ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A.
DE SPOUSES CARANDANG: Three of the four checks used to pay their stock
GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE
GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 160347; November 29, 2006
TOPIC: RULE ON COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES (CO-OWNERS
OF PERSONAL PROPERTIES)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This case reached the Supreme Court as an appeal to the
decision of the CA ruling against the spouses Carandang and denying their motion
for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision that Milagros de Guzman,
the decedent’s wife, is not an indispensable party in the complaint, hence, her
non-inclusion in the case does not warrant a dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS: Spouses Carandang and the decedent Quirino de Guzman were
stockholders and corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS). The
Carandangs have equities at 54 % while Quirino has 46%.
When the capital stock of MBS was increased on November 26, 1983, the
Carandangs subscribed P345,000 from it, P293,250 from the said amount was
loaned by Quirino to the Carandangs. In the subsequent increase in MBS’ capital
stock on March 3, 1989, the Carandangs subscribed again to the increase in the
amount of P93,750. But, P43,125 out of the mentioned amount was again loaned
by Quirino.
When Quirino sent a demand letter to the Carandangs for the payment of
the loan, the Carandangs refused to pay. They contend that a pre-incorporation
agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and Quirino, whereby
Quirino promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the Arcadio without cost, in
consideration for Arcadio’s technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment,
and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore,
there is no indebtedness on the part of the Carandangs.
Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to recover the P336,375 total
amount of the loan together with damages. The RTC ruled in favor of Quirino and
ordered the Carandangs to pay the loan plus interest, attorney’s fees, and costs of
suit. The Carandangs appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, but the CA
affirmed the same. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Carandangs were also denied. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the decedent’s wife.
Thus, Milagros should be considered as an indispensable party in the complaint.
Being such, the failure to join Milagros as a party in the case should cause the
dismissal of the action by reason of a jurisprudence stating that: “(i)f a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may
be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a
cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable
party, was not included as a party-plaintiff.
HELD: No. Although the spouses Carandang were correct in invoking the
aforementioned doctrine, the ground set forth entails an examination of “whether
the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation,
and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded.” The
first query seeks to answer the question of whether Milagros is a real party in interest,
while the latter query is asking if she is an indispensable party. Since the issue of this
case calls for the definition of an indispensable party, invoking the
abovementioned doctrine is irrelevant to the case because the doctrine talks
about a ‘real party in interest’ and not an ‘indispensable party’. Although it is
important to take note that an indispensable party is also a real party in interest.
*Definitions:
> Real party in interest – the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
> Indispensable party – a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action
> Necessary party – one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action
> Pro-forma parties – those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against
another party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule.
An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly,
except as provided by law.
 Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither necessary parties, as the case may be, should be applied. Thus, dismissal is
indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an
an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive indispensable party.
property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules
Under Art. 147 of the Civil Code which was superceded by Art. 108 of the
nevertheless require that she be joined as a party.
Family Code, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the contract of partnership. Thus, Milagros is a co-owner of the subject personal
Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage settlement, property in this case – the credit incurred by spouses Carandang. Being co-owners
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern their property relations. of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an
action for the recovery thereof.
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, “In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits are personal interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit transaction was jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the
executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely
to be conjugal property. the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
Assuming that the four checks are credits, they are assumed to be conjugal
They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the
properties of Quirino and Milagros. There being no evidence to the contrary, such
suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed
presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific
for the benefit of all co-owners.”
partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest.
Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the
Now, with regard to the discussion on the effect of non-inclusion of parties
recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she
in the complaint filed: in indispensable parties, when an indispensable party is not
need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not
before the court, the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable
warranted by her not being a party thereto. (The Civ Pro issue was not the main
party renders all subsequent actuations of the court void, for want of authority to
issue in the case.)
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. For necessary
parties, the non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. Non-compliance with the order for
the inclusion of a necessary party would not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
Lastly, for pro-forma parties, the general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be
followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case
concerning an action to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join
the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse
does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured
by amendment.
Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are also
indispensable or necessary parties, the rules concerning indispensable or
 G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018
BOBIE ROSE D. V. FRIAS, AS REPRESENTED BY MARIE REGINE F. FUJITA, Petitioner, v. ROLANDO
F. ALCAYDE, Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
"Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be
acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of
summons."1
Challenged in this appeal2 is the Decision3 dated May 27, 2010 and Resolution4 dated
October 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109824.
The facts are as follows:
On December 5, 2003, petitioner Bobie Rose D.V. Frias, as lessor and respondent Rolando
Alcayde, as lessee, entered into a Contract of Lease involving a residential house and lot
(subject property) located at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
City, for a period of one year, starting on December 5, 2003 up until December 4, 2004,
with a monthly rental of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000). Respondent refused to perform
any of his contractual obligations, which had accumulated for 24 months in rental
arrearages as of December 2005.5
This prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer,6 docketed as CV Case
No. 6040, with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Muntinlupa City, Branch 80, against the
respondent.7 As per the Process Server's Return8 dated February 14, 2006, the process
server, Tobias N. Abellano (Mr. Abellano) tried to personally serve the summons to
respondent on January 14 and 22, 2006, but to no avail. Through substituted service,
summons was served upon respondent's caretaker, May Ann Fortiles (Ms. Fortiles).
On July 26, 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision,9 in favor of the petitioner and ordered
respondent to vacate the subject premises and to pay the petitioner the accrued rentals
at 12% legal interest, plus P10,000 in attorney's fees. The dispositive portion reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner] and against
[respondent] ordering:
1. The [respondent] and all persons claiming right over him to immediately vacate the
subject premises located at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
City and peacefully surrender possession thereof to the [petitioner];
2. The [respondent] to pay the accrued rental arrearages from December 2003 up to the
time he vacates the property in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php30,000.00) per
month with twelve (12%) percent legal interest; and
3. The [respondent] to pay the [petitioner] the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(Php10,000.00) as reasonable attorney's fees and to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.10
On July 4, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order,11 granting petitioner's Motion to execute the
Decision dated July 26, 2006, and denying respondent's Omnibus Motion thereto.
On July 25, 2007, respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for
Issuance of TRO and/or Injunction,12 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Muntinlupa City,
Branch 203. Respondent averred that the MeTC's July 26, 2006 Decision does not bind him
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. Respondent likewise averred
that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the case for two reasons: (1) petitioners' complaint
has no cause of action for failure to make a prior demand to pay and to vacate; and (2)
petitioner's non-referral of the case before the barangay.13
A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly served to the petitioner.
Based on the Officer's Return14 dated July 27, 2007, Sheriff IV Jocelyn S. Tolentino (Sheriff
Tolentino) caused the "service of a Notice of Raffle and Summons together with a copy of
the complaints and its annexes" to the petitioner, through Sally Gonzales (Ms. Gonzales),
the secretary of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Daniel S. Frias (Atty. Frias).
On September 7, 2007, the RTC, through Judge Pedro M. Sabundayo, Jr. issued an
Order,15 containing therein the manifestation of respondent that he is withdrawing his
application for a TRO and is now pursuing the main case for annulment of judgment.
On September 25, 2007, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion,16 to declare petitioner in
default, on the ground that despite her receipt of the summons, she has yet to file any
pleading.17
On October 3, 2007, the petitioner filed a Special Appearance/Submission (Jurisdictional
Infirmity Raised),18 alleging among others, that respondent's Motion to Revive Relief re:
Issuance of a TRO merits neither judicial cognizance nor consideration.19
On October 30, 2007 the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution,20 for the purpose of
implementing its July 26, 2006 Decision.
On November 5, 2007, Sheriff III Armando S. Camacho, sent a Notice to Pay and to
Vacate21 to respondent. Attached to the notice was the October 30, 2007 Writ of
Execution.
In the RTC's Order22 dated November 15, 2007, the RTC issued a TRO enjoining the MeTC
from implementing its July 26, 2006 Decision, and setting the hearing for respondent's
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction.23
On November 29, 2007, petitioner, through her representative, Marie Regine F. Fujita (Ms.
Fujita), filed a Preliminary Submission to Dismiss Petition - Special Appearance Raising
Jurisdictional Issues (Preliminary. Submission), on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her
person.24 She pointed out that the defect in the service of summons is immediately
apparent on the Officer's Return, since it did not indicate the impossibility of a personal
service within a reasonable time; it did not specify the efforts exerted by Sheriff Tolentino to
locate the petitioner; and it did not certify that the person in the office who received the
summons in petitioner's behalf was one with whom the petitioner had a relation of
confidence ensuring that the latter would receive or would be notified of the summons
issued in her name.25
On December 3, 2007, the RTC issued an Order,26 granting respondent's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the MeTC's July 26, 2006 Decision. The
RTC ruled that although Atty. Frias maintained his. special appearance, he actively
participated in the proceedings by attending the summary hearing in the prayer for the
issuance of the TRO on November 9, 2007 and November 20, 2007. The dispositive portion
reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court grants [respondent's prayer for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court enjoins respondent and the Court Sheriff
of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80, Muntinlupa City and or his deputy or duly authorized
representative(s) from implementing or enforcing the decision dated July 26, 2006 in Civil
Case No. 6040 during the pendency of this action.
SO ORDERED.27
On July 25, 2008, the law office of Real Brotarlo & Real entered its appearance as
collaborating counsel for the petitioner.28
On August 11, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Petition
for Annulment of Judgment and to Set Aside and/or Reconsider 29 the RTC's December 3,
2007 Order, reiterating in substance the November 29, 2007 Preliminary Submission.
Petitioner alleged, among others, that the RTC's December 3, 2007 Order violated the well-
settled rule that a writ of injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take property out of
the possession or control of one person and place the same in the hands of another where
title has not been clearly established by law.30
On August 22, 2008, the RTC issued an Order,31 granting petitioner's November 29, 2007
Preliminary Submission. The RTC ruled that the summons and copies of the petition and its
attachments were not duly served upon petitioner, either personally or through substituted
service of summons strictly in accordance with the Rules. The RTC continued that there is
no proof that Ms. Gonzales or Atty. Frias was authorized by the petitioner to receive
summons on her behalf. Since the face of the Officer's Return is patently defective, the
RTC ruled that the presumption of regularity of performance of duty under the Rules does
not apply. The RTC, thus, ordered the dismissal of the petition for annulment of
judgment.32 The dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the preliminary submission to dismiss petition and
Omnibus Motion filed by [petitioner] Bobbie Rose DV Frias are granted and the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by Rolando Alcayde is DISMISSED. The Order of the court
dated December 3, 2007 granting the issuance of a preliminary injunction is recalled and
set aside considering that since the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the [petitioner], all the proceedings in this case are without any force and effect.
SO ORDERED.33
On September 4, 2008, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion,34 praying for the
recall of the August 22, 2008 Order and/or to maintain the status quo.
On September 15, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 35 of the August 22,
2008 Order.
On October 6, 2008, petitioner filed a Consolidated Opposition,36 alleging that the RTC
held in abeyance the resolution of her November 29, 2007 Preliminary Submission, for eight
(8) months until it issued its August 22, 2008 Order. She likewise alleged that there was
nothing in the RTC's December 3, 2007 Order that categorically denied the November 29,
2007 Preliminary Submission.37
On November 3, 2008, the RTC, through Judge Juanita T. Guerrero, issued an
Order,38 granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, on the ground that he was not
given an opportunity to file his Comment or Opposition to petitioner's August 11, 2008
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion. The dispositive portion of the order reads, thus:
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the
Court dated August 22, 2008 is recalled and set aside. The [respondent] is given fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this order to file his Comment or Opposition or reiterates the one he
filed, on the Manifestation and Omnibus Motion (i.) to Dismiss Petition for Annulment of
Judgment (ii.) to Set Aside and/or Reconsider the Order dated December 3, 2007 and
[petitioner] Bobbie Rose D.V. Frias through his counsel is given fifteen (15) days therefrom to I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF AP[P]EALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
file his Reply if necessary. Thereafter, said Manifestation and Omnibus Motion is considered THAT THE PAIRING JUDGE OF RTC 203 COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
submitted for resolution. AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT DISMISSING [RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT ON A GROUND THAT THE RTC 203 DID NOT
SO ORDERED.39 ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER.
On November 17, 2008, respondent filed a Manifestation (in compliance with the Order
dated November 3, 2008) and Supplement,40 substantially reiterating his September 15,
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
2008 Motion for Reconsideration.
HOLDING THAT THE RTC 203 NEED NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER AS
LONG AS SAID RTC 203 HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE RES.
On November 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Reply (to Alcayde's Comment
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
dated August 19, 2008 and Supplement dated November 12, 2008).41
THAT THE PAIRING JUDGE OF RTC 203 COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER
On February 2, 2009, the RTC issued an Order42 denying petitioner's. August 11, 2008
DATED DECEMBER 3, 2007 OF THE RTC ENJOINING PETITIONER AND SHERIFF OF THE
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 80 OF MUNTINLUPA CITY FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS
WHEREFORE, finding no reason to deviate from the Order of the Court dated December 3,
FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION DATED JULY 26, 2006.53
2007, the same is hereby maintained with modification that the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction shall be issued upon filing of a bond in the amount of Php500,000.00 by the On the one hand, petitioner contends that the CA erred in not dismissing respondent's
[respondent]. For emphasis, the Motion to Dismiss this petition for lack of jurisdiction is petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person.
hereby DENIED. She maintains that since an annulment of judgment is a personal action, it is necessary for
the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over her person. She likewise insists that the CA erred in not
The petitioner BOBIE ROSE D. FRIAS is directed to file his ANSWER within a non-extendible setting aside the RTC's Decision dated December 3, 2007.
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
On the other hand, the CA ruled that a petition for annulment of judgment is not an action
SO ORDERED.43 in personam, thus, the court need not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner,
as long as it has acquired jurisdiction over the res, which in this case was through the filing
On February 20, 2009, petitioner moved for the reconsideration 44 of the RTC's February 2,
of the petition for annulment of judgment with the RTC. This pronouncement was adopted
2009 Order, but the same was denied in the RTC's Order45 dated June 5, 2009.
by the respondent in his comment to the instant petition.
