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Philippine Prison Gangs: Control or Chaos?

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DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2586912

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Philippine Prison
Gangs: Control or
Chaos?

Clarke R. Jones
Regulatory Institutions Network
Australian National University

Raymund E. Narag
Department of Criminology and
Criminal Justice
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale

Resurrecion S. Morales
Bureau of Corrections
Muntinlupa City, Philippines

RegNet Research
Papers
WORKING PAPER
2015 No. 71
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2586912
Abstract
This paper examines whether an unofficial strategy of
using prison gangs for prison control in the Philippines
correctional system could ever be considered
an effective and appropriate management tool.
Contemporary literature on prison gangs usually
deems them as detrimental to an inmate’s prospects
for rehabilitation and disruptive to the smooth running
of penal institutions. However, from ethnographic
research conducted by the authors on prison gangs
in New Bilibid Prison (NBP), the largest maximum
security prison in the Philippines, an alternative
perspective on prison gangs is provided. Based
on the authors’ unique access into the Philippine
prison system, they argue that prison gangs in
this system have become functionally important to
both inmates and prison administrators. Despite
serious prison rule violations, prison gangs in
NBP provide a system of self-governance, prison
order and a network of social support in the
overcrowded and deprived prison conditions.

Keywords
Prison gangs, prison management, corruption,
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Network (RegNet) at the Australian National
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Series Editor: Dr Jeroen van der Heijden

Please forward any feedback, submissions or

requests to: jill.mowbray@anu.edu.au or regnet@
Citation anu.edu.au.
This paper can be cited as:

Jones, Clarke R., Raymund E. Narag and Resurrecion S.

Morales. 2015. ‘Philippine Prison Gangs: Control or Chaos?’
RegNet Working Paper, No. 71, Regulatory Institutions
Network.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2586912

 WORKING RegNet Research
PAPER Papers

WORKING PAPER

Philippine Prison Gangs: Control or Chaos?

Clarke R. Jones, Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National

University

Raymund E. Narag, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice

Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Resurrecion S. Morales, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Philippines

Introduction

This paper takes an atypical view of prison gangs by acknowledging their functional importance in
severely overcrowded and deprived conditions, like those found in New Bilibid Prison (NBP), the
largest maximum security prison in the Philippines. The authors ask whether a strategy used by the
1
Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) , which unofficially endorses the use of prison gangs for prison control,
could ever be considered an effective and appropriate management tool. The role of the gang leaders
(referred to as bosyos, commanders or elders) in controlling gang members is examined to see how
they use their influence over inmates to stabilise the prison environment. The bosyos share a
common interest with the BuCor to maintain order; however, this cooperation appears to be motivated
in part by financial interests, as disorder has the potential to disrupt the gangs’ illicit (and licit)
enterprises. A form of unofficial agreement is reached between the bosyos and the BuCor, with the
BuCor appearing to tolerate much of the gangs’ activities to achieve inmate compliance.

There is no denying that the prison gangs in NBP are responsible for many serious incidents of prison
disorder. These incidents tend to happen quickly, with order being restored equally as fast. It is likely
that the BuCor would face difficulties quelling disorder without the cooperation of the bosyos.
Therefore, the authors suggest that the gang system (or Pangkat) provides a stabilising effect on the
inmate population. As limited resources have been allocated by the Philippine government to
increasing prison staff numbers, reducing corruption, boosting staff training or reforming their
antiquated prison system, the BuCor struggles to provide inmates with basic needs. Gangs seem to
fill this void by providing inmates with a network of social support, stability, access to material
benefits, a source of income (licit and illicit), and a sense of “group identity” (Decker, Melde & Pyrooz,
2012, p. 12). As the bosyos are elected by popular vote by the inmates for a variety of reason (which

                                                                                                                       
1
The BuCor is the agency responsible for administering all prisons in the Philippines that house felons convicted
of three or more years.

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2586912

 WORKING RegNet Research
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will be discussed later in the paper), they hold considerable authority inside NBP. The BuCor has little
choice but to rely on them for assistance with managing inmates and keeping disorder to a minimum.

There are only a few studies on prison gangs in developing countries that provide a realistic
comparison for this study. Darke (2013), for example, examines inmate governance in Brazilian
prisons. He states that because of “chronic staff shortages…inmates are involved not only in
maintaining, but managing, prisons and prisoners”. In these prisons, the “multi-occupancy” type
accommodation and other environmental conditions encourage the development of prison gangs and
inmate self-governance (p. 276). Gangs in these extreme cases, however, cannot provide adequate
protection for its members. In the Pedrinhas prison in northern Brazil, the decapitation of several
inmates draws attention to “the lawlessness of the nation's correctional facilities” (Kiernan, 2014). The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2013) examines prisons in Honduras, where gang
leaders tend to exert total control over prison operations. It is unsafe for guards to enter the prison so
the administrators are only able to secure the perimeter walls, albeit escapes are frequent. The
common problems arising from these studies include high levels of prison congestion, staff shortages,
substandard conditions, high incidences of gang violence and endemic corruption. NBP bears all of
these negative prison characteristics; however, its administrators still feel as though they retain a
certain level of prison control. As one government official claimed during an informal discussion,
“inmates are on a long leash... we allow them to feel as if they are free, but, if we have to, we can
shorten the leash to restrict their freedom... ultimately, we [the Philippine government] are in control”
(Personal communication, Palawan Penal Colony, January 20, 2014).

