respondent.
· On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution reversing the decision of the COMELEC's Second
Division, declaring that private respondent Manzano is
qualified to run for Vice mayor of Makati.
· Pursuant to the resolution rendered by the COMELEC
enbanc, on August 31, 1998, the board of canvassers
proclaimed private respondent as the Vice Mayor of the city
of Makati.
· Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private
respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold the office Vice
Mayor of Makati.
Issues:
1. WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit
considering that he was not an original party in the case for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.
2. WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?
3. WON there was a valid election of citizenship?
Reasons:
1. Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the
time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention"
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the
winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have
private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective
local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was
competent to bring the action, so was Mercado since the he
was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Mercado
had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for
the disqualification against private respondent is clear from
§6 of R.A. No. 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
 which provides that intervention may be allowed in persons with dual citizenship have elected their Philippine
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private
has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of COMELEC respondent’s certificate of candidacy, he made these
en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino
tantamount to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent resident of, or
certiorari. immigrant to, a foreign country.” “I am eligible for the office I
seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution
2. NO. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
contends that through Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government
thereto…”The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed
Code (which declares as “disqualified from running for
to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
elective local position… Those with dual-citizenship”),
any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen.
Congress has “command[ed] in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to
hold elective office.” Dual citizenship is different from dual Ruling:
allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of Petition is DISMISSED.
circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is
recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual BERNARDES, JEAN MARIE A.
allegiance is a result of a person’s volition; it is a situation
wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an
issue because a person who has this raises a question of
which state’s law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a
threat to a country’s sovereignty. Hence, “dual citizenship” in
the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean “dual
allegiance”. Therefore, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification.

3. Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should

suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
LOPEZ VS COMELEC
· A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any
elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship
at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
FACTS: Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution and (2) Omnibus
Order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division,
disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay Chairman.
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of
Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on
October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition
before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo,
praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an
American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In
his Answer, petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at
the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act
of 2003. He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay
Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for
Barangay Chairman.
After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner
emerged as the winner.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution
granting the petition for disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s filing of a certificate of
candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship.
HELD: R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before
those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in
the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This
new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office,
he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath."
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with
approval the COMELEC observation on this point:
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of
the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los
Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a
public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a
candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented
that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A.
No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an
oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he
is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the
instant case, respondent Lopez's failure to renounce his American
citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove
the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to
comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to
prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this
Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position
in the Philippines.

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and
began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory
cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of
votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because
the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN
M. DACANAY, PETITIONER
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His
application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege
to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires
it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to
have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in
the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its
provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the

Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship

Ruling:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the

Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed
by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
NESTOR A. JACOT V. ROGEN T. DAL and COMELEC (CASE
DIGEST)
27 November 2008
GR No. 179848
TOPIC:
Loss and Re-Acquisition of Citizenship
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September
2007 of the , affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the
COMELEC Second Division, disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007
National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a
personal renouncement of his US citizenship.
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a
naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner sought
to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.
He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General
(PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19
June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the
same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September
2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued and Identification Certificate,
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Catarman, Camiguin.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were
held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite
renunciation of his US citizenship
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship
requirement as required by law for persons seeking public office.
HELD:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and
his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship, because these are distinct requirements to be complied
with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of
the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign
country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears
allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his
renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public

office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those
who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born

Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country,
but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship

(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, and

(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,

to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all

foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.
Arnado vs COMELEC
Topic: Citizenship Requirement
Facts:
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the USA.
Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in
the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before
the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA.
He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July
10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship
Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009,
Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10,
2010 national and local elections.
Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to disqualify
Petitioner Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground that Arnado
remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for
entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit
of Renunciation.
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections
proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed the winning candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued held that
Arnado's continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April
3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for
public office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The
COMELEC First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held
that the rule on succession should be followed.
In the meantime, Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who garnered
the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued
that the COMELEC First Division erred in applying the rule on
succession.
The COMELEC En Banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC First
Division. It held that Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to
revert his status to dual citizenship; that he continued to use his US
passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a
Philippine passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips; and that,
after receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his
subsequent trips.
Maquiling then appealed to the SC. While Maquiling’s petition was
pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials for
the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1, 2012,
Petitioner Arnado filed his CoC for the same position. Respondent
Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
Before the May 2013 elections, the SC ruled on the Maquiling petition.
It set aside the COMELEC en banc’s resolution and disqualified
Petitioner Arnado from running for elective position, and declared
Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in
the May 2010 elections and that the subsequent use of his US
passport, Petitioner Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. The issuance of the Maquiling Decision
sets the stage for the present controversy.
Shortly after the Maquiling Decision, Petitioner Arnado executed an
Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated
April 3, 2009.”
Private Respondent Capitpan, Petitioner Arnado’s lone rival in the May
2013 elections, filed a Petition seeking to disqualify him from running
for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on
the ruling of this Court in Maquiling.
Arguments:
Petitioner: That the Maquiling case is not on all fours with the present
controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed beyond the 25-day
reglementary period reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be
cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the
people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their
overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the
Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed
and that he be declared as eligible to run for mayor of Kauswagan.
Petitioner Arnado avers that his former counsel, revealed that he
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on
November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1,
2012, he is a citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same
any other country and, therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for
Respondent COMELEC: It disqualified Petitioner Arnado from running public office during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without
in the May 2013 elections. That at the time he filed his CoC on October total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines - still
1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement of RA 9225 subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1,
of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court
citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it
Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he departed therefrom.
subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of
Maquiling case. the oath of renunciation. Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009
Issue: Whether Petitioner Arnado is qualified to run invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run
Held: No. The Petition is devoid of merit. COMELEC’s decision is for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the
affirmed. time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and
citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local position. applicable to this case.
The phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood
as referring to "dual allegiance.''
RA 9225 allowed natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights
upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run
for public office in the Philippines provided that they:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws; and,
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath
prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
In this case, Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite because,
as held inMaquiling v. Commission on Elections, his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US
passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he
filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The
Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May
 1. Whether or not Chua should be disqualified to run for public
CHUA V COMELEC office.

FACTS:
2. Whether private respondent Imelda E. Fragata filed a
Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua filed her Certificate of
petition for disqualification or a petition to deny due course/
Candidacy for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila. On the date
cancel certificate of candidacy.
of Chua's proclamation, however, Imelda E. Fragata, a registered voter,
filed a Petition captioned as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance
candidate" and "to deny due course and/or cancel [Chua's] Certificate
1. YES. A person intending to run for public office must not
of Candidacy." Moreover, Bacani filed a Motion to Intervene with
only possess the required qualifications for the position for
Manifestation and Motion to Annul Proclamation.
which he or she intends to run. The candidate must also
Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen, was unqualified
possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the
to run for Councilor. Moreover, Chua allegedly continued on using her
law. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal
American passport and did not execute an oath of renunciation of her
renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate
American citizenship. With Chua being a dual citizen at the time she
requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for
filed her Certificate of Candidacy, Bacani prayed that the Commission
qualification to run for public office. With petitioner's failure to
on Elections annul Chua's proclamation.
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed
COMELEC held that it the petition was one for disqualification,
her Certificate of Candidacy. Under Section 40 of the Local
regardless of the caption stating that it was a petition to declare Chua a
Government Code, she was disqualified to run for Councilor
nuisance candidate. The Petition alleged a ground for disqualification
in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, specifically, that Chua
Local Elections.
was a permanent resident in the United States. Considering that Chua
Elections are more than a numbers game. Hence, in
is a dual citizen, the Commission held that Chua was disqualified to run
Maquiling: The ballot cannot override the constitutional and
for Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
Consequently, Chua's Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio, and
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
all votes casted for her were stray. Chua's proclamation was likewise
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
voided, and per Maquiling, Bacani was declared to have garnered the
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
sixth highest number of votes. Thus, in the Resolution, the
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a
Commission on Elections Second Division ruled in favor of Fragata and
candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and
Bacani. MR was denied. Chua filed before this Court a Petition for
eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for issuance of temporary
the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is
to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
ISSUES:
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
 With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, her Certificate of Candidacy was void
ab initio. She was correctly considered a non-candidate. All
votes casted for her were stray, and the person legally entitled
to the position is private respondent Krystle Marie C. Bacani, the
candidate with the next highest number of votes among the
eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections did not
gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua's proclamation
and subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani. SDA

2. It was a petition for disqualification. What remedy to avail

himself or herself of, however, depends on the petitioner. If
the false material representation in the certificate of
candidacy relates to a ground for disqualification, the
petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition for
disqualification, so long as the petition filed complies with
the requirements under the law. Before the Commission on
Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing
either a petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification. In
her Petition, private respondent Fragata did not argue that
petitioner made a false material representation in her
Certificate of Candidacy; she asserted that petitioner was a
permanent resident disqualified to run for Councilor under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Private
respondent Fragata's Petition, therefore, was a petition for
disqualification.

