REMEDIAL LAW>General Principles>Doctrine of Non-Interference/ Judicial Stability

TERESITA TAN, petitioner, vs. JOVENCIO F. CINCO, SIMON LORI HOLDINGS, INC., PENTACAPITAL
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, FORTUNATO G. PE, RAYMUNDO G. PE, JOSE REVILLA REYES, JR.,
AND DEPUTY SHERIFF ROMMEL IGNACIO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 213054. June 15, 2016.]
(First Division)

FACTS: The individual lenders extended a loan to Dante Tan which was facilitated by PentaCapital and
was secured by Dante's shares. When Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and despite demands,
he proposed to settle the same by selling his shares and assigning the proceeds to the lenders. However,
when he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving his
obligations unpaid. Hence, the lenders filed an action for sum of money against him before the RTC Makati
Branch 146 (collection case). After due proceedings, the Makati RTC rendered judgment ordering Dante to
pay the sum of P100,100,000.00 with legal interest, plus attorney's fees and costs. Dante's attempts to
reverse the decision on appeal proved futile, thus, a Writ of Execution (writ) was issued. In order to enforce
the writ, Sheriff Ignacio levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 126981
registered in Dante's name (subject property). An auction sale was then conducted. Dante sought the
quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit executed by his wife, herein petitioner Teresita attesting to the
conjugal nature of the subject property. Meanwhile, the period to redeem the subject property lapsed
without redemption having been made; hence, a Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the
lenders. Dante filed an Omnibus Motion alleging that the subject property was a family home and therefore,
exempt from execution, and that being a conjugal property, it cannot be made to answer for his personal
obligations without any showing that it had redounded to the benefit of the family. The Makati RTC denied
Dante's Omnibus Motion, Dante's motion for reconsideration was denied, and there being no appeal, the
Makati RTC's disposition of the case became final. Teresita filed before the Parañaque RTC a complaint
against respondents, respondent Sheriff Ignacio, and the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City for the
nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the certificate of sale issued in favor of the lenders
(nullification case). Parañaque RTC initially dismissed the case and later ruled in favor of Teresita.
Respondents appealed the same with the CA, which ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of the nullification case?

HELD: Yes. The Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated
falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice:
no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all
its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection
with this judgment. Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was improper and in
glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the
collection case, as well as the execution thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not be
interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the
power to open, modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the
court in which the judgment or order is rendered or issued. Consequently, the Parañaque RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the same, rendering all the proceedings therein, as well as the Decision and other orders
issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction. A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and
void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in
law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is
a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to
it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
REMEDIAL LAW>General Principles>Doctrine of Non-Interference/ Judicial Stability

ELDEFONSO G. DEL ROSARIO and JOSEFINO R. ORTIZ, petitioners, vs. CRISTINA OCAMPO-
FERRER, respondent
[G.R. No. 215348. June 20, 2016.]
(First Division)

FACTS: Ocampo-Ferrer obtained a loan from Del Rosario, secured by a parcel of land situated in Calauan,
Laguna and covered by TCT No. T-165897. After Ocampo-Ferrer defaulted on said loan, Del Rosario filed
a complaint for sum of money against her before the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275. Later, Ocampo-Ferrer and
Del Rosario entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Ocampo-Ferrer bound herself to pay Del
Rosario the amount of P1.2M on or before June 19, 2005, and that upon receipt of payment, Del Rosario
shall return the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-165897. Accordingly, the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275
issued an Order adopting and approving the said Agreement as the Decision in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088.
Despite the foregoing, Ocampo-Ferrer still failed to comply with her obligation, thus, compelling Del Rosario
to move for execution, which was granted by the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275. After the issuance of the Writ of
Execution, petitioner Sheriff Ortiz of RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275 issued a Demand/Notice to Pay to Ocampo-
Ferrer, which the latter failed to act upon. This prompted Sheriff Ortiz to levy Ocampo-Ferrer's parcel of
land located in Las Piñas, covered by TCT No. 30480, and to schedule the public auction of said land. At
the auction sale, Del Rosario came out as the sole and highest bidder, and consequently, a Certificate of
Sale was issued in his favor. In view of the foregoing, Ocampo-Ferrer filed a complaint before the RTC-Las
Piñas Br. 198 seeking the annulment of the sheriff's sale, as well as payment of damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. LP-07-0037. In her complaint, Ocampo-Ferrer claimed that Del Rosario and Sheriff Ortiz
committed unlawful acts in enforcing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088. For their part,
petitioners vehemently denied the accusations against them. They likewise averred that: (a) the complaint
was barred by prior judgment in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088 and that Ocampo-Ferrer never challenged the
same; and (b) the subject matter of Civil Case No. LP-07-0037 is not within the jurisdiction of RTC-Las
Piñas Br. 198 as it is a co-equal court of RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275.

ISSUE: Whether or not a court has jurisdiction to annul actions emanating from a lawful order of a co-
equal court?

HELD: No. The RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198 has no jurisdiction to annul actions emanating from a lawful order
of a co-equal court such as the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275. In other words, when the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275
took cognizance of Civil Case No. LP-03-0088, it acquired full jurisdiction over the matters at hand, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts. Thus, in consonance with the doctrine of judicial stability, the proper
remedy to assail orders originating from the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275 is to file an action before a higher court
with authority to nullify such orders and not before a co-equal body.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court:
no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection
with this judgment.

Hence, the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198 erred in taking cognizance of Civil Case No. LP-07-0037 as this case
sought to annul an order coming from a co-equal court. The RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198 should have dismissed
Civil Case No. LP-07-0037 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its re-filing in the
appropriate court.
REMEDIAL LAW> General Principles> Doctrine of Non-interference/Judicial Stability

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS FOR REFORMS (NASECORE),

REPRESENTED BY PETRONILO ILAGAN, FEDERATION OF VILLAGE ASSOCIATIONS (FOVA),
REPRESENTED BY SIEGFRIEDO VELOSO, AND FEDERATION OF LAS PIÑAS VILLAGE
ASSOCIATIONS (FOLVA), REPRESENTED BY BONIFACIO DAZO, Petitioners, v. MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Respondent.
G.R. No. 191150, October 10, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: MERALCO filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for approval of the revision
of its current rate schedules and an appraisal of its properties, which would allow an increase in its basic
charge. During the pendency of this case, the Philippine Congress enacted R.A. 9136, or the "Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA) which abolished the ERB and created the ERC in its stead, as
well as directed all electric distribution utilities to file an application for approval of their unbundled rates
with the ERC. Thus, MERALCO filed an application. During this time, the ERC adopted the Rate on Return
Base (RORB) methodology in its rate-setting function. Under the RORB methodology, rates are set to
recover the cost of service incurred by the distribution utility plus a reasonable rate of return, whereby
historical costs are used to determine the revenue requirement. The Court rendered a Decision upholding
the new rates fixed by the ERC. Prompted by the Resolution issued by the ERC, MERALCO filed an
application for the approval of its ARR and performance incentive scheme for the regulatory period covered
in accordance with the RDWR (Rules for Setting Distribution Wheeling Rates (RDWR) before the ERC.
MERALCO sought for the reconsideration of the application which was denied. Further, the ERC rendered
a Decision approving with modification MERALCO's separate applications for approval of its translation into
distribution rates of different customer classes in which the CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the regulation, and therefore, should
be disallowed?

HELD: Yes. The rule is settled that "Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to
implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law x x x and enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case
by a competent court." As such, they "cannot be attacked collaterally. Unless such rule is annulled in a
direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands."

In this case, petitioners' opposition against the PBR rate-setting methodology was not made through the
proper case directly attacking the constitutionality and/or validity of the same. Hence, the instant petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the regulation, and therefore, should, be disallowed. Case law provides
that the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by
the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of
fact. As applied in this case, in order to assess the reasonableness of the rates approved by the ERC, there
is a glaring need to scrutinize the veracity of the adverse allegations of both parties, which, in turn,
necessitates an examination of the evidence in support thereof. Therefore, the issue on reasonableness
posed in the petition inevitably treads the territory of questions of fact. Petitioners failed to sufficiently show
that the rates approved in the proceedings were unreasonable as they claimed to be. Thus, the CA cannot
be faulted in sustaining the reasonableness of the rates approved by the ERC. There is a legal presumption
that the fixed rates are reasonable, and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the Government,
through its authorized agents, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and unless there is an abuse
of that discretion, the courts will not interfere.”

Accordingly, the issue has become moot and academic. It was settled that "A case or issue is considered
moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use," as the
aforesaid issue raised in this case. For all these reasons, the petition is therefore denied.
REMEDIAL LAW>JURISDICTION>Jurisdiction of various Philippine Courts
REMEDIAL LAW>CRIMINAL PROCEDURE>Preliminary Investigation/EVIDENCE> Testimonial
Evidence> Hearsay and exceptions to the hearsay rule/ GENERAL PRINCIPLES> Doctrine of non-
interference/judicial stability

Richard A. Cambe, Petitioner, vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., Respondents/Senator Ramon
"Bong" Revilla, Jr., Petitioner, vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., Respondents/Senator Ramon
"Bong" Revilla, Jr., Petitioner, vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., Respondents/Richard A.
Cambe, Petitioner, vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., Respondents/John Raymund De Asis,
Petitioner, vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al., Respondents/Ronald John Lim, Petitioner, vs.
Conchita Carpio Morales, et al., Respondents/Janet Lim Napoles, Petitioner, vs. Conchita Carpio
Morales, et al., Respondents/Mario L. Relampagos, et al., Petitioners vs. Sandiganbayan and
People of the Philippines, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 212014-15/G.R. Nos. 212427-28/G.R. Nos. 212694-95/G.R. Nos. 213477-78/G.R. Nos.
213532-33/G.R. Nos. 213536-37/G.R. Nos. 218744-59, December 6, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions filed by Petitioners who are all charged as co-conspirators for
their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.
In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen.
Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim,
of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Ombudsman directed petitioners to submit their respective counter-affidavits, to which petitioners
complied with, except for Napoles and Lim. Pending resolution of the Ombudsman cases, Sen. Revilla and
Cambe separately moved for the suspension of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints,
which were, however, denied by the Ombudsman. Further, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists
against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder and, thereby, issued the corresponding
warrants of arrest against them. Aggrieved, all the petitioners separately moved for the reconsideration.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the Court erred in denying Cambe's Motion to Suspend Proceedings of the
preliminary investigation?
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the whistleblowers' statements can be admitted in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule?
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the technical rules on evidence be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
investigation proceedings?
ISSUE #4: Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause to indict
the petitioners, except Lim, of violation of RA 3019?

HELD #1: No. The Court disagrees with Cambe’s claim that the filing of the criminal complaints was
premature. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's
audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges against them. Hence,
the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter. There are three kinds of remedies
that are available against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge
of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative and that these remedies may be invoked
separately. It is clear that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The settled rule is
that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two will
not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings. An audit disallowance may not necessarily result in the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the responsible persons. Therefore, an administrative or
criminal case may prosper even without an audit disallowance.

HELD #2: Yes. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence, as in this case. In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta
were to apply during preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay
is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. Under the doctrine of independently
relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is
relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Further, the Court observed that:
Whistleblower testimonies - especially in corruption cases, such as this - should not be condemned, but
rather, be welcomed as these whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in order to expose the
perpetrators and bring them to justice.

HELD #3: Yes. The Court had unanimously ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers are
admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during
preliminary investigation. The foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be
rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings.

HELD #4: No. The Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the Ombudsman's
determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such
discretion. Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence
that would justify a conviction would suffice. In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes
of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
accused are required, not absolute certainty. It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined
during the context of a preliminary investigation. In this light, the Court has ruled that "probable cause can
be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay". The
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
It is not the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to rule on such issue. All that the Office of the
Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the counter-allegations of the accused
and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused
are probably guilty thereof. Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining
probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or lack
of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman did not err
in finding probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on
record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. The standard of probable cause was
adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such, no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan in the proceedings a quo.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

SPOUSES RAMON and LIGAYA GONZALES, petitioners, vs. MARMAINE REALTY CORPORATION,
represented by MARIANO MANALO, respondent.
G.R. No. 214241. January 13, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: Sps. Gonzales filed a Tenancy case against Marmaine before DARAB. PARAD issued a writ of
Preliminary Injunction in favor of Sps. Gonzales. Hence, Sps. Gonzales filed a Notice of Lis Pendens.
PARAD later on dismissed the Tenancy case. Sps. Gonzales moved for a reconsideration, which was
likewise denied. An appeal to DARAB was also denied, as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Due to the failure to appeal by Sps. Gonzales, the DARAB decision became final and executory on May 7,
2009, and an Entry of Judgment was issued on January 19, 2012. Marmaine filed a Motion for Cancellation
of Notice of Lis Pendens, in view of the finality of the ruling in the Tenancy case. PARAD initially denied the
same on the ground of prematurity considering that a civil case involving the same parties is still pending
before RTC of Rosario, Batangas. However, on Marmaine’s motion for reconsideration, PARAD issued an
order setting aside its earlier order and directed the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel the notice of
lis pendens on Marmaine’s certificates of title. Sps. Gonzales moved for a reconsideration which was
denied. Thereafter, they went straight to CA via a petition for review. CA dismissed the petition on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It pointed out that the proper remedy from a PARAD’s
denial of a motion for reconsideration is an appeal to DARAB.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sps. Gonzales failed to exhaust administrative remedies

HELD: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to certain exceptions; one of
which is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice. The rationale behind the exception is that it could best be resolved tentatively by the administrative
authorities. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the
interpretation and application of law.

Here, Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue they raised before CA is the propriety of the
cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, and which falls within the exception as it does not involve the
probative value presented by the litigants and must solely rest on what the law provides.
REMEDIAL LAW>Jurisdiction>Jurisdiction of Various Courts>Special Commercial Court

MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES, Petitioners,

v. GJH LAND, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A. STEVE
JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202664, November 20, 2015
(En Banc)

FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages
arising from an intra-corporate dispute with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, against the respondents. The case
was docketed and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court, and later granted the
application. Respondents sought the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RTC dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case was proper.

HELD: No. The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the exercise of
jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already
acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed;
instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a
commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated
Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.

The Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines shall be observed:
1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch,
the proper courses of action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the
case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and
thereafter, assigned to the sole special branch;
1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the
case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and
thereafter, raffled off among those special branches; and
1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the
case shall be referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court
branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to
should re- docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only
one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special
branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial
Courts, raffle off the case among those special branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch
designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive
Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts
of the same RTC (including its designated special branches which, by statute, are equally
capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for under
existing rules.
3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in
case of any difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly
credited, and any excess, refunded.
4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state
the action's nature both in its caption and body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may,
upon motion or by order of the court motu proprio, be dismissed without prejudice to its re-
filing after due rectification. This last procedural rule is prospective in application.
5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded.
REMEDIAL LAW>Jurisdiction

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
(En Banc)

FACTS: A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other
public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing them of Plunder and
violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The Ombudsman issued a preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
OMB Cases.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive
suspension order and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation,
which was subsequently granted by a Resolution. He argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity since those were undertaken before he was elected,
or had transpired during his first term but had been effectively condoned due to his re-election, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. CA then issued another
Resolution directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari.

Later on, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials
of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby
allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration of justice.
Consequently, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's
resolutions.

Meanwhile, the CA issued a third resolution granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI finding that Binay,
Jr. has an ostensible right to the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the
condonation doctrine.

After the Ombudsman and Binay were required to file their respective memorandum, and comment
on each other’s, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

ISSUE#1: Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed
CA issuances is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

ISSUE#2: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari

ISSUE#3: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining
the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman

ISSUE#4: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually,
the WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based
on the condonation doctrine; and

ISSUE#5: Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition
for contempt is improper and illegal.

HELD#1:

Yes. Certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration
before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition,
i.e. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government
institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence,
involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but
expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from
administrative liability.

HELD#2:

Yes. The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA
6770, or the Ombudsman Act:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies
is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure
promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, and
not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure;
hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued
by the Ombudsman.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings"
of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former
provision is unconstitutional and perforce, invalid.

HELD#3:

Yes. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is
exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not define,
prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari
jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not
shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional
remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
integral and inherent to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the
proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers
principle.

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not
oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as
other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it
proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from
issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued therefor.
HELD#4:

No. The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based
on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized
that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed
committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no
longer be administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the
condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more
prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the
matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236
during the pendency of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was
based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos.
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability
as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that
originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, (Pascual), which
was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the
assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. Thus, by
merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion
based on its legal attribution.

HELD#5:

Absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then
be premature for this Court to rule on the issue.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be
the subject of a charge for indirect contempt because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty
therefor would result in her effective removal from office. However, a reading of the aforesaid March
20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to contempt proceedings.
This issuance, in fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to
comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Jurisdiction

BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO,

HEIRS OF LOURDES S. BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE
BILAG, Petitioners,
vs. ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO AP-AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A.
RAMIREZ, JR., and MA. TERESA A. RAMIREZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: The respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title with prayer of preliminary injunction against
the petitioners. Petitioner alleged that RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it is the Land Management
Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Lands) which is vested with the authority to determine issues of ownership
over unregistered public lands and that it is only now, or more than 27 years from the execution of the
Deeds of Sale, that respondents seek to enforce said Deeds; thus, the present action is already barred by
prescription and/or laches.

ISSUE: Whether RTC Branch 61 has jurisdiction to try the case?

RULING: No. Jurisprudence has consistently held that "jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of
a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of
any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action." Perforce, it is important that a court
or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before
it, considering that any act that it performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding
legal effects. The Court's pronouncement in Tan v. Cinco, is instructive on this matter, to wit:

A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates
no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial,
as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect.