On July 15, 2009, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Default,46 to declare petitioner in
The petition is meritorious.
default for the latter's failure to comply with the RTC's February 2, 2009 order requiring her
to file an answer to the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner once the
complaint or petition is filed. On the other hand, there are two ways through which
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari47
with the CA, to which respondent
jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired through coercive process - either
answered by way of a Comment.48 After the filing of petitioner's Reply,49 the CA on May
through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in
27, 2010 rendered a Decision,50 denying the petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for lack of
court.
merit.
The function of summons in court actions
The Motion for Reconsideration,51 having been denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
October 22, 2010,52 petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following
In the case of Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI) v. Torres,54 We discussed the
issues:
function of summons in court actions, in this wise —
Fundamentally, the service of summons is intended to give official notice to the defendant
or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. The defendant or
respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff as stated in the
complaint. The service of summons upon the defendant becomes an important element
in the operation of a court's jurisdiction upon a party to a suit, as service of summons upon
the defendant is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
Without service of summons, or when summons are improperly made, both the trial and
the judgment, being in violation of due process, are null and void, unless the defendant
waives the service of summons by voluntarily appearing and answering the suit.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is not, however, always the case. Admittedly, and without
subjecting himself to the court's jurisdiction, the defendant in an action can, by special
appearance object to the court's assumption on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If he so
wishes to assert this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted
himself to that jurisdiction.55
Elsewhere, We declared that jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or
respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a
case against him unless he was validly served with summons. Such is the important role a
valid service of summons plays in court actions.56
Nature of a petition for annulment of judgment for purposes of service of summons
For a proper perspective, it is crucial to underscore the necessity of determining first
whether the action subject of this appeal is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because
the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 apply according to the nature of the
action.57
An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve
his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. Its purpose is to
impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically
perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.58 The following are some
of the examples of actions in personam: action for collection of sum of money and
damages; action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry; action for specific performance;
action to enforce a foreign judgment in a complaint for a breach of contract.
Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole
world.59 The phrase, "against the thing," to describe in rem. actions is a metaphor. It is not
the "thing" that is the party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties
even in in rem actions.60 The following are some of the examples of actions in rem: petitions
directed against the "thing" itself or the res which concerns the status of a person, like a
petition for adoption, correction of entries in the birth certificate; or annulment of
marriage; nullity of marriage; petition to establish illegitimate filiation; registration of land
under the Torrens system; and forfeiture proceedings.
A proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property
of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed.61 In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.62 In an action quasi in
rem, an individual is named as defendant. But, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment
is conclusive only between the parties.63 The following are some of the examples of
actions quasi in rem: suits to quiet title; actions for foreclosure; and attachment
proceedings.
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over
the parties is required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal
responsibility or liability upon a person.64 "In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired
either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which
the power of the court is recognized and made effective. "65
Here, respondent filed a petition to annul the MeTC's July 26, 2006 Decision, which ordered
him to vacate the premises of the subject property and to pay the petitioner the accrued
rentals thereon, in violation of the parties' lease contract.
Annulment of judgment, as provided for in Rule 47, is based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes lack ,of due process as
an additional ground to annul a judgment.66 It is a recourse that presupposes the filing of a
separate and original action for the purpose of annulling or avoiding a decision in another
case. Annulment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled is rendered.67 It is unlike a motion for reconsideration, appeal or even a
petition for relief from judgment, because annulment is not a continuation or progression
of the same case, as in fact the case it seeks to annul is already final and executory.
Rather, it is an extraordinary remedy that is equitable in character and is permitted only in
exceptional cases.68
Annulment of judgment involves the exercise of original jurisdiction, as expressly conferred
on the CA by Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 129, Section 9(2). It also implies power by a
superior court over a subordinate one, as provided for in Rule 47, wherein the appellate
court may annul a decision of the regional trial court, or the latter court may annul a
decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court.69
For purposes of summons, this Court holds that the nature of a petition for annulment of
judgment is in personam, on the basis of the following reasons:
First, a petition for annulment of judgment is an original action, which is separate, distinct
and independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. It is
not a continuation or progression of the same case. Thus, regardless of the nature of the
original action in the decision sought to be annulled, be it in personam, in rem or quasi in
rein, the respondent should be duly notified of the petition seeking to annul the court's
decision over which the respondent has a direct or indirect interest.
To consider a petition for annulment of judgment as either in rem or quasi-in-rem, would
create an absurdity wherein the petitioner would simply file the petition in court, without
informing the respondent of the same, through a valid service of summons. This is exactly
what the CA reasoned out in its decision. The CA held that the court need only acquire
jurisdiction over the res, which was "through the institution of the petition for annulment of
judgment" with the RTC, conveniently invoking that "jurisdiction over the res x x x is x x x
acquired x x x as a result of the institution of legal proceedings with the court"70 If left
unchecked, this disposition would set a dangerous precedent that will sanction a violation
of due process. It will foil a respondent from taking steps to protect his interest, merely
because he was not previously informed of the pendency of the petition for annulment of
judgment filed in court.
Second, a petition for annulment of judgment and the court's subsequent decision
thereon will affect the parties alone. It will not be enforceable against the whole world.
Any judgment therein will eventually bind only the parties properly impleaded.
Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 47,71 a judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned
judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void.
In this case, had the RTC granted the respondent's petition, the MeTC's July 26 2006
judgment would have been declared a nullity. This would have resulted to the following
consequences: as to the respondent, he would no longer be required to pay the rentals
and vacate the subject property; and, as to the petitioner, she would be deprived of her
right to demand the rentals and to legally eject the respondent. Clearly, through the RTC's
judgment on the petition, only the parties' interests, i.e., rights and obligation, would have
been affected. Thus, a petition for annulment of judgment is one in personam. It is neither
an action in rem nor an action quasi in rem.
We disagree with the CA's disquisition that since jurisdiction over the res is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the RTC, the jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner may be
dispensed with. Citing the case of Villanueva v. Nite,72 the CA concluded that the petition
is not an action in personam since it can be filed by one who was not a party to the case.
Suffice it to say that in Villanueva, this Court did not give a categorical statement to the
effect that a petition for annulment of judgment is not an action in personam. Neither did
We make a remark that said petition is either an action in rem or a quasi in rem. The issue
in Villanueva was simply whether or not the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the
RTC's decision on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Unlike in this case, there were no issues
pertaining to the proper service of summons, to the nature of a. petition for annulment of
judgment or to the denial of due process by reason of a defect in the service of summons.
We cannot likewise lend credence to the respondent's claim that a petition for annulment
of judgment is either an action in rem or quasi in rem. Suffice it to say that the petition
cannot be converted either to an action in rem or quasi in rem since there was no showing
that the respondent attached any of the properties of the petitioner located within the
Philippines.73
Assuming arguendo, that a petition for annulment of judgment is either an action in
rem or quasi in rem, still the observance of due process for purposes of service of summons
cannot be deliberately ignored. For courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be
expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered
as acting within their jurisdiction.74
There was neither a valid service of summons in person nor a valid substituted service of
summons over the person of the petitioner
At any rate, regardless of the type of action - whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem — the proper service of summons is imperative.75
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, as in this case, the
service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections
676 and 777 of Rule 14. Indeed, the preferred mode of service of summons is personal
service.78 To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint,
(or, as in this case, the petition for annulment of judgment), the serving officer must first
attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt at
personal service has become impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to
substituted service.79
This Court explained the nature and enumerated the requisites of substituted service
in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al.,80 which We summarize and paraphrase below:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service -
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.
"Reasonable time" under Section 8, Rule 14, is defined as "so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently,
what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any, to the other party."
To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious
processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means
15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of
court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for
service. Thus, one (1) month from the issuance of summons can be considered
"reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care,
utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the
expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to
accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is
expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant.
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one (1) month which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts"
means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two (2) different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of
service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return -
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant,
the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all
other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in
the Return to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion -
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be
left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable
age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years
old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a
summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a
responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
presupposed." Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need
to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for
the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of
confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified
of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in
the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance
of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at
least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and
specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge -
If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business,
then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person
on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or
business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these
details must be contained in the Return. [Emphasis and italics supplied].81
A copy of Sheriff Tolentino's Return dated July 27, 2007 reads, thus:
OFFICER'S RETURN
This is to certify the on the 27th day of July 2007, the undersigned caused the service of
the Notice of Raffle and Summons together with a copy of the complaints and its annexes,
to the following defendants, to wit:
BOBBIE ROSE DV FRIAS — served thru Ms. Sally Gonzales, a secretary of her counsel Atty.
Daniel S. Frias, a person employed thereat of suitable age and discretion to receive such
court processes. Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the undersigned to effect personal
service to the defendant, but still no one's around at her given address.
HON. PAULINO GALLEGOS, Presiding Judge -
MTC Branch LXXX, Muntinlupa City and a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in
Sheriff Armando Camacho of MTC - Br. 80, the circumstances authorized by statute.85 Sheriff Tolentino, however, fell short of these
Muntinlupa City - standards. For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service, the same is rendered ineffective. As such, the presumption of regularity
served thru their authorized receiving clerk, Mr. Jay-R Honorica, a person employed in the performance of official functions, which is generally accorded to a sheriffs
thereat of suitable age and discretion to receive such court processes. return,86 does not obtain in this case.

As evidenced by their signature's and stamp received appearing on the original copy of Special appearance to question a court's jurisdiction is not voluntary appearance
the Notice of Raffle and Summons.
In Prudential Bank v. Magdam.it, Jr.87 We had the occasion to elucidate the concept of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I am now returning herewith the original copy of the voluntary or conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance
Notice of Raffle and Summons to the Honorable Court of origin, DULY SERVED, for its to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered
record's [sic] and information. to have submitted to its authority, thus:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
Muntinlupa City, July 27, 2007.82 coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in
court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
A perusal, however, of the Officer's Return discloses that the following circumstances, as
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had
required in Manotoc, were not clearly-established: (a) personal service of summons within
occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the
answer: for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This,
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or place of
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
business.83
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
The Officer's Return likewise revealed that no diligent effort was exerted and no positive
step was taken to locate and serve the summons personally on the petitioner. Upon
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
having been satisfied that the petitioner was not present at her given address, Sheriff
Tolentino immediately resorted to substituted service of summons by proceeding to the
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
office of Atty. Frias, petitioner's counsel. Evidently, Sheriff Tolentino failed to show that she
appearance;
made several attempts to effect personal service for at least three times on at least two
different dates. It is likewise evident that Sheriff Tolentino simply left the "Notice of Raffle
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
and Summons" with Ms. Gonzales, the alleged secretary of Atty. Frias. She did not even
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
bother to ask her where the petitioner might be. There were no details in the Officer's
Return that would suggest that Sheriff Tolentino inquired as to the identity of Ms. Gonzales.
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
There was no showing that Ms. Gonzales was the one managing the office or business of
especially' in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
the petitioner, such as the president or manager; and that she has sufficient knowledge to
submitted to the court for resolution.88
understand the obligation of the petitioner in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Measured against these standards, it is readily apparent that the petitioner did not
acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Indeed, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts
exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not The records show that the petitioner never received any copy of the the respondent's
suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.84 This is petition to annul the final and executory judgment of the MeTC in the unlawful detainer
necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is case. As explained earlier, the copy of the said petition which was served to Ms. Gonzales
was defective under the Rules of Court. Consequently, in order to question the trial court's
jurisdiction, the petitioner filed the following pleadings and motions: Special Neither is the service of the notice of hearing on the application for a TRO on a certain
Appearance/Submission (Jurisdictional Infirmity Raised); Preliminary Submission to Dismiss Rona Adol binding on respondent enterprise. The records show that Rona Adol received
Petition (Special Appearance Raising Jurisdictional Issues); Manifestation and Omnibus the notice of hearing on behalf of an entity named JCB. More importantly, for purposes of
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Annulment of Judgment and to Set Aside and/or acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the Rules require the service of
Reconsider89 the RTC's December 3, 2007 Order, Consolidated Opposition, Manifestation summons and not of any other court processes. [Emphasis and italics supplied].91
and Reply (to Alcayde's Comment dated August 19, 2008 and Supplement dated
As we have consistently pronounced, if the appearance of a party in a suit is precisely to
November 12, 2008); and Motion for Reconsideration against the RTC's February 2, 2009
question the jurisdiction of the said tribunal over the person of the defendant, then this
Order.
appearance is not equivalent to service of summons, nor does it constitute an
acquiescence to the court's jurisdiction.92
In all these pleadings and motions, the petitioner never faltered in declaring that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, due to invalid and improper service of
To recapitulate, the jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner was never vested with the
summons. It is noteworthy that when the petitioner filed those pleadings and motions, it
RTC despite the mere filing of the petition for annulment of judgment. The manner of
was only in a "special" character, conveying the fact that her appearance before the trial
substituted service by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such,
court was with a qualification, i.e., to defy the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over her person.
there was a violation of due process. In its classic formulation, due process means that any
person with interest to the thing in litigation, or the outcome of the judgment, as in this
This Court is of the view that the petitioner never abandoned her objections to the trial
case, must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that interest.93 Thus, as the
court's jurisdiction even when she elevated the matter to the CA through her petition
essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
for certiorari. The filing of her pleadings and motions, including that of her subsequent
evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense, the petitioner must be
posturings, were all in protest of the respondent's insistence on holding her to answer the
properly served the summons of the court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital
petition for annulment of judgment in the RTC, which she believed she was not subject to.
and indispensable ingredient of due process94 and compliance with the rules regarding
Indeed, to continue the proceeding in such case would not only be useless and a waste
the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of
of time, but would violate her right to due process.
jurisdiction.95 Regrettably, as had been discussed, the Constitutional right of the petitioner
to be properly served the summons and be notified has been utterly overlooked by the
In its Order dated December 3, 2007, the RTC harped on the fact that petitioner's counsel,
officers of the trial court.