Most contemporary literature on prison gangs focuses on those in US prisons and, to a lesser extent,
those in UK prisons. In these studies, prison gangs are usually labelled as disruptive and detrimental
to the smooth running of penal institutions (Hunt, Riegel, Morales & Waldorf, 1993; Fleisher & Decker,
2001; Wood, 2006; Pryooz, Decker, & Fleisher, 2011; Phillips, 2012). They are also said to worsen
the conditions for inmates, are harmful to their prospects of rehabilitation and can reduce a prisoner’s
chances for successful reintegration back into society (Fleisher & Decker, 2001; Gaes, Wallace,
Gilman, Klein-Saffran & Suppa, 2002). Approximately three to five per cent of the prison population in
the US, which stands at close to 2.3 million, are claimed to be gang members (International Centre for
Prison Studies, 2012; US Department of Justice, 2012). Considering this relatively small percentage,
Di Placido, Simon, Witte, Gu & Wong (2006) assert that prison gangs are “responsible for
approximately one-quarter to one half” of all prison management problems (p. 93). Inmates who
belong to gangs are more likely “to commit serious disciplinary violations” than non-gang inmates
(DeLisi, Berg & Hochstetler, 2004, p. 372). Yet, these prison gang problems are no longer just the
concern of correctional authorities. Prison gangs have evolved into more sophisticated criminal
networks that run their external enterprises from inside prison and have thus “expanded their crime
bases to the streets” (Fong & Buentello, 1991, p. 66). Therefore, prisons appear to be no longer
serving their intended purposes of rehabilitating offenders and protecting society from criminals. As a

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result of the negative impact of prison gangs, it is common for correctional authorities in the US or the
UK to develop strategies to curb or eradicate them.

Prison gangs may vary in their sophistication and organization; however, they are typically engaged in
drug trafficking, loan sharking, prostitution, gambling, murder, robbery/theft, rape, kidnapping and
extortion, some of which reaches beyond prison walls (Wood, 2006). Their behaviour is
characteristically violent, where intimidation and domination tactics, such as verbal, physical and
sexual assault, are commonly used. For this reason, prison gangs are typically categorised as
‘Security Threat Groups (STG)’ or ‘Inmate Disruptive Groups (IDG)’; however, these categories can
also refer to other less organised prison groups (Ireland & Power, 2012; De Lisi, Berg & Hochstetler,
2004). In terms of size, prison gangs can be simply “a group of three or more prisoners whose
behaviour has an adverse impact on the prison that holds them” (Wood, 2006, p. 606).

Lyman (1989) created a broader and more encapsulating definition, which fits closer the size, level of
organization, and dominance of prison gangs in NBP. He defines prison gangs as,

an organization which operates within the prison system as a self-perpetuating criminally orientated
entity, consisting of a select group of inmates who have established an organised chain of command
and are governed by an established code of conduct (p. 48).

The level of sophistication identified by Lyman allows prison gangs to “organise, recruit, and achieve
dominance” (Jacobs, 1977, p.138). This is particularly the case when there is a “decline in morale of
the guard force and ultimately the deterioration of the organization’s capacity to meet basic control
and maintenance goals” (Jacobs, 1977, p.138).

Regardless of one’s outlook on gangs, once they become entrench in a prison system and part of an
inmate culture, they are hard to eradicate. In NBP, gangs have been around since the early 1940s
and now approximately 95 per cent of the prison population are gang members. Those on remand in
Philippine jails are also predominantly gang members so the cycle of membership continues to
flourish. So far, attempts to break the gangs and restore full control in NBP have been unsuccessful.
With 95 percent of the population being gang members, there are very few options for inmates but to
be pangkat members.

In the US, Jacobs describes the desperate efforts by the administrators in Statesville Penitentiary to
reclaim control by cracking down on the gangs. He describes how the administrators would lock down
the institution, revise their rules and regulations, and change wardens (Jacobs, 1977). However,
whenever a new warden thought that they had restored order, new incidents of disorder quickly
proved them wrong (Glaser, 1979). While the prison administrators’ actions were to prevent the
negative effects of prison gangs, Jacobs (1974) in earlier work saw a positive side to their behaviour.
Jacobs also understood gangs to function “as buffers against poverty” for inmates. He described how

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each gang had a “poor box” where members would contribute when they made “a particularly good
score or deal” (p. 400).

The supportive and protective nature of prison gangs described by Jacobs in Statesville is also
evident in NBP, where less fortunate inmates receive basic financial support from more affluent gang
members. In most instances, inmate survival in the Philippines prison system is dependent on their
access to a source of income, usually found through gang membership. This becomes particularly
crucial when inmates lose contact with family or have no outside support. Indeed, one of the key
explanations for the longevity of the gangs is their capacity to provide inmates with opportunities to
earn income. Gangs have gained geographical and cognitive territorial boundaries that they can lay
claim where business can run unhampered. Though prison guards will have informal control over
these businesses and tax inmates through “orbit” (rent-seeking behaviours), the inmates can still earn
enough to support themselves and their families. As gangs in the maximum security compound have
the capacity to provide an umbrella of protection for all kinds of businesses, licit and illicit, most
inmates (and prison guards) who are placed in the medium and minimum security compounds want to
be transferred back into maximum security.

Skarbek (2012) also recognises the role of gangs in creating “protective organizations” for inmates
and for managing their needs in a correctional system that has failed to perform their intended
function, such as ensuring the welfare and safety of offenders (p. 96). He states that, when “official
institutions cannot provide all of the governance that inmates demand” and, when inmates lose faith in
the correctional system, often because of high-levels of corruption, they turn to other networks of
social support found in prison gangs (Skarbek, 2012, p. 96).

Colvin (2007) applies coercion and social support theory to examine inmate compliance and power
relationships in prisons. He argues that “the consistent delivery of social support....forms the basis of
consent in complex organizations and is especially crucial for maintaining the consent of the governed
in prison” (p.368). Colvin claims that “without these networks of social support”, compliance to prison
rules and the maintenance of prison order could only be achieved with the application of consistently
applied coercion by prison administrators (p. 368). In this study, the consistent delivery of social
support provided by the bosyos and, the pangkat system more generally, “forms the basis of consent”
by inmates in NBP (p.368).