In conclusion, RTC Branch 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs therein (herein
respondents) seek to quiet title over lands which belong to the public domain. Necessarily, Civil Case No.
5881- R must be dismissed on this ground. It should be stressed that the court a quo's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the case renders it without authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the merits
of the case. To reiterate, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is
to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding
legal effects. In this light, the Court finds no further need to discuss the other grounds relied upon by
petitioners in this case.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Rules on Payment of Docket Fee; Effect of Non-Payment

WOODROW B. CAMASO, Petitioner, vs. TSM SHIPPING (PHILS), INC., UTKILEN, and/or JONES
TULOD, Respondents
G.R. No. 223290, November 7, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: Believing that his sickness was work-related and that respondents remained silent on their
obligation, Camaso filed the instant complaint for disability benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement of
medical and hospital expenses, and other consequential damages before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC Case No. OFW (M) 07-09270-14. After efforts for an amicable
settlement between the parties failed, they were ordered to file their respective position papers. The case
was raised to the CA wherein the latter dismissed the petition "for non-payment of the required docketing
fees as required under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court." Dissatisfied, Camaso filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated August 29, 2015, arguing, inter alia, that a check representing the
payment of the required docket fees was attached to a copy of his petition filed before the CA. He further
claimed that upon verification of his counsel's messenger, the Division Clerk of Court admitted that it was
simply overlooked.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Camaso's petition for certiorari before it for non-payment
of docket fees?

HELD: No. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the CA,
such as a petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is required, and that the
failure to comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of such action.

In Bibiana Farms & Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court nevertheless explained that while non-payment of docket
fees may indeed render an original action dismissible, the rule on payment of docket fees may be relaxed
whenever the attending circumstances of the case so warrant.

Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of a
case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not
automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b)
there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via mail, a Metrobank
check dated July 6, 2015 under the account name of Pedro L. Linsangan was attached thereto to serve as
payment of docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode of payment under Section 6, Rule VIII
of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of such personal check shows that Camaso exerted earnest efforts to
pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the
government. In this relation, the assertion of the Officer-in-Charge of the CA Receiving Section that there
was no check attached to Camaso's certiorari petition is clearly belied by the fact that when it was examined
at the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, the check was found to be still stapled thereto.

In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of
procedure in the interest of substantial justice and, hence, remands the instant case to the CA for the
resolution of its substantial merits. Upon remand, the CA is directed to order Camaso to pay the required
docket fees within a reasonable period of thirty (30) days from notice of such order.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Cause of Action

WORLD'S BEST GAS, INC., Petitioner, v. HENRY VITAL, JOINED BY HIS WIFE FLOSERFINA
VITAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211588, September 09, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Vital was one of the incorporators of WBGI, holding P500,000.00 worth of shares of stocks
therein. As a separate business venture, Vital and his wife, respondent Floserfina Vital (respondents),
sourced Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) from WBGI and distributed the same through ERJ Enterprises
owned by them. As of respondents' last statement of account, their outstanding balance with WBGI for
unpaid LPG amounted to P923,843.59. Thereafter, Vital was appointed as Internal Auditor and Personnel
Manager by WBGI's President/CEO and continued to serve as such until his mandatory retirement on
September 25, 2003. Upon his retirement, WBGI's Board of Directors computed Vital's retirement benefits
at P82,500.00 by multiplying his P15,000.00 monthly pay by 5.5 years, which was the number of years he
served as Internal Auditor and Personnel Manager. WBGI also agreed to acquire Vital's P500,000.00
shares of stocks at par value. Vital claimed that the unpaid salaries and separation pay due him
amounted to P845,000.00 and P250,000.00, respectively, leaving a net amount of P671,156.41 payable
to him. WBGI rejected Vital's claim and contended that after offsetting, Vital actually owed it P369,156.19.
Vital filed a complaint before the NLRC for non-payment of separation and retirement pay.
For its part, WBGI averred that the Labor Arbiter (LA) had no jurisdiction over the complaint because Vital
is not an employee, but a mere incorporator and stockholder of WBGI, hence, no employer-employee
relationship exists between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling upon Vital's claim of P845,000.00 and P250,000.00 in unpaid
salaries and separation pay?

HELD: Yes. At the outset, it should be pointed out that the instant case actually involves three (3) distinct
causes of action, namely, (1) Vital's claim for P845,000.00 and P250,000.00 in unpaid salaries and
separation pay; (2) the P923,843.59 in arrearages payable to WBGI from ERJ Enterprises, which was
admitted by Vital but not claimed by WBGI; and (3) Vital's claim of P500,000.00 due from WBGI's acquisition
of Vital's shares of stocks. All of the foregoing were threshed out by the RTC in its December 12, 2011
Decision, and effectively upheld by the CA on appeal. RTC's adjudication of the first cause of action was
improper since the same is one which arose from Vital and WBGI's employer-employee relations, involving
an amount exceeding P5,000.00, hence, belonging to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters pursuant to Article
217 of the Labor Code. But RTC has jurisdiction over the last 2 causes of action.

With the RTC's jurisdiction established over the above-mentioned causes of action, Vital's claim
of P500,000.00 due from WBGI's acquisition of his shares of stocks should therefore be offset against
the P923,843.59 in arrearages payable to WBGI by ERJ Enterprises owned by respondents, as prayed for
by him. Hence, no amount can be adjudicated in Vital's favor, since it is the respondents who, after due
computation, would be left liable to WBGI in the net amount of P423,843.59. This notwithstanding, WBGI
cannot recover this latter amount in this case since it never interposed a permissive counterclaim therefor
in its answer. It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess
of what is being sought by the party. WBGI may, however, opt to file a separate collection suit,
including those related thereto to recover such sum.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Litis Pendentia; Splitting causes of action
Overlap with CIVIL LAW> Civil Law 2> Novation; Usurious Interest; Solutio Indebiti

NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner, v. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Rafael, Marcelino Martinez’ father, obtained from Marilag a loan of P160,000.00, with a stipulated
monthly interest of 5%, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. Rafael failed to settle his
obligation, prompting Marilag to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before
the RTC. RTC ordered Rafael to pay Marilag P229,200.00, consisting of the principal of P160,000.00 and
accrued interest of P59,200.00. Records do not show that this Decision had already attained finality.

Prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, Marcelino agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to Marilag pegged
at P689,000.00. After making a total payment of P400,000.00, he executed a promissory note, binding
himself to pay P289,000.00, "representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation of [his] father to
[Marilag]." After learning of the RTC Decision, Marcelino refused to pay the amount covered by the subject
PN despite demands, prompting Marilag to file a complaint for sum of money and damages (collection
case).

Marcelino averred that he has fully settled Rafael's obligation and that he committed a mistake in paying
more than the amount due under the loan, i.e., the amount of P229,200.00 as adjudged by the RTC in the
judicial foreclosure case which warranted the return of the excess payment.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not in loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the creditor may file a
personal action for collection of sum of money after instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security?
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the acceptance of payment by the creditor from a 3rd person, who has assumed
the obligation, results to novation?
ISSUE #3: Whether or not 5% monthly interest is excessive and unconscionable?
ISSUE #4: Whether or not payment made on the belief that a loan obligation had not yet been satisfied
must be returned?

HELD #1: No. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee
has a single cause of action against the debtor mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing
of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on
the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each
remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he
waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for the recovery of
whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the
bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment
shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount
less than the outstanding obligation.

In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial
foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent
filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia,
considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.

Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition for the
judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal action for
the collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising from foreclosure,
without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for dismissal
is either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in this case.
HELD #2: No. Case law states that the fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who
has assumed the obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors, not novation, and the creditor may
enforce the obligation against both debtors.

Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown.
Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree
that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, which was not shown here.

HELD #3: Yes. Settled is the principle that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void for
being contrary to morals, if not against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on said interest rate;
thus, the interest rate may be reduced as reason and equity demand.

HELD #4: Yes. Such payments were clearly made by mistake, giving rise to the quasi-contractual obligation
of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 in relation to Article 2163 of the Civil Code. Not being a loan or
forbearance of money, an interest of 6% p.a. should be imposed on the amount to be refunded and on the
damages and attorney's fees awarded, if any, computed from the time of demand until its
satisfaction. Consequently, petitioner must return to respondent the excess payments in the total amount
of P134,400.00, with legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the filing of the Answer on August 6,
1998 interposing a counterclaim for such overpayment, until fully settled.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Cause of action

Overlap with CIVIL LAW>Contracts>General provisions>Stipulation Pour Autrui

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. LEGAL HEIRS OF JOSE L. AFRICA, respondents.
G.R. No. 205722. August 19, 2015.
(FIRST DIVISION)

FACTS: The PCGG filed a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the SB against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, Marciano Benedicto, Romulo Benedicto, Zacarias
Amante, Francisca C. Benedicto, Africa (defendants), and others docketed as Civil Case No. 0034. With
respect to Africa, the PCGG alleged that he collaborated with Benedicto and several of the defendants in
acting as conduits of the pilfered funds by laundering the same using the banking facilities of Traders Royal
Bank (TRB), of which Africa was the Chairman of the Board of Directors, before remitting them to the
Marcoses. The PCGG entered into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto where the latter undertook to
cede to the government properties and transfer to the government whatever rights he may have in the
assets of the corporations. It also agreed to extend absolute immunity to Benedicto, the members of his
family, and the officers and employees of the listed corporations such that no criminal investigation or
prosecution would be undertaken against them. Notably, some of the defendants, including Africa, were
not named therein. The PCGG and Benedicto filed a Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement
thereafter the SB approved the same. Respondents filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the case against
Africa, who had since died. Respondents asserted that Africa, who was then merely the Chairman of TRB,
should be exonerated since his supposed conspirators had been exonerated by virtue of the Compromise
Agreement. The SB granted respondents’ motion and dismissed the case against Africa and his heirs.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not a benefit may be conferred in favor of a person, although the Compromise
Agreement did not expressly include his name.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not a common cause of action must exist against all the defendants for one to be
benefited from the Compromise Agreement executed in favor of the others.

HELD #1: No. The Court is hard-pressed to rule against a finding of a stipulation pour autrui in favor of
Africa.

In Limitless Potentials, Inc. v. Quilala, 463 SCRA 586 (2005), the Court laid down the requisites of a
stipulation pour autrui, namely: (1) there is a stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) the stipulation is a
part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) the contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to
the third person — the favor is not an incidental benefit; (4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated;
(5) the third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (6) the
contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized by, the third party.

For a stipulation pour autrui to be appreciated, it is indispensable that there be a stipulation deliberately
conferring a benefit or favor to a third person. Article 1311 of the Civil Code states: Art. 1311. Contracts
take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation, or by provision of law. The
heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. If a contract should contain
some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfilment provided he communicated his
acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not
sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.

The Court has carefully and thoroughly perused the Compromise Agreement and found no stipulation at all
that would even resemble a provision in favor of Africa or the respondents. On the contrary, what is obvious
and glaring is the absence of any provision clearly and deliberately extending the benefits of the
Compromise Agreement to them.

HELD #2: No. The Court finds that the SB erred in ordering the dismissal of the case against Africa, the
latter not being a beneficiary to the Compromise Agreement, and absent any showing that a common cause
of action existed against all the defendants or that Africa is an indispensable party to the case that would
entitle him and his heirs, the respondents herein, to benefit from the Compromise Agreement.

In Imson v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 58 (1994), Lim Tanhu states that where a complaint alleges a
common cause of action against defendants who are all indispensable parties to the case, its dismissal
against any of them by virtue of a compromise agreement with the plaintiff necessarily results in the
dismissal of the case against the other defendants, including those in default. The ruling is rooted on the
rationale that the court’s power to act in a case involving a common cause of action against indispensable
parties is integral and cannot be split such that it cannot relieve any of them and at the same time render
judgment against the rest.

It is settled that for a defendant to benefit from the compromise agreement executed between the plaintiff
and the other defendants, it must be established that: (1) the plaintiff alleged a common cause of action
against the defendants; and (2) all the defendants are indispensable parties to the case.

Respondents neither argued nor showed that the causes of action against the defendants are the same
and that they are all indispensable parties as to benefit from the dismissal of a case as a result of the
Compromise Agreement.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Substitution of Parties

PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. JOVEN L. NGO, as represented by OSCAR J.

GARCIA, Respondent
G.R. No. 214934, April 12, 2016
First Division

FACTS: Pacific Rehouse Corporation entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale with Benjamin Bautista for
the purchase of parcel of land. However, despite receiving the down payment and repeated offers by Pacific
Rehouse to pay the balance, Bautista failed and refused to execute the Deed of Absolute sale and deliver
the certificate of title of the subject property, and even sold the property to another buyer. Hence, Pacific
Rehouse filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Bautista, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2031-08. Further, it also caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. T-800 in order
to protect its rights over the subject property while pending litigation. After the parties had filed their
respective responsive pleadings, the case was set for pre-trial. However, before the same could proceed,
Bautista's counsel filed a Manifestation and Notice of Death informing the RTC that Bautista had died. Thus,
the RTC directed Bautista's counsel to substitute the latter's heirs and/or representatives in the action.

Meanwhile, Joven L. Ngo, represented by Oscar J. Garcia, filed a Verified Petition for Cancellation of Notice
of Lis Pendens against Pacific House and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite docketed as LRC
Case No. 1117-09. Ngo alleged, inter alia, that Bautista obtained a loan from him secured by a real estate
mortgage over the subject property, and that the mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite and annotated on TCT No. T-800. Upon Bautista's default, the mortgage was foreclosed and the
subject property was sold at a public auction, with respondent emerging as the highest bidder. The RTC
then ordered the consolidation of the two cases.

The CA gave due course to the petition with respect to LRC Case No. 1117-09 but ordered the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 2031-08. It was held that the complaint for specific performance and damages in Civil
Case No. 2031-08 was an action in personam since its object was to compel Bautista to perform his
obligations under the Deed of Conditional Sale and hence, rendered him pecuniarily liable. As such, the
obligations in the contract attached to him alone and did not burden the subject property. Since the action
was founded on a personal obligation, it did not survive Bautista's death

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the Civil Case in view of Bautista’s death?

HELD: No. Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during
the pendency of a case by his heirs, provided that the claim subject of said case is not extinguished by his
death. As early as in Bonilla v. Barcena, the Court has settled that if the claim in an action affects property
and property rights, then the action survives the death of a party-litigant, viz.: The question as to whether
an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights,
the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

In sum, the CA erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 2031-08 based solely on Bautista's death. As such, it
should be reinstated and consolidated with LRC Case No. 1117-09, considering that the two cases involve
the same property and, as correctly opined by the court a quo, any adjudication in either case would
necessarily affect the other. In this relation, case law states that consolidation of cases, when proper, results
in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a
possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be achieved, within the context of the present
state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and state finances are limited. It contributes to
the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Likewise, it avoids the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single
judgment.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Forum Shopping, Litis Pendencia

GRACE PARK* INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION and WOODLINK REALTY

CORPORATION, Petitioners
vs.
EASTWEST BANKING CORPORATION, SECURITY BANKING CORPORATION, represented by
the Trustee and Attorney-in-Fact of EASTWEST BANKING CORPORATION TRUST DIVISION,
EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, in his capacity as the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos City, Bulacan, EDRIC C. ESTRADA, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial
Court, Malolos City, Bulacan, Respondents

[G.R. No. 210606, July 27, 2016]

(First Division)

FACTS: The instant case arose from an Amended Complaint for Injunction and Annulment of Foreclosure
Sale filed by petitioners Grace Park International Corporation (Gracepark) and Woodlink Realty Corporation
(Woodlink; collectively, petitioners) against respondents Eastwest Banking Corporation (EBC), Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied), and Security Banking Corporation (Security), EBC Trust Division, Sheriff
Emmanuel L. Ortega, and Sheriff Edric C. Estrada before the RTC-Malolos, docketed as Civil Case No.
543-M-2010. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that: (a) they entered into a Mortgage Trust Indenture
(MTI) with EBC, Allied, Security, and Banco De Oro Unibank (BDO), with EBC acting as trustee, in the
aggregate amounts of P162,314,499.00 and US$797,176.47; (b) under the MTI, BDO was the majority
creditor with 58.04% ownership of the credit, with EBC, Allied, and Security having 18.33%, 12.58%, and
11.05% ownership, respectively; (c) as collaterals, petitioners mortgaged eight (8) parcels of land, as well
as the improvements found thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 439068, 439069, 439070,
439071, 439072, 439073, 439074, and 439075 (collaterals); (d) under the MTI, EBC, as trustee, cannot
commence foreclosure proceedings on any or all parts of the collaterals without the written instructions from
the majority creditors; (e) during the pendency of the MTI, BDO’s majority share in the MTI was effectively
paid for by Sherwyn Yao, Jeremy Jerome Sy, and Leveric Ng (Sherwyn, et al.); (f) Sherwyn, et al. should
have been subrogated to BDO’s majority interest in the MTI; (g) EBC refused to honor the subrogation,
causing Sherwyn, et al. to file an action for subrogation and injunction before the RTC of Makati City (RTC-
Makati), docketed as Civil Case No. 10-323; and (h) EBC commenced foreclosure proceedings without
written instructions from the majority creditors under the MTI, which by virtue of subrogation, should be
Sherwyn, et al. In their Answer and Motion to Dismiss, EBC, Allied, and Security contended that the
complaint before the RTCMalolos should be dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping and litis
pendentia. They claimed that the action for subrogation pending before the RTC-Makati basically involved
the same parties, reliefs, and causes of action with the action pending before the RTC-Malolos in that: (a)
the individual plaintiffs in the RTC-Makati case, i.e., Sherwyn, et al., represent the same interests as the
corporation plaintiffs, i.e., petitioners, in the RTC-Malolos case, since they are the respective owners of
petitioner corporations; (b) there were glaring similarities in the complaints filed before the RTC-Makati and
the RTC-Malolos; and (c) both complaints essentially sought the injunction of the foreclosure sale, as well
as the inclusion of the claims of Sherwyn, et al. in the said foreclosure. In opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss, petitioners insisted that the forum shopping and/or litis pendentia are not attendant between Civil
Case No. 543-M-2010 and Civil Case No. 10-323, considering that there is no identity of parties and causes
of action in both cases. Petitioners likewise averred that the judgment in Civil Case No. 10323 pending in
the RTC-Makati will not amount to res judicata in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 pending in the RTCMalolos
because such judgment can only be used as evidence in the latter case to prove that the requirements of
the MTI for the foreclosure of the collaterals were not complied with. RTC Malolos dismissed the case on
the ground of litis pendentia, which was upheld by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia correct.

