University of Glasgow

The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media

Author(s): Sarah Oates
Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007), pp. 1279-1297
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Routledge
Vol. 59,No. 8,December 2007, 1279-1297 Taylor&FrancisGroup

The Neo-Soviet Model of theMedia

SARAH OATES

Abstract
This articletracesthegenesisof a neo-Soviet
model of themass media. Throughan examinationof the
Russian media in the post-Soviet era as well as a review of media performance during elections in the
region,thearticleconcludes thattheRussianmedia now operate ina 'neo-Soviet'fashion.Factors in
thismedia model includea rejectionof balance or objectivity;flawsinmedia law; self-censorship;
government interferenceand harassmentofmedia outlets;thelackof journalistic and
professionalism;
an atmosphereof violence against journalists.Furthermore,thereare continuitiesin audience
receptionfromtheSoviet to theneo-Sovietmodel.

ALTHOUGH THE MEDIA ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE AN important part of civil

society, there is no broad agreement on the role that themedia actually are supposed
to play in a democracy. In addition, there are serious tensions among themedia, the
public, and the political sphere even in relatively stable, established democracies. The
role of the media in more trying political times, such as during the stresses and
upheavals of war, terrorism and revolution, is perhaps even less understood. Social
scientists remain unsure as to whether themedia tend to lead political change or
more cynically if theymerely reinforce the consensus of the political victors. It is
perhaps for this reason that there is relatively little use of media 'models' in a
comparative perspective, to assess whether the normative role of themedia could be
assessed and measured across a range of polities. There are measurements of media
'freedom' that are compiled and publicised around theworld, but these assessments
are usually more of a projection of a particular national tradition of the media
(typically that of theUnited States) onto themedia system in another country to see
how it measures up. 1 As media critics are quick to point out, the heavily
commercialised media system in the United States is perhaps not the best template
for a broadly democratic media system in other country contexts. This iswhat makes
the incredible experience of the post-Soviet media system,which has faced so many
challenges since 1991, particularly useful for evaluating the utility of media 'models'.
Does the post-Soviet media model and notably theRussian case-fit more into the
perceived Western notions of themedia or does it better reflectan updated version of

lFor example, see www.freedomhouse.org, last accessed 3 August 2007.

? 2007UniversityofGlasgow
ISSN 0966-8136print;ISSN 1465-3427online/07/081279-19
DOI: 10.1080/09668130701655150

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 1280 SARAH OATES

the Soviet model of themedia itself?More critically,what does the development of the
post-Soviet media into an institution that has helped to re-consolidate elite power,
rather than empower citizens, mean for the role of media in society in general?What
can we learn from theRussian case that can help to clarify the general ability of the
media to support-or subvert democratic institutions?
This article uses four central approaches to the question of the existence and
intellectual value of a neo-Soviet model of themedia. First, the article discusses the
classic models of themedia, particularly looking at those developed by Siebert et al.
(1963) during the Cold War. The second strand is to assess the performance of the
Russian mass media in civil society. The analysis then turns to data from five former
Soviet states (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Armenia) to analyse which of
the central traits in the post-Soviet Russian media appear to resonate across much of
the former Soviet Union. In other words, which elements of the post-Soviet media
sphere appear linked to the Soviet journalistic legacy and which to Russia in
particular? Finally, the article presents a proposed neo-Soviet media model that could
show how the Soviet past has influenced a particular (and perhaps inevitable) failure
of themedia to develop as a tool for civil society in Russia.

Relating media models to thepost-Soviet system

In their 1963 classic, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm divided theworld's media into
fourmodels: libertarian, socially responsible, authoritarian and Soviet. Siebert and his
colleagues argued that the Soviet press model required that themedia support the
Marxist- Leninist view of reality; the authoritarian model called for a press
completely subservient to the state; the libertarian model supported the notion that
opinions should be aired freely; and the social responsibility model held thatmedia
should work proactively to include all segments of society in its coverage (see Table 1
for furtherdetails). These models have been debated, criticised, labelled as an artefact
of theCold War and often just ignored. However, they remain an influential starting
point for a discussion of themedia and the public in a generalised way. All of these
models represent 'ideal' situations, as opposed to actual media systems, although
clearly the libertarian (or commercial) system parallels theUnited States model as did
the Soviet system for theUSSR.
Much of the discussion among people who analyse media systems now focuses on
either the libertarian model or the social responsibility model. Is one system better
than the other? Unsurprisingly, countries tend to approve of themodel that is closest
to their own systems, but it is clear there are advantages and disadvantages to either
system in termsof the role themedia play in democracy. For example, the libertarian
or commercial system is considered to be driven by the needs of consumers. Hence, the
chief obligation of the news media in free societies is to provide the general public with
information about significant current events (as well as with entertainment). Anything
that happens that seems interesting or important for media audiences should be
reported quickly, accurately and without any attempt to convey a particular point of
view. It is left to the audience to decide what to believe and what to question. The
libertarian media system reduces the power of the media to serve as political
'gatekeepers', making issues of media ownership and journalistic bias less important.

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1281

TABLE 1
CLASSIC MODELS OF MEDIA SYSTEMS

Model Definition

Libertarian The media are freeto publishwhat theylike.Attacks on thegovernment

(Commercial) are allowed and evenencouragedin theinterest of betteringsociety.
Journalistsandmedia organisationsare given fullautonomy.
(UnitedStates,UnitedKingdom printmedia)
Social The media are not completelyfreeto publishwhat theylikeas theyhave
responsibility certainobligationsto societyto provide informationand balance.The media
shouldprovideaccess to all groups.The media and thegovernment are
partnersinconstructing civil society.
(UnitedKingdom broadcastmedia)
Authoritarian The media servetheneeds of thestate throughdirectgovernmental control.
The media are not allowed toprintor broadcastanythingthatcould
underminetheestablishedauthorityor give offenceto theexistingpolitical
values.Control isby censorshipand punishmentof thosecaughtbreaking
therules.
(NorthKorea)
Soviet In theory,media servetheinterests of theworkingclass and thesenseof
limit/censorshipis imposedby theconsciousnessof thejournalistsin
with theworkers. In practice,theSovietmedia were controlled
solidarity
by thestateas in theauthoritarian model.
(FormerUSSR, arguablyChina)

Source:Derived fromSiebertet al. (1963).