Stojkovic (1984) focuses on the “types of power found among prison inmates” in maximum security
prisons (p. 512). He explores “the bases of power among prison groups”, which included
administrators, prison officers and inmates (p.514). While his study is situated in a modern US facility,
unlike those in the Philippines, the prison environment appears to reflect some similarities in the level
of volatility and lack of viable options for inmate rehabilitation. Stojkovic also notes “five types of
power found among inmates - coercive, referent, providing of resources, expert, and legitimate”
(p.515), which are also evident in NBP. For example, much of the inmate power, or the basis of power

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found in NBP gangs more generally, is generated from the provision of resources. These resources
are often funded through the sale of contraband, particularly drugs and weapons. Stojkovic concludes
that further research would benefit from the examination of how these types of power interact among
differing groups, such as the administrators, staff and inmates, to produce “prison equilibrium” (p.527).
An evaluation of the way the BuCor uses the pangkat system to obtain prison equilibrium is a major
focus for this study.

Methodology

To help understand the factors that have contributed to BuCor’s reliance on gangs to maintain prison
order, this article combines the views of three authors. From their different associations with gangs in
the Philippine prison and jail systems, the authors provide rare insight into the gangs’ highly secretive
world. A series of group discussions between the authors led to comparisons of research findings and
eventually common conclusions, despite initial research progressing independently of each other.
This combination of perspectives offers a valuable and unique contribution to the broader areas of
prison management and prison order in developing countries.

Authors A and B both conducted independent participant observation studies and recorded their
observations of gang-to-gang and gang-to-prison staff (uniform and non-uniform) interactions. Author
A recorded his observations during fourteen field visits over three years (five to seven days duration
each visit) to the maximum security compound of NBP. Author A also recorded aspects of informal
discussions with prison and jail staff and inmates during numerous prison reform workshops and
courses he has run over the past six years. The same themes were raised in all discussions and
included: perceptions of prison control, power balances and who’s in charge; the history and structure
of the gangs; the gang’s election processes; the time taken to reach the position of bosyo and the
reasons for selection; inter-gang relationships and the bosyos’ interactions with other gang leaders;
gang relationships with guards and prison administrators; the gangs’ rules and punishment; incidents
of prison disorder; corruption, overcrowding and general prison life.

Author B currently advises an international development agency in its efforts to reform the Philippine
criminal justice system. Through this effort, he has engaged correctional officials in month-long
workshops in 2013 and 2014 to understand the socio-cultural realities of the penal system and to
construct alternative models. His experiences as a consultant provided Author B insights on how the
administration, down to the frontline prison guards, view prison life. Author B was also a former
inmate for almost seven years in one of the most crowded jails in Metro Manila. During his years of
imprisonment in the gang-populated jail, he conducted participatory research with the inmates, jail
guards, volunteers and visitors. His personal friendships with gang leaders, who were his former
cellmates in jail and now imprisoned in the NBP, also translated to the confidential sharing of intimate
information about gang dynamics and relationship of gangs to prison officers. Additionally, his

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personal experiences as an “inmate mayores” provided a basis for comparison to the prison gang
system in NBP.

Author C has been a psychologist within the Philippine prison system for over 20 years and has had
daily interaction with gang members. She also heads the inmate education and rehabilitation program
for the BuCor. For inmates to be eligible to participate in her programs, they must denounce their
gang affiliations and remove their gang markings (tattoos). In many cases, divorcing themselves from
their gangs is a difficult and sensitive process. Through school admission processes, which includes
inmate counselling, Author C has ascertained a unique understanding of gang indoctrination, gang life
and desistance from gang criminality.

The authors have compared and contrasted their independent findings. A series of discussions
among them provided a validation check to the overall findings presented in this paper. The authors
looked at common themes that cut across their experiences of inmates and prison guards in different
jail and prison settings. In particular, they have investigated how inmates dealt with the conditions of
imprisonment and the different structures and mechanisms inmates and prison guards have devised
to address these conditions. The authors also looked at themes that reflect changes in gang system
through time.

Access into prisons to undertake research of this type is normally very difficult and getting cooperation
from gang leaders to participate in this type of study is usually very rare. Also, gaining approval to
meet with inmates is always complicated (Jones, 1990), and, even when access has been granted by
prison administrators, prison guards tend to be the “ultimate gatekeepers” (Roberts & Indemaur,
2008, p. 314). The most challenging aspects of this study was developing rapport with the gang
leaders and attaining their cooperation. Such cooperation is usually rare and the difficulties
associated with gaining inmate trust cannot be overstated. The bosyos cooperation to participate in
this study was granted providing their anonymity and confidentiality was guaranteed. In order to
comply with ethical standards surrounding research on prisoners, that is, “the vulnerability of a captive
population”, every effort has been made to hide the specific sources of information (i.e. no names
have been cited and no specific reference to individual gang membership or staff position has been
recorded), and no information pertaining to specific criminal activity has been documented (Roberts &
Indermaur, 2008, p. 309).

The Philippine Correctional System

New Bilibid Prison is the largest facility in the Philippine corrective system. This system consists of
approximately 1344 different types of prisons and jails including national prisons, provincial jails, sub-
2
provincial jails, district jails, city jails, municipal jails and regional rehabilitation centres. There are

                                                                                                                       
2
There is an important distinction between a jail and a prison in the Philippines. The jails, which are run by the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), house individuals on remand (inmates who are undergoing
trial) and inmates serving sentences up to three years. Due to case delay however, some inmates stay in the jail

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also numerous ‘lock-up’ jails and detention centres maintained by the Philippine National Police
(PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the
Bureau of Immigration (BI), which are not included in the above figure. These temporary detention
facilities are utilised for those under investigation and for those awaiting transfer to jails under court
orders. It is in these police lock-ups where the majority of inmates join the gangs and tattooed with
gang markings. Those held on remand in Metro Manila usually join one of the four largest Metro
Manila based gangs like the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik (SSS), the Sigue-Sigue Commando (SSC), the
Bahala Na Gang (BNG), and the Batang City Jail (BCJ). Some police stations are known gang
territories. The Laloma police station in Quezon City, for example, is home to BNG. If a person is
arrested and detained in Laloma police station, he will be ‘enjoined’ by the inmates in the police
station to become a member of their gang. They promise protection in case the arrestee is
transferred to the big house, meaning the local jail.