Atty. Frias, attended the summary hearing on November 9, 2007 of the respondent's prayer
for the issuance of a TRO. This, however, can hardly be construed as voluntary
Petition for annulment of judgment is an improper remedy
appearance. There was no clear intention on the part of Atty. Frias to be bound by the
proceedings. Precisely, his "special" appearance in the hearing was to challenge the RTC's
In any event, respondent's petition to annul the MeTC's July 26, 2006 judgment cannot
lack of jurisdiction over her client. This Court held in Ejercito, et al. v. M.R. Vargas
prosper for being the wrong remedy.
Construction, et al.90 that the presence or attendance at the hearing on the application of
a TRO should not be equated with voluntary appearance, thus:
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that an action for annulment of judgment cannot
Despite Agarao's not being a party-respondent, petitioners nevertheless confuse his
and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.96 Its obvious rationale is to prevent the
presence or attendance at the hearing on the application for TRO with the notion of
party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence.97
voluntary appearance, which interpretation has a legal nuance as far as jurisdiction is
concerned. While it is true that an appearance in whatever form, without explicitly
In this case, it is evident that respondent failed to interpose an appeal, let alone a motion
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction
for new trial or a petition for relief from the MeTC July 26, 2006 Decision rendering the same
of the court over the person, the appearance must constitute a positive act on the part of
final and executory. Hence, the October 30, 2007 Order granting its execution was
the litigant manifesting an intention to submit to the court's jurisdiction. Thus, in the
properly issued.
instances where the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the
defendant, the parties showed the intention to participate or be bound by the
It is doctrinal that when a decision has acquired finality, the same becomes immutable
proceedings through the filing of a motion, a plea or an answer.
and unalterable. By this principle of immutability of judgments, the RTC is now precluded
from further examining the MeTC Decision and to further dwell on petitioner's perceived
errors therein, i.e., that petitioners' complaint has no cause of action for failure to make a
prior demand to pay and to vacate; and, that petitioner failed to refer the case before
the barangay.
Resultantly, the implementation and execution of judgments that had attained finality are
already ministerial on the courts. Public policy also dictates that once a judgment
becomes final, executory, and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied
the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.98 Unjustified delay in
the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable
controversies with finality.99
Verily, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right
to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court's ministerial duty. So is it in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2010 and Resolution
dated October 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109824, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is rendered ordering
the DISMISSAL of the respondent Rolando F. Alcayde's petition for annulment of judgment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149554 July 1, 2003
SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the Orders dated June 27, 20011 and July 26, 20012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-24925.
On March 2, 2000, petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against
respondent spouses Teofredo Amarillo Embudo and Marites Huguete-Embudo a complaint
for "Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition,
Damages and Attorney’s Fees," docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24925 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners alleged that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo,
sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-square meter parcel of land, known as Lot
No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay, Cebu, for a consideration of P15,000.00; that
Teofredo acquired the lot from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by virtue of a deed of sale,3 after
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that despite
demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them.
On March 15, 2001, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss4 the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the total assessed value
of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court, pursuant to Section 33(3)5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7691.6
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss7 alleging that the subject matter of
the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court, as provided by Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended.8
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,9 which was denied on July 26, 2001.
Hence, this petition for review based on the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
PURSUANT TO SECTION 33 (3) OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 129 IN UTTER DISREGARD OF
SECTION 19 (1) OF THE SAME LAW AS WELL AS SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ENUNCIATED IN RUSSEL
VS. VESTIL, 304 SCRA 738 (MARCH 17, 1999) WHICH, WITH DUE RESPECT, WAS TAKEN OUT OF
CONTEXT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WHO
SEEK AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AND THEREBY INVOKE THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT IN THEIR
COUNTERCLAIM ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY THE JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT.10
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners maintain that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the
annulment of deed of sale and partition, and is thus incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the action is one for annulment of title and since
the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P15,000.00, it falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The pertinent portions of the complaint alleged:
4. Sometime in the year 1995, Teofredo A. Embudo, the son-in-law of plaintiffs offered them
portion of Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay, Cebu, which defendants bought on
installment basis from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo. Desirous to live near their daughter and
grandchildren, they accepted defendant’s offer. Immediately, plaintiffs paid defendants the
sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) as full consideration and payment of the
purchase of 50-square meter lot at a price of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) per square
meter;
5. Happily, plaintiffs built their house on the portion they bought from defendants which is
adjacent to defendant’s house. Plaintiffs were issued Tax Declaration No. 53170 for the house,
copy is hereto attached to form part hereof and marked as Annex "A";
6. Notwithstanding repeated demands for the execution of the Deed of Sale, defendants with
insidious machination led plaintiffs to believe that the necessary document of conveyance
could not as yet be executed for the reason that they have not yet paid in full their obligation
to Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo, the original owner of the lot in question, when in truth and in
fact, as plaintiffs came to know later, that the aforesaid defendants were already in possession
of a Deed of Sale over the entire lot in litigation in which it appeared that they are the sole
buyers of the lot, thusly consolidating their ownership of the entire lot to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs. A copy of the Deed of Sale is hereto attached to form part hereof and marked as
Annex "B."
7. As a way to further their fraudulent design, defendants secured the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-99694 solely in their names on the basis of the Deed of Sale
aforementioned (Annex "A" hereof), without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. A copy of the
aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title is hereto attached as an integral part hereof and marked
as Annex "C."
8. Since considerable time had already elapsed that defendants had given plaintiffs a run-
around, plaintiffs then demanded for the partition of the lot, segregating a portion in which
their residential house stands, and despite such demand defendants, without qualm of
conscience refused and still refuse to partition the lot;
xxx xxx xxx;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Honorable Court is most respectfully prayed to render
judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, ordering –
1. Defendants to partition, divide and segregate a portion on which the house of plaintiffs is
situated, with an area of Fifty (50) Square Meters;
2. That the Deed of Sale dated December 28, 1995 entered into by and between defendants
and the previous owner of the lot in question be annulled and cancelled;
3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to annul/cancel Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 99694 in the name of the defendants and in lieu thereof directing him to issue Transfer
Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiffs for the 50-square meter lot and another Transfer
Certificate of Title in favor of defendants for the remaining 100-square meter lot;
4. The Municipal Assessor of Talisay, Cebu to cancel Tax Declaration No. 46493 in the name of
the defendants and directing him to issue Tax Declaration in the name of the defendants for
the 50-square meter lot and another Tax Declaration in the name of the plaintiffs for the
remaining 100-square meter lot;
xxx xxx xxx.11
In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,12 it was held that what determines the nature of an action as
well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. Moreover, in Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill,13 we ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The reliance of the petitioners on the case of Russell v. Vestil14 is misplaced. In the said case,
petitioners sought the annulment of the document entitled, "Declaration of Heirs and Deed
of Confirmation of Previous Oral Partition," whereby respondents declared themselves as the
only heirs of the late Spouses Casimero and Cesaria Tautho to the exclusion of petitioners.
Petitioners brought the action in order for them to be recognized as heirs in the partition of
the property of the deceased. It was held that the action to annul the said deed was
incapable of pecuniary estimation and the consequent annulment of title and partition of
the property was merely incidental to the main action. Indeed, it was also ruled in said case:
While actions under Section. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the
assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or
P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. x x x.15
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure
title to the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from respondents.
Petitioners’ cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the 50-square meter
portion of the land from respondents. They pray that they be declared owners of the
property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any interest therein. The
alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which was within the
jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court. The annulment of the deed of sale between Ma. Lourdes
Villaber-Padillo and respondents, as well as of TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in the
complaint because they were necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-
square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.
Petitioners’ argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken. As stated
above, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the
complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where, as in
this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be
filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject
thereof.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The Order
dated June 27, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, dismissing Civil Case
No. CEB-24925, and its Order dated July 26, 2001 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
BIENVENIDO ARCAYOS
G.R. NO. 130866
SEPTEMBER 16, 1998
Facts: Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes
for misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal,
respondent filed a case against St. Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an
employee due to the lack of an employer-employee contract. In addition,
respondent is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no
employer-employee relationship between the two and hence, there could be no
illegal dismissal in such a situation.
The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and
remanded the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the
Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly
filed in the Supreme Court.
Held: No.
Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor,
whose decisions are then appealable to the Office of the President. However, the
new rules do not anymore provide provisions regarding appellate review for
decisions rendered by the NLRC.
However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such
decisions from the NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance system
and the perceived intention of the legislative body who enacted the new rules.
“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is
given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and
that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”
The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or
certiorari should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with
the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals.
CASE DIGEST: HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented by CLAUDIO PADILLA,
Petitioners, v. DOMINADOR MAGDUA, Respondent. (G.R. No. 176858; September
15, 2010).
FACTS: On 26 October 2001, petitioners (Padilla) filed an action with the RTC of
Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and
damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the sale of the land by Ricardo’s
daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador
Magdua (Dominador). The sale (through misrepresentation by Ricardo) was
made during the lifetime of Ricardo.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
assessed value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tanauan, Leyte. In an Order (2006) the RTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount
of P590.00 was less than the amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction
over the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the action
was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages
but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are
actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.
In an Order, the RTC reconsidered its previous stand and took cognizance of the
case. Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed
the case on the ground of prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years
since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right
of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs
appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then
prescription can set in. The RTC added that since prescription had set in to
question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no
action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardo’s
daughters in favor of Dominador.
ISSUES: Should the RTC take cognizance of the case?
HELD: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted.
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to recover ownership
and possession of the land by questioning (1) the due execution and authenticity
of the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to
be the sole owner of the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be
legal heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the deed of sale
executed between Ricardo’s daughters and Dominador. Since the principal
action sought here is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-
entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted.
47 Phil. 345 [ G.R. No. 22909, January 28, 1925 ]
VICTORIANO BORLASA ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. VICENTE POLISTICO
ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
DECISION
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna on July 25, 1917,
by Victoriano Borlasa and others against Vicente Polistico and others, chiefly for
the purpose of securing the dissolution of a voluntary association named Turnuhan
Polistico & Co., and to compel the defendants to account for and surrender the
money and property of the association in order that its affairs may be liquidated
and its assets applied according to law. The trial judge having sustained a demurrer
for defect of parties and the plaintiffs electing not to amend, the cause was
dismissed, and from this order an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to this court.
The material allegations of the complaint, so far as affects the present appeal, are
to the following effect: In the month of April, 1911, the plaintiffs and defendants,
together with several hundred other persons, formed an association under the
name of Turnuhan Polistico & Co. Vicente Polistico, the principal defendant herein,
was elected president and treasurer of the association, and his house in Lilio,
Laguna, was made its principal place of business. The life of the association was
fixed at fifteen years, and under the by-laws each member obligated himself to
pay to Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer, before 3 o'clock in the afternoon
of every Sunday the sum of 50 centavos, except that on every fifth Sunday the
amount was P1, if the president elected to call this amount, as he always did. It is
alleged that from April, 1911, until April, 1917, the sums of money mentioned above
were paid weekly by all of the members of the society with few irregularities. The
inducement to these weekly contributions was found in provisions of the by-laws to
the effect that a lottery should be conducted weekly among the members of the
association and that the successful member should be paid the amount collected
each week, from which, however, the president-treasurer of the society was to
receive the sum of P200, to be held by him as funds of the society.
It is further alleged that by virtue of these weekly lotteries Vicente Polistico, as
president-treasurer of the association, received sums of money amounting to
P74,000, more or less, in the period stated, which he still retains in his power or has
applied to the purchase of real property largely in his own name and partly in the
names of others. The defendants in the complaint are the members of the board
of directors of the association, including Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer,
Alfonso Noble, secretary, Felix Garcia and Vivencio Zulaybar, as promoters
(propagandistas), and Afroniano de la Peña and Tomas Orencia, as members
(vocales) of the board.
In an amended answer the defendants raised the question of lack of parties and
set out a list of some hundreds of persons whom they alleged should be brought in
as parties defendant on the ground, among others, that they were in default in the
payment of their dues to the association. On November 28, 1922, the court made
an order requiring the plaintiffs to amend their complaint within a stated period so
as to include all of the members of the Turnuhan Polistico & Co. either as plaintiffs
or defendants. The plaintiffs excepted to this order, but acquiesced to the extent
of amending their complaint by adding as additional parties plaintiff some
hundreds of persons, residents of Lilio, said to be members of the association and
desirous of being joined as plaintiffs. Some of these new plaintiffs had not been
named in the list submitted by the defendants with their amended answer; and on
the other hand many names in said list were here omitted, it being claimed by the
plaintiffs that the persons omitted were not residents of Lilio but residents of other
places and that their relation to the society, so far as the plaintiffs could discover,
was fictitious. The defendants demurred to the amended complaint on the ground
that it showed on its face a lack of necessary parties and this demurrer was
sustained, with the ultimate result of, the dismissal of the action, as stated in the first
paragraph of this opinion.
The trial judge appears to have supposed that all the members of the Turnuhan
Polistico & Co. should be brought in either plaintiffs or defendants. This notion is
entirely mistaken. The situation involved is precisely the one contemplated in
section 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where one or more may sue for the
benefit of all. It is evident from the showing made in the complaint, and from the
proceedings in the court below, that it would be impossible to make all of the
persons in interest parties to the case and to require all of the members of the
association to be joined as parties would be tantamount to a denial of justice.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of
course, the joinder of all necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, the presence of those latter
being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The class suit contemplates
an exceptional situation where there are numerous persons all in the same plight
and all together constituting a constituency whose presence in the litigation is
absolutely indispensable to the administration of justice. Here the strict application
of the rule as to indispensable parties would require that each and every individual
in the class should be present. But at this point the practice is so far relaxed as to
permit the suit to proceed, when the class is sufficiently represented to enable the
court to deal properly and justly with that interest and with all other interests
involved in the suit. In the class suit, then, representation of a class interest which
will be affected by the judgment is indispensable; but it is not indispensable to
make each member of the class an actual party.