G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000
Principle of jus sanguinis
How Philippine citizenship is acquired
Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other
citizenship
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a
Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen,
she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later
married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution
took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and
the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones
Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established
the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli,
then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Republic vs. Sagun Case Digest
Facts: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a
Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born
on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after
getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City.
In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship averring that she was raised as a
Filipino and she is a registered voter in Baguio City and had voted in
local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She
asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record
of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a
Filipino citizen.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on
certiorari, pointing out that while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance
before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of
Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not
registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she
was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority.
Issues:
1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible?
2. Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election
of Philippine citizenship?
Held:
1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no
specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was
erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of
respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within
the courts competence.
2. When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter
was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines
those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935
Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of
a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. Being a legitimate child,
respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese,
unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine
citizenship. For respondent to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must
have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4),
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to
wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be
expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany
the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine
citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
(3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for
registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of
election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration
Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an
alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required
to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate
of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship
and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented
the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is
elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final
determination and review.
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural
rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special
proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows
any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of
entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship,
which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the
trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine
citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid
election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement
of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence
submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was
her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of
majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner,
even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices,
its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained
the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry
as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable
time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by
respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest
local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to
comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective
election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the
exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the
law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship
by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of
Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to
seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine
citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process.
All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements,
respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.
Naturalization
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus -KERRY LAO
ONG, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175430; June 18, 2012
“Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the governments
favor and against the applicant. The applicant carries the burden
of proving his full compliance with the requirements of law.”
FACTS: Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. As
decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Republic Act
No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law, the petition was
published in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation, and posted in a public place for three consecutive weeks,
six months before the initial hearing.
Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to
Chinese citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958.
He is registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate
of registration and a native-born certificate of residence from the
Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously and permanently
residing in the Philippines from birth up to the present Ong can speak
and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy. He took his
elementary and high school studies at the Sacred Heart School for
Boys in Cebu City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the
Philippine Constitution are taught. He then obtained a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Management from the Ateneo De Manila
University on March 18, 1978.
He married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen. They have
four children, namely, Kerri Gail Kimberley Grace, Kyle Gervin, and
Kevin Griffith, who were all born and raised in the Philippines. At the
time of the filing of the petition, Ong, his wife, and children were living at
No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City.
Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a
businessman/business manager since 1989, earning an average
annual income of P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said
that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in
1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his
business. As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the
years 1994 to 1997.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
RULING: The courts must always be mindful that naturalization
proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization
laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon
the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law.
In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent
Ongs compliance with the qualification found in Section 2, fourth
paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, which provides:
SECTION 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any
person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization:
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not
less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the
person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities
in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as
to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones
becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income should
permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and
consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization.
Ong’s gross income might have been sufficient to meet his
family’s basic needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was
enough to create an appreciable margin of income over expenses.
Without an appreciable margin of his income over his family’s
expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide him and his family
with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he
possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in
Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KAMRAN F. KABARSI
FACTS:
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Kabarsi filed a petition for naturalization
with the RTC where he alleged the following:
1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as
shown in a certification duly issued by the UNHCR;
3. He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City, since early part of June 2000 and more so has
resided continuously in the Philippines for not less than 11 years
immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11
July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1) year;
4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other
places of residence, prior to his present residence, were as
follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog
City; (iii) Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte;
5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in
his identity card which also serves as his birth certificate;
6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old
and born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City, whom he married on
12 October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown in their certificate of
marriage;
8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, l-year old , was born on 9 June
2001 in Dipolog City and presently residing with him and his
wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City;
9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name
(Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11 July 1990 specifically at
the Manila International Airport on board Philippine Airlines
Flight No. 731, per UNHCR certification containing reference to
his Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name;
10. Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reduced to five years the ten
year requirement of continuous residence;
11. He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
12. His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has
been engaged since 1998 and, as such, he derives an average
annual income of Php 80,000.00 more or less;
13. He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications under Section 4, of the Commonwealth
Act No. 473;
14. He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization
Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) regarding the filing with the
Office of the Solicitor General of his bona fide intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration
of Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;
15. It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is a
citizen or subject; that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of filing of this petition up to the time of
his admission to Philippine citizenship;
16. Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and
residing at ABC Compound, Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City
and Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino, married and
residing at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino
citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his petition, will appear
and testify as witnesses at the hearing thereof.
After finding that the petition is sufficient in form, the petitioner
submitted his witnesses, and thereafter, took the witness stand himself.
He narrated that he is an Iranian national. He and his brother left Iran in
1986 beacause of the war between Iran and Iraq at that time. Their
government confiscated their passport so they travelled by camel to
Pakistan where they stayed for 3 years, but was not granted a refugee
status there. They decided to come to the Philippines since one of his
brothers was already studying in the country. They procured Pakistani
passports under assumed names.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July n, 1990, he submitted himself
to the United Nations in Manila. After several interviews, he was
admitted as a refugee and, later on, as a person of concern. As a
refugee, he was granted by the United Nations allowances, medical
benefits and protection to some extent.
On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi's evidence sufficient to
support his petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC
rendered its decision granting the petition for naturalization.
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based
mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in granting Karbasi's petition
as he failed to comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
473 (Naturalization Law) on character, income and reciprocity.
Specifically, the OSG pointed out that Karbasi failed to establish that: 1]
Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization to Filipino citizens; 2] he
has a lucrative income as required under the law; and 3] he is of good
moral character as shown by his disregard of Philippine tax laws when
he had underdeclared his income in his income tax returns (ITRs) and
overstated the same in his petition for naturalization.
The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi's ITRs was
prepared in good faith because he was of the belief that he no longer
needed to include the income he received as payment of his services to
Daewoo Electronics Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins
Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because the same were already
withheld at source. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that
Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove reciprocity between Philippine
and Iranian laws.
ISSUE:
WON reciprocity is necessary in the naturalization of refugees?
HELD: NO
Although it isTrue that the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or
subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right
to become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of Karbasi's
petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental
pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals that he has
successfully established his refugee status upon arrival in the
Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations under its various
international commitments come into operation. Articles 6 and 34 of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in this case, to wit:
Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same
circumstances" implies that any requirements (including requirements
as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular
individual would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in question,
if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of
requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular
make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to
reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.
In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly provides
exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest
obligation of contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As applied to this case,
Karbasi's status as a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino
citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory requirements and
international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be read in
light of the developments in international human rights law specifically
the granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Azucena Saavedra Batu(i)gas
(DIGEST)
GR No. 183110
7 October 2013
TOPIC:
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife, Naturalization, Citizenship
FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed
the Decision of the RTC that granted the Petition for Naturalization of
respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization
before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. She stated that she intends in
good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she
will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of
her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation
or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is
not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the
retail trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns
real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the
country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary
in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to
Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed the Philippines since
birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano.
Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine
schools. After earning a degree in education, she then practiced her
teaching profession in several different schools in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas
(Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen. They have five children, all of
whom studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all
professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal
partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income,
Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets
from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During their marital union, the
Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog,
Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship
requirement as required by law to become a naturalized citizen of the
Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family
either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative that of the other.
naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she
is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.” WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, that granted the
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine Petition for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance
citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which
necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of
naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after
themselves to judicial naturalization. taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.
Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before
the then Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her
marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application.
However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it
found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino
citizen, as only their marriage certificate was presented to establish his
citizenship. As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding,
Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his
parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles,
and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending

the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of
allegiance among family members, thus:
G.R. NO. 138496 February 23, 2004
CO VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
FACTS: HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister,
ARLENE TAN CO, was born May 19, 1975. In their respective
certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO BOON PENG AND
LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. CO BOON
PENG filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. 270. His application was granted and
he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued
a certificate of naturalization and consequently took an oath as
Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under
Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which
was denied on the ff. grounds:
a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same
subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with
respect to the minor children of the applicant;
**Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children
b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only;
c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in
and applied to LOI 270;
d) Application of “pari material” rule of construction is misplaced.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on
account of the naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng.
HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the
certificate of naturalization of their father, to entitle them to Philippine
citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the ff. material
allegations in their petition:
1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
2) They were born in the Philippines;
3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was
naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
G.R. No. 202809, July 02, 2014 - DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law. Aside from his
presentation of all other requirements, petitioner presented, as
witnesses, Dr. Anlacan, Dr. Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, Teresita Go, and
Juan Go.
Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he
conducted on petitioner, he had no psychiatric abnormality at the time
of the test. Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that petitioner’s
medical examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s
family, said that he had known petitioner since childhood through his
association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita described
him as a peace-loving person who participated in activities sponsored
by his school and the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by
profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner personally.
The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization
ruling that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law.
But the CA reversed and set aside said decision. Hence, this petition.
The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by
petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand
as such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present
evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. In the
words of the CA, “he did not prove that his witnesses had good
standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to
be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word may be taken at face
value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of petitioner.”

Issue: Whether or not Go’s petition for naturalization should be granted.
Ruling: No. Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the
application must show substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No.
473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional
requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at
least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations.
In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court listed the requirements
for character witnesses, namely:
· That they are citizens of the Philippines; 

Furthermore, the background checks done on petitioner yielded
negative results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of
his household. In fact, petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an
interview by BOI agents. To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to
embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals.
Finally, it is noteworthy that petitioner’s failure to state his former
residence in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization.
Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case.
Hence, the petition for naturalization is dismissed without prejudice.

· That they are “credible persons”; 


· That they personally know the petitioner; 


· That they personally know him to be a resident of the

Philippines for the period of time required by law; 


· That they personally know him to be a person of good repute; 


· That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable; 


· That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to

become a citizen of the Philippines; and 


· That he “is not in any way disqualified under the provisions” of

the Naturalization Law. 

In the matter of the Petition for Admission to Citizenship of Manish
C. Mahtani, Manish Mahtani vs. Republic of the Philippines
GR No. 211118
PLAINTIFF: Manish Mahtani
DEFENDANT: Republic of the Philippines
DATE: March 21, 2018
PONENTE: J. Tijam
TOPIC: Administrative Philippine Citizenship
Facts:
· This is a case wherein Petitioner Mahtahni, a citizen of India
filed a Declaration of Intent to become a citizen of the
Philippines with the OSG, alleged the ff:
o Has a present address in Ayala Alabang
o Former address at Dasmariñas Village, Makati
o Born August 4, 1970 and a current citizen of India
o Married to Ana Mahtahni – has 3 children enrolled in
Rosemont School
o Arrived in the Philippines with his Mother when he was
9months old, returned to India and pursued his
studies there – but visited the Philippines often
o Continuously resided in Philippines for 15years
o Engaged in a lawful lucrative occupation – current
VP for Operations of Sprint International Inc.
importer of Speedo
o Speaks fluent English and Filipino
o No illness, not convicted of any crime
o Holder of Special Resident Retiree’s Visa
o Good faith to become a Filipino citizen
o Continue to reside in the Philippines from the date of
filling up to his admission
· RTC – GRANTED the petition, on the following grounds:
o Has all the qualifications and non of the
disqualifications
o Already 37years old when the petition was filed
o Met the residency requirement
o Has children studying in the Philippines
o Speaks fluent English and Tagalog
o Gainfully employed as VP of Operations of Sprint
International
o Did not oppose the government
o No disease at witnessed by family friend Dr. Tuquero
o Built special connections notable in the country Mr.
Ernesto Lopez of the prominent Lopez clan
o Evinced with sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos
· RP through the OSG faulted RTC for granting the petition
despite Mahtahni’s – needs documentary evidences and
witnesses
o failure to prove that he has a lucrative trade,
profession, or occupation – no evidence to support
except his testimony
§ needs to present that his income permits him
and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort
o failed to present credible persons as character
witnesses – RP questioned the testimonies of his
witnesses
§ RP posited that the Mr. Lopez and Dr.
Tuquero’s testimonies were deficient to prove
that Mahtahni conducted himself in an
irreproachable manner during his entire stay
in the Philippines
· Hence the filing of MR by the Petitioner
Issue: W/N the petitioner may be granted citizenship, NO
W/N Mahtahni was able to prove that he has some known lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, par
4 of CA No. 473, NO
 The presentation of his income tax return on his motion for
Ruling: reconsideration before the CA will not help his case even if We
consider the same despite being belatedly presented. As correctly
Jurisprudence is to the effect that the requirement of "some known
pointed out by the OSG, it appears on the said tax returns that
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the
Mahtani's income ranges from P620,000 to P715,000 annually or
person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities
P51,000 to P60,000 per month. Considering the costly lifestyle that
in life."25 Neither does it simply mean that one is engaged in a trade,
Mahtani is trying to impress to the courts with such income, We are
profession, or occupation which gives him and his family the luxuries in
constrained to conclude that while the same may have been sufficient
life or enables him and his family to have a way of living above an
to fufill his and his family's basic needs and comfort, again, there is no
average person. As aptly put by this Court in Rep. of the Phils. v. Ong:26
ample proof that it was enough to create an appreciable margin of
It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that income over expenses.
there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to
The concept of a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation in the
be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
contemplation of law speaks of adequacy and sustainability. A careful
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones
review of the records available in this case constrains Us to sustain the
becoming the object of charity or a public charge.27 (Citation omitted)
CA's ruling that Mahtani has not proven his possession of a known
After judiciously scrutinizing the records of this case, We find nothing lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation to qualify for
herein that would support his claim that he has a lucrative occupation. naturalization.
Admittedly, Mahtani did not provide any documentary evidence that
would show his actual financial status, which would support such
finding. At most, the evidence presented by Mahtani merely proves that
he and his family live in comfort or that their cost of living is above that
of an average person or family. In simple terms, what Mahtani
accomplished to demonstrate with the pieces of evidence that he
presented are just "expenses", nothing more. As it appears, Mahtani's
income may be sufficient to meet his family's basic needs, but there is
simply no sufficient proof that it is enough to create an appreciable
margin of income over expenses.28

In the first place, it bears stressing that he did not present anything to
apprise the courts a quo of his income or financial status. Moreover, the
testimonies of Mr. Lopez and Dr. Tuquero, likewise, cannot be
considered as ample proof of Mahtani's claimed gainful occupation as
required under the law. To be sure, doing business and socializing with
prominent personalities do not, in any way, satisfy such strict
requirement of the law.

EDISON SO v. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 170603, 2007-01-29
Facts:
Petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization[3]
under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law,... He was born on February 17, 1982, in
Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St.,
Binondo, Manila, since birth;... tition were the Joint Affidavit[4] of Atty.
Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioner�s Certificate
of Live Birth,[5] Alien Certificate of Registration,[6] and Immigrant
Certificate of Residenc
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[8] setting the petition for
hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all
persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the
petition should not be granted. The entire petition and... its annexes,
including the order, were ordered published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that
copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and... conspicuous
places in the Manila City Hall Building.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented
Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as
the legal consultant and adviser of the So family�s business.
Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully employed
and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares
Street, Binondo, Ma
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has
known petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in
1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo
Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member
of... some school organizations and mingled well with friends... etitioner
also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for
the period required by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
citizen. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had... satisfactorily
supported his petition with evidence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA
Issues:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2)
CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND
MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER
WITNESSES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2)
CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND
MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER decision of the CA denying the petition for naturalization without
WITNESSES. prejudice.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR

NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2)
CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND
MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER
WITNESSES.
Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee
failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2
and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 47
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest
privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien.
It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully
qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the... law.[60]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.

