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Evaluating The Advocacy Coalition Framework - Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier
Evaluating The Advocacy Coalition Framework - Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier
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ABSTRACT
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was developed to provide
a causal theory of the policy process which would serve as one of
several alternatives to the familiar stages heuristic, with its recognized
limitations. This paper first summarizes the central features of the
ACF, including a set of underlying assumptions and specific
hypotheses. We next review the implications for the framework of six
case studies by various authors dealing with Canadian education and
with American transportation, telecommunications, water,
environmental, and energy policy. While generally supportive of the
ACF, the case studies also suggest several revisions.
An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 1992 meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Chicago, September 2-5. The authors would like to thank John Scholz,
Joe Stewart, Hanna Mawhinney, and several JPP reviewers for their helpful comments on
previous versions of this paper.
176 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier
/. Background
| Resources |-
Strategy A1 Strategy B1
of re guidance re guidance
instruments Instruments
| EXTDOBU. ( S T S I E K ) EVEHTS Subsystem
I
|1) Changes in socio-econonic conditions Actors
Decisions by ftlovereigns
I Regarding Inst tutional Rule
|2> Changes in public opinion
Budgets, « ri Personnel
I
|3) Changes in systemic governing coalition
I
|*) Policy decisions and impacts from other
| subsystems
Governmental
Programs
Policy
Hypothesis 9: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there
exists a forum which is:
i) Prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to
participate;
ii) Dominated by professional norms.
C Intergovernmental Relations
The Advocacy Coalition Framework explicitly assumes that most
coalitions include actors from multiple levels of government. First,
almost all national domestic programs rely heavily upon sub-national
governments for actual implementation (Van Horn, 1979; Rhodes,
1988; Scholtz et al, 1991); second, intergovernmental transfers consti-
tute a significant percentage of most sub-national government budgets
(Wright, 1988; Anton, 1989); and, third, sub-national agencies form
a substantial percentage of the groups lobbying national legislatures
and agencies (Salisbury, 1984).
This has certainly been confirmed by the case studies analyzed
here. All except the FCC's development of television design standards
involved a significant intergovernmental dimension. In airline deregu-
lation, local airports were important members of either the Pro or
the Anti-Regulation Coalitions (Brown and Stewart, 1993). On OCS
leasing, one of the major issues has been the distribution of authority
between federal and state and local governments, and state agencies
have been important participants in Congressional hearings (Heintz,
1988). California water policy is an intergovernmental thicket involving
hundreds of local water and irrigation districts; three federal agencies,
the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and EPA;
and three major state agencies, the State Water Resources Control
Board, the Department of Water Resources, and the Department of
Fish and Game (Huntley, 1992; Munro, 1993). Land use and water
quality planning in the Lake Tahoe Basin involves six local govern-
ments, several state agencies from Nevada and California, two federal
agencies (the Forest Service and EPA), and a bistate regional agency
(the TRPA) (Sabatier and Brasher, 1993). Finally, the Mawhinney
(1993) analysis of francophone education in Ontario indicates that it
has been linked to both francophone rights in other provinces and to
the pivotal constitutional issue of Quebec separatism at the federal
level.
There is also evidence that, as predicted by the ACF, members of
a specific coalition will use a variety of institutions at different levels
of government in order to achieve their policy objectives. For example,
at Lake Tahoe the principal environmental group and its allies have
pursued the following strategies over the past thirty years (Sabatier
and Pelkey, 1990):
igo Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier
(1) They supported the use of federal and state funds to help sewer the
Basin in the 1960s.
(2) When land use issues became critical, they supported the creation of the
instate Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) in 1967-70.
(3) When the TRPA approved several major casinos, they first sued in both
federal and state courts and then promoted the intervention of California
land use, water quality, and air quality agencies in the Basin in an effort
to slow development.
(4) In order to put pressure on Nevada to renegotiate the TRPA Compact
in the late 1970s, they convinced a sympathetic Congressman to sponsor
legislation establishing a National Scenic Area in the Basin.
(5) When stringent environmental controls were put into place starting in
1980, the environmental coalition has sponsored buyout programs by both
federal and state agencies in order to ease the burden on property owners.
One could cite an equally varied set of counter-strategies used by
members of the opposing Economic Development Coalition involving
institutions at all levels of government.