If the system is consumer-driven, then it ismuch less vulnerable to manipulation,

either by a powerful group of elites or by inchoate masses. It places a high level of trust
in the audience to decide what is important and to synthesise the critical messages
about society. Yet, this high level of trust in the audience can be problematic, as
studies suggest that people often pick entertainment over serious issues. There are
legitimate concerns that unfiltered information, released without regard for its societal
impact, can lead to serious problems. In the short term, this can mean violence. In the
long term, it can mean the erosion of the rational fabric of society.
The social responsibilitymodel of themedia should address some of these problems
by having a more considered policy about the use of information in society. The social
responsibilitymodel of the news suggests thatmedia outlets design theirnews output
to support a civil society and discourage anti-social behaviour (Negrine 1994). Or, as
Graber phrases it, 'adherents to the tenetsof social responsibility believe that news and
entertainment presented by themass media should reflectsocial concerns'. This turns
themass media into theguardians of public welfare, who 'should fosterpolitical action
when necessary by publicizing social evils', such as preventing nuclear contamination
or stopping child abuse (Graber 2005, p. 22). The media should not broadcast
undesirable viewpoints and questionable accusations, even if they are sensational.
However, if themedia believe that the government is hiding information vital to the
public interest, journalists should seek that information out and make it public. The
benefits of the social responsibilitymodel of themedia, when compared with themore
free-wheeling libertarianmodel, are clear. The social responsibilitymodel provides a
level of protection to society, from everything ranging from bad taste to information

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 1282 SARAH OATES

that could lead to panic or violence. It protects the public from damaging, distorted or
even dangerous information. Overall, itworks toward building a societal consensus
while the libertarian coverage of the same news might destroy that harmony. The
social responsibility model of themedia helps tomaintain a sense of common good
and, most probably, build a sense of nationhood. On the other hand, it deprives
citizens of the right to act on full information-even if that could lead to injustice or
violence and gives media organisations much more power over the distribution of
information in society. If themedia take on a greater 'gatekeeping' role, then they are
more at risk of either information manipulation or control by forces such as the
government.
Many modern political communication scholars reject the models developed by
Siebert et al. For example, Bennett finds itmore useful to think about themedia's
relationship to political power when assessing the impact ofmedia on societies: media
can frame coercive power within societies in ways that can 'encourage, discourage,
hide, or expose it'. In addition, themedia can be selective in their formal political
coverage, reporting on some politicians and their activities while ignoring others.
Finally, media are important for 'transmittingvalues, problem definitions and images
of people in society that provide resources for people in thinking about their lives and
their relations to government, politics and society' (Bennett 2000, p. 205). This last
definition is particularly important in a transitional society, a country inwhich there
has been an authoritarian regime and democratic institutions are stillweak. Yet, it is
also dangerous, in the sense that an emphasis on values that divide the population or
fail to foster civil society such as a focus on the nationalism of the dominant group
or strong leadership over mass preference-can have a detrimental effect on the
development of civil society.
However, if themass media were to choose to 'lead' their audience by attempting to
challenge majority beliefs too vehemently, they run the risk of losing both the
audience's attention and its trust.This is complicated by the fact that it is often hard to
gauge the opinion or mood of an audience, particularly when journalists become
somewhat isolated from average citizens. This would describe a central challenge in
the authoritarian model of themedia. In addition, both public and commercial media
outlets cannot act in isolation from the competition in anymedia 'model'. Even if their
funding structure allows them to ignore short-term popular trends, as is technically
truewith theBritish Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), ifmedia outlets lose audience
share to a point at which they fail to communicate messages to a significant number of
people, they become marginalised. There is compelling evidence thatmedia pursue
their own interests and traditions that seem to thwart the notion of media models.
Media in the United States, in spite of growing concerns over 'infotainment', still
devote a relatively large amount of coverage to elections. In turn, the BBC continues
to cover ceremonial state occasions such as the opening of parliament atWestminster
and the laying of wreaths for thewar dead on Remembrance Day, notwithstanding
their lack of dynamic viewing value.
There is less study of media systems of countries that fall into the authoritarian or
the Soviet media models. This is disappointing, in the sense that long-term studies of
the Soviet Union certainly showed interesting and meaningful variations within a
'monolithic' power structure.Media studies of non-free states indeed media studies

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1283

outside of theUnited States and theUnited Kingdom-are fairly rare. At the same
time, there are elements within non-free states that are relevant in understanding the
relationship in general. While Western analysts debate the relative merits of public
service broadcasting, regulation, dumbing-down, framing of election campaigns and
other issues, they often fail to ask broader questions about media and democracy in
general. For example, Sparks (2000) suggests that thewhole argument about public
media versus commercial media misses the point. He posits that the discussion of
media and society should be re-ordered from an examination of public versus
commercial media to consider who controls themedia under any type of ownership.
For example, Sparks argues that two of the classic models of themedia from Siebert
et al. (Soviet and libertarian) do not work because economic and political power is so
intertwined in both systems. Thus, the systems never could really be contrasted, as the
basic component of media control is in the hands of elites whether in a libertarian or
Soviet media system. For Sparks, power is more important than whether media
controllers are in the state-funded or commercial spheres. It is this sort of thinking that
is useful in terms of examining the Russian media sphere and its relationship to
political power. Indeed, Sparks' ideas were echoed by comments by focus group
participants in Russia, who quite reasonably pointed out that itwould have been
impossible forNTV to have established itselfas a major commercial channel without
strong linkswith theYel'tsin administration. As a 21-year old student fromUlyanovsk
said, it is hard to separate 'government' interests from 'commercial' interests in
contemporary Russia, which is an insightful statement on Russian civil society (Oates
2006, p. 51).2
All of this begs the question of the role that themass media should play in civil
society. Unsurprisingly, this is a question that has intriguedphilosophers for centuries
and is the subject of a wide range of books.3 While it is clear that the view on what
constitutes democracy is quite culturally specific,most critics agree that themedia play
a crucial role in fostering civil society. Scholars vary somewhat on the exact nature of
this role.While Dahl perceives democracy as an ideal rather than an actual type of
governance, he sees freedom of expression, media freedom and the right to expression
all as key components of civil society. Habermas, who has become very visible in the
attempt to understand themedia's role in democracy, argues that themedia provide a
critical 'sphere' inwhich the public can debate and discuss policy as they continually
forge a better society. Huntington perceives themedia as important in an educative
role-and themore educated the citizens, the better chance there is for democracy.
There are differentdefinitions, however, in terms of what constitutes 'education' and
what is really just 'propaganda'; definitions that vary not only from regime type to
regime type,but even among countries with relatively similar political ideologies. It is
this idea thatHallin and Mancini (2003) explored by comparing media systems and
trying to model the role of themedia in the political sphere inways that are more
subtle and perhaps more useful than those suggested more than 40 years ago by
Siebert et al.