Due to the different types of correctional facilities, ad-hoc and sometimes out-dated record
management systems, court backlogs and over-stayers, it is often difficult to ascertain the exact
number of offenders incarcerated in the Philippines. Considering these limitations, the authors
estimate that there are over 132,000 adult offenders, in a correctional system that has been designed
to house only 35,000. The inmate population (in the prison system alone) is currently expanding at a
rate of around 5 per cent annually (Bureau of Corrections, 2012). On average, the Philippine prisons
and jails combined are getting close to around 300 per cent overcrowded. In NBP’s maximum security
compound, for example, there are currently 14,356 inmates with space for only 5,500 (286 per cent
overcrowded). This overcrowding has serious consequences, the most immediate being that there is
simply a lack of physical space to sleep.

As a result of overcrowding, most of the prisons and jails in the Philippines struggle to meet the
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (United Nations, 2012).
Overcrowding usually means that there is a marked reduction in the quantity and quality of resources
available for day to day survival, such as nutritious food and clean water. The increased scarcity of
resources also increases the chances for competition and conflict to acquire and retain them. Even
though inmates may react differently to one another to overcrowding, Jan (1980) proposes that
overcrowding usually has a detrimental effect on inmate behaviour. Ellis (1984) also suggests that
there is a significant correlation between overcrowding and prison violations, and, in this study, the
authors also draw a relationship between overcrowding and the cultivation of prison gangs.

The total inmate population in NBP stands at close to 23,000. Inmates are categorised into three
sections or compounds – maximum, medium and minimum – based primarily on their length of
sentence rather than level of risk. Maximum security has an inmate population of 14,356. Made up of
recidivists and those serving 20 years to life, it has become one of the largest maximum security

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
longer than three years. The prisons, which are run by the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor), refer to national
penitentiaries and are for those inmates serving sentences of three years to life.

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populations in the world (Personal communication, senior BuCor official, November 7, 2013). Medium
security (Camp Sampaguita) has around 8000 inmates consisting of first offenders and those serving
less than 20 years. Minimum security (Camp Bukang Liwayway) has around 300 inmates consisting
of those with two to three years to go before release, those who are physically disabled, and those
aged 6o years and above. There is also a Reception and Diagnostic Centre (RDC) that houses
around 1300 inmates. In the RDC, an inmate’s personal history is recorded, their physical and
psychological health is assessed and prison orientation is provided (Personal communication with a
prison official at NBP, July 18, 2012).

The system of inmate categorisation in NBP is significantly different from the systems used in the US,
UK or Australian prisons. In these countries, the most prominent form of classification for inmates is
security risk-based. In a security risk-based system, inmates are separated into groups according to
threat of escape and custody requirements. Custody requirements refer to the level of danger posed
by inmates to themselves (i.e. suicide), staff and fellow prisoners (Personal communication with a
senior official from Corrections Victoria, September 26, 2012).

In the maximum security compound in NBP, regardless of an inmate’s risk or vulnerability, all offender
types are mixed together, such as those convicted for murder, assault, rape, burglary, property crime,
extortion and drug offences (Chaiken & Chaiken, 1984). This mix of offender types, all living closely in
an overpopulated environment, creates ideal conditions for conflict. However, the maximum security
compound is more like a well-functioning, self-sustaining community than a high-risk and potentially
volatile prison. Aggression between inmates is rarely witnessed. Instead, inmates are occupied with
cooking, washing clothes, peddling wares, gambling, or playing billiards. On most days, inmates and
their families roam the grounds. It is also common to see children playing among the prisoners,
looking at animals in the small zoo or having fun on the children’s play equipment.

In reality, NBP’s densely populated spaces are carefully divided into tightly held gang territories,
although there are no formal boundaries to demarcate these areas. Usually, geographic boundaries in
prisons “serve as a source of conflict” (Brantingham, Tita, Short & Reid, 2012, p. 852), particularly if
an inmate from an opposing gang crosses into another gang’s territory. In NBP, however, inmates can
move relatively safely around the prison grounds regardless of territory. The gang territories are well-
known to the inmates and are usually identified by gang insignias and other territorial indicators, such
as club houses and gang dormitories painted in their individual colours.

There are also gang-controlled licit businesses throughout the prison that generate cash to support a
quasi-cash-based economy - money being critical for inmate survival. Licit gang businesses include
barbershops, shoe-repairers, tattoo parlours, hardware stores, fast-food cafés, a bakery and fresh
food markets selling vegetables, meat and fish. One gang also runs a television station making
programs that mimic popular TV programs such as Iron Bar Chef and NBP’s Got Talent. The same
gang also runs a computer Skype room for inmates to communicate with family. There are also small

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woodwork industries, basket-weaving factories and arts shops, although these are endorsed by prison
management as part of prison rehabilitation and they also generate extra money for other prison
programs.

Regardless of gang affiliation and inmate affluence, all inmates are exposed to varying degrees to the
“pains of imprisonment” (Sykes, 1958). Overcrowding, unsanitary living conditions, poorly ventilated
accommodation, an inadequate number of toilets and washing facilities and poor diet, all exacerbate
the pains of imprisonment. These conditions are aggravated by an inadequate supply of clean water
and poor waste management. The water pipes and sewerage system get clogged and have
deteriorated to the point that sewerage waste seeps into the clean water supply. Uncontaminated
water is in short supply and even the hospital regularly runs out. Patients are forced to drink the
contaminated supply, which results in a higher number of fatalities. Approximately one inmate dies
per day as a result of communicable diseases and illness created by the poor living conditions
(Pangilinan, 2011). Although an Act (BuCor Act 2013) to reform the prison system and enhance staff
conditions has recently been endorsed by the Philippine President, it will take some time before
inmate conditions improve. In the interim, prison gangs will continue to challenge the power balance
within the prison. This is mainly because of their ability to provide inmates with consistently delivered
support and protection (Colvin, 2007).