A common illustration in American procedure of the situation justifying a class suit
is that presented by the creditors' bill, which is filed by one party interested in the
estate of an insolvent, to secure the distribution of the assets distributable among
all the creditors. In such cases the common practice is for one creditor to sue as
plaintiff in behalf of himself and other creditors. (Johnson vs. Waters, 111 U. S., 640;
28 Law. ed., 547.) Another illustration is found in the case of Smith vs. Swormstedt
(16 How., 288; 14 Law. ed., 942), where a limited number of individuals interested in
a trust for the benefit of superannuated preachers were permitted to maintain an
action in their own names and as representatives of all other persons in the same
right.
His Honor, the trial judge, in sustaining this demurrer was possibly influenced to some
extent by the case of Rallonza vs. Evangelista (15 Phil., 531) ; but we do not
consider that case controlling, inasmuch as that was an action for the recovery of
real property and the different parties in interest had determinable, though
undivided interests, in the property there in question. In the present case, the
controversy involves an indivisible right affecting many individuals whose particular
interest is of indeterminate extent and is incapable of separation.
The addition of some hundreds of persons to the number of the plaintiffs, made in
the amendment to the complaint of December 13, 1922, was unnecessary, and as
the presence of so many parties is bound to prove embarrassing to the litigation
from death or removal, it is suggested that upon the return of this record to the
lower court for further proceedings, the plaintiff shall again amend their complaint
by dismissing as to unnecessary parties plaintiffs, but retaining a sufficient number
of responsible persons to secure liability for costs and fairly to represent all the
members of the association.
There is another feature of the complaint which makes a slight amendment
desirable, which is, that the complaint should be made to show on its face that the
action is intended to be litigated as a class suit. We accordingly recommend that
the plaintiffs further amend by adding after the names of the parties plaintiffs the
words, "in their own behalf and in behalf of other members of Turnuhan Polistico &
Co."
The order appealed from is reversed, the demurrer of the defendants based upon
supposed lack of parties is overruled, and the defendants are required to answer
to the amended complaint within the time allowed by law and the rules of the
court. The costs of this appeal will be paid by the defendants. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 160426 January 31, 2008
CAPITOLINA VIVERO NAPERE, petitioner,
vs.
AMANDO BARBARONA and GERVACIA MONJAS BARBARONA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Capitolina Vivero Napere interposes this petition for review to assail the
Court of Appeals’ Decision1 dated October 9, 2003, which upheld the validity of
the Regional Trial Court’s decision despite failure to formally order the substitution
of the heirs of the deceased defendant, petitioner’s husband.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
Respondent Amando Barbarona is the registered owner of Lot No. 3177, situated
in Barangay San Sotero (formerly Tambis), Javier, Leyte and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-7350. Lot No. 3176, covered by OCT No. 1110 in the
name of Anacleto Napere, adjoins said lot on the northeastern side. After Anacleto
died, his son, Juan Napere, and the latter’s wife, herein petitioner, planted coconut
trees on certain portions of the property with the consent of his co-heirs.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that in April 1980, the spouses Napere, their
relatives and hired laborers, by means of stealth and strategy, encroached upon
and occupied the northeastern portion of Lot No. 3177; that the Naperes harvested
the coconut fruits thereon, appropriated the proceeds thereof, and, despite
demands, refused to turn over possession of the area; that in April 1992, a
relocation survey was conducted which confirmed that the respondents’ property
was encroached upon by the Naperes; that on the basis of the relocation survey,
the respondents took possession of this encroached portion of the lot and
harvested the fruits thereon from April 1993 to December 1993; but that in January
1994, the Naperes repeated their acts by encroaching again on the respondents’
property, harvesting the coconuts and appropriating the proceeds thereof, and
refusing to vacate the property on demand.
On November 10, 1995, while the case was pending, Juan Napere died. Their
counsel informed the court of Juan Napere’s death, and submitted the names and
addresses of Napere’s heirs.
At the pre-trial, the RTC noted that the Naperes were not contesting the
respondents’ right of possession over the disputed portion of the property but were
demanding the rights of a planter in good faith under Articles 445 and 455 of the
Civil Code.
On October 17, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision against the estate of Juan
Napere, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, hereby declaring the following:
a) The estate of Juan Napere is liable to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P179,200.00) PESOS in actual
damages;
b) The estate of Juan Napere shall be liable to pay FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS in litigation expenses, and the
c) Cost[s] of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing, inter alia, that
the judgment of the trial court was void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs who
were not ordered substituted as party-defendants for the deceased.
On October 9, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC Decision.3 The
appellate court held that failure to substitute the heirs for the deceased defendant
will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment in a case which survives the
death of such party.
Thus, this petition for review where the only issue is whether or not the RTC decision
is void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of Juan Napere. Petitioner alleges that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the heirs because of
its failure to order their substitution pursuant to Section 17,4 Rule 3 of the Rule of
Court; hence, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered by the trial
court are null and void.
The petition must fail.
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such
death, the Rules require the substitution of the deceased party by his legal
representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is obliged to inform the court of the
death of his client and give the name and address of the latter’s legal
representative.
The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action
that survives the death of the defendant. Notably, the counsel of Juan Napere
complied with his duty to inform the court of his client’s death and the names and
addresses of the heirs. The trial court, however, failed to order the substitution of
the heirs. Nonetheless, despite this oversight, we hold that the proceedings
conducted and the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid.
The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his
duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is
effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon
if the action survives the death of such party.5 The trial court’s jurisdiction over the
case subsists despite the death of the party.
Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial
court’s decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable
violation of due process.6
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was
not denied petitioner.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process as would nullify the proceedings and the
judgment thereon can be invoked only by the heirs whose rights have been
violated. Violation of due process is a personal defense that can only be asserted
by the persons whose rights have been allegedly violated.15 Petitioner, who had
every opportunity and who took advantage of such opportunity, through counsel,
to participate in the trial court proceedings, cannot claim denial of due process.

Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision
a requirement of due process.7 The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every of the Court of Appeals, dated October 9, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 56457,
party’s right to due process.8 It was designed to ensure that the deceased party is AFFIRMED.
would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate.9 Moreover, non-compliance with the SO ORDERED.
Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not
duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision
rendered therein.10 Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when
the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court
G.R. No. L-60544 May 19, 1984
nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.11
ARSENIO FLORENDO, JR., MILAGROS FLORENDO and BEATRIZ FLORENDO, petitioners,
Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily
vs.
appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the
HON. PERPETUA D. COLOMA, Presiding Judge of Branch VII, City Court of Quezon
deceased.12 In such case, there is really no violation of the right to due process.
City; GAUDENCIO TOBIAS, General Manager, National Housing Authority; Registrar
The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
of Deeds for Quezon City; WILLIAM R. VASQUEZ and ERLINDA
submit any evidence available in support of one’s defense.13 When due process is
NICOLAS, respondents.
not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and
protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
affect the validity of a promulgated decision.14

In this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, the petitioners seek the
In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the
annulment of: (1) the May 20, 1975 decision of the respondent court in Civil Case
trial court and the judgment rendered therein because the petitioner, who was, in
No. VII-17952 for ejectment entitled Adela Salindon v. William Vasquez and Silverio
fact, a co-defendant of the deceased, actively participated in the case. The
Nicolas; (2) the August 3, 1981 writ of execution issued by the respondent court;
records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner continued to
and (3) the March 1, 1982 order also issued by the respondent court directing the
represent them even after Juan’s death. Hence, through counsel, petitioner was
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138007 in
able to adequately defend herself and the deceased in the proceedings below.
the name of Adela Salindon and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 239729 in the name
of the petitioners.
On July 11, 1969, Adela Salindon an awardee of a Philippine Homesite and Housing
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PHHC) lot filed a complaint for ejectment
against William Vasquez and Silverio Nicolas with the respondent court. The
disputed residential lot, located at Diliman, Quezon City, is more particularly
described as follows:
Residential lot situated at Quezon City, Philippines, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 138007, in the name of the herein plaintiff, containing
an area of 915.00 square meters. Designated as Lot No. 1, Block No. 101 Psd
— 68808 Diliman Estate Subdivision. Bounded on the SW-by Lot No. 2, Block
101; of the subdivision plan; on the NW-by Road Lot 8, Pcs-4564; on the NE
by Road Lot 96; and on the SE by Lot No. 12, Block 101; both of the
subdivision plan.
In her complaint, Salindon alleged that the defendants were squatters occupying
her property.
Defendant William Vasquez denied his being a squatter in the subject parcel of
land. He alleged that he had been in continuous, open, adverse and actual
possession and occupation of the lot since 1950. He also questioned the city court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action stating that the facts alleged in
the complaint involved questions of title or ownership of the lot, matters outside the
jurisdiction of the respondent court. He further questioned the qualifications of
Salindon to purchase the disputed lot from the PHHC, as she was the owner of
several other registered real estate properties and an outsider in so far as the lot
was concerned.
On March 12, 1971, defendant Silverio Nicolas died. He was substituted by his wife
Erlinda who filed an amended answer with third party complaint against PHHC. In
his answer, Nicolas had denied that he was a squatter on the lot. He alleged that
lie had been a possessor and occupant of a piece of residential lot located at
Malaya Avenue, continuously, openly, publicly and adverse to any other claimant
and under concept of an owner for more than ten years. Like defendant Vasquez,
he also questioned the jurisdiction of the respondent court over the subject matter
of the action and the qualifications of Salindon to purchase the subject parcel of
land.
Third-Party defendant PHHC admitted the sale of the disputed land to Adela
Salindon. According to PHHC, the award of the lot to Salindon was a valid exercise
of the PHHCs powers and could not be collaterally assailed the illegal acts of the
defendants could not ripen into legal ones; the defendants being squatters have
not acquired any vested right over the property and that, since the subject lot is
not a relocation area intended for squatters, the defendants can not claim
preference in the award of the lot. The PHHC also questioned the jurisdiction of the
city court over the third party complaint on the following grounds: (1) cancellation
of the deed of sale executed in favor of Salindon amounts to an action for
rescission of contract which falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance; and (2) the action involves title or possession of real property,
hence the action against PHHC should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
After trial on the merits, the respondent court issued a decision in favor of the
defendants. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiff as follows:
(1) declaring the conditional and the absolute deeds of sale executed by
the PHHC in favor of the plaintiff Adela Salindon as null and void; and
(2) ordering the PHHC to award the lot in litigation to the defendant William
Vasquez and Erlinda Nicolas and, upon payment by said defendants of the
total consideration within 30 days from notice of this decision, to execute
the corresponding deed of absolute sale in their favor.
On August 25, 1975 Adela Salindon appealed the aforequoted decision to the
Court of Appeals.
On December 11, 1976, Salindon died. There was, however, no substitution of party,
hence Salindon continued to be the appellant in the appealed case. On March
21, 1977 the case was remanded to the city court for the retaking of testimony
which could not be considered because the stenographic notes could not be
transcribed. The deceased Salindon continued to be an adverse party.
Meanwhile, after Salindon's death, her heirs settled her estate and the subject lot
was transferred with a new Transfer Certificate of Title to the petitioners.
On July 31, 1980 the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution ordering plaintiff-
appellant Salindon to show cause why her appeal should not be dismissed.
On December 4, 1980, the Court of Appeals issued another Resolution dismissing
the appeal for having been abandoned.
On August 3, 1981, respondent court issued a writ of execution to enforce the
decision.
On November 7, 1981, respondent General Manager Gaudencio Tobias of the
National Housing Authority (hereinafter referred as NHA), successor to the powers
and functions of the PHHC, wrote a letter to private respondents informing them
that the NHA was ready to implement the decision and suggesting that in order to
avoid delay, they secure an order directing the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City
to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 239729.
On February 16, 1982 respondent William Vasquez filed a motion for the issuance
of an order directing the Quezon City Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. 138007
in the name of Adela Salindon and TCT No. 239729, in the name of petitioners. A
similar motion was filed by respondent Erlinda Nicolas.
On March 19, 1982, petitioner Arsenio Florendo, Jr., filed a manifestation and
opposition to the motions for cancellation alleging that the court has no jurisdiction
to order the cancellation of the titles
Hence, the instant petition.
Considering the circumstances of the case, a preliminary issue surfaces as to the
status of the decision vis-a-vis the petitioners. The petitioners challenge the
proceeding in the Court of Appeals after the death of the plaintiff-appellant Adela
Salindon. They are of the opinion that since there was no legal representative
substituted for Salindon after her death, the appellate court lost its jurisdiction over
the case and consequently, the proceedings in the said court are null and void.
This argument is without merit.
There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. The
supervening death of plaintiff-appellant Salindon did not extinguish her civil
personality (Republic v. Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242; Vda. de Haberes v. Court of Appeals,
104 SCRA 534). Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased within
a period of thirty (30) days or within such time as may be granted ...
Section 16 of Rule 3 provides:
Whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of
his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to
give the name and residence of the executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative of the deceased ...
In the case at bar, Salindon's counsel after her death on December 11, 1976 failed
to inform the court of Salindon's death. The appellate court could not be expected
to know or take judicial notice of the death of Salindon without the proper
manifestation from Salindon's counsel. In such a case and considering that the
supervening death of appellant did not extinguish her civil personality, the
appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case.
There is no showing that the appellate court's proceedings in the case were tainted
with irregularities.
It appears that the petitioners are heirs of Adela Salindon. In fact, it was because
of this relationship that the petitioners were able to transfer the title of Adela
Salindon over the subject lot to their names. After Salindon's death, the disputed
lot was included as part of her estate. Salindon's counsel, whose acts bind his client,
failed to comply with his duty to the court and his deceased client. Considering all
this, the appellate decision is binding and enforceable against the petitioners as
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
(Section 49 (b) Rule 39, Rules of Court). Furthermore, "... judgment in an ejectment
case may be enforced not only against defendants therein but also against the
members of their family, their relatives, or privies who derived their right of
possession from the defendants" (Ariem v. De los Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). Under the
circumstances of this case, the same rule should apply to the successors-in-interest
if the decision should go against the original plaintiff.