2Focus group, March 2000.

3Some of the classics in the twentieth century are Dahl (1989), Habermas (1989), and Huntington
(1991).

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 1284 SARAH OATES

According to Hallin and Mancini, one of the central problems with The Four
Models of thePress is that the elements of all of themodels
(except the Soviet) are
evident inmany democracies. They find that the fourmodels now limit, rather than
contribute, to understanding of themedia's role in the political sphere. By using the
study of political systems inNorth America and Europe, Hallin and Mancini devised
the Liberal Model, the Democratic Corporatist Model and the Polarised Pluralist
Model (see Table 2). As Hallin and Mancini defined and tested theirmodels, itbecame
clear that it is very difficult to usefully compare entiremedia systems. In addition, they
found that the forces of commercialisation and globalisation were leading to
'considerable convergence' among media systems in different countries, making it
thatmuch more difficult to construct models that analysed themedia and political
sphere within a single country (Hallin & Mancini 2003, p. 12). While their three
models offer a more nuanced understanding of how media systems operate today and
are based on modern-day research, they also show the limitations of trying to define
'models' that usefully explain the relationship between media and politics in a
comparative context. Russia does not fit into any of these models, which is not
surprising.What isvaluable about Hallin and Mancini's study in reference toRussia is
that it encourages scholars to use empirical data about a case study in order to
formulate a media model. This iswhat will be attempted below by looking at the state
of the current Russian media and contrasting itwith factors in the Soviet media. Is it
fundamentally differentor does the Soviet 'frame' of themedia allow us particular
insight into the role the contemporary Russian media play in politics?

The contemporary Russian media sphere

In thewake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new Russian government
generally rejected the elaborate, staged productions from Soviet times. It became clear,
however, that the audience needed a sense of gravitas and authority from its leaders
and that Soviet tradition and visual historywere an important part of that.This would

TABLE 2
HALLIN AND MANCINI'S MEDIA MODELS

Model name Definition Countriesonwhichit isbased

Liberal Relative dominanceofmarket Great Britain,Ireland,

mechanismsand commercial media. North America.
Relatively small role of state.
Democratic Historical co-existenceof commercial NortherncontinentalEurope.
corporatist media andmedia tied to
organisedsocial and politicalgroups.
Relativelyactive (but legallylimited)
role of the state.
Polarised pluralist Integration ofmedia intoparty Mediterraneancountries
politics,weaker historical of southernEurope.
development of commercial media.
Strong role of the state.

Source: Hallin and Mancini (2003).

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1285

not be surprising to analysts such as Schudson, who compellingly argues in The Power
of News that it is impossible to separate 'news' from 'culture'; what journalists
'produce and reproduce is not information if there is such a thing; it is what is
recognised or accepted as public knowledge given certain political structures and
traditions' (Schudson 1995, p. 31). This view comes closest to that expressed by
Russian focus group participants in 2000 and 2004 when they talked about their
perceptions of the media and the role it plays in their society.4 Russians
overwhelmingly reject the idea of 'objectivity' or even 'balance' in theirmass media
(Oates 2006). Rather, theyperceive themedia as political players, generally deployed
in the service of their financial and political patrons. As such, theRussian audience
well understands that the 'news' they receive from sources such as Vremya on The
First Channel or Segodnya on NTV is an arrangement of information through strong
political filters.As long as they understand the type of filter, they feel that they can
understand the news. They are also quick to say that anyone who believes that this
'filter'does not exist, in any media system, ismerely naive.
One of themost confusing things about theRussian media is an apparent diversity
that does not translate into effective, independent political power. Although analysts
initially labelled Russia as a 'developing democracy', it has not developed democratic
institutions. Rather, there is the appearance of democratic institutions in form,
including media outlets, elections, parliament and a popularly elected president, but
these institutions lack democratic content. As a result,much of themass media simply
repeat the fable of democratic interaction. Any attempt to challenge the government
on key issues such as corruption at the top, the progress of war inChechnya, bribery
or the oppression of political challengers, is not tolerated. As suggested by a focus
group participant in Ulyanovsk in her comment above, it is difficult to separate
financial interests frommedia interests in contemporary Russia.s As a result, it can be
complicated to identifywhen financial concerns are impeding media freedom and
vice versa. However, evidence is now overwhelmingly clear that there is a significant,
progressive narrowing of media freedom in Russia. Although therewere significant
problems of bias (particularly in election coverage) from 1993 onward, the more
serious attacks on media outlets began after Putin took elected office inMarch 2000.
Some of these moves to limitmedia freedom have been quite public, notably the
seizure and forced change in ownership of NTV in 2001 as well as themurder of
Novaya Gazeta reporter and Chechen war correspondent Anna Politkovskaya in 2006.
In addition to these clear signals to the limits of free expression, there are numerous
less high-profile attacks on themedia as a voice not completely in concert with the
Kremlin. For example, Russian government officials seized the computer servers and
effectively stopped the operations of the Educated Media Foundation inMoscow
(formerly Internews Russia) inApril 2007. The seizure was justified on the grounds
that two officials at the organisation had failed to declare E10,000 when arriving back

4From 24 focus groups conducted inMoscow, Ulyanovsk and a hamlet near Voronezh in 2000 as
well as eight focus groups inMoscow and Ulyanovsk in 2004. The focus group questions were written
by the author and the groups were moderated by Russian Research Ltd. For detailed findings from the
groups, see Oates (2006), particularly Chapters 3 and 7. This research was funded by two grants from
the British Economic and Social Research Council (R223350028 and R000223133).
5Focus group, March 2000.