Much of the inconsistency with the management of inmates in NBP stems from the frequent
changeover of prison officials within the BuCor. Over the past three years, for example, there have
been six different directors (both temporary and permanent appointments) to head the BuCor, each
implementing their own changes to the regime. The removal and replacement of each director has
been based on a range of reasons including a change in the Philippine presidency (resulting in a
change government agency heads) to corruption allegations and prison scandals. The most recent
permanent appointment of a new director occurred in March 2013. This appointment followed an
incident in November the previous year that was widely reported in the Philippines media. In this
incident, six inmates were injured while jogging after a fragmentation hand grenade was thrown at
them by an inmate from a rival gang.

Each time a new director is appointed by the Philippine President, the new incumbent selects a fresh
prison management team that he feels are trustworthy and loyal to him. The new management team
has subsequently appointed a different set of prison superintendents in an attempt to increase
security and reduce corruption. Unfortunately, due to a shortage of resources to recruit new personnel
and an existing Civil Service Law, which provides a security of tenure for government employees,
corrupt guards are rarely fired. Instead, they are moved to other penal farms around the country.
Consequently, corruption is never really addressed and the problem is simply shifted to other penal
farms.

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Because of the instability in the BuCor leadership structure, a dishonest guard force, and the
continuous pains of imprisonment, feelings of uncertainty, mistrust and insecurity have become
embedded in the inmates’ psyche. These feelings all combine to reinforce the inmates’ dependence
on the gang system.

Gangs in Maximum Security

Around 95 per cent of the maximum security inmate population belong to one of twelve gangs. The
following table gives a count of gang numbers as of 6 November, 2013. The gangs from largest to
smallest are:

Gang Name Membership

Sigue-Sigue Sputnik (SSS) 2,642

Genuine Ilocano Gang (GIG) 2,092

Batang City Jail (BCJ) 1,890

Sigue-Sigue Commando (SSC) 1,074

Happy Go Lucky (HGL) 908

Batang Cebu 45 (BC) 907

Batang Mananalo (Batman) 825

Bahala Na Gang (BNG) 815

Batang Samar Leyte (BSL) 523

Batang Mindanao (BM) 449

Bicol Region Masbate (BRM) 406

Original Ex-Convict (OXO) 180

Querna 1,140

NBP Hospital 499

Total: 14,356

The membership of the four largest gangs (SSS, BCJ, SSC and BNG) is usually drawn from those
inmates originating from Manila, while the others gangs take inmates from other regions around the

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Philippines. The Querna is housed separately from the gangs and generally consist of foreign
prisoners, those holding political status, or those considered as ‘VIPs’ or very important prisoners.

All the gangs have a formal hierarchical structure, similar to a military style chain of command. This
hierarchical structure includes a leader or bosyo, a deputy commander, several subordinate mayors,
vice mayors, chief petty officers and petty officers. The can also be one or two advisors to the bosyos
depending on the size of the gang. This formal structure not only enables the gangs to accomplish
collective goals, either to support the BuCor or to complete discrete criminal tasks for their own
agendas but also “establishes stability” within the prison (Decker, Melde & Pyrooz, 2012, p. 13).

The bosyos form the nucleus of a gang and oversee most of the gang’s activities (licit and illicit). He
also provides a stable role model for the gang and helps provide order to the inmates’ day-to-day life.
Without strong leadership and direction from the bosyo, inmate conflict would most likely escalate. In
this context, a bosyo wields a good deal of power and influence over inmates to the extent that they
have a significant role in running the internal operations of the prison.

Some bosyos are also alleged to have contacts in the highest levels of the Philippine government. In
a couple of recent cases, the bosyos or their spouse have had direct contact with officials to persuade
them to improve their conditions of confinement, organise special medical treatment outside of the
prison or get wealthy offenders or, in some instances, drug lords moved into their gangs. These
administrative decisions are often made without the knowledge or consultation of the BuCor Director.

Bosyos are selected through a stringent election process. They can be selected based on
characteristics like popularity, wealth, influence (primarily to the prison officials, but also to the
inmates as well), personality, intelligence, seniority, length of sentence (the longer the period of
incarceration the more credibility the inmate has for election), and criminal reputation. In recent times,
an inmates’ wealth is the main factor behind leadership credentials. It can take up to 20 years or more
to be selected as an elder [Bosyo]; however, some have been selected in less time because of family
wealth and political connections. Criminal reputation and close relationship to outgoing bosyos can
also help with selection.

Below the bosyo in the gang structure are a protection group consisting of armed enforcers or
warriors known as tiradors. The position of tirador is unofficial and highly secret and information about
them is rarely disclosed to guards or to the BuCor. The tiradors provide protection for the bosyo and
the gangs’ interests and they also act as the key pugilists during gang disputes. The tiradors also run
the protection and extortion rackets and carry-out reprisal attacks on behalf of the bosyos. The
number of tiradors per gang varies depending on the size of the gang, for example, the SSS gang
may have up to 300 tiradors, while the OXO gang may have less than ten. In addition to the tiradors,
each gang also has a chief bastonero (armourer and chief disciplinarian). The word baston is a
paddle or stick use for hitting an inmate’s buttocks as a punishment called takal. The bastonero
serves as the sergeant at arms in the cell (bastonero) or the brigade (chief bastonero).

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Aside from the formal gang structure, there is also an informal structure where inmates establish their
own hierarchy or pecking order based on inmate code. The inmate code usually reflects outside
cultural and social values that specify the immorality of a crime (Emery, 1970). For example, inmates
tend to place rankings on various crimes based on the crime’s morality, despite the fact that some
had committed heinous acts. Like ordinary citizens, inmates display a sense of justice and moral
standards and often show a sympathetic reaction of outrage and anger to certain crimes. Offences
that are socially regarded as immoral, such as sexual offences against women or violence against
children, are similarly regarded by inmates in NBP (Emery, 1970). The gangs’ rule system or magna
cartas (described below) clearly list unacceptable behaviour that is directed against women and
children.