We note, however, that the petitioners challenge the decision on the ground that
the respondent city court had no jurisdiction in the first instance over the ejectment
complaint.
In this respect, the petitioners are correct. Adela Salindon filed an ejectment case
to evict alleged squatters who were in possession of a lot awarded to her by the
PHHC. Instead of dealing with the case as a simple one of ejectment and handling
the issues within the confines of its limited jurisdiction, the respondent city court
went further into territory out of bounds to it and cancelled the administrative
determinations of the PHHC, rescinded the deeds of sale, usurped the powers of
the administrative agency by awarding the government lots to the defendants on
the basis of evidence clearly inadequate from the records and by the rules of the
agency to sustain such awards, conclusively adjudicated on the basis of irregular
proceedings the ownership of the disputed lot, and ordered the cancellation of
Torrens titles already issued in the petitioners' names.
May the petitioners take advantage of this lack of jurisdiction?
As a rule, the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The time
honored principle is that "... jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and may not
be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal ...".(Calimlim
v. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399). This principle, however, is not absolute. There are cases
wherein we ruled that because of their exceptional and peculiar circumstances, a
party is estopped from invoking the lack of the court's jurisdiction. (Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29; Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 543). We
always look into the attendant circumstances of the case so as not to subvert
public policy. (See Paro v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262).
This is one such case where the successors-in- interest of the original plaintiff are
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Adela
Salindon, the original plaintiff in the ejectment case consistently maintained her
stand that the respondent court had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint. She
insisted on this jurisdiction over the opposition of the defendants, the private
respondents herein. Thus, she filed a lengthy memorandum against the dismissal of
the complaint after the trial on the merits of the case and made an emphatic
justification of the jurisdiction of the respondent court.
The following rule applies:
... a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or.
694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication
but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for
reasons of public policy. (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, supra)
Equitable considerations cannot also help the petitioners. Their own deed of extra-
judicial partition dated March 31, 1977 shows that Adela Lucero Salindon left forty
four (44) parcels of land, forty two (42) of which were in Pangasinan, one (1) parcel
in Natividad Street, Manila and the disputed parcel in Quezon City. There is no
showing in the records that the forty three (43) other parcels were either not owned
by Salindon when the PHHC lot was awarded to her or that ownership of these lots
and of 706,684 shares of stock in such blue chip corporations as Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., Philippine Overseas Drilling and Oil Development
Corporation, etc. did not disqualify her from applying for a PHHC lot. There is no
showing from the records that the petitioners would suffer from a denial of
substantial justice if the foregoing rules are applied to them.
The private respondents, however, stand on an entirely different footing. As
defendants in the ejectment case they vigorously questioned the jurisdiction of the
city court. They cannot now take advantage of a decision issued in excess of
jurisdiction and in doing so abandon a principal averment in their respective
answers. The respondent court had no jurisdiction to take over the functions of the
PHHC and award ownership of the lot to them.
Not only was the decision of the city court rendered without jurisdiction, it was also
erroneously irregular to the point of constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The PHHC was correct when it stated that squatters and intruders who
clandestinely enter into titled government property cannot, by such act, acquire
any legal right to said property. There is no showing in the records that the entry of
the private respondents into the lot was effected legally and properly. An act G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
which was illegal from the start cannot ripen into lawful ownership simply because
the usurper has occupied and possessed the government lot for more than ten (10) HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO, petitioners,
years, cleared it of cogon grass, fenced it, and built a house on the premises. No vs.
vested rights should be allowed to arise from the social blights and lawless acts of COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor. DENNIS M.
squatting and clandestine entrance. True, the government by an act of VILLA-IGNACIO of Pasig, Rizal; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP P/SR. SUPT.
magnanimity and in the interest of buying social peace through the quieting of RICARDO F. DE LEON, Camp Commander and Head of the PNP Custodial Group,
mass unrest may declare usurped property as a "relocation" area for the squatters. Camp Crame, Cubao, Quezon City, respondents.
However, the records fall to show that there has been such action insofar as the
disputed lot is concerned or that the private respondents fall within such a policy Emerito M. Salva & Associates; Juanito L. Andrade; and Lazaro Law Firm for
or that they have complied with the usual requirements before the benefits of petitioners.
relocation may be given them. At any rate, this was for the PHHC, now the NHA, to
decide and not the city court.
REGALADO, J.:

Under the circumstances of this case, the ownership of the disputed lot remains
Submitted for resolution in the present special civil action are: (1) the basic petition
with. the National Housing Authority. The NHA may use the authority of this decision
for certiorari and mandamus with a petition for habeas corpus, to review the
to evict the private respondents and their successors-in-interest from the property
resolution issued by respondent Court of Appeals, dated
and deal with the lot according to its present powers vested by law and in the light
February 18, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261;1 (2) the Urgent Motion2 and
of its current policies and programs. This decision, however, should not be
Supplemental Urgent Motion3 for Immediate Action on Petition for Habeas corpus;
interpreted to preclude the private respondents from introducing evidence and
and (3) the Urgent Petition to Declare Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. and First Assistant
presenting arguments before the National Housing Authority to establish any right
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio for Contempt and to Annul
to which they may be entitled under the law and the facts of the case.
Proceedings (with Immediate Prayer for another Cease and Desist Order).4

WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 20, 1975, the writ of execution dated August
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San
3, 1981 and the order to annul TCT Nos. 138007 and 239729 dated March 1, 1982,
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate
all issued by the respondent city court are nullified and set aside for having been
informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide fot has been the
issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion insofar as the
rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the amendment of the
private respondents are concerned. Considering our findings as regards the
information may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the
petitioner, the Registrar of Deeds for Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT
charge so long as it Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, and
No. 239729 in the names of the petitioners and TCT No. 138007 in the name of Adela
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93.5 Both accused posted
Salindon. The National Housing Authority is declared the owner of the disputed lot
their respective cash bail bonds and were subsequently released from detention.
and is directed to take possession of the same and to either hold or dispose of it
according to law and this decision.
On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed a
Motion to Defer Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to enable him "to
SO ORDERED
review the evidence on record and determine once more the proper crimes
chargeable against the accused,"6 which was granted by Judge Villajuan in an
order dated November 16, 1993.7 Thereafter, pursuant to Department Order No.
369 of the Department of Justice, respondent Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and was instructed to
conduct a re-investigation of the aforesaid criminal cases filed against herein
petitioners.8
By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated November 23, 19939 filed
by respondent prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered suspended by
Judge Villajuan until after the prosecution's request for change of venue shall have
been resolved by the Supreme Court, and the preliminary investigation being
conducted by the former shall have been terminated. 10 It appears that on
December 2, 1993, private complainants, through their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R.
Bello III, had filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Change of Venue of
Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, purportedly to safeguard the lives of
the victims and their witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 11
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex
parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases. 12 This motion was granted by
Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered
withdrawn from the docket of the court. 13 On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts
of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms 14 which were subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge
Victoria Pornillos of Branch 10, Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and were docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos.
4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93. No bail having been recommended for the crime of
murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein petitioners. 15 On December
23, 1993, said presiding judge issued an order setting the arraignment of the
accused for December 27, 1993. 16
On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment before Judge Pornillos were
reset due to the absence of respondent prosecutor. On even date, petitioners filed
before Judge Villajuan a Motion for Reconsideration of his order of December 15,
1993 which granted the motion to withdraw the original informations. 17
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack
of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3,
1994. 18 At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24,
1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash and, at the same
time, directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners when the latter
refused to enter their plea. 19
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge
Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, and setting the arraignment of the
accused therein for February 8, 1994. 20 On said date, however, the arraignment
was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order
dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners' motion
to quash filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 and 4007-M-93. As earlier stated,
respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18,
1994, hence this petition.
I. On the Main Petition
The main issue in this case involves a determination of the set
of informations under which herein petitioners should be tried, that is, (a) the first
set of informations for homicide and frustrated homicide in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, or (b) the subsequent informations for murder,
frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-
93 to 4007-M-93. Several corollary but equally important issues have likewise been
addressed to us for resolution, to wit:
1. Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null
and void on the ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as
required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b) the
appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the prosecution
was to amend the informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant
to Section 14 of Rule 110;
2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations
was immediately final and executory;
 3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to quash and
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the new informations considering that (a)
the designated public prosecutor allegedly had no authority to file the
second set of informations; and (b) the filing thereof constituted forum
shopping; and
4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 was valid.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
1. It is petitioners' submission that the prosecution's failure to serve them a copy of
the motion to withdraw the original informations and to set said motion for hearing
constitutes a violation of their right to be informed of the proceedings against
them, as well as a violation of Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, so they contend, the ex parte motion should be considered as a worthless
scrap of paper and Judge Villajuan had no authority to act on it. Ergo, the order
granting the same is null and void.
Petitioners advance the theory that respondent prosecutor should have amended
the original informations instead of withdrawing the same and filing new ones. They
postulate that the principle of nolle prosequi does not apply in this case since the
withdrawal or dismissal of an information is addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court which has the option to grant or deny it and the
prosecution cannot impose its opinion on the court. It is further stressed that in case
there is a need to change the nature of the offense charged, that is, from homicide
to murder, by adding the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the only legal and
proper remedy is through the filing of the corresponding amended information;
and that the withdrawal of an information is allowed only where the new
information involves a different offense which does not include or is not included in
the offense originally charged.
Normally, an accused would not object to the dismissal of an information against
him because it is to his best interest not to oppose the same. Contrarily, if the
accused should deem such conditional or provisional dismissal to be unjust and
prejudicial to him, he could object to such dismissal and insist that the case be
heard and decided on the merits. 21 However, considering that in the original cases
before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy,
and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be
arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In
actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original
three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge
graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations
not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition.
Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the
motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93
does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.
Petitioners' contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the
consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too
strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had
the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of
murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was
shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with
amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference
considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is
strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a new
information.
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not
divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held
that —
The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a
notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the
case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion.
The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order
set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed
the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari. 22
Besides, when petitioners were given by Judge Villajuan the opportunity to file a
motion for reconsideration, even assuming the alleged procedural infirmity in his
issuance of the order of dismissal, the same was thereby deemed cured. This is
especially so in this case since, on his order, the original informations were
reinstated in Branch 14 of the trial court.
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal
of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when
the case is already in court, he cannot impose
his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court, once the case had already been brought therein any disposition the
prosecutor may deem proper thereafter should be addressed to the court for its
consideration and approval. 23 The only qualification is that the action of the court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to
due process of law.
We reiterate once again the doctrine we enunciated and explained in Crespo vs.
Mogul, etc., et al.: 24
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due
to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice
whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that
the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information
is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by
the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. And,
if after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the
information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of
action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. 25
It is not denied that in the present case, the court granted the motion of
respondent prosecutor for the suspension of the proceedings until the
re-investigation thereof shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the prosecutor
arrived at a finding that petitioners should have been charged with murder,
frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms. This prompted him to file an ex
parte motion to withdraw the original informations for homicide and frustrated
homicide. Although the motion did not state the reasons for the withdrawal of the
informations, nevertheless, the court in the exercise of its discretion granted the
same, as a consequence of which a new set of informations was thereafter filed
and raffled to another branch of the court. Petitioners now question the propriety
of the procedure adopted by the prosecution, insisting that an amendment, not a
new information, was required under the circumstances.
It must here be emphasized that respondent prosecutor sought, and was
subsequently granted, permission by the court to dismiss the original informations.
It cannot therefore be validly claimed that the prosecutor exceeded his authority
in withdrawing those informations because the same bore the imprimatur of the
court. The issue is thus focused on whether or not under the given situation the court
acted correctly in dismissing the original informations rather than ordering the
amendment thereof.
It has been observed that while the Rules of Court gives the accused the right to
move for the quashal of the information, it is silent with respect to the right of the
prosecutor to ask for a dismissal or withdrawal thereof. 26 A perusal of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure will show that there are only two provisions concerning the
dismissal of an information other than on motion of the accused, namely, Section
14 of Rule 110 and Section 11 of Rule 119. But then, it may be contended that these
rules speak of a dismissal by the court when there is a mistake in charging the
proper offense, but make no mention of a dismissal made upon application of the
prosecution. That is not necessarily so.
It is true that Section 11, Rule 119 is virtually a restatement of Section 14, Rule 110,
providing as it does that:
Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. —
When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily
included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to
be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the
accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rule 119 is the rule specifically governing the trial stage where evidence is
necessarily being presented, hence the trial court is now in a better position to
conclude that manifestly the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or of one that it necessarily includes. It would primarily be the function of
the court to motu proprio order the dismissal of the case and direct the filing of the
appropriate information. We do not discount the possibility of either the
prosecution or the defense initiating such dismissal and substitution at that stage,
although, from a realistic point of view, that would be a rare situation. This provision,
therefore, is more directly and principally directed to the trial court to invest it with
the requisite authority to direct by itself the dismissal and refiling of the informations
therein contemplated.
Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for the
prosecution of offenses. Section 14 thereof, quoted infra, provides in its second
paragraph the procedure and requisites for the substitution of a defective
information by the correct one. Although, just like Section 11 of Rule 119 the
permissible stage for effecting that substitution is "at any time before judgment,"
unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that "it appears . . . that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, . . . ." The situation under said Section 14
contemplates a longer time span, inclusive of the period from the filing of the
information up to and before trial. Since no evidence has been presented at that
stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the records of
the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial
judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially
determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is
it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be
taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and
should institute remedial measures for the dismissal of the original information and
the refiling of the correct one, otherwise he would be recreant to his duties.
It is interesting to note that in the American jurisdiction, such right is specifically
recognized under Rule 48 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that the entry of a nolle prosequi by the Government is a permissible right,
although requiring in all cases the approval of the court in the exercise of its judicial
discretion. 27 As a matter of fact, the prosecuting attorney is given the broad
power, sole authority and discretion to enter a nolle prosequi provided he does not
act arbitrarily 28 and subject to the discretion of the court.