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 1286 SARAH OATES

into the country in January 2007. According to a press release from the Educated
Media, the declaration mistake usually results in a small fine (R2,000 or about E57).
The Educated Media foundation had worked for years training Russian journalists
and keeping them apprised of their rights.
Russia has a mix of state and commercial ownership across all levels of print and
broadcasting. However, themost dominant media outlet is television in Russia. The
primacy of central television stations in Russia remains relatively unchallenged,
unlike in themany Western countries, due to several factors. First, the Internet is
underdeveloped in the country as both the telecommunications infrastructure and
personal income to buy extra media services lag behind much of theWest. National
newspapers are relatively expensive and many people simply cannot afford the
luxury of a subscription. The same is true for satellite television, which is generally
forwell-off people in the urban centres. As a result, the central television stations in
Russia retain a particular political influence that they now lack in places such as the
United States and the United Kingdom. The dominant networks (broadcast on
Channels 1 and 2 on the television dial) are the state-run First Channel and state
owned Russian Television and Radio (RTR). Technically, only 51% of the First
Channel is owned directly by the Russian state, but much of the rest of the
ownership is in the hands of state enterprises controlled by theKremlin. As a result,
theKremlin retains the right to hire and fire the director of the channel. Since the
creation of themodern Russian state in 1991, this ability has been exercised many
times. In themore settled, authoritative regime of Putin, however, constant hiring
and firingsare no longer necessary. Employees of all media outlets are well aware of
the limits of what can be said on air or in print. This parallels the Soviet experience
of journalists, inwhich the action of a censor was rarely needed, as Soviet journalists
understood the party 'line' and theway all stories should be formulated by the time
they received their firstjobs.
Even if there are certain topics that receive littlemeaningful coverage in Russia,
there is a lot of news in general. There are more than 400 newspaper titles (more than
during the Soviet era), but most of them are quite small and struggle financially (BBC,
21 February 2007).6 In addition, all prominent newspapers toe theKremlin line. There
is some radio news, including the relatively liberal Ekho Moskvy (Echo ofMoscow)
radio station, but radio nationwide provides little serious alternative news.While there
are well-known, professional websites that address Russian news and politics, many of
them reflect the limited news diversity found in themainstream Russian media. In any
case, Internet authority in the news sphere remains relatively low in Russia. In the
most popular sphere of television, there has been steady growth and the number of
channels that half of theRussian nation could receive increased from five in 2004 to
nine in 2006 (Kachkaeva et al. 2006).
If there ismedia diversity,why is there no media freedom? The problem lies in two
key areas: the dearth of effective law in Russia as well as the lack of journalistic
professionalism. Freedom of speech is guaranteed in the 1993 Russian Constitution,
but this does not serve as a basis for media laws that protect this concept.

6As part of its remit, the BBC monitors media outlets from around the world. This report is available
at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/4315129.stm, accessed 22 May 2007.

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1287

Rather, there are serious flaws in the legal system in termsof protection of free speech
(Oates 2006). Surprisingly, Russia actually lacks a contemporary law in its key media
sector of broadcasting. In addition, there is a 'war' of laws in the country-affecting
themedia sector and beyond because the president can issue edicts that conflictwith
laws passed by the parliament. The situation is furtherconfused by the fact that the
regions also regulate themedia locally and can impose furtheror even contradictory
laws on media outlets and journalists. As much local media funding comes from the
local government (and its very existence often depends on the goodwill of local
leaders), themedia are quite vulnerable to local legislation. The Moscow Media Law
and Policy Centre found that some regional media legislation actually conflicts with
national law, making it impossible formedia outlets to operate within both legal
boundaries (European Institute for theMedia 2000a, p. 19). As a result, the law does
not provide a framework for themedia sphere; rather, it supplies another way for local
and national politicians to threaten themedia with closure for adverse coverage. There
have been some occasional legal victories for themedia, but they are relatively rare
and insignificant.7
The key question about Russian journalists is whether they have fundamentally
changed from their acknowledged role as cogs in the propaganda system of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Do theycontinue to see themselves as political
players, rather than political observers, in service to the citizens? It is understandable
that journalists who worked as propagandists in the Soviet era might have trouble
adjusting to change. However, there is fairly strong evidence that the post-Soviet
generation of journalists also do not interpret their role as disinterested supporters of
civil society (Pasti 2005; Voltmer 2000; European Institute for theMedia 2000a,
2000b). Much of the problem is simply practical. Journalists inRussia must adhere to
the news agenda set by the forces that control theirmedia outlets. While the post
Soviet period initially had some variation in opinion, this has become increasingly
limited as theKremlin tolerates less and less opposition to its policies. State-funded
media outlets face losing their subsidies for failing to toe the Kremlin line.When
commercial media outlets criticise the presidential administration on key issues (such
as opposition to Putin's corruption, or thewar inChechnya), theyoften lose financial
control through government sanctions including the strict application of ever
changing finance laws. Even when individual journalists may choose to pursue
controversial issues, theywill find that cautious editors and publishers will be quick to
set limits.When interviewed inMarch 2004, the host of theNTV political talk show
Freedom of Speech, Savik Shuster, complained that his NTV bosses constantly called
him to complain about his plans to book outspoken guests.8 A fewmonths later, his
show was cancelled.
Practical issues of keeping their jobs (and sometimes their liberty or even lives)
aside, there is substantial evidence thatRussian journalists do not view themselves as
political watchdogs or challengers of the political status quo. Most Russian journalists

7For example, themedia did successfully challenge a quite restrictive election coverage law that was
passed in 2003, which would have made it essentially impossible for them to carry any discussion of

party policy or ideology in the election coverage.

interview with author, NTV offices, Moscow, March 2004.