Ruling:

the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for
naturalization without prejudice.[34] According to the CA, petitioner�s
two (2) witnesses were not credible because they... failed to mention
specific details of petitioner�s life or character to show how well they
knew him; they merely �parroted� the provisions of the
Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their applicability to
petitioner�s case.[35] The... appellate court likewise ruled that
petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the
applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the
hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002,
petitioner was only twenty (20)... years, nine (9) months, and twenty
five (25) days old, falling short of the requirement.[36] The CA stated,
however, that it was not its intention to forever close the door to any
future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and
that... it believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time,
a decided asset to this country.[37]

Petitioner�s motion for reconsideration[38] was denied in a

Resolution... petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with
the requirements of naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the

GO, SR. VS RAMOS
Sept 4, 2009 | J. Quisumbing | Jurisdiction | Rai
Three petitions that were consolidated.
Petitions stemmed from a complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by
Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau
of Deportation) against Jimmy Go
• alleged that Go is an illegal and undesirable alien
• alleged that while Jimmy says he is a Filipino citizen, his
personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not
- presented Go’s birth certificate issued by Office of Civil
Registrar of Iloilo, which indicated that Go’s citizenship as
“FChinese”
• Ramos argued that although it appears from his birth certificate
that Go’s parents were Filipinos, the document seemed
tampered with since only the citizenship of the father is
handwritten while the rest were typewritten
• alleged that in Sept 1989, Jimmy Go, through stealth,
machination and scheming, managed to cover up his true
citizenship and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, was able to get a Philippine passport from the DFA
Jimmy refuted all the allegations in his counter-affidavit
• deportment complaint was a harassment case designed to oust
Jimmy from his rightful share in his business dealings with
Ramos
• insisted that he was a natural-born Filipino
• his dad Carlos was the son of a Chinese father and a Filipina
mother —> elected Phil citizenship, evidenced by the Oath of
Allegiance that he made and his execution of an Affidavit of
Election of Phil Citizenship
• the registration of both were late, but it was explained sufficiently
in the affidavit
• Jimmy said that he even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections
• denied that his father came to the Philippines as an
undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of
arrival in the Philippines since he was born and raised here
Re: the erroneous entry of “FChinese” in his birth certificate
• Jimmy said this was the fault of the employees in the local Civil
Registrar’s Office
• they might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when
making the entry
• it might be that the handwritten part in his father’s citizenship
was the staff correcting themselves when they found out that his
dad already took his oath as Filipino
Re: his siblings birth certificates, where it said that their father was
Chinese
• Jimmy said that the entry was wrong since it was made without
prior consultation with his father
Associate Commissioner Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint of
deportation against Jimmy
• affirmed the findings of the NBI tasked to investigate the case
• his father did elect Filipino citizenship, which by operation of law
transmitted Philippine citizenship to Jimmy as well
Board of Commissioners reversed the dismissal —> Carlos’ election of
Philippine citizenshi was made out of time
• Board directed the preparation and filing of appropriate
deportation charges against Jimmy
Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy
Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
RTC of Pasig
• seeking to annul the resolution of the Board of Commissioners,
the Charge Sheet and the proceedings therein
• in essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to
continue with the deportation proceedings
In interim, Board issued a decision ordering the apprehension and
deportation of Jimmy
• Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to Jimmy’s
apprehension
Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus but it was dismissed
because he was provisionally released on bail
Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari with CA re: the Board’s
decision
• grave abuse of discretion on the part of TC for passing on their
citizenship, saying that they only asked for the nullification of the
Resolution and the charge sheet
CA: dismissed petition
• no merit in argument that citizenship issue should proceed only
before proper court in an independent action and that neither
Bureau nor Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were
born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino
citizens
• rejected petitioner’s claim that they enjoy presumption of being
Filipino citizens
• CA held that the Board has exclusive authority and jurisdiction to
try and hear cases against an alleged alien and determine their
citizenship
Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the SC
Bureau Immigration Commissioner Fernandez, Jr. issued a Warrant of
Deportation
• resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy in the
Bureau of Immigration Bicutan, pending his deportation to China
Jimmy again filed a petition for habeas corpus before RTC Pasig
• TC dismissed said petition, ruling that the remedy of habeas
corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order for release once a
deportation order has been issued by the Bureau
Jimmy appealed to CA
• CA granted the petition and enjoined the officers of the Bureau
from deporting him until the issue of his citizenship was settled
through courts of justice
ISSUES:
1. W/N the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos and
Jimmy had prescribed
2. W/N the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to
implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein
3. W/N the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their
claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust
the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation
proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to
pass upon the issue of alienage
4. W/N due process was properly observed in the proceedings
before the Board
5. W/N the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed
Re: Case has not prescribed
SC: No - cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. When
the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it has to be threshed
out and decided on.
• Why? because a person can subsequently reacquire or lose his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by the law

JIMMY ARG: It already prescribed because the 5 year count should
have started when he did the said illegal act (the getting of passport)
SC: No - it is the legal possibility of bringing the action which
determines the starting point for computation of the period of
prescription. Prescription should be counted from the time Luis Ramos
filed the complaint for deportation.
Re: Carlos is not an indispensable party
SC: Carlos is not an indispensable party since he doesn’t stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is being sought is
the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. The
principal issue that will be decided is the propriety of the deportation.
True, Jimmy’s citizenship hinges on whether or not his father is a
citizen, so it is necessary that Carlos’ citizenship will be passed on. But
whatever will be the findings will in no way prejudice Carlos.
As said previously, res judicata does not obtain in citizenship
proceedings. It will only be applied in cases of citizenship if the
following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party
2. the SolGen or his authorized representative took active part in
the resolution thereof
3. the finding of citizenship is affirmed by the SC
In the event that Carlos’ citizenship is questioned or his deportation
sought, the same will be ascertained again since the decision that will
be rendered in this case will have no preclusive effect on his
citizenship. Since no benefit or injury will redound to Carlos, he cannot
be said to be an indispensable party.
Re: Board’s jurisdiction
SC: No question that Board has authority to hear and determine the
deportation case against a deportee and in the process determine the
question of citizenship raised by him.
Chua Hiong vs Deportation Board: Court laid down an exception,
following American jurisprudence, on the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by
the deportation Board.
• Judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts
themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting
the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable
grounds for the belief that the claim is correct
• Also, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive
of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be
recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings
Resort to courts only allowed at the sound discretion of a competent
court in proper proceedings
• Board’s jurisdiction not divested by mere claim of citizenship
• Also, deportee who claims to be a citizen and therefore not
subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship
reviewed by the courts after the deportation proceedings
• decision of the Board is not final but subject to review by the
courts
No reason to overturn findings of CA that the evidence was not
sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with deportation
proceedings
• birth certificates of Jimmy and his siblings were presented
• their birth certs indicate that they are Chinese citizens
• Also, the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship was irregular
since it wasn’t made on time
P ARG: doctrine of jus soli applicable in Carlos’ case since his father • SC is not ruling that they aren’t Filipinos, since that wasn’t what
was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the Phil they were called to do
Bill of 1902 and Jones Law of 1916 • they are only passing on the issue of citizenship to determine if
the proceedings should be enjoined to give way to a judicial
SC: No - TC and CA are both correct when they ruled that the doctrine
determination of the same
of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. While the doctrine of
jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of
Re: Due process
citizenship, in Tan Chong vs Sec of Labor the SC abandoned the
SC: The allegation that due process was not followed must fail.
principle of jus soli.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in
Re: Carlos’ election of Phil citizenship conferred on Carlos Phil
nature and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules
citizenship
of ordinary court proceedings.
SC: CA correct when it found that it did not. 1935 Consti and Com Act
• essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or
625 prescribes procedure that should be followed to make a valid
as applied in administrative proceedings, the opportunity to
election of Phil citizenship. It didn’t prescribe a time period within which
explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the election of Phil citizenship but phrase “reasonable time” after
the action or ruling complained of
attaining age of majority has been interpreted to mean the election
should be made within 3 years from reaching the age of majority. • as long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are
True that the SC has said that the 3-year period for electing Phil sufficiently met
citizenship may be extended when the person has always regarded
himself as Filipino. But the SC said that in this case, there was no Jimmy wasn’t furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and
circumstance sufficiently shown that merits the extension of the 3-year Charge Sheet but he was still given ample opportunity to explain his
period. side and present controverting evidence = satisfied demands of due
• the fact that Carlos voted doesn’t demonstrate such belief, since process.
it was done after he elected Phil citizenship
Re: Habeas corpus remedy
• the mere fact that he was able to vote doesn’t validate his
Since Jimmy was duly charged before the Board and was in fact
irregular election of Phil citizenship —> only manifests his desire
ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by the SC’s
to exercise a right reserved for Filipinos but doesn’t alter his real
pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to
citizenship which in this jurisdiction is determined by blood (jus
continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas
sanguinis)
corpus is rendered moot and academic.