HELD. Yes. At the outset, it must be emphasized that “[forum shopping] is the act of a litigant who
repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court,
to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. What is
important in determining whether [forum shopping] exists is the vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related
causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.”

In Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Palicte, 716 SCRA 175 (2014), the Court held that “[t]he test to determine the
existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final
judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following
elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under
consideration.”

In reference to the foregoing, litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means “a pending suit” and is
variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the
dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two (2) actions are pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, so that one (1) of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is
based on the policy against multiplicity of suits.

Anent the first requisite of forum shopping, “[t]here is identity of parties where the parties in both actions
are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
Absolute identity of parties is not required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of
this principle. Thus, it is enough that there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and
a party in the second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.”

With respect to the second and third requisites of forum shopping, “[h]ornbook is the rule that identity of
causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of
res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes
of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there
is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to
the subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall
not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. Among the several tests resorted to in
ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same
evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the
defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test
of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint.”
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Defenses and Objections Not Pleaded

EDRON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and EDMER Y. LIM, Petitioners,

vs. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, represented by GOVERNOR
VICENTE T. PIMENTEL, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 220211, June 5, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract for the construction of the Leaming Resource
Center of Tandag, Tandag Bus/Jeepney Terminal, and Tandag Public Market. Petitioners claimed that
despite their completion and respondent's consequent acceptance of the works as evidenced by
Certificates of Final Acceptance, the latter did not pay them. Thus, the petitioner filed for specific
performance with damages against the respondent. More than a year after the filing of its Answer,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, the respondent argued that according to the construction agreements,
final payment to petitioners shall be made only after the submission of a sworn statement attesting to the
fact that all of the latter's obligations for labor and materials under the contracts have been fully paid. In this
regard, respondent contended that since petitioners have yet to submit such sworn statement, then the
latter do not have a cause of action against it. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner but the CA reversed
the decision stating that the contractor's submission of the sworn statement attesting that all its obligations
for labor and materials under the contracts have been fully paid is a condition sine qua non in demanding
final payment from the owner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fact of non-submission of sworn statement, which was not pleaded in the
Answer, would constitute lack of cause of action?

HELD: No. At the outset, the Court notes that the CA's dismissal of petitioners' complaint is heavily-
grounded on the latter's alleged non-submission of the sworn statement required in Paragraph 4.3, Article
IV of the construction agreements. Such reliance is misplaced.

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or
by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

It may be gleaned from the said provision that except for the defenses of: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d) prescription, other defenses must
be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver thereof. Otherwise
stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense shall be deemed waived, and
consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon the same in further proceedings.

In the instant case, a judicious review of the records reveals that respondent's Answer with
Counterclaim dated January 6, 2009 did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners' non-execution of
the sworn statement pertained to in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements. In fact, such
matter was only raised in its Motion to Dismiss filed more than a year later after the Answer, or on May 24,
2010, to support the ground relied upon in the said Motion, which is failure to state a cause of action.
However, it must be pointed out that the Motion and the arguments supporting it can no longer be
considered since it was filed out of time as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that
motions to dismiss should be filed "within the time for but before the filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim." More importantly, such matter/ defense raised in the motion does not fall within
the exceptions laid down in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. As such, respondent was already
precluded from raising such issue/defense. Hence, the RTC cannot be faulted in: (a) issuing an Order dated
August 11, 2010 denying the Motion to Dismiss; and (b) not including a discussion of said issue/defense in
its Decision dated December 28, 2010 and Order dated September 16, 2011.
REMEDIAL LAW > Civil Procedure> Amendment of Pleadings

SPOUSES ERNESTO TATLONGHARI and EUGENIA TATLONGHARI, petitioners,

vs. BANGKO KABAYANIBAAN RURAL BANK, INC., respondent.

[G.R. No. 219783. August 3, 2016]

(First Division)

FACTS: On August 3, 2004, a certain Pedro V. Ilagan (Pedro) filed a complaint for annulment of special
power of attorney (SPA), promissory notes, and real estate mortgage (civil case) against respondent
Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. (the bank) and the Provincial Sheriff of Batangas Province
(defendants) before the RTC. He alleged that the Office of the Ex Officio Sheriff of the RTC had posted and
published notices of Sheriff’s Sale against him as the attorney-in-fact of a certain Matilde Valdez (Valdez),
married to Crispin Brual (Brual), and herein petitioners spouses Ernesto and Eugenia Tatlonghari (Sps.
Tatlonghari), setting the auction sale of properties belonging respectively to the said couples allegedly for
the satisfaction of Pedro’s indebtedness to the bank amounting to P3,000,000.00. Among others, Pedro
denied that he obtained a loan from the bank and that Sps. Tatlonghari or Valdez constituted him as an
attorney-in-fact for the purpose of mortgaging their respective properties as collateral to the bank. After the
original complaint was filed, Pedro convinced Sps. Tatlonghari to join him in the civil case against the bank.
He informed them that the bank used a falsified SPA and made it appear that they had authorized him to
obtain a loan from it, secured by a real estate mortgage on their property which was the subject of
foreclosure proceedings. As Sps. Tatlonghari did not issue any SPA or authorization in favor of Pedro, they
agreed to join him as plaintiffs in the civil case against the bank and likewise accepted the offer for Pedro’s
counsel, Atty. Bienvenido Castillo (Atty. Castillo), to represent them. On August 11, 2004, Sps. Tatlonghari
and Pedro, together with Valdez and Brual, as plaintiffs, filed an amended complaint (First Amended
Complaint) against defendants. On September 21, 2004, the defendants filed their answer. On July 22,
2005, Atty. Eliseo Magno Salva (Atty. Salva) of the Salva Salva & Salva Law Office entered the appearance
of the law firm as collaborating counsel for plaintiffs. Thereafter, plaintiffs, through Atty. Salva, filed a
Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Second Amended Complaint asserting the need to
file a Second Amended Complaint for the purpose of, inter alia, including as additional plaintiffs Sps.
Tolentino A. Sandoval (Tolentino) and Evelyn C. Sandoval (Evelyn; collectively, Sps. Sandoval), who had
previously purchased the mortgaged property of Valdez. Incidentally, Valdez and Brual had since died;
thus, the Second Amended Complaint also sought to include their estate and heirs as defendants, as the
latter’s consent to substitute their predecessors could not be secured. Additionally, Eugenia Ilagan
(Eugenia), Pedro’s spouse, was included as plaintiff. Subsequently, the RTC admitted the Second
Amended Complaint. While the case was pending, Sps. Tatlonghari allegedly discovered evidence which
led them to believe that it was Tolentino, one of their co-plaintiffs, who was responsible for involving their
property in the purportedly anomalous transactions with the bank. As Attys. Castillo and Salva, the
collaborating counsels of record, were both hired by Pedro and Tolentino, Sps. Tatlonghari decided to
engage the services of their own counsel. Thus, on August 3, 2011, Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva (Atty.
Villanueva) entered his appearance as counsel for Sps. Tatlonghari. Subsequently, Atty. Villanueva filed a
motion for leave to file third amended complaint on behalf of Sps. Tatlonghari. In their motion, they alleged
that the title to their property had already been consolidated in favor of the bank, and that the original and
amended complaints contained no allegations or prayer pertaining specifically to their cause of action
against the bank, which might bar them from getting complete relief in the civil case. Particularly, the Third
Amended Complaint fully described the property in question and stated that it was an entirely different
property from the one covered by the real estate mortgage in favor of the bank. In view thereof, Sps.
Tatlonghari prayed, inter alia, for the reconveyance of their property, which the bank maliciously and
unlawfully foreclosed and transferred in its name, and for the award of damages. The RTC denied Sps.
Tatlonghari’s motion, explaining that while it graciously allowed the second amendment of the complaint, it
can no longer allow a third amendment in view of the delay in the adjudication of the merits of the case. In
a Decision dated January 29, 2015, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
denying Sps. Tatlonghari’s motion, citing Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which states in part:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the denial of Sps. Tatlonghari’s motion for leave to file
third amended complaint.

HELD: Yes. Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right,
so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading
sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only amend his
pleading upon prior leave of court. Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading
as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is
served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a
party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court.

In this case, Sps. Tatlonghari alleged that the First and Second Amended Complaints did not contain certain
material averments that were necessary to establish their own causes of action against the bank, and that
it did not contain a prayer seeking the reconveyance of their property from the bank to them. Indeed, a
meticulous inspection of the records reveal that other than the allegation that they did not execute any SPA
in favor of Pedro authorizing him to use their property as collateral for his loan with the bank, the First and
Second Amended Complaints are bereft of any material allegations pertaining to their personal involvement
in the case against the bank. Although the First and Second Amended Complaints were replete with
allegations with regard to the causes of action of Pedro and Sps. Sandoval, it contained nothing with respect
to that of Sps. Tatlonghari. In fact, apart from the prayers seeking the declaration of nullity of the SPA that
Sps. Tatlonghari allegedly executed on behalf of Pedro and the award for damages, the Second Amended
Complaint did not seek any relief in favor of Sps. Tatlonghari; instead, it prayed for specific relief only in
favor of Sps. Sandoval, who were purportedly the true and lawful owners of the property previously
registered in the name of the deceased Valdez.

In view of the foregoing, it would have been more prudent on the part of the RTC, in the exercise of its
discretion, to allow the amendments proffered by Sps. Tatlonghari and to admit the Third Amended
Complaint. The RTC should have allowed such admission if only to prevent the circuitry of action and the
unnecessary expense of filing another complaint anew. Although it is true that the RTC exercises discretion
in this respect, it should have been more circumspect and liberal in the exercise of its discretion. With the
admission of the Third Amended Complaint, the ultimate goal of determining the case on its real facts and
affording complete relief to all the parties involved in this case would then be realized. Moreover, it appears
from the records that the inexcusable delay upon which the denial of Sps. Tatlonghari’s motion was
grounded was not their fault nor was the same deliberately caused. Records are bereft of evidence to show
that such delay was attributable to them, or that in filing their motion, they were impelled by bad faith. Thus,
while it is true that inexcusable delay would, under ordinary circumstances, justify the denial of their motion
for leave to file third amended complaint, such ground does not obtain in this case. Besides, Sps.
Tatlonghari’s motion for leave to file third amended complaint was filed before the trial of the case; hence,
the real controversies in this case would all have been presented with all the parties having ample time to
prepare for trial.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Motions>Motion For Extension

SPOUSES AMADOR C. CAYAGO, JR. AND ERMALINDA B. CAYAGO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES

EVELITO CANTARA AND SOLEDAD CANTARA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203918, December 02, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: The instant case stemmed from a complaint for forcible entry filed by Sps. Cantara against
Sps. Cayago. The MTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal, the RTC reversed the
decision. Sps. Cayago filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an order dated July 6,
2010. Sps. Cayago, through counsel, received such order of denial on July 15, 2010. Pursuant to
the Rules, Sps. Cayago had 15 days, or until July 30, 2010 within which to file a petition for review
before the CA. On July 29, 2010, Sps. Cayago filed a motion for extension of time praying for an
additional period of 15 days within which to file their petition for review. Since August 14, 2010 fell
on a Saturday, Sps. Cayago filed their petition for review with the CA on August 16, 2010. CA
dismissed the petition for being filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA propeprly dismissed the petition

HELD: No. In dismissing Sps. Cayago's petition for review for being belatedly filed, the CA held that
the mere filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for review is not enough as Sps. Cayago are
obligated to exercise due diligence to verify from the Division Clerks of Court of the appellate court
the action on their motion for extension, considering that time may run out on them, as it did in this
case. It explained that the case was raffled to the ponente on August 10, 2010 and the rollo or case
record was forwarded to his office only on January 5, 2011. As such, he could not have acted on the
motion on or before July 30, 2010, the last day for filing the petition for review.

It bears stressing that Sps. Cayago's motion for extension of time, as well as their petition for review, was
physically in the CA's possession long before the issuance of its Decision on April 14, 2011, but for reasons
completely beyo
nd their control, the motion for extension of time to file their petition belatedly reached the ponente's office
and was therefore not timely acted upon. As a result, the same was unceremoniously dismissed on
procedural grounds. As in the Zaulda case, it is a travesty of justice to dismiss outright a petition for review
which complied with the rules only because of reasons not attributable to the petitioners - Sps. Cayago in
this case - such as delay on the part of the personnel of the CA in transmitting case records to their
respective ponentes.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Dismissal of Actions>Lack of Cause of Action

WESTMONT BANK (now UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS.*), Petitioner, vs.

FUNAI PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, SPOUSES ANTONIO and SYLVIA YUTINGCO, PANAMAX
CORPORATION, PEPITO ONG NGO, RICHARD N. YU, AIMEE R. ALBA, ANNABELLE BAESA,
NENITA RESANE, and MARIA ORTIZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175733, July 8, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Funai Philippines Corporation (Funai) and Spouses Antonio and Sylvia Yutingco obtained loans
from Westmont Bank (Westmont), secured by several promissory notes (PNs). Funai and Sps.Yutingco,
the original defendants, defaulted in the payment. Hence, Westmont filed a complaint before the RTC for
sum of money with writ of preliminary attachment. RTC ordered the attachment of the personal and real
properties of the spouses, as well as the attachment of properties under the names of other persons, but
which were under the control of Sps. Yutingco. Westmont filed an Amended Complaint and Second
Amended Complaint impleading additional defendants, praying that they be declared as mere alter egos,
conduits, dummies, or nominees of Sps Yutingco to defraud their creditors, including Westmont. The
additional defendants moved to dismiss the complaints alleging that: (a) the complaints stated no cause of
action against them, considering the lack of legal tie or vinculum juris with Westmont; and (b) they were not
parties-in-interest in the case absent any proof linking them to the transaction between Westmont and the
Sps.Yutingco. RTC adjudged Sps Yutingco jointly and severally liable to Westmont. However, it dismissed
the amended and the second amended complaints of Westmont for failure to state a cause of action against
the additional defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not mere allegations are sufficient to constitute a cause of action?
HELD: No, the Amended and Second Amended Complaints are still dismissible on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC. "A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently
avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the
named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the
complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion
to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action." Judicious examinations of Westmont’s
Amended and Second Amended Complaints readily show their failure to sufficiently state a cause of action
as the allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts which would warrant an action against the additional
defendants for the collection of the amount due on the subject PNs.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Pre-Trial

ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS SANTOS and her daughters, namely, VIRGINIA, AUREA, and
BINGBING, all surnamed DELOS SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. ALBERTO ABEJON and the estate of
TERESITA DINGLASAN ABEJON, Respondents
G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: The instant case arose from a Complaint for Cancellation of Title with collection of sum of money
filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC. The complaint alleged that Erlinda and her late
husband Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro) borrowed the amount of P100,000.00 from the former's sister,
Teresita, as evidenced by a Promissory Note dated April 8, 1998.

During the pre-trial proceedings, the parties admitted and/or stipulated that: (a) the subject land was
previously covered by TCT No. 131753 in the name of Erlinda and Pedro, but such title was cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. 180286 in the name of Teresita; (b) the Deed of Sale and Release of Mortgage
executed on July 8, 1992 were forged, and thus, should be cancelled; (c) in view of said cancellations, TCT
No. 180286 should likewise be cancelled and TCT No. 131753 should be reinstated; (d) from the time when
the spurious Deed of Sale was executed until the present, Delos Santos have been the actual occupants
of the subject land as well as all improvements therein, including the three (3)-storey building constructed
by respondents; and (e) the P100,000.00 loan still subsists and that respondents paid for the improvements
being currently occupied by petitioners, i.e., the three (3)-storey building.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admissions and stipulations during the pre-trial proceedings should be honored
and, thus, should no longer be ruled about?

HELD: Yes. At the outset, it must be emphasized that a pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify
and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and
maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for
the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice
in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. It is, thus,
mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to realize the paramount objective of
simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.

The parties in this case are bound to honor the admissions and/or stipulations they made during the pre-
trial.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals>Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments

ROLANDO S. ABADILLA, JR., Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BONIFACIO P. OBRERO and BERNABELA
N. OBRERO, and JUDITH OBRERO-TIMBRESA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 210855, December 9, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: The subject matter of the present controversy is a beachfront property in Barangay 37, Calayab,
Laoag City (subject property). Respondents, together with Airways Development Corporation (Airways),
were declared as the registered owners thereof and issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 460-L on
September 20, 1999. In a subsequent action for partition, the subject property was titled in respondents’
names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38422. On September 22, 2007, claiming that the
subject property was part of a 13-hectare land previously sold to his father, Rolando S. Abadilla, Jr.
(Abadilla, Jr.) forcibly entered the subject property with the assistance of armed men. Thereafter, Abadilla,
Jr.’s men blocked the way to the apartelle erected on the subject property and demolished the other
structures found therein. This prompted respondents to file on October 1, 2007 a complaint for ejectment
(forcible entry) with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Abadilla, Jr.
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Laoag City (MTCC). Unfortunately, respondents’ application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was later on deemed abandoned.

On July 18, 2008, respondents filed the present complaint for injunction and damages before the RTC
(injunction case). Abadilla, Jr. claimed, that respondents were guilty of forum shopping, contending that
respondents were seeking the same nature of reliefs from the MTCC and the RTC arising from the same
set of facts which resulted in their dispossession of the subject property. Respondents denied having
committed forum shopping. They asseverated that the ejectment case was filed to “indicate their prior
possession of the subject property,” while the injunction case was instituted “to seek the protection of the
court and the grant of injunctive relief to prevent [Abadilla, Jr.] from inflicting further damage on their persons
and property, as well as damages.”