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 1288 SARAH OATES

view themselves as political players and do not seek to change that role (European
Institute for theMedia 2000a; Oates 2006). They work for their particular political
'patron'. Viewers, readers and listenerswill be presented with 'news' that is essentially
propaganda from the point of view of the political patron. As the presidential
apparatus has consolidated power in Russia to a large extent, there is now little
deviation from the Kremlin line. In particular, this means there is virtually no
meaningful news fromChechnya. Generally, itmeans thatRussian citizens have little
information tomeaningfully debate political issues or participate in civic life.
There remains some variation in themedia sphere in Russia, as a wide range of
opinion and news is expressed in smaller outlets. In particular, a Moscow
newspaper called Novaya Gazeta and a Moscow-based radio station, Ekho Moskvy
continue to report on issues such as the war in Chechnya, opposition to Putin,
protest marches and the political opposition. They do this is an atmosphere of
menace and personal threat. As noted above, the most prominent opposition
journalist, Novaya Gazeta reporter Politkovskaya, was assassinated inOctober 2006
in the elevator of her apartment building. Although her death caused worldwide
comment and outrage, President Putin dismissed her work as 'extremely
insignificant' for Russian politics.9 There was little interest in her death in Russia.
This is unsurprising, as the international Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has
estimated that 29 journalists were killed in a single decade in post-Soviet Russia.
Many have died covering thewars in Chechnya, but the organisation estimated that
at least 11 were murdered in contract-style killings in the four years after Putin
came to power.10With this sort of example of the fate of investigative journalists, it
is not surprising thatmost Russian journalists have a finelydeveloped sense of self
censorship and self-survival. Unfortunately, many also freely accept bribes
(particularly during elections) to write favourable articles on some candidates and
publish scurrilous rumours about others (European Institute for theMedia 2000a;
Oates 2006).

Charting media performance across theformer Soviet sphere

The above section has outlined the current state of themedia inRussia and identified
several barriers to themedia's ability to contribute to a civil society. However, are
these problems more symptomatic of the Russian political present or of the Soviet
past? In order to answer this question, the article now turns to evidence of the

9Putin made these comments at a news conference in Dresden with German Chancellor Angela
Merkel. He also called the killing a 'disgustingly cruel crime'. See 'Chechnya: Politkovskaya Mourned
as "Last Hope'", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 October 2006, full article available at: http://

www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/10/955DF0B0-A445-46EF-A7F8-A49B36A501E8.html, last ac
cessed 3 August 2007.
10See Journalists Killed in the Line of Duty in the Last 10 Years, a report from the Committee to

Project Journalists, available at: http://www.cpj.org/killed/killed_archives/Intro.html, last accessed 3

August 2007. The figures only include those for whom there is evidence to suggest that a journalist was
likely killed in direct reprisal for his or her work or in cross fire while carrying out a dangerous
assignment. The figure does not include journalists who were killed in accidents apparently unrelated
to their work.

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1289

performance of the post-Soviet media. These data are from the analysis of media
monitoring reports during 18 elections from 1993 to 2002 fromRussia togetherwith
similar reports from Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine (Oates 2004).1 The
evidence of media performance in the reports was scored in a range of areas, which
revealed a set of common problems across the region. The main findings are
below.
summarised

Bias

The media in all five countries were consistently biased, worsening somewhat from
1993 to 2002. These findings are particularly compelling because the European
Institute for theMedia reports used in the analysis are backed by careful quantitative
measuring of broadcasttime and print space devoted to all major parties and
candidates in the elections. There is bias evident in virtually all types of mass media
worldwide but that bias is far subtler and less pervasive than the type of bias seen in
post-Soviet countries, particularly on state-run television channels.

Censorship
This varied somewhat. There was no evidence of censorship at all in four of the 18
elections the 1998 Armenian presidential elections, the 1999 Armenian parliamen
tary elections, the 1994 Moldovan parliamentary elections, and the 1999 Russian
parliamentary elections. However, it is clear that self-censorship as opposed to top
down censorship was at work in at least some of these elections, particularly in the
1999 Russian elections. Indeed, there is a statistical correlation between evidence of
censorship and self-censorship in the findings in general. Otherwise, censorship has
ranged enormously, from the small amount present in the 1995 Russian parliamentary
elections to the virtually complete censorship found in the 2001 Belarusian presidential
elections.What this finding suggests is that censorship is only one particular tool used
by governments in an attempt to control themedia.

Governmental influence

The coding showed that this was a more prevalent problem than the more old
fashioned, Soviet style of censorship. In half of the elections coded therewas evidence
to suggest that government influence completely pervaded themedia system during
elections. In an additional five elections, therewas much evidence that government
interferencewas a serious problem. Only in the 1993 Russian elections was there little
evidence of government interference. To compound the problem, government

nThese reports were conducted by the former European Institute for the Media in D?sseldorf,

Germany. They were gathered and analysed by the author with funding from a Leverhulme Research
Fellowship. The reports are archived online at: http://www.media-politics.com/eimreports.htm,
accessed 22 May 2007. They were scored by identifying the presence of certain issues (such as bribery,
violence and censorship) on a scale of zero (not present) to four (extensive evidence of occurrence). The

reports were coded by the author, with intercoder reliability checks performed by Dr Gillian
McCormack, formerly of the European Institute for theMedia.

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1290 SARAH OATES

interferencecorrelates quite stronglywith self-censorship in the data, suggesting that

the government influence 'trains' journalists as well as controls them directly into
supporting the government of the day.