Generally an inmate’s criminal history is the greatest determining factor of where they find themselves
positioned within the inmate hierarchy. This pecking order is no different to other prison systems
where there is a constant power struggle between those in the middle rankings competing for prison
status. The pecking order in NBP is dynamic, as survival of the fittest is the general rule of existence.
However, it does not automatically follow that the strong and intelligent inmates are placed at the top
of the hierarchy and the weak and vulnerable at the bottom. A strong intelligent man would be
disqualified from his natural position in the pecking order if, for example, it was discovered that he
was a rapist or a child molester. A person who appeared weak and perhaps not so intelligent could be
elevated to the upper echelons of the hierarchy if he was wealthy.

The 12 gangs and the Querna occupy 13 of the 14 dormitories or buildings inside the maximum
security compound. The 13 other buildings define the different gang territories and are organised into
3
13 brigadas. The fourteenth building (Building 14) is separated from the others but is currently
unoccupied and under renovation. Each brigada has a bosyo and two or more subordinate mayors,
depending on the number of gangs housed in the building. There can be up to two gangs per building,
but each is physically separated by a brick wall. The mayors help provide order, are in charge of
maintaining cleanliness in the buildings, and are responsible for social, religious and recreational
programs. In return, they enjoy special benefits, such as being allowed to build or occupying a hut or
kubol that is attached to the outside of their building.

The kubols function as sleeping quarters, offices and/or headquarters. Compared to usual prison
standards, they are relatively more comfortable. Some have air conditioning and television, and all
have much needed personal space and privacy. As most things that take place inside NBP occur at a
cost, the bosyos, and the approving prison guards, all receive money from the construction and rent
of kubols. The mayors also profit by operating the kubols as either motels, where inmates pay a small

                                                                                                                       
3
There is clearly a relationship between the number of gangs, a gangs’ structure and the prison layout. However,
whether the number of gangs (including the Querna) that formed were curtailed to fit into the number of buildings
in NBP, or whether the numbers of building were built to accommodate the number of gangs, is subject to further
investigation.

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fee for a short period of privacy when wives and partners visit, or as brothels where inmates pay to
have sex with transsexual inmates or with prostitutes provided by prison guards.

Despite the significant level of prison congestion in NBP, the incidence of prison gang violence
appears to be minimal and overt incidents of aggression between inmates was rarely witnessed.
Several bosyos have claimed that they make conscious efforts to maintain cooperation and friendship
between each other and blame many of the prison incidents on rogue inmates and corrupt prison
guards. Rogue inmates are usually dealt with quickly and quietly and out of the view of prison guards.
The actual statistics on the number and type of prison violations are difficult to obtain as NBP’s
system of record keeping by security staff has been ad-hoc with data seldom transferred to a central
database. Also, when prison violations have occurred, they have not been recorded due to an
insufficient number of prison guards to investigate and report on the incidents. When guards have
been present, there was often a reluctance to report incidents because of the need to maintain and
protect inmate relationships. The inmate code and gangs’ magna cartas also ensure that inmates do
not ‘snitch’ to the guards on their gang mates. When gang violence does occur in NBP, it is typically
brutal, large-scale and often results in inmate fatalities. Violent incidents in NBP can happen quickly,
changing the prison “from order to disorder, and the reverse, rather rapidly” (Useem & Piehl, 2006, p.
89). Violence is usually attributed to competition between gangs over their illicit activities, and due to
the constant struggle to improve an inmate’s pecking order within the prison population.

The gangs also have their own form of disciplinary or judiciary system where trials are conducted
should a member attempt to challenge the leadership or contravene his or other gang rules or
unofficial codes of conduct. A jury is appointed to determine the level of guilt and the gravity of the
breach, and the bosyos, together with a committee of delegated members, determine the punishment.
In the case of rival gang members, retribution is usually swift and is carried out without consultation or
approval from the BuCor. This retribution or punishment is usually overseen by a tirador. While
bosyos and the tiradors usually deal with troublesome gang members, internal security within the
prison is also partly administered by marshals or peace-keepers. These peace-keepers consist of
trusted inmates made up predominantly of incarcerated former police and military officials. The
peace-keepers are paid a token fee by the BuCor to maintain order, but their real direction comes
from the bosyos. Even though prison policy dictates the prison regime and external security
arrangements, such as entry and exit procedures to the prison, internal gang rules or magna cartas
provide the actual system of order in the prison. The gangs’ magna cartas vary slightly, but usually
include rules like:

• Give respect to all officers and member of the gang;

• Failure to pay debt to a gang mate will be given appropriate penalty;

• Stealing from a gang mate is strictly prohibited;

• Never fail to give a weekly due or contribution to the gang;

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• Avoid any form of criticism to fellow inmates - any problem that may arise involving gang
mates should be consulted to elders (bosyos) before taking action;

• Give due respect to visitors of gang mates – talking to them is allowed only with the consent
of the gang mate;

• In cases of trouble among gang members, the same should be deliberated fairly and justly;

• Voyeurism is strictly prohibited – violation shall receive the maximum penalty; and

• Having an affair with the wife or girlfriend of a gang mate is strictly prohibited – a maximum
penalty shall be imposed for those who violate this rule (Personal communication with a
Bosyo at NBP, November 28, 2012).

There are significant differences between the ways the gangs enforce their magna cartas. For
example, in some of the larger gangs like the SSS, SSC, GIG or the BCJ, there can be dire
consequences for those gang members who breach the rules, whereas, in some of the smaller gangs
like the BM and OXO, the punishments can be less severe. The lesser penalties can involve the
offender providing personal services to a gang officer for a set period of time or more swift penalties
involving physical beatings with a bat (called takal or ‘paddling’). In other more serious cases, the
penalty may involve the offender giving his wife or partner to the bosyo for sexual favours. The wife or
partner has little choice but to consent, as refusal would likely result in the killing of the offending gang
member. A serious violation could be where a gang member has verbally or physically assaulted the
wife, girlfriend or partner of a fellow inmate from his or a rival gang. This type of penalty could also be
imposed as an act of retaliation or retribution for killing a rival gang member, for betraying a bosyo, or
for unsuccessfully challenging the bosyo for the leadership.