The RTC dismissed the injunction case with prejudice on the ground of forum shopping. Aggrieved,
respondents elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari instead of filing a notice of appeal. CA
granted respondents’ certiorari petition, and annulled and set aside the RTC Orders dismissing with
prejudice the injunction case. Moreover, the CA took cognizance of the certiorari petition, notwithstanding
that the appropriate remedy to challenge the dismissal of the complaint for injunction and damages with
prejudice is an appeal, citing the need to relax the rules to prevent irreparable damage and injury to the
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari, notwithstanding the
wrong mode of appeal taken to assail the order of dismissal of the complaint for injunction and damages
filed by respondents.

HELD: Yes. An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because
the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. As the records in this
case reveal that they received a copy of the Order dated August 11, 2010 denying their motion for
reconsideration on August 31, 2010, they had only until September 15, 2010 within which to file a notice of
appeal. However, instead of doing so, respondents erroneously filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
on October 30, 2010, or way beyond the reglementary period within which to perfect an ordinary appeal.

Given the improper remedy taken, the order of dismissal rendered by the RTC has, thus, become final and
immutable and, therefore, can no longer be altered or modified in any respect. The doctrine of immutability
of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that had already attained finality, even if the purpose of
the modification is to correct errors of fact or law. As the only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of
final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause
no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments, none of which are obtaining in this case, and considering
further that there lies no compelling reason to relax the rules of procedure, the CA erred when it took
cognizance of respondents’ certiorari petition and rendered judgment thereon.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Judgments>Immutability of Final Judgment

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, v. ALEXANDER P. BICHARA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 213729, September 02, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: PAL hired Bichara as a flight attendant. In 1971, PAL implemented a retrenchment program and
on that same year, Bichara resigned. But on May 15, 1975, he was rehired. Bichara was included in PAL's
Purser Upgrading Program as Flight Purser. As flight purser, he was required to take five (5) check rides
for his performance evaluation and earn at least an 85% rating for each ride. However, Bichara failed in the
two (2) check rides. So, Bichara was demoted to flight steward. Bichara appealed his demotion to PAL, but
no action was taken; hence, he filed a complaint for illegal demotion against PAL before the NLRC. The
labor arbiter declared Bichara's demotion as illegal, and accordingly, ordered PAL to reinstate Bichara to
his position as flight purser. PAL filed an appeal before the NLRC and later before the CA, both of which,
however, upheld LA Nora's finding. But during the pendency of the illegal demotion case before the CA,
PAL implemented another retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of Bichara's employment.
This prompted him, along with more than 1,400 other retrenched flight attendants to file a separate
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal retrenchment. On July 9, 2005, Bichara reached the 60 year-old
compulsory retirement age under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). He then filed a motion for
execution of LA Nora's June 16, 1997 Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that LA Macam to have exceeded his authority in ordering
the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement?

HELD: Yes. A judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long
and well-established rule. As such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds
the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity. A companion to this rule is
the principle of immutability of final judgments, which states that a final judgment may no longer be
altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court renders it. Any attempt
to insert, change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on
immutability of judgments. But like any other rule, this principle has exceptions, namely:

(1) the correction of clerical errors;

(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.

In this case, Labor Arbiter Macam went beyond the terms of the June 16, 1997 Decision when he, in his
February 4, 2009 Order, directed the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the payment of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement. Unlike the cases cited by the CA, which all involved illegal dismissal cases,
it would not be proper to accord such relief in this case since, in those cases, the awards of separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement were all hinged on the validity of the employee's dismissal. Here, the validity of
Bichara's termination is the subject matter of a separate caseHence, LA Macam exceeded his authority
when he ruled on this issue and directed PAL to pay Bichara separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Further, it should be pointed out that the principle of immutability of judgments, from which the above-stated
rule on writ of executions proceed, allow courts, as an exception, to recognize circumstances that transpire
after the finality of the decision which would render its execution unjust and inequitable and act accordingly.
Thus, in view of the supervening events above-mentioned, this Court deems the award of salary differential
to be the just and equitable award under the circumstances herein prevailing.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Judgement

WARLITO C. VICENTE, Petitioner, vs. ACIL CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 196461, July 15, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Acil Corporation (Acil) acquired a lot adjacent to the lot owned by Warlito Vicente (Vicente) by Free
Patent. Acil filed a complaint for cancellation of title before the RTC against Vicente, alleging that he owned
the lot as it was formed by accretion, and that Vicente encroached upon a portion of his lot. RTC dismissed
Acil’s complaint as it failed to prove the accretion. On appeal to the CA, the court upheld Vicente’s
ownership of Acil’s lot, but ruled that Vicente encroached upon a portion of said lot. Both parties were
dissatisfied, hence the appeal. Vicente claimed that there was a need to await for the proper determination
by the DENR of the exact location and area of the encroached premises. On the other hand, upon Acil’s
motion, the RTC issued of a Writ of Execution as regards the encroachment, which was opposed by Vicente
for being void, as it directed the sheriff to levy the goods, chattels and real properties of the defendants,
instead of ordering him to take custody and deliver possession of the encroached portion of land.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the appointment of a surveyor for the sheriff to execute the
Judgment?

HELD: No. Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a
writ of execution to enforce the judgment or order. Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the
suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity. As the RTC correctly
held that there is no need for the appointment of a surveyor for the sheriff to execute the judgment,
considering that the CA in its decision has already identified the encroachment as the shaded portion in
Acil’s exhibit. No grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the trial court. The writ of execution it
issued conformed to the judgment to be executed and adhered strictly to the very essential particulars.
Thus, there appears to be no more reasonable basis to thwart the judgment’s execution. On this basis, the
court finds no need for the appointment of a surveyor for the sheriff to execute the judgment.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Actions>Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration

GENPACT SERVICES, INC., and DANILO SEBASTIAN REYES, Petitioners,

vs. MARIA KATRINA SANTOS-FALCESO, JANICE ANN M. MENDOZA, and JEFFREY S. MARIANO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Genpact is engaged in business process outsourcing particularly servicing various multinational
clients, including Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). On different dates from 2007 to 2011, Genpact
hired respondents Santos-Falceso, Mendoza and Mariano (respondents) to various positions to service its
Allstate accounts. However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its account resulting in respondents being
placed on floating status, and eventually, terminated from service. This prompted respondents to file a
complaint before the NLRC. Respondents alleged that after Allstate terminated its contract with Genpact,
resulting in respondents they were initially placed on “benching” status with pay, and after 5 months,
Genpact gave them the option to either voluntarily resign or be involuntarily terminated on the ground of
redundancy with severance pay of ½ month basic salary for every year of service, in either case. They
chose the latter and were made to sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any and all forms of monetary
benefits. They argued that the termination of Genpact and Allstate’s agreement neither amounted to a
closure of business nor justified their retrenchment. LA dismissed respondents’ claim for lack of merit which
was affirmed by the NLRC. CA dismissed outright the petition purely on procedural grounds: failure to file
a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to elevating the case to the CA is a fatal infirmity which
rendered their petition for certiorari before the latter court dismissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. This notwithstanding, the foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions. A judicious review of the
records reveals that the exceptions in items (d-where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless) and (e-where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extremely urgency for relief) are attendant in this case. Sec. 15, Rule VII [37] of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, as amended, provides, among others, that the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may
be availed of once by each party. In this case, only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, petitioners also had an opportunity to file such motion
in this case, should they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived petitioners
of such opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their right to due process. All told, petitioners were
completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. To rule otherwise would be clearly antithetical to the tenets of fair play, not to mention
the undue prejudice to petitioner’s rights. Thus, in light of the fact that the CA dismissed outright the petition
for certiorari before it solely on procedural grounds, a remand of the case for a resolution on the merits is
warranted.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration; Rules on payment of
docket fees

ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS, Petitioner,

vs. THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. and ROLANDO OGSOS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 221062, October 5, 2016.
(First Division)

FACTS: Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico, entered into a Contract of Lease covering 5 parcels
of agricultural land owned by the latter with the agreement that the former agreed to pay the latter 230
piculs or 290.95 liquid-kilogram (lkg.) of centrifugal sugar every crop year, starting from crop year 1994-
1995 to crop year 2000-2001, as lease rental. After two years, the term of the lease contract was extended
for 3 years, or until the end of crop year 2004, due to Ogsos, Sr.’s improvements on the leased premises.
Thereafter, the contract was amended to from 230 piculs or 290.95 lkg. of centrifugal sugar every crop year
to P150,000.00 cash, beginning the crop year 1996-1997. Petitioners filed a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages claiming that the lease rentals from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 1998-
1999 were not paid. They did not include in their claim the lease rentals for crop year 1999-2000 because
respondents had already abandoned the leased premises since the said crop year. Respondents alleged
that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as embodied in the lease contract and its subsequent
amendments. They denied abandoning the leased premises and claimed that the Petitioners unlawfully
took possession of the leased premised sometime in December 1998. The respondents also averred that
since crop years 1994 to 1997-1998, the average production of sugarcane is 1,308.68 lkg. of sugar and
30.409 tons of molasses per year, as computed based on the Planter's Production Reports. Thus, when
petitioners took possession of the leased premises, respondents lost their profits equivalent to the aforesaid
production starting from crop year 1999-2000 until the termination of the lease contract on crop year 2003-
2004.24 Accordingly, respondents filed a counterclaim for these lost profits plus damages. In 2006,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss respondents' counterclaim arguing that the same were permissive and
that respondents had not paid the appropriate docket fees. However, the RTC, in its November 16, 2006
Order, denied the said motion, declaring respondents' counterclaim as compulsory; thus, holding that the
payment of the required docket fees was no longer necessary.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was filed out
of time?

ISSUE #2: Whether or not respondents' counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not permissive in
nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is required?

HELD #1: No. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time
begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall
not run until the next working day. Since March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday, petitioner and Kathryn were
completely justified in filing their motion for reconsideration on the next working day: Monday, March 31,
2014. Accordingly, the CA should not have considered it filed out of time, and instead, resolved such motion
on the merits. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA
for resolution on the merits. However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of
the merits may be had — as in this case — the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of
remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of
justice. In view of the foregoing — as well as the fact that petitioner prayed for the resolution of the
substantive issues on the merits — the Court finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this
case.

HELD #2: No. Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the
counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand,
the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals
REMEDIAL LAW > Evidence> Forgery

DAMASO T. AMBRAY and CEFERINO T. AMBRAY, JR.,*Petitioners,

vs
SYLVIA A. TSOUROUS, CARMENCITA AMBRAY-LAUREL, HEDY AMBRAY-AZORES, VIVIEN
AMBRAY-YATCO, NANCY AMBRAY-ESCUDERO, MARISTELA AMBRAY-ILAGAN, ELIZABETH
AMBRAY-SORIANO, MA. LUISA FE AMBRAY-ARCILLA, and CRISTINA AMBRAY-
LABIT, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016]

(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioners and respondents are siblings. With the exception of Sylvia, there are he children of the
late Ceferino Ambray (Ceferino, Sr.) and Estela Trias (Estela), who passed away on February 5, 1987 and
August 15, 2002, respectively. During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several properties, one
of which was a parcel of land located in San Pablo City, Laguna denominated as Lot 2 of subdivision plan
Pcs-12441, with an area of 4,147 square meters, more or less, covered by TCT No. T-11259 of the Register
of Deeds of San Pablo City (Lot 2). On December 28, 1977, Ceferino, Sr. mortgaged Lot 2 with Manila
Bank for the amount of P180,000.00. The mortgage was discharged on September 16, 1984. Prior to the
discharge of the mortgage or sometime in August 1984, Lot 2 was subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot 2-A,
Lot 2-B, and the subject property, Lot 2-C, resulting in the cancellation ofTCT No. T-11259. Lot 2-C was
registered in Ceferino, Sr.' s name in accordance with his letter dated August 29, 1984 requesting the
Register of Deeds of San Pablo City to register Lot 2-C in his name. Thus, TCT No. T-22749 was issued
covering the said parcel under the name of Ceferino, Sr., married to Estela. In June 1996, Maristela
discovered that TCT No. T-22749 covering Lot 2-C had been cancelled and in its stead, TCT No. T-41382
was issued in the name of petitioners.1âwphi1 It appears that by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale (Deed of Sale) dated January 16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr., with the consent of Estela, allegedly sold "a
portion of lot 2 of the consolidation subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-12441" to petitioners for a consideration of
P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City only on
February 5, 1996.This prompted respondents to file a criminal case for falsification of public document
against petitioners, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Damaso T Ambray and Ceferino T Ambray" and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 39153 (falsification case) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of San Pablo City. In a Decision dated October 30, 2000, the MTCC acquitted petitioners of the charge for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, respondents filed the
instant complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against petitioners and Estela
(defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. SP-5831(01), alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of
Sale were null and void because the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries.
Thereafter, respondents filed the instant complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages
against petitioners and Estela (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. SP-5831(01), alleging that TCT
No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were null and void because the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela
thereon were forgeries. RTC nullified the subject Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-41382 to which the CA
affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the nullification by the CA of the Deed of Sale and the TCT correct.

HELD. No. At the outset, it should be pointed out that, as a general rule, a re-examination of factual findings
cannot be done by the Court acting on a petition for review on certiorari because it is not a trier of facts and
only reviews questions of law. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. Finding a confluence of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal issues
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, and
the Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between
the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized to have been forged.

Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the
following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over
allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who
was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.

The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. Case law holds that for the said rule to
apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony
or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties
or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the
present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former
trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former case. The reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former
trial or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former
testimony can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the
party must establish the basis for the admission of testimony in the realm of admissible evidence.

Further lending credence to the validity of the Deed of Sale is the well-settled principle that a duly notarized
contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and
credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this legal presumption, evidence must be clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a
spurious contract.

Hence, for the above-state reasons, whatever inferences the RTC had observed tending to defeat the
existence of a valid sale in favor of petitioners are rendered inconsequential.

In particular, the RTC noted, and found it puzzling, that the Deed of Sale did not specifically mention the
exact area that was being sold to petitioners, disposing only of "a portion of lot 2" without specifying the
metes and bounds thereof. As such, the RTC concluded that Ceferino, Sr. could not have sold a specific
portion of Lot 2 to petitioners, having been subdivided only in 1984. However, Article 1463 of the Civil Code
expressly states that "[t]he sole owner of a thing may sell an undivided interest therein." As Ceferino, Sr.
was the sole owner of the original Lot 2 from whence came Lot 2-C, he is therefore allowed by law to convey
or sell an unspecified portion thereof. Hence, the disposition of Lot 2-C to petitioners, a portion of Lot 2 yet
to be subdivided in 1978, was therefore valid.

That Ceferino, Sr. requested the registration of the title of Lot 2-C in his name in 1984, while the property
was supposed to have already been sold to petitioners in 1978, was likewise fully explained during trial.
Damaso clarified that their parents were apprehensive that he and Ceferino might mortgage or squander
the property while they were still alive. Moreover, despite knowledge of the sale, they did not demand for
its immediate registration because during their father's lifetime, they never questioned his decisions. This
further explains why, despite the disposition in petitioners' favor, it was Ceferino, Sr. himself who leased
Lot 2-C to third parties, which Damaso renewed in his father's name after the latter's death. The delay in
the transfer of the title over Lot 2-C to petitioners was also occasioned by the fact that Estela kept the Deed
of Sale in her custody and gave it to petitioners only later on, by reason of her poor health.Be that as it may,
and to reiterate, the delay in the registration of the sale in favor of petitioners neither affects nor invalidates
the same, in light of the authenticity of the Deed of Sale itself.

In fine, the CA and the RTC both erred in finding that the Deed of Sale was of spurious origin. The
authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Sale must be upheld against the assumptions made by the
RTC in its Decision. Accordingly, TCT No. T-41382 covering Lot 2-C in the name of petitioners remain valid.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals

ROSALIE SY AYSON, Petitioner, v. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., AND FAIRWAYS AND

BLUEWATER RESORT AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 223254, December 01, 2016

FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., AND FAIRWAYS & BLUEWATER RESORT & COUNTRY CLUB,
INC., Petitioners, v. ROSALIE SY AYSON, Respondent.
GR. No. 223269
(First Division)

FACTS: Rosalie Ayson claimed that she purchased a 1000 sq. m. parcel of land situated in Yapak, Malay,
Aklan from Divina Marte Villanueva. Sometime in June 1997, Ayson discovered that Fil-Estate and Fairways
had entered into the possession of the said property and included it as part of its golf course without the
former's consent and authorization. Despite receipt of a Notice to Cease and Desist from Ayson, Fil-Estate
and Fairways continued their encroachment and development of the subject land making it now a part of
the entire golf course. Thus, she was constrained to file the instant complaint.

Fil-Estate alleged that it had a joint venture agreement with Villanueva for the development of the Fairways
and Bluewater Resort Golf and Country Club, and that Villanueva had said several parcels of land that she
owned, including the one sold to Ayson, on the condition that they would agree to a land swap if
development should push through.

RTC ruled in favor of Ayson, awarding damages including moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees. The RTC, however, no longer ordered the return of the parcel of land due to the losses to
be incurred by Fil-Estate by reason of all the costs associated with the exclusion of the said lot. Both parties,
dissatisfied with the decision, appealed to the CA. The CA maintained the decision of the RTC with a few
changes to the amounts, and reducing substantially the moral damages in favor of Ayson. Dissatisfied, both
parties once more appealed by means of Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 was proper?