On the other hand, Mawhinney's (1993) analysis of educational
policy in Ontario indicates that every actor should not be thrown
into an undifFerentiated, multi-level subsystem. Different levels of
government are semi-autonomous, and coalitions spend a great deal
of time trying to restrict authority to the level at which they have a
comparative advantage (Schattschneider, i960). In the francophone
case, for example, the Loyalist Coalition tried to keep education a
purely provincial matter while the Francophone Coalition sought to
expand the scope of the conflict by linking it to Quebec separatism.
Ultimately, the federal government under Pierre Trudeau agreed with
the Francophones that keeping Quebec in the country would require
a new Charter of Rights and Freedoms providing educational rights
for linguistic minorities in Ontario and other provinces. This was, of
course, very similar to the history of school deregulation in the United
States: racial minorities expanded the scope of the conflict from the
states to the federal government and were eventually rewarded when
the Supreme Court ruled Brown v. Board of Education that state-
supported segregated schools violated the Constitution (Stewart, 1991).
In intergovernmental relations, the strength of the jurisdictional
dividing lines is essentially an empirical question. In cases of national
preemption, such as the regulation of television and radio broadcasts,
there is basically a single national subsystem. In cases of traditional
local autonomy such as the regulation of private land use, subsystems
tend to be organized around particular local governments. Minority
coalitions at the local level always have the option of trying to
involve state and/or national officials. This means, however, revision
is required in Hypothesis 4 that the policy core of a governmental
Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework 191
program will not be significantly revised as long as the subsystem
advocacy coalition which instituted a policy remains in power. In the
Ontario case, for example, several policy core attributes of education
were changed by the federal government even though the Loyalist
Coalition remained in power in the province of Ontario. We thus
suggest the following:
Hypothesis 4 (Revised): The Policy Core (basic attributes) of a governmental
program in a specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as
the subsystem advocacy coalition which initiated the program remains in
power within that jurisdiction - except when the change is imposed by a hierarchically
superior jurisdiction.
£
a
Hypotheses
1) Coalitions stable over decade or yes yes yes probably, except yes, after coalesced
for political
appointees
2) More coalition consensus on yes
policy core than secondary
aspects
3) Coalition will give up secondary yes
aspects before policy core
yea yes yes
4) Policy core of program stable as yes
long as dominant coalition
remains in power
yes yes yes yes
4 Rev) . . . except when the change is yes
imposed by a hierarchically superior
jurisdiction
yes but yes, but perhaps perhaps
5) Changing policy core of
program requires exogenous
perturbation
yes yes perhaps perhaps
5 Rev) . . . which must be skillfully
exploited by minority coalition
6) Intermediate level of conflict yes
conducive to learning across
coalitions
7) Areas with solid data and perhaps
accepted theory conducive to
learning across coalitions
8) Areas in natural sciences more perhaps
conducive to learning across
coalitions
9) Professional forum increases yes
likelihood of learning across
coalitions yes
yes
10) Within coalition, agencies more 1
moderate than interest groups
yes yes yes 3-
11) Learning by policy brokers may lead
to policy core change
200 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier
NOTES
1. With the exception of the co-authors (Anne Brasher and Gil St. Clair) of our two chapters,
none of the chapter authors are our graduate students or otherwise indebted to us. All of
the chapters contain both praise and criticisms of the ACF, and have resulted in several
revisions of the framework.
2. Neutrality here does not refer to the absence of political party affiliation but rather to the
absence of substantive policy preferences in the agency's public domain. The traditional
wisdom views Britain as the paradigm of a neutral civil service. But the script from a 1992
BBC episode of 'Yes, Minister', entitled 'The Bed of Nails', reveals a deft skepticism regarding
that portrait:
Minister: All these cabinet undersecretaries, they're civil servants. They're supposedly part
of the Government, but they behave like counsel, briefed by various transport interests, to
defeat the Government.
Civil Servant: That's how the civil service works in practice. Each department is controlled
by the people it's supposed to be controlling. . . Energy lobbies for the oil companies, Defense
lobbies for the aerospace industry, the Home Office lobbies for the police. . .
Granted, this is satire, but there are obviously people in Britain who do not accept the
image of neutral civil servants. Our experience with English countryside planners indicates
that they have a very coherent ideology and are, in fact, far less policy-neutral than their
French counterparts (Sabatier and Wertheimer, 1993).
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