Commercialinfluence
The spectre of commercial influence on media content is one of the problems
introduced into the post-Soviet media system by themarket. There appeared to be no
evidence of this in reports of nine of the elections (in Armenia, Belarus, the 1994
Moldovan parliamentary elections and the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections).
This would make sense as therewere little or no powerful commercial media at this
point in fact, Russia's influential commercial television station NTV was not in
operation by the 1993 elections. However, as discussed above, therewas considerable
bias from commercial stations particularly in the 1996 re-election of Boris Yel'tsin.
Thus, these post-Soviet countries have experienced theworst of both worlds. Rather
than balancing the biases of the statemedia, the commercial media often spawn biases
of their own.

Lack of journalistic
professionalism
Comments by journalists and observations by analysts support the idea thatmany
post-Soviet journalists do not believe in balanced or objective reporting. They perceive
their media outlets as political players rather than political observers. As such,
distorting news, using 'black PR', ignoring some political players and exaggerating the
value of others is seen as an appropriate role for journalists. This also facilitates
widespread bribery and 'hidden' advertising inwhich paid political advertisements are
presented as news stories. Unsurprisingly, evidence of the lack of journalistic
professionalism is correlated, to a degree, with government influence and self
censorship.

Flaws inmass media law

Mass media law was particularly weak in some countries immediately after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In Belarus, for example, there was little modern
legislation dealing with elections and mass media coverage by the time of the 1994
Belarusian presidential elections. Nor did the situation improve in Belarus, as laws
therewere often aimed at controlling themass media rather than enabling it to cover
elections properly. In other countries, the law itselfhas been less of an issue. However,
theEuropean Institute for theMedia monitors noted throughout the reports that it is
not so much a dearth of law as itspoor application that has created a bad climate for
election coverage.

Funding problems for themass media

Of the five countries discussed in this part of the study, Armenia's mass media
struggled the hardest with economic woes. This is not surprising as Armenia's

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1291

economic problems were particularly bad, even in post-Soviet terms. However, the
European Institute for theMedia reports noted problems in funding throughout the
region. The situation appears to have remained relatively static, although Russia's
media market was hit hard by economic crises in the late 1990s and this is particularly
reflected in the evidence in the 1999 and 2000 election reports fromRussia.

Media harassment

This shows a great deal of variation across the region. In 10 elections in this study,
therewas no sign of thisor very littleevidence of harassment. However, harassment of
journalists has been unusually severe inBelarus. In addition, therewas much evidence
of media harassment inUkraine in 1998 and in theArmenian parliamentary elections
in 1995. Unsurprisingly, media harassment is correlated with violence against
journalists, crime against journalists, the violation of electoral rights and censorship.
At times, it was slightly difficult to code, but the general idea was that media
'harassment' took a broader form thanmere censorship and often involved tax audits,
refusing to register a media outlet for dubious reasons or trouble over the use of state
offices.

Violation of electoral rights throughdistortion of media norms

This category examined evidence of bribery, hidden advertising, kompromat, self

censorship, crime and violence against journalists in an attempt to come to an
understanding of the depth and scale of the violation of electoral rights in each
election.

Bribery
In 11 of the elections coded, there appeared to be no evidence of bribery. This perhaps
relates to two issues. First, it is very difficult to get honest assessments of briberywhen
talking to post-Soviet journalists. In addition, inmany of these elections governmental
influence, rather than cash, may have been more important in termsof controlling the
mass media. The most widespread evidence of bribery has been inRussian elections.
Evidence of bribery is strongly correlated with hidden advertising (not surprising as
that is one of themost common items bought with cash under the table) and less
strongly correlated with kompromat.

Hidden advertising

As noted above, hidden advertising tracked quite closely with evidence of bribery,
becoming apparent as a serious problem inRussia from 1995 on as well as inMoldova
and Ukraine. Perhaps themost worrying element of hidden advertising is thatmany
post-Soviet journalists regard it as a normal practice. It is quite difficult,however, for
the average reader or viewer to distinguish between 'bought' and regular news
coverage. Journalists in some post-Soviet countries even defend hidden advertising by
claiming virtually all news coverage is now bought.

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 1292 SARAH OATES

Kompromat
This is a particularly distinctive post-Soviet media product. Kompromat, the Russian
abbreviation for 'compromising materials', is a type of media distortion endemic to
the post-Soviet media sphere. It is essentially 'mud-slinging' by journalists, the quick
succession of accusations against political figureswith no balance or reply from those
accused. It goes far beyond merely disseminating unpleasant rumours about an
opponent. It often employs somewhat dubious facts and figures, sometimes with a
grain of truth and sometimes essentially groundless. A classic example of kompromat
was the flurryof news stories about Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov by Channel 1
commentator Sergei Dorenko in 1999 (which included insinuations that Luzhkov
embezzled money to build a massive dacha outside Moscow). Typical post-Soviet
kompromat also has entertainment value from its nastiness, with rumours and half
truths stretched into fantastical stories (such as the notion that Russian presidential
candidate Grigory Yavlinsky had cosmetic surgery). Kompromat has been developed
and refined over the years, becoming particularly strong in the Russian elections in
1999 and 2000. In fact, the coding evidence suggests that either kompromat is a
particularly Russian phenomenon-overwhelming the media system in 1999 and
2000 or that itwas not as broadly defined by the European Institute for theMedia
monitors in the other elections.

Self-censorship
Self-censorship appears to be relatively pervasive across the countries, with the
exception of Armenia. It does not seem to increase steadily over time; rather it seems
more severe at particular elections (particularly for the 1998Moldovan parliamentary
elections). Much like bribery, self-censorship is rather difficult to code. However,
many post-Soviet journalists who can be disarmingly frank about theirprofession
admit that theypractise self-censorship in order to keep their jobs and, in some cases,
to avoid physical violence. Most post-Soviet societies have generated a culture in
which the limitsof permissible expression are quite clear. For example, inRussia ithas
become obvious that direct and sustained criticism of the president will not be
tolerated in a major media outlet. Self-censorship is a particularly worrying and
corrosive condition formedia freedom. As noted above, evidence of self-censorship is
strongly correlated with government influence. It also is strongly correlated with
crime, which suggests that it is part of the atmosphere of fear and control of
journalists.