HELD: No. To recapitulate, both the RTC and the CA found that Ayson is the undisputed owner of the
subject land, as evidenced by TCT No. T-24562. Despite such knowledge, Fil-Estate and Fairways
nevertheless chose to rely on Villanueva's empty assurances that she will be able to convince Ayson to
agree on a land swap arrangement; and thereafter, proceeded to enter the subject land and introduce
improvements thereon. The courts a quo further found that since such acts were without Ayson's knowledge
and consent, she, thus: (a) suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish knowing that the property she and
her husband had invested for their future retirement had been utilized by Fil-Estate and Fairways for their
own sake; and (b) had to seek legal remedies to vindicate her rights. Thus, both lower courts concluded
that Fil-Estate and Fairways' acts were done in bad faith and resulted in injury to Ayson; hence, they are
liable for, inter alia, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The findings of Fil-Estate
and Fairways’ bad faith, as well as their liability for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees, are all factual matters which are not within the ambit of the instant petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In this regard, it has long been settled that factual findings of the trial
court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, save for certain
exceptions, which Fil-Estate and Fairways failed to show in this case — at least regarding this issue.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals, Docket Fees

JULIUS BAUTISTA, ARSENIO LARANANG, REYNALDO BALD EM OR, CARMELITA MANAYAN,

NORMA FLORES, CONSUELO ESTIGOY, CARMELITA VALMONTE, SIMEON MARTIN,
MAGDALENA GADIAN, JOSE GINNO DELA MERCED, JOVEN SILAN, JR, JULIO DIAZ, GIDEON
ACOSTA, and WENCESLA BAUTISTA,Petitioners
vs.
LT. COL. BENITO DONIEGO, JR., LT. COL. ALFREDO PATARATA, and MAJOR GENERAL
GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, Respondents

[G.R. No. 218665, July 20, 2016]

(First Division)

FACTS: On June 24, 2013, Bautista et al. filed a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the issuance of
a TRO and award of damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Palayan City (MTCC) against
respondents. They alleged that beginning March 2013, respondents, with the help of soldiers from Fort
Magsaysay, by means of stealth, strategy, force, threat, and intimidation, entered the parcels of land located
at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City (subject land) which they have been occupying in the concept of owner
for more than ten (10) years. In defense, respondents denied the allegations and claimed that it was
Bautista, et al. who surreptitiously entered the subject land despite knowledge that it was part of the Fort
Magsaysay Military Reservation since December 19, 1955 pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 237,
s. 1955 of then President Ramon Magsaysay. They also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages. After due proceedings, the MTCC rendered its Decision dated October 8, 2013, directing the
respondents and all persons acting on their behalf to vacate the subject land and to peacefully turn over
the premises to Bautista, et al. In a Decision dated December 9, 2014, the RTC reversed and set aside the
MTCC Decision. Finding respondents to be the lawful possessors of the subject land, it ordered Bautista, et
al. to vacate and peacefully turn over the same to the former. In so ruling, the RTC declared that Presidential
Proclamation No. 1033, s. 2006 did not state, expressly or impliedly, that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) was to be dispossessed of the subject land and that the purpose thereof was merely
changed from military reservation to off-base housing. On June 16, 2015, the CA issued its assailed
Resolution merely noting without action, inter alia: (a) Bautista, et al. 's Petition- for Review with the
payment of docket fees; (b) Bautista, et al. 's Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO; and (c) Bautista, et
al. 's Omnibus Motion for Clarification and Resolution (Re: Assigned Docket Numbers). The CA's action
was in connection with its earlier Resolution dated March 9, 2015 denying J. Bautista's Motion for Extension
and consequently, expunged the case from the records.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in merely noting without action Bautista, et al.' s Petition for Review
and other subsequent pleadings, thus, denying them due course.

HELD. Yes. Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other
lawful fees, depositing the amount of ₱500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the
adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of
the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period,
the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition
for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.
Thus, for appellate jurisdiction to attach, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the petitioner
must have invoked the jurisdiction of the CA within the time for doing so; (b) he must have filed his petition
for review within the reglementary period; (c) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and (d) the
other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time. In this regard, the Rules of Court require that
in an appeal by way of a petition for review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the
timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. To perfect the appeal, the party
has to file the petition for review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its
intent are clear and unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the docket
fees.5Consequently, without the petition, the CA cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Applying the foregoing parameters, the appellate jurisdiction did not attach with the filing of J. Bautista's
Motion for Extension.1âwphi1 Notably, the pleading filed was a mere motion for extension and not a petition
for review, and there was no payment of the required docket fees. Besides, J. Bautista filed the motion
ostensibly on behalf of the rest of the petitioners in the courts a quo but records are bereft of evidence to
show that they had authorized him to do so. The Court also notes that J. Bautista filed the motion after
receipt only of the RTC's December 9, 2014 Decision, from which all of the petitioners (Bautista, et
al.) seasonably filed their Motion for Reconsideration: Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 139159-UDK, the CA did
not acquire appellate jurisdiction for two (2) reasons: one, it was merely a Motion for Extension and not a
proper Petition for Review, and two, there was no payment of the required docket fees.

However, the same does not hold true with respect to the Petition for Review subsequently filed by
Bautista, et al., which was originally docketed as CA-G.R. 139764. The said petition was filed together with
the payment of docket and other lawful fees and assailed not only the December 9, 2014 Decision of the
RTC, but also the March 10, 2015 Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Records show that
Bautista, et al. filed their Petition for Review within the fifteen (15) day period after their receipt of the Order
denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, therefore, the Petition for Review was properly filed, and
the CA acquired appellate jurisdiction over the case.

In view of the foregoing, the CA committed reversible error in merely noting without action the Petition for
Review, as well as the subsequent pleadings that Bautista, et al. had filed. The Petition for Review initially
docketed as CA-G.R. 139764 was an entirely new and distinct pleading assailing the RTC's issuances and
did not proceed from the Motion for Extension filed by J. Bautista, which the CA had already ordered
expunged from the records. As such, with the expunction of J. Bautista's Motion for Extension, the docket
number previously assigned to it should not have been re-assigned to the properly and seasonably-filed
Petition for Review. To note, the CA would not have designated the appropriate docket number to the
Petition for Review had it not found the same to be in order.

In fine, considering that Bautista, et al. had duly perfected their appeal upon the timely filing of their Petition
for Review together with payment of the prescribed docket and other lawful fees, the CA had already
acquired appellate jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, it is only proper that the CA reinstate and re-
docket the same.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals>Petition For Review On Certiorari Under Rule
45>Quantum Of Evidence

MELVIN P. MALLO, Petitioner, vs. SOUTHEAST ASIAN COLLEGE, INC. and EDITA ENATSU,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 212861, October 14, 2015
(First Division)

Facts: The instant case arose from a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and
underpayment of salary/wages, damages, and attorney’s fees filed by Mallo against Southeast Asian
College, Inc before the NLRC.

Mallo alleged that SACI first hired him as a Probationary Full-Time Faculty Member of its College of Nursing
and Midwifery with the rank of Assistant Professor C for (SY) 2007-20088 and, thereafter, his employment
was renewed for the succeeding semesters until the Summer Semester of SY 2010-2011.10

In 2011, Mallo inquired about his teaching load for the First Semester of SY 2011-2012, but SACI only
responded that teaching assignments for the semester were yet to be given to faculty members. Claiming
that he was already a permanent employee of SACI petitioner demanded that he be given his corresponding
teaching load. However, Dr. Curato simply retorted that the school was under no obligation to give him any
teaching loads for the semester because he was merely a contractual employee. Thus, Mallo was
constrained to file the instant complaint against respondent.

In July 2012, the Labor Arbiter Ruling found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. In December 2012
NLRC affirmed the LA decision. In 2014 the Court of Appeals modified the NLRC ruling and, thereby,
declared petitioner to have abandoned his job It held that while petitioner had indeed attained the status of
a regular employee, there was no illegal dismissal to speak of as the evidence on record failed to show any
overt or positive act on respondents' part to terminate his employment.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled there was no illegal dismissal and that petitioner
abandoned his job.

Held: Yes. A scrutiny of the records reveals that their factual findings differ as to whether or not Mallo was
illegally dismissed or had abandoned his job. In this regard, it bears stressing that in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the scope of the Court's judicial review is generally confined
to errors of law and does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
lower courts and/or quasi-judicial agencies had based their determination. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the
factual findings of the LA and the NLRC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded not only great
respect, but also finality, and are deemed binding upon the Court so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. However, in instances where there is a divergence in the findings of facts of the
NLRC and that of the CA, there is a need for the Court to review the records to determine which of them
should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts, as in this case.

Here, Mallo insists that respondents illegally dismissed him because the latter failed to give him any
teaching load for the First Semester of SY 2011-2012. On the other hand, respondents vehemently deny
Mallo's claims, maintaining that they promptly gave him his teaching assignment and that the latter even
initially accepted the same, but such assignment was eventually turned down due to a conflict in schedule
with his new employment in another school.

In termination cases, the onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal
was not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure to discharge such onus would mean that the dismissal
was not justified and, therefore, illegal.

The records readily show that as early as April 2011, respondents already assigned Mallo a teaching load
for the First Semester of SY 2011- 2012 as a Clinical Instructor for SACI students to be assigned at NCMH,
which the latter accepted. Unfortunately, Mallo failed the qualifying tests at NCMH twice, thus, virtually
disqualifying him from performing his work as SACI's Clinical Instructor thereat. Despite these
developments, respondents were able to remedy the situation, albeit belatedly, by assigning Mallo as a
Clinical Instructor at UDMC instead, as shown in the Tentative Faculty Loading dated June 24, 2011. In
view of the foregoing, the Court is inclined to hold that respondents never dismissed Mallo from his job.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals>Withdrawal Of Appeals

COMMISSIONERS OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILS.)

CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 212920, September 16, 2015
(First Division)

Facts: Nippon is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws which is primarily
engaged in the business of freight forwarding. It is a Value-Added Tax (VAT) registered entity. In 2004,
Nippon filed an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized input VAT in for the year 2002 before the
BIR. A day later, or on April 23, 2004, it filed a judicial claim for tax refund, by way of petition for review,
before the CTA.

In August 2011, the CTA Division partially granted Nippon's claim for tax refund, and thereby ordered the
CIR to issue a tax credit certificate in representing its unutilized input VAT which was attributable to its zero-
rated sales. In a Resolution dated July 31, 2012, the CTA Division granted Nippon's motion to withdraw
and, thus, considered the case closed and terminated. In 2013, the CTA En Banc affirmed the July 31,
2012 Resolution of the CTA Division granting Nippon's motion to withdraw

Issue: Whether the CTA properly granted Nippon’s motion to withdraw.

Held: Yes. When the case is deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing
of the appellee’s brief may still be allowed in the discretion of the court. A perusal of the Revised Rules of
the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA) reveals the lack of provisions governing the procedure for the withdrawal
of pending appeals before the CTA. Hence, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 1 of the RRCTA, and the Rules of
Court shall suppletorily apply: Sec. 3 Applicability of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court in the Philippines
shall apply suppletorily to these Rules. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court · an adjunct rule to the appellate
procedure in the CA under Rules 42, 43, 44, and 46 of the Rules of Court which are equally adopted in the
RRCTA · states that when the case is deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after
the filing of the appellee’s brief may still be allowed in the discretion of the court.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Certiorari>Extension of Time to File

CENTRAL BICOL STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,

ATTY. MARIO T. BERNALES, Petitioner, v. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY
GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. AND GAWAD KALINGA FOUNDATION, INC.
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, JOSE LUIS OQUIÑENA, * AND ITS CAMARINES
SUR CHAPTER HEAD, HARRY AZANA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 210861, July 29, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Province of Camarines Sur allocated for a housing project parcels of land initially granted to
CBSUA pursuant to BP 198. CBSUA filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, possession and damages,
with prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Province
and GKFI. RTC denied CBSUA’s application for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.

CBSUA’s MR was denied in an Order, a copy of which CBSUA received on October 17, 2011, which gave
CBSUA 60 days or until December 16, 2011 within which to assail the RTC’s Orders via petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. OSG seek an additional period of 10 days or until December 26,
2011 within which to file its petition for certiorari. CBSUA filed its petition for certiorari on December 26,
2011.

CA denied the motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari and dismissed outright the petition
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction filed by CBSUA for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not under the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, extensions for the filing of petitions for certiorari have been completely disallowed?

HELD: No. Under exceptional cases, the Court has held that the 60-day period may be extended subject
to the court’s sound discretion. As a general rule, under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a petition for certiorari must
be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.

The Court laid down the following recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the 60-day
reglementary period: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party
by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance
of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

In this case, the RTC itself recognized the existence of laws which mandated the transfer of ownership over
the subject land, among others, to CBSUA. Were it not for the latter’s failure to have effected the registration
of the certificate of title under its name, then there appears to be no standing objection against the
enforcement of those laws. In addition, records show that CBSUA has been in possession of the subject
land. Thus, it would serve the interest of substantial justice for the CA to rule upon the merits of this case
rather than dismiss the petition before it on a mere procedural technicality, it being shown, to the satisfaction
of the Court, that the above-highlighted grounds to relax the rules obtain.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals>Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45)

FORTUNATO R. BARON, et. al., Petitioners, vs. EPE TRANSPORT, INC. AND/OR ERNESTO P.
ENRIQUEZ, Respondents
G.R. No. 202645, August 05, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Bersabal and other EPE's taxi drivers filed a complaint for violation of the CBA, unfair labor
practice, refund of overcharged boundary, and money claims against. Three (3) days after, Baron, Bersabal
and Melendres claimed that they were no longer allowed to use their taxi unit and prevented from entering
EPE's premises. Consequently, they filed another complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice,
separation pay, and attorney's fees. Respondents denied that petitioners were dismissed as the latter
themselves failed to return to work. That after they filed separate complaints for violation of the CBA and
unfair labor practice, petitioners suddenly went on absence without official leave (AWOL) and subsequently
filed the instant suit. LA dismissed petitioners' illegal dismissal case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter and lack of cause of action, however, NLRC reversed and set aside it. CA, on the other hand
reinstated LA’s decision, hence, petitioners filed for petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not questions of facts may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari?

HELD: Yes. It should be pointed out that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely re-
examine the evidence presented by the contending parties. Nevertheless, the divergence in the findings of
fact by the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and that of the CA on the other - as in this case - is a
recognized exception for the Court to open and scrutinize the records to determine whether the CA, in the
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
ruling that petitioners were illegally dismissed.

To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court
or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion
connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. It has also
been held that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. The existence of such patent violation evinces that the
assailed judicial or quasi-judicial act is tainted with the quality of whim and caprice, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Tested against these considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in granting
respondents' certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding petitioners to
have been illegally dismissed. The NLRC's ruling cannot be equated to a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment since its pronouncement of illegal dismissal squares with existing legal principles.
In a catena of cases, the Court has held that the onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure to discharge such onus would
mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Petition For Review On Certiorari

OKS DESIGNTECH, INC. REPRESENTED BY ZAMBY O. PONGAD, Petitioner,

vs. MARY JAYNE L. CACCAM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211263, August 05, 2015
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: OKS DesignTech, Inc. hired Caccam under a Contract of Employment for a Fixed Period for five
months and was renewed for one year. Before the contract ends, Caccam received a letter signed by the
Company Manager informing her of such expiration. Claiming to be summarily dismissed, she then filed a
complaint for dismissal on the ground that she was a regular employee and was not afforded the
opportunity to be heard.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that she was illegally dismissed since the first contract signed was deemed a
probationary contract and that by extending it for another year, she attained the status of a regular employee
who may be dismissed only for just or authorized cause.
On appeal to the NLRC, it reversed and set aside the LA's decision and instead, dismissed the complaint.
It ruled that Caccam was a fixed-term employee and not a regular one whose employment may be validly
terminated upon the expiration of her contract. MR was denied.
Caccam elevated the matter to CA via petition for certiorari. CA reversed NLRC’s Decision, ruling that the
terms and conditions of the first contract and the second contract negated a fixed-term employment since
they state that respondent's employment may be terminated prior to the expiration thereof for "just or
authorized cause or when the EMPLOYEE fails to meet the reasonable standards made known to him by
the EMPLOYER." MR was denied. OKS Designtech then filed a petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance of petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 which does not raise a question of law.
HELD: Yes. It is well-settled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely
examine the evidence presented by the contending parties. Nevertheless, the divergence in the findings of
fact by the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and that of the CA, on the other, is a recognized exception
for the Court to open and scrutinize the records to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of
its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that
respondent was not illegally dismissed.
Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all
in contemplation of law. It has also been held that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. The existence of such patent
violation evinces that the assailed judicial or quasi-judicial act is snared with the quality of whim and caprice,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Here, the CA erroneously granted Caccam's certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in ruling that respondent was legally dismissed. Caccam was found to have been hired under a
valid fixed-period employment contract and her employment was lawfully terminated upon its expiration
without need of any further notice. Hence, the CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC which, in fact, correctly found respondent not to have been illegally dismissed.
Petitioner ultimately seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the demolition of the structures which
they — as opposed to respondents' version — claim to be located in the Diplomatic and Consular Area,
and hence, outside of the JUSMAG Area.

Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish:
(a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that
there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the
absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative
remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent or
future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a
ground for injunction.
Here, the petitioner failed to prove that the structures for which they seek protection against demolition fall
within the Diplomatic and Consular Area – thus, failed to show they have a right in esse to be protected.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals

SPOUSES EDMOND LEE AND HELEN HUANG, Petitioners, v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 218867, February 17, 2016
[First Division]

FACTS: Spouses Lee and Huang are the owners of parcels of land. These properties were compulsorily
acquired by the DAR in accordance to CARL. DAR offered a sum as just compensation but the spouses
rejected the valuation. Thus, they file a petition before the RTC a for the determination of just compensation.
The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. The respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order
dated June 14, 2002. In September 2006, the spouses moved for the execution of the RTC’s decision but
was opposed by the respondent alleging that it filed a Notice of Appeal on June 19, 2002, as such, RTC’s
decision was not yet final and executory. The RTC gave due course to the respondent’s appeal and directed
that the entire records be transferred to the CA. After almost 5 years, the spouses filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal for failure to prosecute asserting that from the time the RTC gave due course to its appeal,
respondent had not made any further action on its appeal, particularly with regard to the payment of the
appeal fees. RTC, thus, dismissed the appeal. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was perfected.