In several cases, we have also impliedly recognized the propriety of such a
procedure particularly in those instances where the prosecution is allowed to
dismiss or withdraw an information on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. We
have even gone further by imposing upon the fiscal, as he was then called, the
duty to move for the dismissal of the information if he is convinced that the
evidence is insufficient to establish, at least prima facie, the guilt of the accused. 29
In this case now before us, what is involved is a dismissal effected at the instance
of the prosecutor by reason of a mistake in charging the proper offense, in order
that new informations can be filed. The problem that may be posited, and should
now be resolved, is when the fiscal may be allowed to move to dismiss an
information and when he should merely move to amend it.
Section 14 of Rule 110, which is invoked by petitioners, reads as follows:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended,
in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint
or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
 placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or
complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information
or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court can order the filing of
another information to charge the proper offense, provided the accused would
not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the
offense proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the
offense charged in the original information.
It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the
amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result in altering
the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the accused. Hence, in the case of Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, 30 the accused
therein were originally charged with homicide and were released on bail.
However, the then provincial fiscal, after a review of the affidavits of the witnesses
for the prosecution, discovered that the killing complained of was perpetrated with
the qualifying circumstances of treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
and employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Consequently, an
amended information for murder was filed against the accused who were ordered
re-arrested without the amount of bail being fixed, the new charge being a capital
offense.
The Court ruled therein that the amendment was proper, pursuant to Section 13,
Rule 106 of the 1940 Rules of Court (now Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure), thus:
Here these rules properly apply, since it is undisputed that the herein
accused were not yet arraigned before the competent court when the
complaint for homicide was amended so as to charge the crime of murder.
Upon the authority of said rules, the amendment could therefore be made
even as to substance in order that the proper charge may be made. The
claim that such amendment can only refer to matters of specification
affecting the elements constituting the crime is not correct, for there is
nothing in the rule to show that the nature of the amendment should only
be limited to matters of specification. The change may also be made even
if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
Be that as it may, it is quite plausible under Section 14 of Rule 110 that, instead of
an amendment, an information for homicide may also be dismissed before the
accused pleads, to give way to the filing of a new information for murder. This may
be deduced from the pronouncement of the Court in the aforecited case
of Dimalibot, to wit:
This clearly appears from the second part of Section 13 of Rule 106 which
says that, if it appears before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original information
and order the filing of a new one provided the defendant may not be
placed in double jeopardy. If a new information may be ordered at any
time before judgment no reason is seen why the court may not order the
amendment of the information if its purpose is to make it conformable to
the true nature of the crime committed. . . .
In the subsequent case of Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, et al., 31 however, Section
14 of Rule 110 was clarified to mean as follows:
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of
the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but
they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while
substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original
charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without
leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court
as the original information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another
preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in
substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and
the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the
original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments
to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the
objection of the accused, for if the original information would be
withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand,
substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the
original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under
the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information
under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of
the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges
an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a
substitution is in order.
In any event, we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the withdrawal of the
original informations, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the court in granting the motion and, more importantly, in consideration of the
fact that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before herein petitioners
were arraigned, hence before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a
substitution was made at such stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double
jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be prevented under the rule on
substitution, for the simple reason that no first jeopardy had as yet attached.
Consequently, we hold that although the offenses charged under the three new
informations necessarily include those charged under the original informations, the
substitution of informations was not a fatal error. A contrary ruling, to paraphrase
from our former pronouncements, would sacrifice substantial justice for formal
nuances on the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore, petitioner's right to
speedy trial was never violated since the new informations were filed immediately
after the motion to withdraw the original informations was granted.
2. The controversy over the jurisdiction of Judge Pornillos to entertain and act upon
the new informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of
firearms, is grounded on three points of disagreement.
Firstly, it is argued that the new informations were prematurely filed considering that
the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations had not yet become
final and executory and that, as a matter of fact, the same was subsequently
reconsidered and the case reinstated by Judge Villajuan. Therefore, so petitioners
postulate, Judge Pornillos could not acquire jurisdiction over the same offense
involving the same incident and the same accused.
Secondly, petitioners contend that the dismissal of the original informations and the
filing of new ones which were raffled to another branch of the court constituted
forum shopping, and was tainted with malice considering the indecent haste with
which the motion to withdraw the informations was filed, the order granting the
same was issued, and the new informations were filed, all of which took place on
the same day. Pursuant to the doctrinal ruling that the court first acquiring
jurisdiction excludes the other courts, it is theorized that the cognizance of the case
taken by Judge Villajuan barred Judge Pornillos from assuming jurisdiction
thereover.
Finally, the designation of respondent Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio (who was
then First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Rizal) as Acting Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan was arbitrary and without any justifiable reason. It follows,
therefore, so petitioners vigorously argue, that in the absence of such authority, the
informations should be considered null and void by reason of which Judge Pornillos
did not acquire jurisdiction over the same.
On the other hand, respondents question the propriety of petitioners' filing of a
petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals against
the order of the lower court denying petitioners' motion to quash, claiming that the
proper remedy was to proceed to trial on the merits and thereafter raise on
appeal, as special defenses, the grounds invoked in the motion to quash.
It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is
placed on trial and before he is called on to plead is not equivalent
to an acquittal, 32 and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. 33 It is not a final disposition of the case. 34 Rather, it partakes of the nature
of a nonsuit or discontinuance in a civil suit and leaves the matter in the same
condition in which it was before the commencement of the prosecution. 35
A dismissal is different from an acquittal. An order of dismissal which is actually an
acquittal is immediately final and cannot be reconsidered. 36 Furthermore, an
acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because
the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt;
but a dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not
guilty. Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court
of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance. 37 For dismissal to be a
bar under double jeopardy, it must have the effect of acquittal.
All these go to show, therefore, that the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 did not amount to an acquittal of herein petitioners.
Consequently, the same did not immediately become final, hence petitioners
could still file a motion for the reconsideration thereof. Moreover, such dismissal
does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. 38 Since jeopardy
had not yet attached, herein petitioners were not prejudiced by the filing of the
new informations even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet
become final. Neither did it affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent
case.
In American legal practice, where a motion for an order of nolle prosequi is made,
the only power to deny the motion would be based on failure of the district
attorney to judiciously exercise his discretion. 39 In most cases, the motion will be
readily granted and should not be refused unless the court has some knowledge
that it is based on an improper reason or a corrupt motive. But such a motion to
dismiss will not also be approved unless the court is satisfied that the administration
of justice requires that the prosecution be ended, or if there appears to be a clear
violation of the law. 40 Whatever may be the reason therefor, a denial of the motion
to withdraw should not be construed as a denigration of the authority of the special
prosecutor to control and direct the prosecution of the case, 41 since the
disposition of the case already rests in the sound discretion of the court.
This brings us to the question as to whether or not an order of dismissal may be
subsequently set aside and the information reinstated. Again, in American
jurisprudence, the authorities differ somewhat as to whether a nolle prosequi may
be set aside and the cause reinstated. 42 Some cases hold that the nolle
prosequi may be recalled and that the accused may be tried on the same
information,43 but before it can be retraced, set aside, cancelled, or struck off, the
permission or assent of the court must be had and obtained, and such cancellation
or retraction must be duly entered. According to other authorities, however, the
entry of an unconditional nolle prosequi, not on the ground that the information is
insufficient on its face, is an end to the prosecution of that information, and
such nolle prosequi cannot afterward be vacated and further proceedings had in
that case.44
Still in some cases, it has been held that a nolle prosequi may be set aside by leave
of court, so as to reinstate proceedings on the information, or unless it was entered
by mistake. 45 In our jurisdiction, we follow the rule which allows an order of dismissal
to be set aside by leave of court. In one case, it was held that in the absence of
any statutory provision to the contrary, the court may, in the interest of justice,
dismiss a criminal case provisionally, that is, without prejudice to reinstating it before
the order becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
offense. 46
The rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction the court first acquiring jurisdiction
will retain it to the end to the exclusion of other tribunals, is not to be given
unyielding effect in all cases and it does not apply where the jurisdiction of the first
court has come to an end in any legal way, such as by nolle prosequi. 47 The rule
on exclusions is intended to prevent confusion and conflicts in jurisdiction and to
prevent a person from being twice tried for the same offense, but no accused has
a vested right to be tried in any particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and
when one court of concurrent jurisdiction voluntarily relinquishes it by a nolle
prosequi or dismissal of the case, there can be no legal or logical reason for
preventing the other court from proceeding. 48 With much more reason will this rule
apply where only branches of the same court, and not different courts, are
involved in the jurisdictional conflict.
There was no forum shopping in the lower court with respect to the case involved.
While the procedure adopted by the prosecution was somewhat cumbersome, it
was not in bad faith and, accordingly, it did not affect the legality of the
proceedings. There is no showing, and petitioners failed to prove otherwise, that
the assignment by raffle of the new informations to another branch of the same
court was intended to prejudice herein petitioners, or to place them under less
favorable circumstances, or to find a court which would act favorably on the
prosecution's case.
The authority of the special prosecutor appointed by the Secretary of Justice to
sign and file informations has long been recognized in this jurisdiction and it has
been held that such information cannot be quashed on that account. There is
nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, holding of investigations, and
conducting prosecutions that only an officer appointed by the President or one
expressly empowered by law be permitted to assume these functions. 49 And any
irregularity in the appointment does not necessarily invalidate the same if he may
be considered a de facto officer. 50
Of course, where the person who signed the information was disqualified from
appointment to such position, the information is invalid and the court does not
acquire jurisdiction to try the accused thereon. 51 Such is not, however, the situation
obtaining in the case at bar. It will be noted that respondent prosecutor was
designated by the Secretary of Justice to handle the re-investigation
and prosecution of the case against petitioners pursuant to Department Order No.
369. Petitioners failed to show any irregularity in the issuance of said directive.
At any rate, the power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice
under Presidential Decree No. 1275 had been broadened beyond the confines of
the old law, that is, Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code, wherein the
power of the Secretary was then limited only to certain instances. Pertinently,
in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., 52 we said:
The Court notes, however; that Department of Justice Order No. 85 was
issued pursuant to, among others, P.D. No. 1275 issued on 11 April 1978
which provides:
Sec. 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service;
Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. —
There is hereby created and established a National
Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of
the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the
Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice
and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices,
and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter
provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the
investigation and prosecution of all cases involving
violations of penal laws.
The power of supervision and control vested in the
Secretary of Justice includes the authority to act directly
on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Prosecution
Staff, the Regional State Prosecution Office or the Office
of the Provincial or City Fiscal and to review, modify or
revoke any decision or action of the Chief of said staff or
office.
The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice
under P.D. No. 1275 had thus been broadened beyond the confines of the
old law, i.e., Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, where
the power of the Secretary of Justice to designate acting fiscals or
prosecutors to handle a particular case was limited to instances "when a
provincial fiscal shall be disqualified by personal interest to act in a
particular case or when for any reason he shall be unable, or shall fail to
discharge any of the duties of his position." Indeed, the limitation upon
which petitioners rely no longer subsisted under P.D. No. 1275.
Having been duly designated in accordance with law, the panel of
prosecutors had complete control of the investigation and prosecution of
the case. . . .
3. Petitioners similarly dispute the legality of their arraignment on January 24, 1994,
when Judge Pornillos entered a plea of not guilty for them after they refused to
plead, without furnishing them copies of the information with the list of witnesses,
after merely reading the informations against them and asking whether they
understood the same, which were allegedly in palpable violation of Section 1, Rule
116. Petitioners aver that they were requesting for the suspension of the
arraignment as they wanted to have a final copy of the order of January 24, 1994
which was merely read in open court, and to take the necessary steps to question
the same by way of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.
In criminal cases, it is the duty of the accused, in addition to the other pleas
authorized by law, to plead whether he is guilty or not of the crime charged. In that
way and in that way only can an issue be created upon which the trial shall
proceed. 53 Section 1 (c) of Rule 116 is quite explicit that where the accused refuses
to plead, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. Hence, under such
mandatory language, if the accused refuses to plead, the court must enter a plea
of not guilty. The words are so plain and unambiguous that no construction is
necessary. It actually calls for a literal application thereof. Any explanation or
defense which petitioners would want to invoke can be properly raised during the
trial, but they cannot refuse to enter their plea. Nonetheless, the alleged defect in
their arraignment on January 24, 1994 is deemed to have been cured when they
were again arraigned on February 18, 1994 with the assistance of counsel de oficio,
and the information was read to them in the vernacular.
In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial court handling Criminal
Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction over the new
informations which we have likewise declared valid, petitioners may be
prosecuted thereunder.
II. On the Petition for Habeas corpus
This petition is predicated mainly on petitioners' asseveration that the court which
issued the warrant for their arrest had no jurisdiction over the case, hence their
detention should be deemed illegal.
We have earlier declared that Branch 10 of the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the new set of informations. Consequently, the warrant of arrest issued on the bases
of said informations filed therein and the subsequent detention of herein petitioners
pursuant thereto are valid. What instead has to be resolved is the corollary issue of
whether the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together with their
present petition for certiorari and mandamus.
The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where
necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ
of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters, but not the
record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. Hence, a writ
of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of
review. 54 However, habeas corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the
remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the
functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or
irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter. 55
Neither can we grant the writ at this stage since a writ of habeas corpus is not
intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial court. In the absence of
exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Habeas corpus is not
ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that
may arise. 56 It has to be an exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be
available to an accused before trial. 57 In the absence of special circumstances
requiring immediate action, a court will not grant the writ and discharge the
prisoner in advance of a determination of his case in court. 58 In the case under
consideration, petitioners have dismally failed to adduce any justification or
exceptional circumstance which would warrant the grant of the writ, hence their
petition therefor has to be denied.