Carlos and Jimmy didn’t show conclusive proof of their citizenship nor
PETITIONS DENIED.
presented substantial proof of the same —> SC has no choice but to
sustain the Board’s jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings
NATIONALITY THEORY
NGO BURCA VS RP DIGEST
FACTS:
Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to Florencio Burca a Filipino
citizen. She claims that she possessed all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications for naturalization as a Filipino citizen , she applied
for cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration.
This was opposed by the Solicitor General, but the trial court dismissed
the opposition and declare that Zita Ngo Burca hass all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
citizen and that she being married to a Filipino citizen is hereby
declared as a citizen of the Philippines.
Such judgment of the trial court was appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of Zita Ngo Burca should be
granted?
RULING : NO
The SC discussed here that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not
acquire the status of the Philippines unless there is proof that she
herself may be lawfully naturalized.
An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting
that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none
of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law;
(2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where
petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing
of the petition; and
(3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official,
administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent
court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino
citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
As to the merits of the case:
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for
naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of
residence.
The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former
places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and
objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his
actual, physical surrounding".
the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to
petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do
not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of
residence is fatal.
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that
they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to
be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this
Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that
said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of this Act. Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth
the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the
petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case".
These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable
insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must
fail.
Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner.
No other witnesses were presented. This does not meet with the legal
requirement. Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed
from is hereby reversed and the petition dismissed.
 o The 1967 case of Arocha v Vivo sustained the validity
of said order.
Board of Commissioners (CID) v dela Rosa (1991)
· 1973: Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of
Bidin, J.
exclusion filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of
Special Inquiry. Acting Commissioner Nituda later issued an
FACTS:
order recalling the warrant of arrest against Gatchalian.
· Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the SolGen for
· 1990: acting director of NBI wrote to the DOJ recommending
the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration
that Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of
(formerly the CID) and Board of Special Inquiry to set aside
exclusion be charged with violation of the Immigration act.
two orders issued by different judges of RTCs and to enjoin
The SOJ indorsed the recommendation and a mission order
public respondent judges from acting on the ff. civil cases:
was issued by Commissioner Domingo of the CID ordering
o 1st case: filed by Gatchalian in the RTC of Manila.
the arrest of Gatchalian.
Judge dela Rosa issued an order that denied the
o Gatchalian filed the present civil cases that are being
Motion to Dismiss and restrained petitioners from
assailed in the case at bar.
commencing or continuing with any proceedings that
· Petitioner’s arguments:
will lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian
nd
o The judges have no jurisdiction over petitioner and the
o 2 case: filed by Gatchalian’s wife and minor children
subject matter;
in the RTC of Valenzuela. Judge Capulong issued an
o That assuming the judges had jurisdiction, they acted
that enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the
with grave abuse of discretion by hearing the
deportation charges against Gatchalian
deportation case and in effect determined
· July 12, 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William,
Gatchalian’s citizenship;
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native
o That respondent judges disregarded the cases of
born Filipino Citizen. He also testified that he had 5 children
Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Acra which put to finality
with his wife Chu Gim Tee: Jose, Gloria, Francisco (William’s
the order of the Board of Commissioners
father), Elena, and Benjamin.
o Respondent committed forum-shopping
· June 27, 1961: Then 12-year old William arrived in Manila
· Private respondent’s arguments:
from Hongkong with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson
o Petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the
Gatchalian with Certificates of Registration and Identity
deportation case until the courts have resolved the
issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a
issue of his citizenship;
cablegram from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
o Petitioners cannot fairly and judiciously dispose of the
· July 12, 1961: the Board of Special Inquiry admitted William
deportation case;
and his companions as Filipino Citizens.
o Ground for deportation has already prescribed
· July 6, 1962: Board of Commissioners, after reviewing the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry reversed the
ISSUES + RULING:
decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of
respondent Gatchalian
WoN the RTCs had jurisdiction over the cases. YES.
· Under §21 of BP 129, the RTC has concurrent jurisdiction
with the SC and CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
· While §9(3) of BP 129 vests the CA with exclusive
jurisdiction over “quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
board or commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and
sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948”, the same does not provide that
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction extends to all
quasi-judicial agencies.
o The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are
exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are
those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or
their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the
Court of Appeals.
o RA 5434 does not include the Bureau of Immigration.
The decisions of the Bureau of Immigration are
subject to judicial review in accordance with §25,
Chapter 4, Book VII of the Administrative Code:
§ Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency
decisions shall be subject to judicial review in
accordance with this chapter and applicable
laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the
court specified in the statute or, in the absence
thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of Court.
· B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial
bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except
those specifically provided for under the law as
aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal
rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and
may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari
by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
· While it is true that Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an
alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their
citizenship and that a mere claim of citizenship cannot
operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings, the Court carved out
an exception in Chua Hiong v Deportation Board:
o When the evidence submitted by a respondent is
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts
should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
· Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in
cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is
correct.
· Hence, Gatchalian’s petitions before the RTCs contained a
proper and ripe controversy for the disposition of the courts.
He also presented sufficient documents and other evidence
to his petitions.
WoN Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Arca already settled the respondent’s
alienage (i.e., res judicata). NO.
· The party to the case was Pedro Gatchalian (William’s
uncle). Moreover, the cases did not categorically make any
statement that William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen.
Generally, res judicata does not apply to questions of
citizenship except in the following case (stated in Burca v
Republic):
 o A person's citizenship must be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
o The Solicitor General or his authorized representative
took active part in the resolution thereof; and
o The finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
· Such elements are not present in the case at bar.
WoN the arrest of respondent based on the warrant of exclusion is
valid. NO.
· Pursuant to §37(a) of the Immigration Act, an arrest can
only be effected after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation
as charged against the alien.
· Moreover, the mission ordered issued by petitioner only for
purposes of investigation. The mission order/warrant of
arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant
to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
· Petitioners also omitted the fact that Acting Commissioner
Nituda issued a memorandum in 1973 that recommended
the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6,
1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and
the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants.
· Such was the last official act of the government that is the
basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of
respondent William Gatchalian.
· Also took note that the basis for the warrant of exclusion is
that the cablegram issued by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs was forged. Even if the applicants could have entered
illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the
Philippines entitles them to remain in the country.
WoN the ground for deportation already prescribed. YES.
· The warrant of arrest came 28 years after the alleged cause
of action arose in 1962. The warrant was issued by
Commissioner Domingo only in 1990.
· §37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation
"shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause
of deportation arises."
· In any case, the warrant of exclusion was already recalled
by Acting Commissioner Nituda in 1973.
· §45 of the Immigration Act imposes the penalty of a fine
not more than one thousand pesos, imprisonment for not
more than two years, and deportation if he is an alien. For
such correctional penalties, the prescriptive period is 10
years.
· The Court also cited §1 of Act No. 3326 that states:
o "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight
years for those punished by imprisonment for two
years or more, but less than six years”
o No prosecution and consequent deportation for
violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the
eight-year prescriptive period, it being a special law.
· Deportation actions are not imprescriptible. In Lao Gi v CA,
the Court stated:
o Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of
the nature of a criminal action, however, considering
that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a
person, the constitutional right of such person to due
process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on
criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.
 o Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final
judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five
(5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory.
· Since his entry into the country, Gatchalian also contributed
to the economy by providing jobs and investing.
WoN there is proof that Santiago’s children were born out of wedlock.
NO.
· Following the principle of lex loci celebrationis: a marriage
formally valid where it is celebrated is valid everywhere.
· Santiago’s attestation that the marriage was valid is
competent evidence as statements or declarations regarding
family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (§34,
Rule 130 of the RoC).
· Since the marriage is valid, it follows that William’s father
Francisco (Santiago’s son) follows the Filipino citizenship of
his father. And since William is also a legitimate child of
Francisco, he is a Filipino citizen.
DISPOSITION: Petitions dismissed.
Feliciano, J. Dissenting Opinion:
· The warrant of exclusion remains valid. Respondent and his
co-applicants failed to substantiate and prove their claim to
Filipino citizenship.
· Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine
citizenship by any mode of entitlement subsequent to his
application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961,
i.e., by any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and
supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco
Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
· The validity of Pedro Gatchalian’s citizenship, which was the
controversy in Arocha v Vivo, included that of his other
co-applicants (William et al).
· The Court in that decision upheld that validity of the July 6,
1962 order. Since respondent William Gatchalian does not
claim to have been naturalized as a Philippine citizen after
rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must
accordingly be held to be not a Philippine citizen.
· The prescriptive period does not apply. Deportation may be
effected at any time after entry. The NBI recommended the
filing of charges in 1990.
· Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the
right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage
of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to
admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from
the deportation of aliens, who, after having been initially
lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which
rendered them liable to deportation.
· Reliance on Act. No. 3266 is also misplaced. The Act refers
to criminal prosecutions under special laws.
· The recall of arrests in the memorandum issued by Nituda
has no effect. The Commissioner is not higher than the BOC
itself, hence the appellate proceedings vested in the BSI.
· Respondent’s petition for rehearing was filed more than 10