Overall, very little is known about gang punishments due to the criminality involved, gang loyalty, and
the associated inmate code of silence, which is upheld at all costs. If an inmate was caught by other
members giving gang information away to outsiders, it is considered as betrayal and can have dire
consequences. Like in most prisons, inmates that seek money or extra benefits from guards in
exchange for information about gang activities are deemed ‘snitchers’. However, the harsh conditions
inside NBP and an inmate’s survival instinct mean that everyone eventually has a price, even the
bosyos. Bosyos usually have their own intelligence networks and, at times, law enforcement and
intelligence agencies tap into those networks for information.

Like their street counterparts, prison gangs develop their own sub-cultures. These sub-cultures can
include particular shared customs and behavioural norms, such as set rules (already discussed
above), dress codes, secret communications, and other physical distinctions. The main physical
distinctions are usually tattoos or markings. Upon joining a gang, an inmate must be tattooed or
tagged with the group’s symbol to indicate their dedication and commitment to the gang. These marks
are considered extremely personal and are said to represent the giving of their heart and soul to the
gang. Even when the tattoos are removed as part of ad-hoc prison policy, such as on entry to the
RDC or prison schools, the tattoos can quickly reappear if back inside maximum security.

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As a result of a recent spate of gang incidents in NBP maximum security compound, the BuCor,
under the instructions of the Philippine Secretary of Justice, has begun to implement new security
strategies to curb violent gang activity and to retake control inside the prison. Examples of gang
violence are many, but a string of embarrassing incidents have been the catalyst for the government’s
recent focus on NBP. For example, prior to a hand grenade incident in November 2012, in May the
same year an inmate being groomed to lead the SSS gang was shot twice in the head with a .22
calibre pistol in the gang’s dormitory by a member of his own gang while playing billiards. Earlier in
February the same year, an inmate was killed and three others injured when a riot broke out during a
basketball game between rival gangs the SSS and SSC.

Following these incidents, the acting director of NBP moved all the bosyos from the maximum security
compound to isolation cells in medium security in an attempt to disrupt the gangs’ chain of command
(Personal communication with a prison officer at NBP, November 28, 2012). In their absence, the
administration selected new leaders to replace them. This was unsuccessful, however, as the gangs
did not respect the new leaders and, in a few cases, they were beaten up by the gang members in
protest (Personal communication with a gang leader at NBP, November 27, 2012). Other attempts
have also been made to influence the dynamics of the gangs’ leadership and hierarchy by switching
the title of bosyo to ‘elder’ and mayor to ‘dormitory-in-charge’. Efforts have also been made to reduce
the seniority of the bosyos by appointing two influential inmates as ‘chairmen’ to supervise the
bosyos.

As weapons and other contraband, such as cell phones and illegal drugs, are behind many of the
serious incidents in maximum security, initiatives to limit the ingress and egress to one access point
has also been implemented. While gang conflict often arises from the sale of contraband, which is
usually traded at highly inflated prices compared to the street value, the contraband market also has a
corrupting effect on prison officials. The potential for high financial rewards entice prison guards into
participating in the sale of contraband (Hunt et al, 1993; Riverland, 1999); however, some may also
be coerced into participating or assisting gang activity to ensure their personal safety while working
inside the prison (Ireland & Power, 2012). Corruption among prison guards has become so
entrenched that it is part of their operational cultural. As prison guards’ wages are generally low, even
by Filipino standards, corrupt practices have come to form a vital means of supplementing their small
income. In many situations, it is not uncommon for prison guards to have also been clandestinely
recruited into prison gangs and perform favours for their gang mates. Corruption has a terrible
disruptive effect on inmates who learn to distrust the guards and look for protection and support
through other means – this is usually through gang membership (Personal communication with a
prison official at NBP, November 27, 2012).

The sale of contraband is estimated to generate several million Philippine pesos annually, which is
well above the combined salaries of the prison guards. However, it is important to note that not all of
the profit from the gangs’ illegal activities is squandered to pay off guards. It is common for the gangs

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to fund major renovations or improvements to the prison and to sponsor rehabilitation programs. One
such example is a bakery and café inside the BCJ gang compound, which trains and employs
inmates (Personal communication with a prison official at NBP, May 24, 2013).

Mobile telephones (referred to as cell phones) are one of the main items of contraband found in NBP.
The sheer quantity of cell phones is problematic, as they allow inmates to communicate with outside
associates regarding illicit enterprises. The cell phones also allow the bosyos to maintain a level of
control over gang members in other security compounds and in other penal colonies around the
Philippines. Cell phones also make it easier for inmates to organise prison escapes. For example, in
early December 2012, the leader of a notorious street gang was snatched from the front gate of the
RDC in NBP by fellow gang members. The gang is known for its brazen robberies of banks and
convenience stores in Metro Manila. While corruption and lax security procedures probably facilitated
the escape, it also likely that street gang members would have informed their incarcerated leader of
the escape plan via cell phone and warned some of the guards of their plot (Personal communication
with a prison official at NBP, November 28, 2012).

Attempts by previous Directors to remove cell phones or render them useless have been
unsuccessful. In 2010, for example, the administration installed a cell phone ‘jammer’ that blocked the
inmates’ use of their handsets by sending out radio waves along the same frequencies of their cell
phones. This causes enough interference with the communication between the cell phones and
towers to render the handsets unusable. When the prison guards found out that the jammer also
prevented them using their own personal handsets, the device was promptly switched off. With prison
guards unable to use their own cell phones if trouble occurred, their personal security was placed at
risk when left without a means of communication inside the prison. Cell phones are often used by the
guards instead of radios because there are not enough radios to go around. In any event, an unofficial
view is that cell phones help in inmate rehabilitation as it keeps them in touch with loved ones.
Therefore, any attempts to reduce them are often ineffective as guards are half-hearted about the
removal of the cell phones.