In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting
a right to bail or vindicating its denial. In the case of Enrile vs. Salazar, etc., et
al., 59 we held that:
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for
invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction
by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this
Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the
Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
III. On the Motion to Cite for Contempt
The records show that on February 24, 1994, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order, pursuant to its resolution in Administrative Matter No. 94-1-13-RTC
which is a petition for change of venue filed by the Vinculados, requiring Judges
Felipe N. Villajuan and Victoria Villalon-Pornillos to cease and desist from hearing
the criminal cases involving herein petitioners which were pending before them. 60
Subsequently, another resolution was issued in said cases, dated
March 1, 1994, with the following directive:
ACCORDINGLY, without prejudice to the final determination as to which of
the two (2) sets of information will be upheld or prevail, the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby directed to transfer
all the aforementioned criminal cases filed against Mayor Honorato Galvez,
et al. now in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, to the Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle as one (1) single case
among its branches and for the branch concerned, after raffle, to proceed
with all deliberate dispatch after the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261
have been resolved with finality. 61
As a consequence, the seven informations which were docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-94-55481 to Q-94-55487 were assigned to and are now pending trial on the
merits before Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over
by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. Petitioners now assert that Judge Salazar and
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio proceeded with the trial of the cases despite the
aforestated directives in the above cited resolutions. We find no merit in the motion
to cite them for contempt.
The records reveal that there was a manifestation dated May 31, 1994 62 filed by
the Solicitor General wherein the latter manifested his conformity to the agreement
made between the prosecution and the defense before Judge Salazar, the
pertinent part of which agreement is as follows:
1. During the hearing on May 26, 1994, the prosecution, through Senior State
Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio, the defense through Justice Alfredo Lazaro,
and this Honorable Court agreed that the trial in these cases shall proceed
on condition that: (a) the defense shall not be deemed to have waived
any issue or objection it has raised before the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
114046; and (b) that the trial shall also be without prejudice to whatever
decision and resolution the Supreme Court may render in the case before
it.
Counsel for petitioners, retired Justice Alfredo Lazaro, takes issue with said
agreement on the pretension that the same is not the true agreement of the
parties, but he failed to state what they actually agreed upon. Withal, the
resolutions of this Court in the petition for change of venue, as well as the cease
and desist order issued therein, are clearly directed against the two aforenamed
regional trial judges in Malolos, Bulacan. By no stretch of the imagination can we
interpret the same to include Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. of Quezon City.
For that matter, the issues involved in this petition for certiorari do not necessarily
require a suspension of the proceedings before the present trial court considering
that the main petition hinges only on a determination of which set of informations
shall constitute the indictments against petitioners and for which charges they shall
stand trial. Whichever set of informations prevails, the evidence of the prosecution
and defense will more or less be the same and can be utilized for the charges
therein. Hence, no cogent reason exists for the suspension of the proceedings
before the court below.
As a final word, while it may well be that both sets of information validly exist for the
nonce, to allow both of them to subsist will only serve to confuse and complicate
the proceedings in the cases therein. Brushing aside procedural technicalities,
therefore, it becomes exigent to now consider and declare the four informations
for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms as having amended
and superseded the original three informations for homicide and frustrated
homicide, there being no substantial rights of herein petitioners which may be
affected thereby. Correspondingly, the three informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide should be ordered withdrawn from the Quezon City trial court's
docket.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition
for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus;
DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to cite respondent judge and prosecutor for
contempt and to annul proceedings; and ORDERING the withdrawal and
invalidation of the three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide against
petitioners from the docket of Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190071 August 15, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MAUNLAD HOMES, INC. and all other persons or entities claiming rights under
it, Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank), assailing the
decision dated October 28, 20092 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
107772.
THE FACTS
Union Bank is the owner of a commercial complex located in Malolos, Bulacan,
known as the Maunlad Shopping Mall.
Sometime in August 2002, Union Bank, as seller, and respondent Maunlad Homes,
Inc. (Maunlad Homes), as buyer, entered into a contract to sell 3 involving the
Maunlad Shopping Mall. The contract set the purchase price at ₱ 151 million, ₱ 2.4
million of which was to be paid by Maunlad Homes as down payment payable on
or before July 5, 2002, with the balance to be amortized over the succeeding 180-
month period.4 Under the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes to take
possession of the property and to build or introduce improvements thereon. The
parties also agreed that if Maunlad Homes violates any of the provisions of the
contract, all payments made will be applied as rentals for the use and possession
of the property, and all improvements introduced on the land will accrue in favor
of Union Bank.5 In the event of rescission due to failure to pay or to comply with the
terms of the contract, Maunlad Homes will be required to immediately vacate the
property and must voluntarily turn possession over to Union Bank.6
When Maunlad Homes failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank sent the
former a Notice of Rescission of Contract7 dated February 5, 2003, demanding
payment of the installments due within 30 days from receipt; otherwise, it shall
consider the contract automatically rescinded. Maunlad Homes failed to comply.
Hence, on November 19, 2003, Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a letter
demanding payment of the rentals due and requiring that the subject property be
vacated and its possession turned over to the bank. When Maunlad Homes
continued to refuse, Union Bank instituted an ejectment suit before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, on February 19, 2004.
Maunlad Homes resisted the suit by claiming, among others, that it is the owner of
the property as Union Bank did not reserve ownership of the property under the
terms of the contract.8 By virtue of its ownership, Maunlad Homes claimed that it
has the right to possess the property.
On May 18, 2005, the MeTC dismissed Union Bank’s ejectment complaint.9 It found
that Union Bank’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract and that
both parties are claiming a better right to possess the property based on their
respective claims of ownership of the property.
The MeTC ruled that the appropriate action to resolve these conflicting claims was
an accion reivindicatoria, over which it had no jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 139, affirmed the
MeTC in its decision dated July 17, 2008;10 it agreed with the MeTC that the issues
raised in the complaint extend beyond those commonly involved in an unlawful
detainer suit. The RTC declared that the case involved a determination of the rights
of the parties under the contract. Additionally, the RTC noted that the property is
located in Malolos, Bulacan, but the ejectment suit was filed by Union Bank in
Makati City, based on the contract stipulation that "the venue of all suits and
actions arising out or in connection with the Contract to Sell shall be in Makati
City."11 The RTC ruled that the proper venue for the ejectment action is in Malolos,
Bulacan, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, which states:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal
trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated. [emphasis ours]
The RTC declared that Union Bank cannot rely on the waiver of venue provision in
the contract because ejectment is not an action arising out of or connected with
the contract.
Union Bank appealed the RTC decision to the CA through a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in its October
28, 2009 decision,12 ruling that Union Bank’s claim of possession is based on its claim
of ownership which in turn is based on its interpretation of the terms and conditions
of the contract, particularly, the provision on the consequences of Maunlad
Homes’ breach of contract. The CA determined that Union Bank’s cause of action
is premised on the interpretation and enforcement of the contract and the
determination of the validity of the rescission, both of which are matters beyond
the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Therefore, it ruled that the dismissal of the ejectment
suit was proper. The CA, however, made no further ruling on the issue of venue of
the action.
From the CA’s judgment, Union Bank appealed to the Court by filing the present
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Union Bank disagreed with the CA’s finding that it is claiming ownership over the
property through the ejectment action. It claimed that it never lost ownership over
the property despite the execution of the contract, since only the right to possess
was conceded to Maunlad Homes under the contract; Union Bank never
transferred ownership of the property to Maunlad Homes. Because of Maunlad
Homes’ failure to comply with the terms of the contract, Union Bank believes that
it rightfully rescinded the sale, which rescission terminated Maunlad Homes’ right
to possess the subject property. Since Maunlad Homes failed to turn over the
possession of the subject property, Union Bank believes that it correctly instituted
the ejectment suit.
The Court initially denied Union Bank’s petition in its Resolution dated March 17,
2010.13 Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Union Bank, the Court set aside its
Resolution of March 17, 2010 (in a Resolution dated May 30, 2011 14 ) and required
Maunlad Homes to comment on the petition.
Maunlad Homes contested Union Bank’s arguments, invoking the rulings of the
lower courts. It considered Union Bank’s action as based on the propriety of the
rescission of the contract, which, in turn, is based on a determination of whether
Maunlad Homes indeed failed to comply with the terms of the contract; the
propriety of the rescission, however, is a question that is within the RTC’s jurisdiction.
Hence, Maunlad Homes contended that the dismissal of the ejectment action was
proper.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
The authority of the MeTC to interpret contracts in an unlawful detainer
action In any case involving the question of jurisdiction, the Court is guided by the
settled doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the
action pleaded by the litigant through the allegations in his complaint.15
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant
in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to expiration or
termination of the right to possess.16 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
the action must be filed "within one (1) year after the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession." Thus, to fall within the jurisdiction of the MeTC, the
complaint must allege that –
1. the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of
a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; 2. eventually, the defendant’s possession
 of the property becameillegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant
of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.17
Contrary to the findings of the lower courts, all four requirements were alleged in
Union Bank’s Complaint. Union Bank alleged that Maunlad Homes "maintained
possession of the subject properties" pursuant to the Contract to Sell.18 Maunlad
Homes, however, "failed to faithfully comply with the terms of payment," prompting
Union Bank to "rescind the Contract to Sell in a Notice of Rescission dated February
5, 2003."19 When Maunlad Homes "refused to turn over and vacate the subject
premises,"20 Union Bank sent another Demand Letter on November 19, 2003 to
Maunlad Homes requiring it (1) "[t]o pay the equivalent rentals-in-arrears as of
October 2003 in the amount of ₱ 15,554,777.01 and monthly thereafter until the
premises are fully vacated and turned over" to Union Bank, and (2) to vacate the
property peacefully and turn over possession to Union Bank.21 As the demand went
unheeded, Union Bank instituted an action for unlawful detainer before the MeTC
on February 19, 2004, within one year from the date of the last demand. These
allegations clearly demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer and vested
the MeTC jurisdiction over Union Bank’s action.
Maunlad Homes denied Union Bank’s claim that its possession of the property had
become unlawful. It argued that its failure to make payments did not terminate its
right to possess the property because it already acquired ownership when Union
Bank failed to reserve ownership of the property under the contract. Despite
Maunlad Homes’ claim of ownership of the property, the Court rules that the MeTC
retained its jurisdiction over the action; a defendant may not divest the MeTC of its
jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the property.22 Under Section 16, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, "when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession." Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, however, states
that "the judgment x x x shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and
shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building."
The authority granted to the MeTC to preliminarily resolve the issue of ownership to
determine the issue of possession ultimately allows it to interpret and enforce the
contract or agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. To deny the
MeTC jurisdiction over a complaint merely because the issue of possession requires
the interpretation of a contract will effectively rule out unlawful detainer as a
remedy. As stated, in an action for unlawful detainer, the defendant’s right to
possess the property may be by virtue of a contract, express or implied; corollarily,
the termination of the defendant’s right to possess would be governed by the terms
of the same contract. Interpretation of the contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant is inevitable because it is the contract that initially granted the
defendant the right to possess the property; it is this same contract that the plaintiff
subsequently claims was violated or extinguished, terminating the defendant’s
right to possess. We ruled in Sps. Refugia v. CA23 that –
where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the
validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which
the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these
issues.
The MeTC’s ruling on the rights of the parties based on its interpretation of their
contract is, of course, not conclusive, but is merely provisional and is binding only
with respect to the issue of possession.
Thus, despite the CA’s opinion that Union Bank’s "case involves a determination of
the rights of the parties under the Contract to Sell," 24 it is not precluded from
resolving this issue. Having acquired jurisdiction over Union Bank’s action, the MeTC
can resolve the conflicting claims of the parties based on the facts presented and
proved.
The right to possess the property was extinguished when the contract to sell failed
to materialize
Maunlad Homes acquired possession of the property based on its contract with
Union Bank. While admitting that it suspended payment of the
installments,25 Maunlad Homes contended that the suspension of payment did not
affect its right to possess the property because its contract with Union Bank was
one of sale and not to sell; hence, ownership of the
property has been transferred to it, allowing it to retain possession notwithstanding
nonpayment of installments. The terms of the contract, however, do not support
this conclusion.
Section 11 of the contract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes provides that
"upon payment in full of the Purchase Price of the Property x x x, the SELLER shall
execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the Property to the
BUYER."26 "Jurisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute
a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the
price, the contract is only a contract to sell." 27 The presence of this provision
generally identifies the contract as being a mere contract to sell.28 After reviewing
the terms of the contract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes, we find no
reasonable ground to exempt the present case from the general rule; the contract
between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes is a contract to sell.
In a contract to sell, the full payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition whose non-fulfillment is not a breach of contract, but merely an event
that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. "The non-payment of
the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and
effect."29 Maunlad Homes’ act of withholding the installment payments rendered
the contract ineffective and without force and effect, and ultimately deprived
itself of the right to continue possessing Maunlad Shopping Mall.
The propriety of filing the unlawful detainer action in Makati City pursuant to the
venue stipulation in the contract
Maunlad Homes questioned the venue of Union Bank’s unlawful detainer action
which was filed in Makati City while the contested property is located in Malolos,
Bulacan. Citing Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, Maunlad Homes claimed
that the unlawful detainer action should have been filed with the municipal trial
court of the municipality or city where the real property involved is situated. Union
Bank, on the other hand, justified the filing of the complaint with the MeTC of
Makati City on the venue stipulation in the contract which states that "the venue
of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Contract to Sell shall
be at Makati City."30
While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that ejectment actions shall be
filed in "the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property
involved x x x is situated," Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the rule shall not
apply "where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the
action on the exclusive venue thereof." Precisely, in this case, the parties provided
for a different venue. In Villanueva v. Judge Mosqueda, etc., et al.,31 the Court
upheld the validity of a stipulation in a contract providing for a venue for ejectment
actions other than that stated in the Rules of Court. Since the unlawful detainer
action is connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint with
the MeTC of Makati City.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the decision dated
October 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107772. Respondent
Maunlad Homes, Inc. is ORDERED TO VACATE the Maunlad Shopping Mall, the
property subject of the case, immediately upon the finality of this Decision.
Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears,
as well as rentals accruing in the interim until it vacates the property.