Crime

This category looked at incidents thatwere crimes against journalists, yet apparently
stopped short of actual violence. These types of incidents included ransacking of
editorial offices and theft. In the reports, therewas very littleevidence of crime against
journalists, which is somewhat at odds with reports by groups such as Reporters
Without Borders and Amnesty International. Crime against journalists was only
found to be pervasive in the 1995 Armenian parliamentary elections and fairly

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1293

widespread in elections in Belarus in 1995 and 1996. As mentioned above, crime was
strongly correlated with evidence of media harassment and censorship.

Violence
International groups have reported an enormous amount of violence against
journalists in the former Soviet Union, notably in Russia and Ukraine. While some
of the deaths are due to war coverage of Chechnya, there have been numerous
mysterious murders and assaults on journalists inRussia far away from the battlefield.
One of themost famous cases of violence against journalists was the discovery of the
beheaded body of Internet journalist Heorhiy Gongadze inUkraine in 2000.12 Thus,
there is a great deal of evidence of violence in at least part of the region covered in this
coding. The reports, however, generally only covered the election period (although
coding was made of violence against journalists generally mentioned in the reports).

Using thepost-Soviet data to build a post-Soviet media model

The key question iswhether the Soviet and post-Soviet media spheres are essentially
differentand, if so, whether there is a useful model that can help us to understand the
media's role in the post-Soviet political sphere. In thismodel, we consider only two
'snapshots' of the Soviet and post-Soviet media sphere. For the Soviet model, we use
general attributes throughout the Soviet period. While there were variations, in
particular from the Stalinist era to theKhrushchevite 'thaw',we are considering here a
model that embraces the central attributes over time in the Soviet media. By the same
token, the post-Soviet model does not reflectall the relative variation ofmedia voices
since 1991. In particular, there ismarkedly lessmedia freedom now than in 1991.13
Thus, thismodel uses the situation in 2007 as a second point in time to find evidence.
Table 3 compares central components in the Soviet and post-Soviet media sphere to
test the idea of a neo-Soviet model of themedia. Several differences are immediately
clear from the table. Under the Soviet system, therewas no 'bias' in the news media.
Rather, thematerial printed and broadcast was a Sovietised version of reality.News
was selected, edited and presented in order to support the Soviet worldview and the
progress toward achieving worldwide communism. At the same time, the Soviet
audience developed the ability to glean relevant information from the news, in
particular when political changes were signalled by theway inwhich the leaders were
covered (or even positioned on the podium in Red Square). While therewas little
ability for the news media to produce variation in the news, the audience became
attuned to understanding shifts and changes in policy in theway itwas reported. In
thisway, the Soviet audience did receive information that it foundmeaningful. On the

12This launched a political scandal inUkraine as the allies of Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma
were accused of plotting his disappearance?although this was never proven.
13While this is clear from observation?particularly with the forced editorial changes at NTV in
2001?it also has been traced inmedia
observation reports during Russian elections by the European
Institute for the Media at: http://www.media-politics.com/eimreports.htm,
(archived last accessed 3
August 2007) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office of Democratic
Initiatives and Human Rights (see www.osce.org/odihr, last accessed 3 August 2007).

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1294 SARAH OATES
TABLE 3
COMPARING THE SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET MEDIA SPHERE

Sovietmedia until1985 Post-Sovietmedia as of 2007

Bias Virtuallymonolithiccontrol Strongbias inmaterial that

of information flow. purportsto be 'news'.
Censorship Elaborate censorship Broad-based,voluntary
bureaucracy,but roleof self-censorship
as developed
important.
self-censorship throughpunishmentof
reporters,
media outlets
thatchallengeKremlin
on keypoints.
Governmental Formal, themedia were 'organs' Formal forstate-runmedia;
influences of various stateand party informalyetpowerfulfor
institutions(althoughCPSU commercialmedia.
had ultimatepower/authority).
Commercial Not a factor. Powerfulforcommercial
influences media with notionof
'he who pays the piper calls
the tune'.
Journalistic
profession Did not exist. Has not developed.
Mass media law Media were propaganda organs. Exists,but incompleteand
not useful inprotectionof
media as FourthEstate.
Protectionfor In theorybut never inpractice. In theorybut limitedby
freespeech constraintslistedabove
and below.
Fundingproblems Subsidisedcompletely. Inadequate subsidies;many
strugglein competitive
market.
Media harassment Not an issue;allmedia controlled Severe issue,includingclosures
by thestateexceptforvery ofmedia outletsby strict
minor undergroundliterature applicationof arrayof
(samizdat,tamizdat,foreignradio). (sometimesconflicting)laws.
Violence against Not an issue.Although dissidents Violence (including
murder)
journalists were imprisonedand evenkilled againstjournalistscommon.
in labour camps, there was a
distinctionbetweenSoviet
journalistsand Soviet dissidents.
Audience Subjectswho embracedthe Subjectswho embrace the
Sovietworld view. Russian worldview.

other hand, the audience received very little information that was not rigorously
framed and moulded by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the world
before the Internet and the collapse of the Soviet state, therewere few information
sources to challenge thisworldview.
Nor do the post-Soviet media operate under the same type of censorship as the
Soviet media. However, self-censorship was key to the smooth operation of the Soviet
propaganda system. The same can be said today of the post-Soviet media system, in
which the attempt to use the role of the journalist tomake a political impact now ends
with dismissal or in extreme cases even violence and death. It is true that there are
now a wide range of media outlets in Russia and thatmany freely criticise the state.
Yet, it is clear that there is littlepolitical efficacy in alternative ideas found in some