The high level of gang control in NBP can make attempts by the BuCor to manage inmates
problematic. In a constant struggle to negotiate the limits of each side’s control, previous directors
have held regular weekly meetings with the bosyos and prison guards to discuss issues ranging from
disputes between gangs and prison guards to general prison operations. In these and other informal
meetings, Bosyos are able to manipulate the administration by having direct access to the Director.
This practice is not normally available to maximum security inmates in other correctional institutions
(Personal communication with a senior official from Correction Victoria, 26 September 2012). Such
access has given the bosyos an element of control over prison operations.

At times, the fierce competition between gangs can challenge, or even undermine, the BuCor’s
authority. In this context, some prison guards are alleged to have been clandestinely recruited into

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gangs and have granted favours to their gang mates. This usually involves guards either ignoring
4
criminal activity or being actively involved in the activity. As the Bucor have allowed gangs to thrive
for over half a century, gang loyalty has become entrenched within the inmate culture that it will now
be difficult for the BuCor to regain control. The inmates now see their gangs as the only mechanism
for the provision of consistent support. While the gangs may give the appearance of consent and
compliance with the prison rules and regulations, which gives the appearance of order, their
compliance is to ensure “the continuation of the illegitimate social support of the gangs”. That is,
inmates may consent and comply with the rules to give the impression of order (i.e., no fighting,
rioting or escapes) while still engaging in activities (i.e., drug trafficking and kidnapping) that are
clearly against prison rules (Colvin, 2007, p. 372).

In this context, there are also financial and familial incentives for gangs to keep prison disruption to a
minimum. As gangs generate income from illegitimate and legitimate enterprises within NBP, with the
proceeds often being sent to sustain their families, it is important that the privileges, which support the
sources of income, are not withdrawn through punitive action. Often a gang member’s wife or partner
also take on gang membership and play an active part in managing the affairs of the gang. Therefore,
the withdrawal of visiting privileges can have a significant impact on a gang’s operations. Family
members also carry information and contraband in and out of the prison, so the withdrawal of visiting
privileges would temporarily affect a gang’s business opportunities. This is particularly the case when
it results in a reduction of supply of drugs, weapons or other contraband. It is in a gang’s interest,
therefore, to maintain an outward appearance of peace and order so as not to disrupt their illicit
business operations. Thus, “through calculated mentality”, bosyos share a common interest with the
prison administration to maintain order. A form of compliance and consent to the prison regime is
purchased through the tolerance of gang activities (Colvin, 2007, p. 381).

Conclusion

This paper has taken an atypical approach to most contemporary studies on prison gangs by
exploring whether they can have a prison management function in heavily overcrowded and resource-
poor correctional institutions like those found in the Philippines. Despite attempts to curtail prison
gang activities, the BuCor has succumbed to unofficially endorsing their role as a form of prison
control. While some of the conclusions in this paper may not be appropriate for modern prisons in
developed countries, the authors suggest that, in prisons in developing countries, inmate compliance
and prison order are difficult to maintain without some form of inmate self-governance.

                                                                                                                       
4
This dynamic, while it empowers the gangs, can provide some prison guards the mechanism to develop
personal informal control, over and beyond the managerial formal control they exercise over the inmates. To
develop a personal level of control, prison officers embrace the prison gang culture and actively engage in its
dynamics. They think and talk like the gang leaders and manage conflicts in a gang-approved way. In the long
run, these prison guards develop their own social stature in the prison society. Inmates follow the bidding of these
prison guards, not because of their formal positions, but because of the informal power they yield among the
gang leaders.

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As the BuCor has not been able to afford reforming its ageing prisons, NBP administrators have come
to tolerate, and often ignore, the prison gangs’ illicit activities. This tolerance has been conditional on
the gangs giving the appearance of compliance and control. When violent incidents have occurred, it
was important for the prison regime for incidents not to resemble chaos, reach the public domain and
cause embarrassment to the BuCor and Philippine government as a whole. Nonetheless, over the
past two years, a series of gang-related incidents have unsettled the prison environment, resulting in
inmate discontent and uncertainty.

When major incidents of gang violence have occurred, the typical response by the Philippine
government has been to sack the director of the BuCor. This has subsequently resulted in a new NBP
administration team and a change of prison guards. With the appointment of new guards, prison rules
and regulations are also usually changed and different levels of coercion applied to enforce prison
rules. These changes are often made without any thought to how they affect the inmate population.
As a result of the inconsistency in staffing and coercion, maximum security inmates have, overtime,
learnt to ignore the changes to the prison regime, pay lip service to prison rules and regulation, and
rely on their bosyos and their gangs’ magna carta for stability and daily direction.

Corruption also appears to have been one of the most divisive problems in NBP, which has resulted
in inmates distrusting the prison administration. Also, BuCor’s system of classification (i.e. non-violent
offenders mixing with some of the Philippines most brutal), coupled with an inadequate number of
prison guards per inmate population, has meant that prison administrators have been unable to
adequately provide protection to those inmates in need. Inmates have therefore looked for support
and protection through gang membership.

Because of a long history of inaction by the BuCor to improve prison conditions in NBP, the gang
system has become entrenched. The new recently appointed prison administration will be forced to
walk a very fine line between control and chaos. Gang violence can change the prison from order to
chaos, and the reverse, very quickly. Considering the high levels of prison congestion and competition
between gangs, prison disorder seems to be infrequent, with the gangs giving the appearance of
consent and compliance. This facade of prison order is delicately maintained by the bosyos so as not
to threaten their illicit enterprises.

Unless significant resources can be directed towards drastically modernising NBP’s archaic facilities,
significantly reducing the inmate-to-prison guard ratio and eliminating corruption, prison gangs will
retain their functional importance to inmates. Only time will tell whether it will be possible to
successfully implement the objectives set out in the new BuCor Modernization Act 2013, which,
among other things, aims to improve prison conditions. Until then, prison gangs will continue to fill the
role of a de facto family and provider, offering inmates stability, security, protection, a source of
income, and a sense of ‘belongingness’.

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