years after the 1962 order.
· In Arocha, the Court held that individual actions of members
of the BOC are legally ineffective:
o Individual action by members of a board plainly
renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a
Board. The Legislature organized the Board of
Commissioners precisely in order that they should
deliberate collectively and in order that their views
and Ideas should be exchanged and examined
before reaching a conclusion.
Davide, J. Dissenting Opinion:
· The questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely
within their quasi-judicial functions, hence §9(3) of BP 129
is applicable.
· Gatchalian committed forum shopping. Since he is a
resident of Valenzuela, there is no reason for him to file the
petition with the RTC of Manila.
· Chua Hiong v Deportation Board is not applicable. The word
courts should not now be interpreted to mean or to include
the regional trial courts because, as stated above, said
courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction over the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the Board of
Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry. This case
was decided in 1955 yet, or twenty-six years before the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
· The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial
intervention is that the evidence submitted by a respondent
is conclusive of his citizenship, which is not the case in the
present petition.
· The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board
of Special Inquiry of 14 March 1973 to the then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of the July 6,
1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners were not only
highly anomalous, irregular and improper, it was done
without any semblance of authority.
o The Board of Special Inquiry did not have the power to
review, modify or reverse a Decision of the Board of
Commissioners rendered about eleven years earlier.
o Then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda, acting
alone, did not likewise have the power or authority to
approve the recommendation of said Board, to revive
and/or reaffirm the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry, to reverse, and nullify, the
Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of
Commissioners, and to order the admission of
William Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. His order is
void ab initio.
CASE DIGEST Labo v Comelec
176 SCRA 1 – Law on Public Officers – Election Laws – Citizenship of
a Public Officer – Dual Citizenship – Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His
rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as
Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified;
that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian.
Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an
Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino;
that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an
Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the
Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further
asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will
of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in
the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence
presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It
was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It
was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to
the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an
Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was
listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual
citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore
allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his
Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his
Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared
as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his
lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not
tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio
have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate
had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege
over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo
warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by reason
of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second
highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he
or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.
HOW FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP IS REACQUIRED
RAMON LABO, JR. vs. ROBERTO ORTEGA AND COMELEC
211 SCRA 297
July 3, 1992
FACTS:
· For the second time, Ramon Labo, Jr., believing that he is a
Filipino citizen, filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 1992 elections.
On the other hand, Roberto Ortego also filed his COC for
the same office.
· Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo
before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a
Filipino citizen.
· On May 9, 1992, COMELEC issued the assailed resolution
denying and cancelling Labo’s COC on the ground that he is
not a Filipino citizen.
· Labo previously cited the 1980 US case of Vance v.
Terrazas, wherein it was held that in proving expatriation, an
expatriating act an intent to relinquish citizenship must be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
· Labo claimed, however, that Sec. 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code "operates as a legislatively mandated special
repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation
as the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying
him was not yet final at the time the election was held.
· Labo also claimed that he has already filed an application for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before the office of the
Solicitor General, which was favored by the Solicitor
General.
· However, COMELEC resolved to suspend the proclamation
of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City
Mayor of Baguio.
· To prove that Labo is not a Filipino citizen, Ortega submitted
the decision of the Supreme Court in "Ramon L. Labo, Jr.,
petitioner, v. Comelec, et al.," GR No. 86564, August 1,
1989, which declared Labo as NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his
office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio
City once this decision becomes final and executory.
· On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for
review docketed as G.R. No. 105111 with prayer, among
others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
set aside the resolution of COMELEC to render judgment
declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct COMELEC
to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the
contested elections.
ISSUE:
· WON Labo reacquired his Filipino citizenship to become
qualified to run for mayor and be declared as the
winner? – NO.
HELD:
· NO. Labo failed to show that he reacquired his Filipino
citizenship. No evidence was adduced for Labo as in fact he
had no Answer as of the hearing. Up to this moment, Labo
still failed to submit a scintilla of proof to shore his claim
before this Court that he has indeed reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.
· Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To
reiterate, Labo was disqualified as a candidate for being an
alien. His election does not automatically restore his
Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an
indispensable requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39,
Local Government Code).
· On May 5, 1992, Labo filed his verified Answer, insisting that
he is a Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and preserve
his Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an Australian
citizenship; that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in
 citizenship; and that "existing facts support his continuous
maintenance and holding of Philippine citizenship" and
"supervening events now preclude the application of the
ruling in the Labo v. Comelec case and the respondent
(Labo) now hold and enjoys Philippine citizenship.
· No evidence has been offered by Labo to show what these
existing facts and supervening events are to preclude the
application of the Labo decision.
· COMELEC is bound by the final declaration that Labo is not
a Filipino citizen. Consequently, Labo’s verified statement in
his certificate of candidacy that he is a "natural-born" Filipino
citizen is a false material representation."
· At any rate, the fact remains that Labo has not submitted in
the instant case any evidence, if there be any, to prove his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before the
COMELEC or SC. The COMELEC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in cancelling Labo's certificate of
candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen
pursuant to the SC’s ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v.
Comelec (supra).
· As for Labo’s argument citing Sec. 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code. In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA
No. 6646, to wit:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or the
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
· A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that
the COMELEC can legally suspend the proclamation of
Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes
notwithstanding. Labo failed to present any evidence before
the COMELEC to support his claim of reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
· Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what we have stated
in Labo v. Comelec (supra), viz.,:
Under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim,
that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of
these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree
of naturalization or to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. . . .
· Despite the favorable recommendation by the Solicitor
General on Labo’s application for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, the Special Committee on Naturalization had not
yet acted upon said application for repatriation. Indeed, such
fact is even admitted by Labo. In the absence of any official
action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere
application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to
an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine
citizenship.
· The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on
the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired
finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his
proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
· Undoubtedly, Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the
fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine
citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines."
· The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage — the
very essence which strikes at the very core of petitioner
 Labo's qualification to assume the contested office, he being
an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was
elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
· SC dismissed the petition.
Petition - Frivaldo admitted but said that he was only forced to do so
since the time of Marcos regime he was considered as an
ererPeti
enemy and he went to USA seeking refuge and his
tionerr: naturalization is not impressed with voluntariness as he went
back after the Marcos Regime to the country to help the
Juan
restoration of democracy.
- He implies that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by
participating in the election.
Gallan - The case was approved by COMELEC and motion to dismiss
Frivalo filed by Frivaldo was denied to which Frivaldo filed a motion
for certiorari and prohibition to the court.
Respon Issue:
dent:
- Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
COME Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988?
LEC Ruling:
Ponente: Justice Cruz
- Petition denied, Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the
Nature of Philippines and disqualified from serving as the Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the
Action: elected Vice-Governor.
Petition for - Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate
for local elective office must be a citizen of the Philippines
Certiorari and a qualified voter of the constituency where is running.
Facts: - Omnibus Election Code section 117 states that a qualified
voter, among other qualifications, must be a citizen of the
- Frivaldo, J. was elected as a Governor of the province of Philippines.
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988.
- The Court rules that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
- On October 27, 1988 the League of Cities of Sorsogon Philippines at the time of his election as the evidence shown
President Salvador Estuye filed a petition to COMELEC from the certification of US District Court of North California
requesting to disqualify Frivaldo from his office on the stating that he is a citizen of the Philippines.
grounds that he was a naturalized citizen of the United States
- Frivaldo’s argument that he reacquire his Philippine citizenship
of America.
through the participation in the election which in his view
- Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen in Januray 20, repatriated him to which the Court refutes that there are
1983. proper methods to which one can reacquire citizen ship
 either through Direct Act of Congress, Naturalization or
Repatriation to which Frivaldo did not access to.
- Only citizens of the Philippines which have one allegiance can
run in local elective office.
Republic vs. dela Rosa executory. No pronouncement as to costs. The proceedings of the trial
Facts: court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted private publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his
(C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization
captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of th Philippines.
The respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992,
and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months
before the said date of hearing.
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing
Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done on January instead of having it
on March, " where he manifested his intention to run for public office in
the May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the hearing was
moved on February.
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as
a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby
vesiting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino
citizen
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor
General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as Filipino.
Held:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing
to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to
VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
 It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed
ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.
Frivaldo vs. Comelec
GR No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the
filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided
FACTS:
otherwise.

Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R.
He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Lee questioned his citizenship.

He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725

and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.

However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already
ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire
citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest
number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.

HELD:

The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the
curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation
retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor.

The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under

Presidential Decree No. 725 are:

(1) filing the application;

(2) action by the committee; and

(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved.

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this
case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be
a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen."
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in
the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenshipby, among others, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Subsequently, petitioner
filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent
Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD:
YES. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when
he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

CO vs. HRET
Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural
born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second legislative district are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent,
Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr.
is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong
Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence
in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private
respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an
application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named
Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr.
registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during
those elections.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and
those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides,
private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the Philippines.
On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should
have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is
enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in
that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be
eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the
age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
TABASA v. CA G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006 Citizenship,
Repatriation
JANUARY 26, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner Joevanie Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. When he was seven years old, petitioner acquired
American citizenship after his father became a naturalized citizen of the
United States.
When Petitioner came to the Philippines as a “balikbayan”, he was
arrested and detained by an agent of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) and thereafter, investigated. It was found out as
reported by the US embassy that petitioner’s passport has been
revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of
arrest. He was subsequently ordered to be deported back to the US.
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired
Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No.
8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he
cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.
ISSUE:
apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his. The
privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the
natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of
a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended
indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost

his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity
under RA 8171?

RULING:

He does not. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a
Filipino at birth and that he acquired American citizenship when he was
still a minor. He cannot claim that he is entitled to automatic repatriation
as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or
economic necessity.

Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171

To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are

the following:

a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to

aliens; and

b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their

Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not

due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could
have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to
Altarejos vs COMELEC proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigration
Facts: Certificate of Residence (ICR) issued on 3 November 1997 by the
· Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then
Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of
· January 15, 2004 - Private respondents Jose Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Immigration and Deportation.
Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the
COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the ü Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino
certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this
citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section
foreign country." Private respondents alleged that based on a letter from 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides
the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of
that “repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration issued
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in
on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence issued
on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.2 the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.”
· January 26, 2004 - Petitioner filed an Answer stating, among others, that he
ü Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has
did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as
taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a
that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus,
petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he · COMELEC First Division adopted the recommendations of Atty. Zaragosa
was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner and disqualified petitioner.
sought the dismissal of the petition.
· Petitioner filed a motion of reconsideration, attaching documents that gave
· Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and proof to his repatriation. This was subsequently denied by COMELEC en
hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be banc, on the grounds that it should have been submitted during the
disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor on the hearing.
following grounds:
· On May 2004, election day itself, petitioner filed for certiorari, with prayer
ü The Local Government Code of 1991 requires that an elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory
dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the
country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad COMELEC.

ü It has been established by clear and convincing evidence that ssues:

respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is
· WON registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and Appendix:
with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation

· WON the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the Local Government Code of 1991:
COMELEC, First Division.

SC Ruling:
On the first issue
· Yes. Section 2 of RA 8171 is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in
the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration."
· As to when citizenship would apply, the Court's ruling in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of
one's application for repatriation subsists.
SEC. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city
or province or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxx.

· Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent
government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was component cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least
cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified
On the second issue from running for any elective position:]
· The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of
xxx.
the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove
before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of (d) Those with dual citizenship.
repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving
compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for xxx.
reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
said evidence. acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; xxx
Petition is Denied.
 naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that
would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
AASJS – Calilung v. Datumanong
allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
Facts:
allegiance.
Petitioner filed this petition to prevent Justice Secretary
Datumanong from implementing R. A. 9225 arguing that R.A. 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which
states that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.

Issue:
Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the court
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance.

Held:
R.A. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no jurisdiction
yet to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance. The court held that that
the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away
with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is
allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No.
9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2
and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR
SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR
GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as
the Secretary of Justice,Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of
Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws
governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be
issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225,
entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."
Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on
August 29, 2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act
shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage
must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
 (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office
in the country of which they are naturalized citizens;
and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or
noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is
held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not
affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1)
Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine
citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,
together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner
maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits
dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the
Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an
oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The
Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to
the national interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely
declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not
allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen
is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship.
The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the
supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical
affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations
of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative
branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue
of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact
been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations
reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two
situations exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that
there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed
out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public
interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual
allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of
the Constitution…
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address
the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public
interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he
said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by
requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual
citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country
because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of
allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case
may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government
will have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern,
when dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original
version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the
measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he
explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did
not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance
to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to
the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual
citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in
Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a
Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual
allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law.
However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in
the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states
that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed
that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says
nothing about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is
created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath
of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures
and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and
swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at
this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person
is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to
the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no
longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the
intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is
allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No.
9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress
has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such
absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not
rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is
no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through
Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to
distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus,
until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme
Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual
allegiance.8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of
a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has
to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on
issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is
not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines
for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That
case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but
merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges
of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with
judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of
setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the
Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what
acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
006 David v. Agbay AUTHOR: Faye
[G.R. No. 199113, March 18, NOTES: (if applicable)
2015]
TOPIC: Retroactivity of laws
PONENTE: VIL
LARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.
Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the
Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindor. However, in the
year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built
their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
2. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in
Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a
Filipino citizen.
3. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on
the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to
own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
against the petitioner.
4. Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA was
pending, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification
Certificate No. 266-10-07 issued by the Consulate General of
the Philippines (Toronto).
5. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he
could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he
bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to
him that the subject property was titled land and they have the
right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact
led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and
private respondent’s family.
6. On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner
for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the
filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed
before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
7. On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting
petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent
re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the
defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
8. Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who
had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his
citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said
naturalization.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. 9225
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic.nRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the
conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for
both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens
of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different,
“re-acquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second
group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before (first group) and
after (second group) the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the
heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and
“retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the
law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall
be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was
lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country
is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took
effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the
new law.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee, wherein the following was
explained:
“The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63…The second
aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future
instances… eacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino
citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for
those in the future.”
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen
prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first
category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public