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1295

minor media outlets in Russia. In part, this is due to the lack of social capital in
Russia, which is not surprising in the context of the severe social, economic and
political constraints on group aggregation in the country. If even relatively powerful
political entities such as Yabloko and theCommunist Party of theRussian Federation
are continually harassed, how can a grass-roots movement hope to succeed? The
media cannot simply talk about political alternatives and expression; theremust be
institutionswithin society to implement these ideas. As political parties have notably
failed as effectivepolitical institutions in Russia (Smyth 2006) there is littlehope for
meaningful political aggregation fromRussian citizens.
In addition, governmental 'influence' on themedia was essentially complete in the
Soviet era, while it is patchier in Russia today. Commercial influence and funding
was not a factor in the Soviet Union nor was legal protection for free speech. It is
interesting to note that post-Soviet journalists appear to have inherited not only a
type of Soviet-style controls, but they also have a range of additional factors with
which to cope. While these include financial pressures in the fluctuations of the post
Soviet economy, although Kachkaeva et al. (2006) point out that there are stillmany
thrivingmedia outlets, themore worrying issues are those of media harassment and
violence against journalists. As noted in the cross-national study of post-Soviet
media performance at elections, the erosion of strong, central authorities brings
problems along with democratic possibilities. The rise of organised crime in Russia
has created powerful, lawless enemies to civic institutions such as a free press. The
situation ismade much more difficultbecause trying to establish the links between
governance and crime is difficult in post-Soviet Russia. While many journalists have
been murdered, there are few leads as to who is guilty. This sends a clear and
chilling message to other journalists that they may pay for publishing or
broadcasting stories with their lives. The Soviet system had clear rules and lines
of demarcation about the tolerance for openness (even before the glasnost' era).
These boundaries shifted over time, but the rules were clear. The post-Soviet media
sphere is a frighteningand dangerous place, even for journalists simply trying to do
their daily jobs. It was particularly fatal for those such as Politkovskaya, who
deliberately challenged the Russian regime with her criticisms of its policy towards
Chechnya and paid with her life.

From Soviet to neo-Soviet audience

What the Soviet and post-Soviet media environment share inRussia is the particular
attitude of the audience. There were few social science studies of the audience in the
Soviet era, but based on contemporary studies that ask people to recall their attitudes
about themedia, a clear pattern emerges (Oates 2006). In focus groups and opinion
surveys,Russians report a surprisinglyhigh level of approval of theirmass media from
pre-glasnost' times.While thiswas at firstsurprising and puzzling toWestern analysts,
there is a rationale behind the attitudes. While Russians are quick to point out that
they did not believe all of the reports of the record-breaking harvests and industrial
output, they honoured the idea behind the reports. The news was meant to 'lead'
rather than to describe; to emphasise the good in Soviet society and ignore the bad.
The media sent a clear, unambiguous message about Soviet values, giving the audience

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 1296 SARAH OATES

a sense of contentment and pride in their society.Although the contemporary Russian

audience reports interestand enjoyment in a greater range ofmedia offerings, they also
value the fundamental role of themedia as an institution that guides (rather than
questions or undermines) the nation. In particular, they find it important that the
media play a stabilising or even inspiring role as the Russian Federation struggles
through its foundational period. This could explain why Russians consistently pick the
state-run First Channel as both their favourite and most trusted news source and
generally more trusted than other political institutions in the country.
On the face of it, this attitude is at odds with Western notions of the role of the
media in society (as much as thoseWestern notions may disagree over the value of the
libertarian versus social-responsibility media systems). On the other hand, theRussian
attitudes that emerge from the study of the Russian media audience can illuminate
similar issues in theWest. In the United States, media scholars report that media
outlets have failed to challenge the Bush administration on the need for a 'war on
terror' in the wake of 9/11. Despite the lack of links with Al Qaeda or compelling
evidence of weapons of mass destruction, theAmerican public (and Congress) have
supported a re-invasion of Iraq. Challenging thismedia frame has been enormously
difficultforAmerican journalists, due to both theirown feelings of angry patriotism as
well as a lack of tolerance for questioning of the president at an emotional time for the
country (Entman 2003; Hutcheson et al. 2004; McDonald & Lawrence 2004). To
suggest that themedia spheres in theUnited States and Russia are similar is not useful
ormeaningful. However, it isboth useful and meaningful to think about the role of the
audience in comparative perspective. The Russian media audience exists inwhat some
would consider a 'paradoxical' world, with a high approval rating of media that they
know omits key facts and censors political opposition. However, they rationalise this
with the understanding of themass media as a key player in both the establishment
and maintenance of an effectiveRussian state.Media diversity and criticism is a luxury
that can lead to instability and chaos, a view theyoften have of their experience under
President Boris Yel'tsin (Oates 2006).
Thus, it can be asked whether a notion of a neo-Soviet media model is useful. It is
most useful in thinking about the nature and role of the audience. The Soviet audience
understood that the news was meant to be inspirational, rather than informational.
Russians report some frustrationwith that, but a surprisingly large number also recall
itwith affection and nostalgia. There is nothing so frustratingas a barrage of bad news
which one has no ability to counteract or address. This comprehension of theRussian
audience allows us to better understand the lack of concern and outcry over the
narrowing of media freedom of Russia. Even the forced change in ownership and
editorial policy at NTV in 2001 received relatively little protest (although it is
somewhat hard to ascertain how much was not covered). At the same time, the post
Soviet media environment has many elements in common with the Soviet
environment. In particular, thewidespread nature of self-censorship and the lack of
legal protection for free speech and media outlets in Russia reflect the nature of the
Soviet system itself.
What makes the system 'neo-Soviet' as opposed to 'Soviet' is a list
of new controls and pressures on journalists, notably market forces as well as a
miasma of harassment and violence. Although there is nominal media variation, there
is little true diversity. There is virtually no ability of themass media tomeaningfully

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 THE NEO-SOVIET MODEL OF THE MEDIA 1297

challenge the central political policies or help to foster grass-roots movements. As

such, the Russian media is again a tool for the elites rather than a watchdog of the
masses.

University of Glasgow

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