HELD: No. Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that within the period for taking an appeal,
the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from,
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall
be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal. In Gipa
v. Southern Luzon Institute, citing Gonzales v. Pe, the Court clarified the requirement of full payment
of docket and other lawful fees under the above-quoted rule in this wise: The procedural requirement
under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is
not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC
to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paving the full amount of the appellate
docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment
of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. After
a punctilious review of the records of this case, the Court finds that respondent failed to perfect its
appeal before the RTC by not paying the full amount of the prescribed appellate docket fees.
Consequently, the RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the case and, as a matter of discretion, properly
dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Actions>Mandamus

FELICITO M. MEJORADO, Petitioner, vs. HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondent
G.R. No. 214430, March 9, 2016
First Division

FACTS: Felicito Mejorado documented 62 smuggled oil importations from 1991 to 1997 of Union Refinery
Corporation (URC), OILINK Industrial Corporation (OILINK), Union Global Trading, and Philippine Airlines
(PAL). He provided confidential information to the Bureau of Customs (BOC) which lead to the latter’s
investigation of the 23 out of 62 smuggled oil importations he reported. The investigation resulted in the
payment of the four (4) companies of millions in unpaid Value-Added Tax (VAT), excise, and ad valorem
tax. Thus, he filed his first claim for informer’s reward with the BOC and Department of Finance.
Subsequently, BOC investigated 30 additional smuggled oil importations out of the 62 Mejorado reported.
From this investigation, it was able to collect deficiency taxes from URC, OILINK and PAL prompting
Mejorado to file his second claim for informer’s fee. Mejorado was able to receive his first claim for informer’s
reward. However, he was not able to receive his second claim for informer’s reward because the DBM has
not issued any Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) due to its pending determination whether the provisions of
Tariff and Customs Code on informer’s award or that of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 should be applied.
Hence, Mejorado filed a petition for mandamus praying that DBM be directed to issue the NCA covering
his second claim and that the amount thereof be released to him with legal interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DBM may be compelled by mandamus to issue NCA to Mejorado

HELD: No. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to
enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. In Star Special
Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto Princesa City, a case cited at length by petitioner himself,
the Court elucidated that the writ of mandamus, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is
not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a
substantial doubt exists, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.

It bears reiteration that the writ of mandamus may only issue if the party claiming it has a well-defined,
clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded, and that it was the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required to accord the same upon him. Petitioner's prayer for the issuance of the NCA to
cover the amount of his second claim falls short of this standard, there being no clear and specific duty on
the part of the respondent to issue the same.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Actions>Mandamus

CITY OF DAVAO, represented by RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, in his capacity as City Mayor, RIZALINA
JUSTOL, in her capacity as the City Accountant, and ATTY. WINDEL E. A VISADO, in his capacity
as City Administrator, Petitioners,
vs. ROBERT E. OLANOLAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181149, April 17, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Robert E Olanolan, respondent herein was elected the Punong Barangay of Brgy 76-A. An election
protest was filed by the opposing candidate, Celso Tizon which was later on granted by the COMELEC. He
later on filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was given due course. Hence he was reinstated in the
disputed office. Upon his reinstatement, respondent presided over as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A
which, in the regular course of business, passed Ordinance No. 01, Series of 2005,11 on January 5, 2005,
otherwise known as the "General Fund Annual Budget of Barangay Bucana for Calendar Year 2005".
Records clearly show that respondent's proclamation as Punong Barangay was overturned by the
COMELEC upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later declared the duly-elected Punong
Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. While the Court en bane indeed issued an SQAO on November 9, 2004 which
temporarily reinstated respondent to the disputed office, the same was recalled on March 31, 2005. On this
basis, the City of Davao refused to recognize all acts and transactions made and entered into by respondent
as Punong Barangay after his receipt of the Recall Order as it signified his immediate ouster from the
disputed office. He then filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC seeking to compel petitioner to allow
the release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred under his administration. RTC denied the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC's dismissal of respondent's mandamus petition?

HELD: Yes. "Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the
act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, the Court
explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to
one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.

In this case, respondent has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. To
recount, respondent filed a mandamus petition before the RTC, seeking that petitioner, as city government,
release the funds appropriated for Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the compensation of barangay
employees, and all funds that in the future may accrue to Brgy. 76-A, including legal interests until full
payment.

Petitioner could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed for by respondent in
view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that "mandamus only lies to enforce the performance
of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative
and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means
the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according
to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of
others."

In this case, petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds to
respondent considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay
of Brgy. 76-A. Surely, it was part of petitioner's fiscal responsibility to ensure that the barangay funds
would not be released to a person without proper authority.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Action>Extrajudicial Foreclosure>Implementation Of Writ Of
Possession

AQA GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211649, August 12, 2015

JE-AN SUPREME BUILDERS AND SALES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent
G.R. No. 211742
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Plantersbank extra judicially foreclosed KTC’s mortgaged properties when the latter defaulted
payment of its loan to the former. KTC likewise failed to redeem the said properties. Thereafter,
Plantersbank applied for a writ of possession, which was granted by the RTC. The writ of possession was
issued to AQA Global Construction which occupied the subject properties at that time.
AQA filed a Motion to be excluded from the implementation of the writ claiming that its possession is adverse
to KTC and stemmed from a contract of lease with Je-an Supreme Builders. Je-an also filed an affidavit to
stay the implementation of the writ, alleging that its right to possess was separate and distinct from that of
KTC and was derived from a Contract to Sell.
RTC issued an order excluding AQA and Je-an from the implementation of the writ on the ground that they
are third parties which did not derive title from KTC. Motion for consideration was denied.
Plantersbank elevated the matter to CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA ruled that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in staying the implementation of the writ of possession against AQA and
Je-An. It held that when a writ of possession had already been issued, the adverse third party seeking to
vindicate its claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed properties may avail of the
cumulative remedies of: (a) terceria to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of
the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor; and (b) an independent separate action.
Motions for consideration were denied.
AQA and Je-an thereafter filed petitions for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the implementation of writ of possession of a property subject of a foreclosure sale
but in the possession of a third party by virtue of a Contract to Sell may be stayed in favor of such
third party?

2. Whether or not the remedies of an adverse party to a writ of possession of a property are limited to
terceria and an independent separate action?
HELD:
1. No. The general rule is that after the lapse of the redemption period, the purchaser in a foreclosure
sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased who is entitled to the possession of
the said property. Upon ex parte petition, it is ministerial upon the trial court to issue the writ of
possession in his favor. The exception, however, is provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules which applies suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages. Under the
said provision of law, the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in
the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment debtor.
For the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third party, but
also held by him adversely to the judgment obligor - such as that of a co-owner, agricultural tenant
or usufructuary, who possess the property in their own right and not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of, or privy to, the judgment obligor.
 In this case, petitioners’ claim of right of possession is not adverse to the judgment obligor. A
Contract to Sell is legally insufficient to transfer title in its favor absent a deed of conveyance duly
executed by the vendor and, at most, affords it a mere inchoate right over the said properties.

Clearly, the stay of the implementation of the writ of possession prayed for by Je-An on the basis
of such inchoate right would becloud the integrity and derogate the indefeasibility of the torrens title
issued in favor of Plantersbank as a confirmed owner. Corollarily, the enforcement of the writ of
possession cannot also be stayed in favor of AQA which merely derived its possession from Je-An
through an unregistered contract of lease. Hence, it is the general rule that should apply and not
the exception.

2. No. Aside from such remedies, the adverse third party may take other legal remedies to prosecute
his claim, such as invoking the supervisory power of the RTC to enjoin the
enforcement/implementation of the writ of possession, as what petitioners did in this case.
Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over the entire execution process, and
such authority carries with it the right to determine every question which may be invariably involved
in the execution, and ensure that it is enforcing its judgment only against properties irrefutably
belonging to the judgment debtor.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Unlawful Detainer, Requisites

TEODORICO A. ZARAGOZA, Petitioner,

vs. ILOILO SANTOS TRUCKERS, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 224022, June 28, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Teodorico A. Zaragoza bought a parcel of land located at Cabatuan, Iloilo from his parents.
Teodorico claimed that unknown to him, his father leased a portion of the land to Iloilo Santos Truckers,
Inc. He also claimed that Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc. stopped paying rent after Teodorico’s father died. Iloilo
Santos Truckers, Inc., maintained that it was willing to pay rent, but was uncertain as to whom payment
should be made as it received separate demands from Florentino’s heirs, including Teodorico. Thus, Iloilo
filed an interpleader case before the RTC, Branch 24 of Iloilo City which was however dismissed. Yet,
pursuant to the RTC’s order, Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc. consigned before the said RTC the amount of
P521,296.89 representing its unpaid rentals. This notwithstanding, Teodorico A. Zaragoza demanded rental
payment from Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc., alleging that the amount consigned was insufficient and that the
total amount of unpaid rent amounted to P752,878.72. Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc., though, maintained that
it was not liable to pay such amount which included interests, since there was no such stipulation of interests
in their lease contract. Hence, Teodorico A. Zaragoza filed an unlawful detainer suit against Iloilo Santos
Truckers, Inc. before the MTCC which was granted. On appeal, the RTC and the CA both ruled in favor of
Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc. Thus, Teodorico A. Zaragoza filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful detainer suit should prosper?

HELD: Yes. For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur: (1) there
must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2) there must be demand both
to pay or to comply and vacate. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful
detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of
action may be pursued. Implied in the first requisite, which is needed to establish the cause of action of the
plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract of lease entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease conditions alleged to have been violated.
In other words, for an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor must show that: first, initially, the
defendant-lessee legally possessed the leased premises by virtue of a subsisting lease
contract; second, such possession eventually became illegal, either due to the latter's violation of the
provisions of the said lease contract or the termination thereof; third, the defendant-lessee remained in
possession of the leased premises, thus, effectively depriving the plaintiff-lessor enjoyment thereof;
and fourth, there must be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate and that the suit is brought within
one (1) year from the last demand.

In this case, the first, third, and fourth requisites have been indubitably complied with, considering that at
the time the suit was instituted on June 21, 2011: (a) there was a subsisting lease contract between
petitioner and respondent; (b) respondent was still in possession of the subject land; and (c) the case was
filed within one (1) year from petitioner's letter dated May 24, 2011 demanding that respondent pay monthly
rentals and at the same time, vacate the subject land. Thus, the crux of the controversy is whether or not
the second requisite has been satisfied, that is, whether or not respondent violated the terms and conditions
of the lease contract, specifically with regard to the payment of monthly rentals.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Forcible Entry

SPOUSES JANET URI FAHRENBACH and DIRK FAHRENBACH, Petitioners,

vs. JOSEFINA R. PANGILINAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 22454, August 7, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Respondent acquired a parcel of unregistered land from her aunt, Felomina Abid through a Waiver
of Rights. The said lot measured 5.78 hectares and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056. However,
unknown to respondent, Abid also executed a Deed of Sale on July 15, 1995 in favor of Columbino Alvarez
covering the same piece of land. Alvarez executed a handwritten letter stating that the subject lot, with an
area of 5.78 hectares and covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056, belonged to respondent.10 Alvarez also
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that the said land is not the property he had intended to buy from
Abid but the one with an area of 8 hectares. Respondent learned that petitioners were occupying the 5.78-
hectare subject lot she acquired from Abid and built structures thereon without respondent’s consent.
Despite demands, petitioners refused to vacate the premises. Thus, after the barangay conciliation
proceedings failed, respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners before the MCTC of
Coron, Busuanga, Palawan. MCTC dismissed respondent’s complaint and upheld petitioners’ possession.
RTC reversed the ruling of the MCTC and ordered petitioners to vacate the subject lot. CA affirmed the
RTC’s findings insofar as it held that respondent was the prior possessor of the subject lot, but remanded
the case to the RTC for the determination of the proper amount of monthly rentals payable to respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that respondent was in prior possession of the subject lot?

HELD: No. The Court agrees with the findings of the CA and the RTC that respondent was the prior
possessor of the subject lot. In truth, the subject lot was not the property sold to petitioners by Alvarez, but
was the one which respondent acquired from Abid in September 1995 by virtue of a Waiver of Rights. With
the true identity of the subject lot having been established, it must nonetheless be determined whether or
not respondent had prior de facto possession over the same, considering that this case stemmed from a
forcible entry complaint.

It is well-settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or unlawful detainer
cases is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute.
The main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that
either party may set forth in his pleading. The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual
possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that
it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the defendant. In this
case, respondent had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the subject lot. Records disclose
that respondent occasionally visited the subject lot since she acquired the same from Abid in September
1995. She even paid the lot’s realty taxes, as well as requested for a survey authority thereon. In fact, she
submitted old photographs showing herself on the subject lot, the identity of which petitioners did not
contend.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Proceedings> Cancellation or Correction of entries in the Civil Registry
(Rule 108)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY (CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN THE RECORDS OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE), FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 211724, August 24, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela" for almost 60 years. However, when he
requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised to
discover that he was registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." He filed a Petition for
Correction of Entry before the RTC. He alleged that he is the acknowledged natural child of Jorge V.
Almojuela and Francisca B. Condeno, both deceased. He averred that while his parents did not mcarry
each other, he has been known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said
surname in all of his official and legal documents. The RTC granted the petition and directed to cause the
correction of entry of the facts of petitioner's birth by changing his surname from "Condeno" to "Almojuela"
and to furnish the Civil Registrar General with a copy of the corrected birth certificate. The Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), moved for reconsideration, citing lack of
jurisdiction due to defective publication and contending that the caption or title of a petition for change of
name should state: (a) the alias or other name of petitioner; (b) the name he seeks to adopt; and (c) the
cause for the change of name, all of which were lacking in the petition filed before the RTC. The RTC denied
the OSG's motion and reiterated its stance that based on the allegations thereon, the petition was only for
the correction of entry in the records of the NSO. As petitioner had established compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements therefor, the RTC had thus acquired jurisdiction. Dissatisfied, the OSG appealed
to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Decision and Order and nullified the RTC's
order. It held that although petitioner correctly invoked Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in filing his petition,
he, however, failed to strictly comply with the requirements thereunder when he omitted to implead the
Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings, who stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for, as parties.
Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's birth certificate on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction?

HELD: No. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes
in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding. An adversary proceeding is defined as
one "having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it." Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given
to persons named in the petition, and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial
correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all
other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial alterations
renders the entire proceedings therein null and void. The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a
party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can
be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the
trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint
including the judgment.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial
court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party
and as to the subject matter.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Criminal Jurisdiction

DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA, Petitioner,

vs. EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 223844, June 28, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: The instant case stemmed from a Complaint Affidavit filed by Petitioner Cariaga before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) - Urdaneta City, Pangasinan accusing respondents Emmanuel D.
Sapigao (Sapigao) and Ginalyn C. Acosta (Acosta; collectively, respondents) of the crimes of Falsification
of Public Documents, False Certification, and Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171,
174, and 359 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

In a Resolution dated April 10, 2014, the OPP dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Cariaga
moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated July 28, 2014. Aggrieved, he
filed a petition for review before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) - Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan.

In a Resolution dated January 5, 2015, the ORSP affirmed the OPP's ruling that no probable cause to indict
respondents of the said crimes. Undaunted, Cariaga moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied
in a Resolution dated March 14, 2015. Thus, he filed a petition for review before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 140206.

In a Resolution dated June 17, 2015, the CA dismissed Cariaga's petition before it. It held that the ORSP
is not the final authority in the hierarchy of the National Prosecution Service, as one could still appeal an
unfavorable ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). As such, Cariaga's direct and immediate
recourse to the CA to assail the ORSP ruling without first filing a petition for review before the SOJ violated
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, the dismissal of Cariaga's petition for review
is warranted. Unperturbed, Cariaga filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a
Resolution dated March 1 7, 2016; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Cariaga's petition for review before it on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

HELD: No. The CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition for review. The Department of Justice's
(DOJ) Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS Rule on Appeal," which
governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter
alia, the RSP, in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a
verified petition for review before the SOJ. However, this procedure was immediately amended by the
DOJ's Department Circular No. 70-A dated July 10, 2000, said DOJ Department Circular delegated to the
ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed
before it, provided that: (a) the case is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case,
should it proceed to the courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs) - which includes not only violations of city or
municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years,
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties attached
thereto. This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling should the
former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing amendment is further
strengthened by a later issuance, i.e., Department Circular No. 018-14 dated June 18, 2014, entitled
"Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases," pertinent portions of which read:

A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing appeals process in the NPS with regard to
complaints subject of preliminary investigation would depend on two factors, namely: where the complaint
was filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the provinces; and which court has original jurisdiction over the
case, i.e., whether or not it is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as follows:
(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of
the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with
finality;

(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling
of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with finality;

(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the
OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose ruling shall be
with finality;

(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of
the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with finality;

(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c ), the SOJ may, pursuant to his power of control and
supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling of the ORSP
or the Prosecutor General, as the case may be.

In the instant case, Cariaga filed a complaint before the OPP in Pangasinan (i.e., outside the NCR)
accusing respondents of committing the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification,
and Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the RPC. Of the crimes
charged, only False Certification and Slander by Deed are cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, while
Falsification of Public Documents is cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. Applying the prevailing rule
on the appeals process of the NPS, the ruling of the ORSP as regards Falsification of Public Documents
may still be appealed to the SOJ before resort to the courts may be availed of. On the other hand, the ruling
of the ORSP pertaining to False Certification and Slander by Deed should already be deemed final - at
least insofar as the NPS is concerned - and thus, may already be elevated to the courts.

Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition before it on the ground of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents may be referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling regarding the crimes of False Certification
and Slander by Deed may already be elevated before the courts. Thus, the CA should have resolved
Cariaga's petition on the merits insofar as the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed are
concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA for
resolution on the merits. "However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of
the merits may be had - as in this case - the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of
remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of
justice." In view of the foregoing - as well as the fact that Cariaga prayed for a resolution on the merits - the
Court finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Judgments, Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments

CONCHITA S. UY, CHRISTINE UY DY, SYLVIA UY SY, JANE UY TAN, JAMES LYNDON S. UY,
IRENE S. UY,*ERICSON S. UY, JOHANNA S. UY, and JEDNATHAN S. UY, Petitioners,
vs. CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, substituted by his heirs PAULITA MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO,
CESAR DEL CASTILLO, A VITO DEL CASTILLO, NILA C. DUENAS, NIDA C. LATOSA, LORNA C.
BERNARDO, GIL DEL CASTILLO, LIZA C. GUNGOB, ALMA DEL CASTILLO, and GEMMA DEL
CASTILLO, Respondents,
G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: De Castillo filed against spouses Uy for reconveyance, damages, and attorney's fees involving a
parcel of land. However, since Jaime had died, Crispulo amended his complaint and impleaded Jaime's
children and siblings, as defendants. Crispulo died during the pendency of the action and was substituted
by his heirs. RTC ruled in respondents' favor and accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful
owners of Lot 791; (b) nullified OCT No. 576, as well as TCT No. 29129; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay
respondents moral damages and litigation costs in the amount of P20,000 each, as well as attorney's fees
equivalent to 25% of the zonal value of Lot 791. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA, and
subsequently, to the Court, but the same were denied for lack of merit. The ruling became final and
executory on April 8, 2010, thus, prompting the Court to issue an Entry of Judgment dated May 4, 2010.
On August 17, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, manifesting therein that
since the zonal value of Lot 791 at that time was ₱3,500 per sqm. and that Lot 791 covers an area of 15,758
sqm., the total zonal value of Lot 791 was ₱55,153,000. Hence, the attorney's fees, computed at 25%
thereof, should be pegged at ₱13,788,250.

In an Order, RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. A Writ of Execution
was issued, to which the sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment seeking to levy petitioners' properties in an
amount sufficient to cover for the attorney's fees, moral damages and litigation costs. Petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion praying that the writ of execution be quashed and set aside, and that a hearing be
conducted to re-compute the attorney's fees. Before the RTC could act upon petitioners' Omnibus Motion,
they filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on Jurisdictional Ground(s) claiming that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the Uy siblings in the Quieting of Title Case as they were never served with summons in
relation thereto. CA affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC. The CA found no merit in the claim that the
Uy siblings were never served with summons.

ISSUE: Whether CA correctly upheld the twin Orders dated December 9, 2011 and the Order dated May
17, 2012 of the RTC?

HELD: Yes. The CA correctly pointed out that in the November 26, 1997 Manifestation/Motion, petitioners,
through their counsel, Atty. Trinidad, explicitly stated, among others, that they "received the Summons with
a copy of the Second Amended Complaint" and that "the Answer earlier filed serves as the Answer to the
Second Amended Complaint." Having admitted the foregoing, petitioners cannot now assert otherwise. "It
is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. They are
legally binding on the party making it.

Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they were
nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an Answer to the
amended complaint and actively participating in the case. In fact, one of the petitioners and Uy siblings,
Ericson, was presented as a witness for the defense. Moreover, petitioners appealed the adverse RTC
ruling in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the Court. It is settled that the active participation of the
party against whom the action was brought, is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later on impugning the
court's jurisdiction. After all, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is obtained either by
a valid service of summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court's authority.
The Uy siblings were not merely substituted in Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they were imp leaded in
their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place
when the party to the action dies pending the resolution of the case and the claim is not extinguished. Jaime
died on March 4, 1990, or 6 years before private respondents filed the Quieting of Title Case. Thus, after
Conchita filed an Answer informing the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint was amended to
implead the Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules of Court provisions on substitution upon the death of a party
do not apply and the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in place of Jaime in the Quieting of Title Case.
Instead, they were impleaded in their personal capacities. In this regard, petitioners' argument that they
cannot be held solidarily liable for the satisfaction of any monetary judgment or award must necessarily fail.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Preliminary Investigation>Probable Cause

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ (as then Ombudsman), DON M. FERRY, JOSE R.
TENGCO, JR., ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA, OFELIA I. CASTELL, and RAFAEL A.
SISON, Public Respondents,
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, MANUEL I. TINIO, and ANTONIO R. ROQUE, Private Respondent.
G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015
(First Division)

Facts: The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated July 15, 2003 filed by the PCGG against
former officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), as well as former
officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping Corporation (Galleon) charging them of violating
Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. In the Affidavit-Complaint, the PCGG alleged that on October 8, 1992,
then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identify
various anomalous behest loans entered into by the Philippine Government in the past. Later on, President
Ramos issued Memorandum Order in November 9, 1992, laying down the criteria which the Ad Hoc
Committee may use as a frame of reference in determining whether or not a loan is behest in nature.

Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG) consisting of
officers and employees of different government financial institutions (GFIs), examined and studied
documents relative to loan accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations during the regime of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) - one of which is the loan account granted by the DBP
to Galleon. Based on the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations
obtained by Galleon from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans. Resultantly, the PCGG
filed the instant criminal complaint against individual respondents.

In 2007, the Ombudsman found no probable cause against private respondents and, accordingly, dismissed
the criminal complaint against them.34 It found that the pieces of evidence attached to the case records
were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual respondents, considering that the
documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of executive summaries and technical reports, which
are hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value.

Issue: Whether the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict respondents
of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.

Held: Yes. The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint against them. It must be stressed that the Court has
consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of
probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not
precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court’s pronouncement in Ciron v.
Gutierrez is instructive on this matter, to wit:

This Court’s consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the determination of the Ombudsman
of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
This observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much
the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.

In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings – whether by the
Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor – is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists
to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara,
Jr., the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the following
manner, to wit:

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.

Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require
an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The presence and
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation,
as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level."

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing the criminal complaint against individual respondents for lack of probable cause, as will be
explained hereunder.

As already stated, individual respondents were accused of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the elements
of which are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage,
or preference in the discharge of his functions. In the same vein, they were likewise charged with violation
of Section 3 (g) of the same law, which has the following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer;
(b) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) that such contract or
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Notably, private individuals may
also be charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with public officers.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Preliminary Investigation>Probable Cause

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), Petitioner, v. HON. ORLANDO C.

CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, FIDEL C. CU, CARMELITA B.
ZATE, AND MARY LOU S. APELO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 206866, September 02, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioner PDIC charged the respondents Honorable Casimiro, Fidel Cu, Carmelita Zate and
Mary Lou Apelo for the crime of direct bribery and corruption of public officials under R.A. No. 3019.
PDIC, acting as statutory receiver, took over the affairs of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI) of which
Cu and his family owned at 85.99% shares, after the BSP Monetary Board ordered its closure. As statutory
receiver, PDIC purposedly went on to gather, preserve, and administer its records, assets, and liabilities for
the benefit of its depositors and creditors. In the course of the receivership, Arsenia Gomez (Gomez), former
Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI went to the PDIC and submitted an Affidavit outlining the
alleged irregularities committed by private respondents when BDBI was still in operation. According to
Gomez, Cu instructed her to take money from the vault in the amount of P30,000.00 and to deposit the
same to Apelo's bank account in PNB allegedly for their professional fee. Additional 2 deposits were made
to Apelo’s bank account. In view of Gomez's revelations, PDIC decided to file the instant criminal complaint
against private respondents. Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause. The
Ombudsman found that while it may be said that certain amounts were indeed deposited to Apelo's bank
account, there is no proof that Apelo withdrew the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ombusman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case against the
respondent for lack of probable cause?

HELD: YES. At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering
with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether
or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion.
After BDBFs closure, PDIC started to perform its functions as statutory receiver, which includes, among
others, the control, management, and administration of BDBI as well as investigating the causes of BDBI's
closure. In the course of the receivership, Gomez, a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI,
came forward and through her affidavit, reported the purported scheme perpetrated by private respondents
that fraudulently concealed BDBFs true condition as a banking entity. Gomez's affidavit outlines such
scheme as follows: (a) Apelo would provide Cu an "advance warning" of any impending surprise bank
examinations on BDBI by BSP; (b) upon receipt of the "advance warning," Cu would then make the
necessary steps to misrepresent BDBI's status, such as instructing BDBI employees on how to cover the
possible findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI, as well as infusing cash into BDBI's
vault in order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books reflect the actual cash in vault, and
thereafter returning such cash to the source; (c) in exchange for such "advance warnings," Cu and/or Zate
gave Apelo as "professional fees" the aggregate amount of P140,000.00 by depositing the same to the
latter's bank account; and (d) to cover up such amounts given to Apelo, Cu and/or Zate, instructed Gomez
to initially cover the unofficial and unbooked cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts
in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items.” To support such statements, Gomez provided copies of deposit
slips showing that such amount was indeed deposited to Apelo's bank account. She likewise asserted that
in the course of her employment at BDBI, she does not know of any official or legitimate transactions that
BDBI had with Apelo that would warrant the disbursement of the aforesaid amount in the latter's favor.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Preliminary Investigation>Probable Cause

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL M. REINOSO, GENEROSO TANSECO, MANUEL
MORALES, RUBEN B. ANCHETA, GERONIMO Z. VELASCO, TROADIO T. QUIAZON, JR.,
FERNANDO MARAMAG, EDGARDO TORDESILLAS, ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., GERARDO SICAT,
PANFILO O. DOMINGO, POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MANUEL B. SYQUIO, RAFAEL M. ATAYDE,
HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., GEORGE T. SCHOLEY,1 TIRSO ANTIPORDA, JR., CARLOS L.
INDUCTIVO, AND TEODORO VALENCIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193176, February 24, 2016
[First Division]

FACTS: Several loans were granted by the PNB to Hercules Minerals and Oils, Inc. (HMOI). Based on
these loans, which are alleged to be behest loans, PCGG filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against
the respondents accusing them of violating Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. It contends that the loans
extended by PNB to HMOI were in the nature of behest loans, being characterzed by the following: (a) the
loans were undercollateralized; (b) the borrower corporation was undercapitalized; (c) the stockholders,
officers, or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; and (d) the extra-ordinary speed in
which the loan release was made. Only respondent Panfilo Domingo submitted his counter-affidavit raising
as defense, among others, insufficiency of evidence, claiming further that the collaterals used in obtaining
the loans were valid and acceptable in the banking industry, and that other properties posted as security
were overlooked by the PCGG. He also maintained that the PCGG made no independent appraisal of the
said properties and, thus, had no credible knowledge on the true value of the collaterals. Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint due to lack of probable cause to hold respondents liable as charged. It held that
the PCGG's argument that the loans were undercollateralized was specious, as the Committee did not
make any independent valuation of the said collaterals. Neither did it secure any documentation which
could show that HMOI exaggerated the value thereof. Motion for reconsideration being denied, PCGG
appealed before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it found no probable
cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 and consequently,
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

HELD: Yes. Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers. On the other hand,
Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences
to private parties who conspire with public officers, its core element being the engagement in a transaction
or contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The fact that PNB appeared
to be unduly exposing its finances by extending iniquitous loans to HMOI, despite the latter being
undercapitalized and, notwithstanding the inadequacy of the collaterals being offered to secure the loans,
should have been sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to find probable cause. The HMOI loans appear to
bear the badges of a behest loan, as indicated by the following circumstances: HMOI was undercapitalized,
the loans extended to it by PNB were undercollateralized, its officers were identified as "cronies," President
Marcos had a marginal note/endorsement on Atayde's March 10, 1981 letter which facilitated the approval
of another loan in favor of HMOI, and the loans were approved with extraordinary speed. It bears stressing
that the duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to establish whether there
exists probable cause to file an information in court against the accused. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused committed the crime. Taking into
account, the quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, the Court finds that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint for lack of probable
cause. That the PCGG failed to make or submit an independent valuation of the properties in order to
support its stance that the loans were undercollateralized is of no moment. The lack of independent
valuation alone is not sufficient to dismiss the case for insufficiency of evidence to establish mere probable
cause. To be sure, preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Resolution of Investigating Officer

GIRLIE M. QUISAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 216920, January 13, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: On December 28,2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (OCP Makati) issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against Quisay for violation of RA 7610. Consequently, an Information
was filed. Quisay moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground of lack of authority of the person
who filed the same before RTC. She pointed out that the Resolution penned by ACP De La Cruz was
approved by SACP Hirang but the Information penned by ACP De La Cruz was without any approval from
any higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or
approval from the City Prosecutor to file the Information.

RTC denied the motion to quash and ruled that the Certification attached to the Information have sufficiently
complied with Rule 112, Sec. 4 which requires prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor in
the filing of Informations. CA affirmed the same and further held that the Certification indicated that it was
filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and with prior written authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor. Moreover, CA opined that the Certification enjoys the presumption of regularity accorded to a
public officer’s performance of official functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not ACP De La Cruz (Officer who filed the Information) had authority to do so.

HELD: No, there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of
the OCP-Makati’s division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La
Cruz which stated, among others, that “DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng
sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig” · which
translates to “and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City
Prosecutor”.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Information, Appeals
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence>Findings of Facts, Credibility of Witnesses

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. NORIETO MONROYO y MAHAGUAY, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 223708, June 28, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: In October 2004, four (4) Informations were filed before the RTC, charging Monroyo of three counts
of Acts of Lasciviousness against AAA, a fourteen (14) year-old-virgin and Qualified Rape against her sister,
BBB, a sixteen (16) year-old-virgin. The circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and proven
in his case, Monroyo being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree. On the charges of Acts of
Lasciviousness, the prosecution alleged that Monroyo approached AAA in three separate instances,
touched her private organ, and warned her against telling her parents about what happened. On the charge
of Rape, the prosecution claimed that on the night of November 18, 2003, BBB woke up when she felt
someone touching her breast. Later, with force, threat and intimidation, Monroyo had carnal knowledge of
BBB. In March 2004, BBB mustered enough courage to tell her mother about the incident when the latter
saw her crying. BBB subjected herself to a medical examination administered by Municipal Health Officer
Dr. Ma. Virginia R. Valdez (Dr. Valdez), who found healed hymenal lacerations that could have been caused
by a hard object, like an erect penis.

For his part, Monroyo denied the accusations against him and testified that, AAA and BBB asked for money
from him to buy junk food while he was buying cigarettes from a store. When he refused to give them
money, they grabbed the belt bag tied around his belt. Monroyo tried to retrieve the bag by tickling them on
the side of their bodies but the bag was ripped in the process. Monroyo slapped AAA and BBB for destroying
the bag and then he went home. He claimed that he does not know why the cases were filed against him
by complainants but speculated that it was probably because of a familial tiff with the latter’s father regarding
the house that he and his wife were residing in. In a Joint Decision, the RTC found Monroyo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness. The RTC gave more credence to AAA’s
testimony clearly and convincingly narrating the details of each lascivious conduct committed by Monroyo
against her. It added that AAA had no ill motive against Monroyo, while the latter’s excuses were too shallow
and insignificant for AAA to concoct a story that she was molested. In another Decision, the RTC similarly
found Monroyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. The RTC gave full faith and credence
to BBB’s testimony, as she was likewise able to narrate the details of how Monroyo raped her inside their
house, noting further that her youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s ruling, observing that the trial court’s findings as to the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies deserve the highest respect absent any showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied material facts or circumstances. Aggrieved by his impending conviction, Monroyo filed the
present appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the recital of facts in the Informations constitute violations of Acts of Lasciviousness
under the RPC?
2. Whether or not the factual findings of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court?
3. Whether or not the testimonies of AAA and BBB shall be accorded great weight and respect?
4. Whether or not the appeal opens the entire case for scrutiny on any question, even one not raised by
the parties as errors?

HELD:
1. Yes. It is settled that a designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to
avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense. As the Court
had ruled, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the legal provision alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the information. In the present case, the
recital of facts in the Informations constitute violations of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
2. Yes. Case law dictates that factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA), are binding on the Supreme Court (SC) barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and substance, of which there are none in this case.
3. Yes. Jurisprudentially, settled is the principle that if a victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or
significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and the accused may be convicted solely on
the basis thereof. Putting more emphasis, the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal,
as in this case.
4. Yes. Well-settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for scrutiny on any
question, even one not raised by the parties as errors, and that the appeal confers the appellate court
with full jurisdiction over the case, enabling the court to examine records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. Thus, given that the
circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and proven in this case, the Court examines
Monroyo’s criminal liability for Qualified Rape as charged.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Liabilities; Effect of Death

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. PORFERIO CULAS y RAGA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 211166, June 5, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Accused Porferio Culas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of statutory rape.
However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in the instant case, the Court received a Letter from
the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of accused-appellant's death. There is a need to reconsider
and set aside said Resolution dated July 18, 2014 and enter a new one dismissing the criminal case against
accused-appellant.

ISSUE: Whether the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused be extinguished by reason of his death?

RULING: Yes. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

In People v. Layag, the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal
on his liabilities, as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the
civil liability, based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the
victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action
against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Civil Liability Ex Delicto

ESTATE OF HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., represented by RAFAEL A. POBLADOR, Petitioner,

vs. ROSARIO L. MANZANO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192391, June 19, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: On May 1996 Elsa A. Poblador was authorized by the Probate court as the administratrix of certain
properties of Petitioner Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. (petitioner), represented by Rafael A. Poblador
(Rafael) including his shares in Wack-Wack golf course. Elsa instructed Rafael, heir of Honorio Poblador
to look for potential buyers. Rafael engaged the services of Rosario Manzano, a broker of Metroland
Holdings Incorporated. The property was sold to Metroland Holdings for the amount of ₱18,000,000.00
which it paid ₱15,200,000.00 through a check and the balance of ₱2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to
Manzano for the payment of the taxes.

On October 1996 the sale of the shares were annulled by the Probate Court. Thus, Elsa returned to
Moreland the ₱15,200,000.00 and asked the BIR for a refund of the paid taxes. Meanwhile, Rafael, through
an accountant allegedly requested Manzano for an accounting of the ₱2,800,000.00 she received on behalf
of petitioner. In response, Manzano faxed documents requested by petitioner but when examined, there
was a discrepancy in said documents as it was found that the amount paid was only ₱80,000.00 instead of
₱1,480,000.00. This led to the filing, on December 8, 1999, of an Information for the crime of estafa against
Manzano.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability ex delicto of Manzano exists?

HELD: No. The petition lacks merit. It is a fundamental rule that "the acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him."