document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among
those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public
document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
TAN VS. CRISOLOGO
November 8, 2017 | Martires, J
PETITIONER: VIVIENNE TAN
RESPONDENT: VINCENT “BINGBONG” CRISOLOGO
SUMMARY: Vivienne Tan was a naturalized US citizen who sought to
run for QC 1st district representative. However, she only took her Oath
of Allegiance to the PH, as required by RA 9225, after she had applied
to be a registered voter. Crisologo challenged her inclusion in the
voter’s list, saying she was not a citizen at the time of her registration,
and that she failed to meet the residency requirement. SC held that she
was not a PH citizen at the time she registered.
DOCTRINE
1. RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH
citizenship before RA 9225 and reacquired it under the
same and 2) those who lost PH citizenship after RA 9225
and retained citizenship.
2. Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003,
before the enactment of RA 9225. If retroactive application is
permitted, then the distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile.
3. To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship
retroacts to the date it was lost = absurd scenario where the
person would still be considered a PH citizen when he had
renounced his citizenship.
FACTS
1. 19 Jan 1993: Vivienne Tan became a naturalized US citizen.
2. 20 August 2003: RA 9225 was enacted.
3. 26 Oct 2009: Tan applied to be a registered voter in Quezon
City. She indicated that she was a Filipino by birth. The
Election Registration Board approved her application on 16
Nov 2009.
4. 30 Nov 2009: Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH in
Makati.
5. 1 Dec 2009: Tan filed a petition before the Bureau of
Immigration for the reacquisition of her PH citizenship and
executed a declaration renouncing allegiance to the US. The
BI confirmed her reacquisition.
6. 1 Dec 2009: Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy to run as
QC 1st District representative.
7. 28 Dec 2009: Bingbong Crisologo filed a petition before the
MeTC seeking to exclude Tan from the voter’s list, alleging
1) she was not a PH citizen when she registered as a voter
and 2) she failed to meet the residency requirement.
8. MeTC ruled to exclude Tan from the voter’s list, holding that
she was not a PH citizen at the time she registered as a
voter.
9. Tan appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the MeTC and
dismissed Crisologo’s petition. RTC opined that the question
of her citizenship was cured by Tan’s subsequent Oath,
Petition for Reacquisition, the BI’s Order granting the said
petition, and Sworn Declaration re: renouncing her
allegiance to the US.
10. The RTC decision became final and executory due to RA
8189. Hence, Crisologo filed for certiorari before the CA.
11. The CA held that the RTC committed GADALEJ in reversing
the MeTC decision, hence this Petition.
ISSUE/HELD
W/N Tan can be considered a PH citizen at the time she registered as a
voter – NO. Basically, no legal basis for the retroactive application of
RA 9225. Her inclusion in the voter’s list is highly irregular.
W/N when PH citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath as
required by RA 9225, the effect on citizenship status retroacts to period
before taking said oath - NO
RATIO
1. The reacquisition of PH citizenship under RA 9225 requires
only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the PH.
 2. RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH
citizenship before RA 9225 and reacquired it under the
same and 2) those who lost PH citizenship after RA 9225
and retained citizenship.
3. Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003,
before the enactment of RA 9225. If retroactive application is
permitted, then the distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile.
4. An interpretation giving RA 9225 retroactive effect as
contemplated by Tan would cause confusion, especially with
respect to Sec. 3, RA 9225. Verba legis.
5. The Court also used the holistic approach, citing
Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport Authority vs. Urgello. The law must
not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in
relation to the whole law.
6. RA 9225 contains to provision regarding the retroactivity of
its effects as regards natural-born citizens who became
naturalized citizens of a foreign country before RA 9225.
7. To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship
retroacts to the date it was lost = absurd scenario where the
person would still be considered a PH citizen when he had
renounced his citizenship.
8. Rule is also that statutes are to be construed as having only
a prospective operation, unless legislature intended to tive
them a retroactive effect.
9. Citing Maquiling vs COMELEC (penned by CJ Sereno): the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that
can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the
next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation
of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted
the citizenship.
10. We cannot consider one a Filipino citizen unless and until his
or her allegiance to the Republic of the PH is reaffirmed.
NOTES
 As a defense, Jalosjos answered that the date of "16th day of July,
AGAPITO CARDINO VS. COMELEC
2012" was mistakenly indicated in the Affidavit of Renunciation
instead of its actual execution date of July 19, 2012. Jalosjos
FACTS:
claimed that it was on the latter date that she appeared before
Judge De Guzman-Laput to execute a personal and sworn
The petitioner and rosalina jalosjos both ran for the position of mayor of
renunciation of her American citizenship. Jalosjos further contended
dapitan city. Jalosjos was the one proclaimed as the winner with 18k
that Cardino failed to show that Judge De Guzman-Laput denied having
votes. This resulted to petitioner filing a petition for quo warranto before
administered the oath that Jalosjos took as she renounced said
COMELEC to nullify the candidacy of jalosjos on the ground of
citizenship.
ineligibility on the ground of citizenship.
The COMELEC ruled for the dismissal of the petition for quo warranto,
Cardino alleged that Jalosjos was a former natural-born Filipino citizen
since, the affidavit of renunciation cannot be considered falsified but
who subsequently became a naturalized citizen of the United States of
only one containing clerical error in the date of execution.
America (USA). Jalosjos later applied for the reacquisition of her
Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 92255 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, USA. On August
ISSUE:
2, 2009, Jalosjos took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and an Order of Approval of citizenship retention and
Won the COMELEC is liable for grave abuse of discretion amounting to
reacquisition was issued in her favor. However, when Jalosjos filed her
lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing the petition for quo
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Dapitan City on October 1,
warranto.
2012, she attached therein an Affidavit of Renunciation of her
American citizenship that was subscribed and sworn to on July
HELD:
16, 2012 before Judge Veronica C. De Guzman-Laput of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte.
the case at bar has already been rendered as moot and academic.
Since, the mayorship of Dapitan City following the May 13, 2013
Cardino averred that based on the certification from the Bureau of
Elections, already expired on June 30, 2016. However, we deem it
Immigration, Jalosjos left the Philippines for the USA on May 30,
appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits considering that
2012 and she presented her US passport to the immigration
litigation on the question of Jalosjos' citizenship is capable of
authorities. Jalosjos then arrived back in the Philippines via Delta
repetition in that it is likely to recur if she would run again for
Airlines Flight No. 173 on July 17, 2012 at around 10:45 p.m. using
public office.
her US passport. he alleged that there is a physical impossibility and
alleged that Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation was a falsified document
The present case arose from a petition for quo warranto filed by
that had no legal effect. As such, when Jalosjos filed her COC for
Cardino under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
Mayor of Dapitan City, she still possessed both Philippine and American
pertinently reads:
citizenships and was therefore disqualified from running for any elective
local position.
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the
election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional,
provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the [COMELEC] within ten days
after the proclamation of the results of the election.
According to Cardino, the ineligibility of Jalosjos stemmed from the fact
that she was a dual citizen of the Philippines and the USA when she
submitted her COC for Mayor in the May 13, 2013 elections.
In Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained
in detail the requirements that must be complied with under Republic
Act No. 9225 before a person with dual citizenship can be qualified to
run for any elective public office, to wit:
[Republic Act] No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic,
thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section
5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
xxxx
In this case, the crux of the controversy involves the validity of Jalosjos'
Affidavit of Renunciation. Cardino asserts the spuriousness of the
affidavit based on the date of its supposed execution on July 16, 2012;
whereas Jalosjos claims otherwise, insisting that while the affidavit was
so dated, the same was merely an error as the affidavit was executed
and subscribed to on July 19, 2012.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second Division
that the date of July 16, 2012 in the Affidavit of Renunciation was
indeed a clerical error. The COMELEC Second Division gave
greater weight to the evidence offered by Jalosjos, particularly the
testimony of Judge De Guzman-Laput, who unequivocally stated
that Jalosjos personally appeared before her sala "n July 19, 2012
to subscribe to the Affidavit of Renunciation.
After carefully reviewing the evidence on hand, the Court finds no
proper reason to disturb the factual findings of the COMELEC. We
reiterate our ruling in Typoco v. Commission on Elections that:
The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by
substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of
justice. This principle is applied with greater force when the case
concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the poll body - created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself- on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs.
latest, on the day of the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy and
Jalosjos filed it later or on 1 October 2012. In sum, the facts
surrounding this particular issue lead to the conclusion that the
date appearing in the Affidavit of Renunciation is the result of an
honest mistake. Furthermore, respondent Judge could not have
falsified the Affidavit of Renunciation just to do Jalosjos a favor.
Respondent Judge was correct in saying that if there was anybody who
benefited from her inadvertence, it was complainant since the mistake
gave him a ground to question the validity of the election of Jalosjos as
mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga [d]el Norte.

To repeat, the Court is not a trier of facts. The Court's function, as

mandated by the Constitution, is merely to check whether or not
the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it simply erred or
has a different view. Time and again, the Court has held that a
petition for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined
only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent
and substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is
presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its
domain.

Notably, the Court arrived at a similar conclusion in resolving the

administrative case filed by Cardino against Judge De Guzman-Laput
relative to the incidents of this case. Thus, in our Resolution24 dated
June 18, 2014 in OCA IPI No. 13-2627-MTJ, we adopted and approved
the following conclusions of law and recommendations of the OCA:

EVALUATION: On the issue of falsification, this Office finds for

respondent Judge. There was really no reason why respondent
Judge would have to falsify the date of the notarization of the
Affidavit of Renunciation when indicating the actual date of
notarization, 19 July 2012, would not have affected the validity of
the affidavit. There was no deadline to reckon with since the
Affidavit of Renunciation was required to be executed, at the