In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People, the Court discussed the concept of civil liability ex
delicto in Estafa cases under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the RPC (with which Manzano was likewise
charged), stating that when the element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be
no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does not exist. Particularly, the Court said:

Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary estimation
through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa are:

(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.

The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to cause damage. As this
Court previously held, "the element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable." Our law abhors the act of
defrauding another person by abusing his trust or deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances which constitute estafa. Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) states that estafa is committed by abuse of confidence –

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).... (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property.

In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or
conversion. When the element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In such
case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is
no act or omission from which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted
because a reasonable doubt exists as to the existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability
may still be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not
suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the
act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty,
civil liability exists.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Chain of
Custody of Illegal Drugs

KEVIN BELMONTE y GOROMEO, Petitioner,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 224143, June 28, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Two (2) separate informations were filed before the RTC accusing: (1) Kevin Belmonte y Goromeo
(Belmonte), Mark Anthony Gumba y Villaraza (Gumba), and Billy Joe Costales (Costales) of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165; and (2) Gumba of violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution
alleged that the accused were arrested pursuant to a buy-bust operation conducted by the authorities. All
the accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC. Aggrieved, Belmonte, Gumba and
Costales elevated their conviction to the CA, arguing that the chain of custody of the seized items was not
established because the markings and inventory were done in San Gabriel, La Union, while the signing of
the Certificate of Inventory by the representatives of the DOJ and the media took place in Carlatan, San
Fernando City, La Union. However, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, Belmonte filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody of the seized items was established?

HELD: Yes. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

In this relation, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution
has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the
chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.

It is important to note that while the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid
officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence
nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render
the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such
non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In other words,
any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
In this case, the Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of the marijuana confiscated
from the accused were preserved, and any deviation from the chain of custody procedure was adequately
justified.

Records bear that the bricks and bundle of marijuana confiscated from the accused were immediately
marked, photographed, and inventoried upon the arrest of Belmonte and Gumba, and that the markings
were done by Ominga herself who placed her initials, signature, and the date of confiscation thereat in the
presence of Belmonte, Gumba, the back-up officers from the PDEA and the PNP, and the Barangay
Captain of Poblacion, San Gabriel. 79After the inventory and photography at the arrest site, Ominga and
her team returned to the PDEA office where Ominga personally prepared the crime laboratory examination
request which she delivered to the PDEA chemist, Valdez, together with the bricks and bundle of marijuana
confiscated from the accused. Notably, the absence of media representatives at the time Ominga prepared
the inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-examination when she testified that when
contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still far from the area and would not be able
to arrive on time.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Appeals

MARLON CURAMMENG y PABLO, Petitioner vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 219510, November 14, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: The instant case arose from an Information filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Bauang, La
Union (MTC), charging Curammeng of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that on the night of September 25,
2006, a Maria De Leon bus going to Laoag, Ilocos Norte being driven by Francisco Franco y Andres
(Franco) was traversing the northbound lane of the national highway along Santiago, Bauang, La Union,
when its rear left tire blew out and caught fire. This prompted Franco to immediately park the bus on the
northbound side of the national highway, and thereafter, unloaded the cargoes from the said bus. At a little
past midnight of the next day, an RCJ bus bound for Manila being driven by Curammeng traversed the
southbound lane of the road where the stalled bus was parked and hit Franco, resulting in the latter's death.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) found Curammeng guilty which was appealed to Regional Trial Court
(RTC) who upheld the decision which was then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) who dismissed said
appeal for having failed to attach a Certificate of Non – Forum Shopping as well as material portions of the
records.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Curammeng’s petition in violation of Rule 42, Section 2
of Rules of Court?

HELD: No. Such dismissal is not correct. It must be stressed that since a petition for review is a form of
appeal, non-compliance with the foregoing rule may render the same dismissible. This is in furtherance of
the well-settled rule that "the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
A party who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing
which the right to appeal is invariably lost." Verily, compliance with procedural rules is a must, "since they
are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice." Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules
of procedure will tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing
circumstances of the case, such as where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the
petition, the Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.

In the instant case, the Court notes that the dismissal of Curammeng's appeal is based solely on his
counsel's negligence in failing to attach a certification of non-forum shopping as well as material portions
of the record. Notwithstanding the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with Compliance dated November
6, 2014, the CA upheld its earlier dismissal, ratiocinating that the reasons presented by Curammeng' s
counsel were not compelling enough to relax the technical rules on appeal. While the Court understands
and applauds the CA' s zealousness in upholding procedural rules, it cannot simply allow a man to be
incarcerated without his conviction being reviewed due to the negligence of his counsel. In sum, the Court
deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of procedure in order to afford Curammeng the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal, rather than to deprive him of such and make him lose his
liberty on procedural blunders which he had no direct hand in. Accordingly, the case should be remanded
to the CA for resolution of the appeal on its merits.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Appeals

JORGE B. NAVARRA, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 224943, March 20, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Jorge B. Navarra was accused of the crime of the crime of violation of Section 22 (a), in relation
to Section 28 (h) and (f)[,] of R.A. 1161, as amended, by R.A. 8282, Navarra, being one of the members of
the board of directors of the Far East Network of Integrated Circuits Subcontractors (FENICS) Corporation,
a covered member of the Social Security System (SSS), conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and
refuse to remit and pay to the SSS the SS/Medicare/EC contributions withheld by them from the salaries of
the FENICS employees, the counterpart SSS/Medicare/EC contributions of FENICS, as well as the
salary/calamity loan payments due to the SSS withheld by them, despite demands from them to remit and
pay these obligations to the SSS. Petitioner averred that while he is indeed the President and Chairman of
the Board of Directors of FENICS, he never had custody of the employees' SSS contributions, as it was the
Human Resources Department that was tasked to handle such matters. Further, he asserted that during
the period when the alleged delinquencies were incurred, FENICS had already shut down. In this relation,
petitioner narrated that: (a) from 1995-1996, FENICS diligently remitted the employees' SSS contributions;
(b) beginning 1997, its business started to decline due to the pull-out of one of its biggest customers
eventually leading to its shut down; and (c) since FENICS was already non-operational, its employees were
unable to work, and naturally, there could have been no wages/salaries from which the SSS contributions
could be sourced.

The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Aggrieved, petitioner
appealed to the CA arguing that: (a) the information against him was defective as it failed to properly charge
him with a criminal offense; (b) he cannot be held liable for violation of Section 28 (h) of RA 8282 since
under this provision, it is the employer, i.e., FENICS, that should be charged with the same; (c) the
prosecution failed to establish that the private complainants were indeed FENICS's employees; and (d) in
any event, his criminal liability was already extinguished by his compromise agreement with the SSS.

CA affirmed petitioner's conviction in toto. It held that: (a) petitioner's failure to raise the issue of the validity
or regularity of the Information prior to entering his plea was deemed a waiver of any defect in the same;
(b) since FENICS is a corporation, its failure to remit the SSS contributions of its employees subjects its
officers, such as petitioner, to liability, especially since FENICS had already been dissolved; (c) the
prosecution's documentary evidence clearly show that the private complainants were FENICS's employees;
(d) petitioner's letters dated October 25, 2000 and April 25, 2003 proposing to settle FENICS's
delinquencies should be viewed as an admission of guilt on his part; and (e) there was no compromise as
SSS did not assent thereto, and even assuming there was one, such cannot extinguish petitioner's criminal
liability. Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated
May 19, 2016; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for violation of Section 22 (a), in
relation to Section 28 (h) and (f), of RA 8282?

HELD: Yes. Preliminarily, the Court notes that petitioner assails the validity or regularity of the Information
filed against him on the ground that it allegedly did not charge a criminal offense. However, as pointed out
by the CA, petitioner never raised such issue prior to his arraignment. In fact, a reading of the records
shows that petitioner only raised the same after he was convicted by the RTC and the case was already on
appeal before the CA. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that his failure to object to the alleged defect in the
Information before entering his plea amounted to a waiver of such defects, especially since objections as
to matters of form or substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Hence,
petitioner can no longer be allowed to raise this issue before the Court.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Search and Seizure>Motion to Quash
Overlap with Political law>Arrest>Warrantless Arrest

ELMER G. SINDAC @ "TAMER," Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 220732, September 06, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: Morning of April 17, 2007 PO3 Bonifacio Peñamora (PO3 Peñamora) and PO1 Erbert Asis (PO1
Asis) saw Sindac headed for Barangay Poblacion Uno, prompting them to follow him. Along the national
road of said barangay, PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis saw Sindac meet with a certain Alladin Cañon (Cañon)
who sold and handed over a plastic sachet to him. Suspecting that the sachet contained shabu, PO3
Peñamora and PO1 Asis rushed to the scene and introduced themselves as police officers. Cañon escaped
but the policemen were able to apprehend Sindac. When ordered to empty his pocket, Sindac brought out
his wallet which contained a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. After initially
determining that such substance is shabu, the policemen arrested Sindac and brought him to the police
station. There, Sindac's arrest was recorded, the seized item was marked in Sindac's presence, and a
request for chemical test was prepared. A laboratory examination later confirmed that the plastic sachet
seized from Sindac contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The Regional Trial Court found
Sindac guilty which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not there was prior valid warrantless arrest made under Section 5, Rule 113 of Rules
of Court and Section 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution constituting a valid warrantless search and
seizure under Section 13 of Rules of Court and Section 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution?

ISSUE #2: Whether or not the Sindac’s failure to assail the validity of his warrantless arrest and search
constitutes a waiver of his right to challenge the validity of search and seizure done to Sindac under Section
3 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD #1: No. The warrantless arrest was not valid. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated
upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a
warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied with. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section
5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section
5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it. In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense
is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer himself
witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.

In this case, the Court finds that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on the person of
Sindac. Based on the records, the arresting officer, PO3 Peñamora, himself admitted that he was about
five (5) to ten (10) meters away from Sindac and Cañon when the latter allegedly handed a plastic sachet
to the former. Suspecting that the sachet contained shabu, he and PO1 Asis rushed to Sindac to arrest
him.

HELD #2: No. Sindac’s failure to assail the invalidity of the arrest and subsequent search shall not constitute
a waiver of his right on his part. As a consequence of Sindac's unlawful arrest, it follows that there could be
no valid search incidental to a lawful arrest which had yielded the plastic sachet containing 0.04 gram of
shabu from Sindac. Notably, while it is true that Sindac: (a) failed to question the legality of the warrantless
arrest against him before arraignment; and (b) actively participated in the trial of the case, it must
nevertheless be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a waiver ONLY as to any question concerning any
defects in his arrest, AND NOT with regard to the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest. In Homar v. People:

We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively participated in the trial of the case. As a
result, the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest.

However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It
is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and
justifies the acquittal of the petitioner. All told, since the shabu purportedly seized from Sindac constitutes
inadmissible evidence in violation of Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Sindac's conviction to be
improper and therefore, acquits him.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence> Object (Real) Evidence (Rule 130, A)>R.A. 9165

ANTONIO GAMBOA y DELOS SANTOS, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 220333, November 14, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: In the evening of May 1, 2003, PO1 Sahagun and SPO1 Manuel received information that a certain
Jun Negro was engaged in illegal drug activity in Angeles City. A buy-bust team was formed with PO1
Sahagun designated as the poseur-buyer while the rest as back-up officers. The buy-bust team proceeded
to the target area in Angeles City. Upon their arrival, PO1 Sahagun encountered Negro. They approached
him and told him that they wanted to buy ₱200.00 worth of shabu. Negro handed a sachet containing
suspected shabu to PO1 Sahagun then she gave him the buy-bust money. With the sale consummated,
she executed the signal prompting the back-up officers to rush in and arrest Negro. Negro then ran into a
nearby house. PO1 Sahagun gave chase, but Negro eluded her. Inside the house, she discovered Antonio
Gamboa seated by a table which had shabu paraphernalia on top, and accordingly, arrested them with the
assistance of the back-up officers. SPO1 Manuel confiscated one plastic sachet of shabu from Gamboa.
They were then brought to the police station together with the seized items. At the office, the police officers
marked the seized items. They then prepared the request for laboratory examination dated May 2, 2003.
The next day, SPO1 Manuel delivered the seized items to the crime laboratory for examination, which was
examined by a Forensic Chemist, who found that the seized sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The RTC found Gamboa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody rule as provided for in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 have
been followed to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD: No. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified
as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure
up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers
must follow in handling the seized drugs, to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said
section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. The IRR of RA 9165 mirror the content of Section 21,
Article II of the same law, but adds that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-
compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II- under justifiable grounds - will not render void
and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.

In the instant case, PO1 Sahagun and SPO1 Manuel marked and inventoried the seized items upon arrival
at the police station. However, their testimonies failed to show that they took photographs of the said items
and that Gamboa, or his representative, was able to observe or, at the very least, knew that the confiscated
items were being marked. They were likewise silent as to the presence of the other required witnesses, i.e.,
the representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and any elected public official. An examination of
the records would similarly show that the prosecution did not offer the photographs of the seized items. The
breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 committed by the police officers,
left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised. Case law states that, the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter
of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as
an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence>Burden of Proof

DOMINADOR M. APIQUE, Petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH, Respondents

G.R. No. 205705, August 05, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: As Evangeline was always in Germany, she opened a joint savings account on January 18, 1999
with Dominador. On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject
account and, thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account with the same bank. It was only
on February 23, 2003 that Evangeline learned of such withdrawal from the manager of the bank. Evangeline
then had the passbook updated, which reflected the said withdrawal. She likewise discovered that
Dominador had deposited the amount withdrawn to his own account with the same bank and that he had
withdrawn various amounts from the said account.

Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no avail. Hence,
she filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, and attorney's fees, with prayer for preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against Dominador before the RTC.

In her complaint, Evangeline claimed to be the sole owner of the money deposited in the subject account,
and that Dominador has no authority to withdraw the same.

In his answer, Dominador asserted, among others, that he was authorized to withdraw funds from the
subject account to answer for the expenses of Evangeline's projects, considering: (a) that it was a joint
account, and (b) the general and special powers of attorney executed by Evangeline in his favor.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dominador and dismissed the complaint because Dominador may validly
withdraw as compensation for his services as administrator, but the CA reversed and set aside it noting
that Dominador’s authority to withdraw is still subject to the approval of Evangeline.

ISSUE: Whether or not a party who acts as an administrator has the burden of proof to prove his claim for
compensation?

HELD: Yes. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence, or evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto. Thus, the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his
assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden to prove its positive assertions
never parts. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient
in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense, i.e., an avoidance of
the claim. Dominador miserably failed in this respect.

Corollarily, the Court cannot subscribe to Dominador's claim for payment of compensation as administrator
of the business affairs of Evangeline based on the principle of quantum meruit, which was not raised as an
affirmative defense or counterclaim in his answer to the complaint. Settled is the rule that defenses which
are not raised in the answer are deemed waived and counterclaims not set up in the answer shall be barred.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence>Burden of Proof and Presumptions

DOLORES DIAZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LETICIA S. ARCILLA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 208113, December 2, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: On March 11, 1999, an Information for estafa was filed against Dolores Diaz (Diaz) for her alleged
failure to return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in
trust — i.e., on consignment basis — from Leticia Arcilla (Arcilla). Diaz entered a negative plea. The
prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of Arcilla who claimed to be a businesswoman engaged in
the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is Diaz) under the condition that
the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted.
Arcilla averred that on February 20, 1996, she entrusted merchandise consisting of umbrellas and bath
towels worth P35,300.00 to Diaz as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996
duly signed by the latter. However, on March 20, 1996, Diaz was only able to remit the amount of
P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and Arcilla’s demands to remit the proceeds
or return the goods.

Diaz admitted having previous business dealings with Arcilla but not as an agent. She clarified that she was
a client who used to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from Arcilla on installment
basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of
POCs and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been
settled. However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from Arcilla on February
20, 1996.

The RTC acquitted Diaz of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay Arcilla the amount of
P32,000.00, with interest from the filing of the Information on March 11, 1999 until fully paid, and to pay the
costs. However, the CA modified the award of interests by reckoning the same from the time of extrajudicial
demand on July 28, 1998. Accordingly, it directed Diaz to pay Arcilla the amount of P32,000.00 with legal
interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from July 28, 1998 until finality of the decision and thereafter, at the rate of
12% p.a. on the outstanding balance until full satisfaction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dolores Diaz is civilly liable?

HELD: Yes. It is noteworthy to mention that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence, or “greater weight of the credible evidence,” is required. Thus, an accused acquitted
of estafa may still be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant, as in this
case

Under Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a
document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3(p) of
the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves
every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The
effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome
the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.

In this case, Diaz failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, Arcilla’s possession
of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been
extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than
the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in Arcilla’s
favor.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence>Presentation of Evidence

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO, Respondent

G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017
(First Division)

FACTS: Galeno filed a petition for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No. 46417 before
the RTC. She alleged therein that she is one of the co-owners of the subject property by virtue of a Deed
of Sale dated July 6, 1962. She further alleged that when she and her co-owners had the subject property
resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land area of the subject
property as appearing in OCT No. 46417, in that the title reflects an area of 20,948 square meters, while
the Certification issued by the DENR Office of the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management
Services, shows an area of 21,298 square meters. Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject
property in order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners.

Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence the following documents: (a) the Certification issued by
Chief of the Technical Services Section of the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land Management
Services of the DENR in Iloilo City; (b) the technical description of Lot No. 2285, a copy of which was
certified by Ameto Caballero, Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was certified correct by
Acevedo; and (c) the approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258, certified by Rogelio M. Santome, Geodetic
Engineer; Alfredo Muyarsas (Muyarsas), Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin
(Gerobin), OIC, Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Services, DENR. On the strength of
these pieces of evidence, Galeno sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property with the records
of the DENR.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of evidence offered are sufficient to warrant the correction prayed for?

HELD: No. the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant the correction. No probative
weight can be given upon them in view of the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not testify
in court to prove the facts stated therein.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter.

As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued respondent's
documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of probative value and
cannot by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best, they may be considered only as
prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein.

Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.