The case is REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, to
determine the amount of rentals due. In addition to the amount determined as
unpaid rent, respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. is ORDERED TO PAY legal interest of
six percent (6o/o) per annum, from November 19, 2003, when the demand to pay
and to vacate was made, up to the finality of this Decision. Thereafter, an interest
of twelve percent ( 12%) per annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until
full payment is made.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186993 August 22, 2012 interest that had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the receipt of the
said demand letter, the respondents still failed to settle their loan obligation.
THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B.
ACERON, Petitioners, On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles,
vs. California, United States of America (USA), executed their respective Special
SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG, Respondents. Powers of Attorney6 in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for
the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. On September 15,
VELASCO, JR.,* 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint 7 for collection of
sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, **
On November 21, 2006, the respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint
DECISION filed by the petitioners on the grounds of improper venue and prescription.8 Insisting
that the venue of the petitioners’ action was improperly laid, the respondents
asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of the
REYES, J.:
place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in
Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint against them in the RTC of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated August 28, 2008 and the
Quezon City was improper.
Resolution2 dated February 20, 2009 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101159. The assailed decision annulled and set aside the Orders dated
The RTC Orders
April 12, 20073 and August 27, 20074 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 81 in Civil Case No. Q-06-58834.
On April 12, 2007, the RTC of Quezon City issued an Order9 which, inter alia, denied
the respondents’ motion to dismiss. In ruling against the respondents’ claim of
The Antecedent Facts
improper venue, the court explained that:
On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan
Attached to the complaint is the Special Power of Attorney x x x which clearly
in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from
states that plaintiff Nancy Ang constituted Atty. Eldrige Marvin Aceron as her duly
Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). On even date, the respondents executed
appointed attorney-in-fact to prosecute her claim against herein defendants.
a promissory note5 in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the
Considering that the address given by Atty. Aceron is in Quezon City, hence, being
latter the said amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum,
the plaintiff, venue of the action may lie where he resides as provided in Section 2,
upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to
Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.10
pay the petitioners.

The respondents sought reconsideration of the RTC Order dated April 12, 2007,
Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter
asserting that there is no law which allows the filing of a complaint in the court of
asking them to pay their outstanding debt which, at that time, already amounted
the place where the representative, who was appointed as such by the plaintiffs
to Seven Hundred Nineteen Thousand, Six Hundred Seventy-One U.S. Dollars and
through a Special Power of Attorney, resides.11
Twenty-Three Cents (US$719,671.23), inclusive of the ten percent (10%) annual
The respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC of Quezon City The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated August 28, 2008, but
in its Order12 dated August 27, 2007. it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated February 20, 2009.16

The respondents then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari 13 alleging in the main Hence, the instant petition.
that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners’ complaint
may only be filed in the court of the place where they or the petitioners reside. Issue
Considering that the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA, the
respondents assert that the complaint below may only be filed in the RTC of In the instant petition, the petitioners submit this lone issue for this Court’s resolution:
Bacolod City, the court of the place where they reside in the Philippines.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
The respondents further claimed that, the petitioners’ grant of Special Power of WHEN IT RULED THAT THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT
Attorney in favor of Atty. Aceron notwithstanding, the said complaint may not be VENUE WAS NOT PROPERLY LAID.17
filed in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, i.e., RTC of Quezon City.
They explained that Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners,
The Court’s Ruling
is not the real party in interest in the case below; accordingly, his residence should
not be considered in determining the proper venue of the said complaint.
The petition is denied.
The CA Decision
Contrary to the CA’s disposition, the petitioners maintain that their complaint for
collection of sum of money against the respondents may be filed in the RTC of
On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered the herein Decision,14 which annulled and set
Quezon City. Invoking Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they insist that Atty.
aside the Orders dated April 12, 2007 and August 27, 2007 of the RTC of Quezon
Aceron, being their attorney-in-fact, is deemed a real party in interest in the case
City and, accordingly, directed the dismissal of the complaint filed by the
below and can prosecute the same before the RTC. Such being the case, the
petitioners. The CA held that the complaint below should have been filed in
petitioners assert, the said complaint for collection of sum of money may be filed
Bacolod City and not in Quezon City. Thus:
in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, which is the RTC of Quezon
City.
As maybe clearly gleaned from the foregoing, the place of residence of the
plaintiff’s attorney-in-fact is of no moment when it comes to ascertaining the venue
On the other hand, the respondents in their Comment 18 assert that the petitioners
of cases filed in behalf of the principal since what should be considered is the
are proscribed from filing their complaint in the RTC of Quezon City. They assert that
residence of the real parties in interest, i.e., the plaintiff or the defendant, as the
the residence of Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative, is immaterial to the
case may be. Residence is the permanent home – the place to which, whenever
determination of the venue of the petitioners’ complaint.
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. Residence is vital when
dealing with venue. Plaintiffs, herein private respondents, being residents of Los
The petitioners’ complaint should have been filed in the RTC of
Angeles, California, U.S.A., which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Philippine
courts, the case should have been filed in Bacolod City where the defendants, Bacolod City, the court of the place where the respondents reside, and
herein petitioners, reside. Since the case was filed in Quezon City, where the not in RTC of Quezon City.
representative of the plaintiffs resides, contrary to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, the trial court should have dismissed the case for improper venue. 15
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the
convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the
principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the
matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.19
The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents
is a personal action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules
give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in
the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant
must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the
action is commenced.20
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such
case may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides. In
Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd.,21 this Court held that there
can be no election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff
has no residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may only be filed
in the court of the place where the defendant resides. Thus:
Section 377 provides that actions of this character "may be brought in any province
where the defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be found,
or in any province where the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides, at the election
of the plaintiff." The plaintiff in this action has no residence in the Philippine Islands.
Only one of the parties to the action resides here. There can be, therefore, no
election by plaintiff as to the place of trial. It must be in the province where the
defendant resides. x x x.22 (Emphasis ours)
Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the
respondents reside in Bacolod City. Applying the foregoing principles, the
petitioners’ complaint against the respondents may only be filed in the RTC of
Bacolod City – the court of the place where the respondents reside. The petitioners,
being residents of Los Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the
venue of the filing of their complaint.
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it annulled and set aside the
orders of the RTC of Quezon City and consequently dismissed the petitioners’
complaint against the respondents on the ground of improper venue.
In this regard, it bears stressing that the situs for bringing real and personal civil
actions is fixed by the Rules of Court to attain the greatest convenience possible
to the litigants and their witnesses by affording them maximum accessibility to the
courts.23 And even as the regulation of venue is primarily for the convenience of
the plaintiff, as attested by the fact that the choice of venue is given to him, it
should not be construed to unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights
conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.24
Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below; thus, his residence is
immaterial to the venue of the filing of the complaint.
Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact
of the petitioners, is not a real party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (Emphasis ours)
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.25 A real party in
interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be
enforced.26
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest
in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment
therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the
limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents.
Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights
of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal
capacity does not have the right to file the complaint below against the
respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners – the
real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case below
belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is
not a real party in interest.27
person or persons being represented must be included in the title of the case and
such person or persons shall be considered the real party in interest. In other words,
the principal remains the true party to the case and not the representative. Under
the plain meaning rule, or verba legis, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.
xxx29 (Citation omitted)

The petitioner’s reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their
conclusion that Atty. Aceron is likewise a party in interest in the case below is
misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. – Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted
and defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert trust, a
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules.
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal. (Emphasis ours)
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the rules on venue, like the other procedural
rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the
impartial and even-handed determination of every action and proceeding.
Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted
freedom to choose the court where he may file his complaint or petition. The
choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff's whim or caprice. He may be
impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court
even if not allowed by the rules on venue.30
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated August 28, 2008 and Resolution dated February 20, 2009
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101159 are AFFIRMED.

Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the SO ORDERED.
representative is likewise deemed as the real party in interest. The said rule simply
states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and,
hence, should be included in the title of the case.

Indeed, to construe the express requirement of residence under the rules on venue
as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff would abrogate the meaning
of a "real party in interest", as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Court vis-à-vis Section 3 of the same Rule.28

On this score, the CA aptly observed that:

As may be unerringly gleaned from the foregoing provisions, there is nothing therein
that expressly allows, much less implies that an action may be filed in the city or
municipality where either a representative or an attorney-in-fact of a real party in
interest resides. Sec. 3 of Rule 3 merely provides that the name or names of the
G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005
SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The petitioners, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a parcel
of land, with a house constructed thereon, located in Parañaque, Metro Manila
(now Parañaque City) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 134391
issued on February 24, 1998.1
On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and
Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 2 in which the
former sold the property to the latter for the price of ₱940,250.00 payable in six (6)
installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the
property.
It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the
property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the condition
that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the
latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners.
On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a
Complaint3 against the respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and
damages. The petitioners alleged therein that, they did not transfer the property to
and in the names of the respondents as vendees because the first two checks
drawn and issued by them in payment for the purchase price of the property were
dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite
demands therefor.
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their
favor, thus:
a. The sale/Memorandum of Agreement (Annex "A," supra) be declared null and void,
rescinded and with no further force and effect;
b. Defendants, and all persons claiming right under them, be ordered to immediately
vacate the subject property and turnover its possession to the plaintiffs;
c. Defendants, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay the plaintiffs:
i. ₱10,000.00 – monthly, starting 01 October 1997 until complete turnover of the subject
property to the plaintiffs, as reasonable compensation for its continued unlawful use and
occupation by the defendants;
ii. ₱200,000.00 – moral damages;
iii. ₱200,000.00 – exemplary damages;
iv. ₱250,000.00 – attorney’s fees and litigation – related expenses; and
v. the costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for.4
The petitioners declared in their complaint that the property subject of the
complaint was valued at ₱6,900,000.00. They appended copies of the MOA and
TCT No. 134391 to their complaint. The case was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia,
of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the
action.
On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of the
petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of the
property is a real action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been
brought in the RTC of Parañaque City, where the property subject matter of the
action was located, and not in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the petitioners
resided. The respondents posited that the said court had no jurisdiction over the
property subject matter of the action because it was located in Parañaque City.5
In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and attorney’s
fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence, it may be filed in the RTC of
Bulacan where they reside. They averred that while their second cause of action
for the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action, the same may,
nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of action for damages,
conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.6
By way of reply, the respondents averred that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court applies only when one or more of multiple causes of action falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts, and the other or others are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, and the venue lies therein.
On February 9, 2000, the trial court issued an Order7 denying the motion for lack of
merit. It found merit in the petitioner’s contention that Section 5(c), Rule 2 was
applicable.
Meanwhile, the case was re-raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. In
a Motion8 dated December 20, 2000, the respondents prayed for the
reconsideration of the trial court’s February 9, 2000 Order. On October 16, 2001, the
court issued an Order9 granting the motion and ordered the dismissal of the
complaint. It ruled that the principal action of the petitioners was a real action and
should have been filed in the RTC of Parañaque City where the property subject
matter of the complaint was located. However, since the case was filed in the RTC
of Bulacan where the petitioners reside, which court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, it must be dismissed.
Hence, the present recourse.
The petition has no merit.
The sole issue is whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan. The resolution of this issue is, in turn, anchored on whether
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court invoked by the petitioners is applicable in this
case.
Under the said Rule, a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party
subject to the conditions therein enumerated, one of which is Section 5(c) which
reads:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. -- …
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one
of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; …
Explaining the aforequoted condition, Justice Jose Y. Feria declared:
(c) Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial
Court, the action should be filed in the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action
have different venues, they may be joined in any of the courts of proper venue.
Hence, a real action and a personal action may be joined either in the Regional
Trial Court of the place where the real property is located or where the parties
reside.10
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of
the other which causes the latter injury. The essential elements of a cause of action
are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative
legal duty of the defendant to respect one’s right; and (3) an act or omission of
the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right.11 A cause of action should not be
confused with the remedies or reliefs prayed for. A cause of action is to be found
in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer for relief. It is the
substance and not the form that is controlling.12 A party may have two or more
causes of action against another party.
A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of action
in a complaint. The question of the joinder of causes of action involves in particular
cases a preliminary inquiry as to whether two or more causes of action are
alleged.13 In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the main
thrust is whether more than one primary right or subject of controversy is present.
Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on the other,
whether the same evidence would support the other different counts and whether
separate actions could be maintained for separate relief;14 or whether more than
one distinct primary right or subject of controversy is alleged for enforcement or
adjudication.15
A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies.
The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he
has stated more than one cause of action. The prayer may be an aid in interpreting
the petition and in determining whether or not more than one cause of action is
pleaded.16 If the allegations of the complaint show one primary right and one
wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are
incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods, elements of injury,
items of claims or theories of recovery are set forth.17 Where two or more primary
rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of causes of action.
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint
in the said RTC, venue was improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted
conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule
G.R. No. 160053 August 28, 2006
2 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs
in the court a quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents, namely,
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN, Petitioners,
the breach of the MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay the first two installments in
vs.
payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to the petitioners the
HON. JANE AURORA C. LANTION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa
possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied
City, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 13, PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, ELIZABETH
by the respondents. The claim for damages for reasonable compensation for the
C. UMALI, ALICE PERCE, JELEN MOSCA, REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR LIPA CITY,
respondents’ use and occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as moral
BATANGAS, THE CLERK OF COURT and EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
and exemplary damages suffered by the petitioners on account of the aforestated
COURT OF BATANGAS, Respondents.
breach of contract of the respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of
action, and are not independent or separate causes of action.18
DECISION
The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of the
respondents’ breach thereof and the latter’s failure to return the premises subject QUISUMBING, J.:
of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a
real action.19 As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where This is a petition for certiorari assailing the orders dated May 15, 2003 1 and
the property is located, namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1, September 15, 20032 in Civil Case No. 2002-0555 issued by public respondent,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which reads: Presiding Judge Jane Aurora C. Lantion, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa
City, Batangas.
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Renato and Angelina Lantin took several peso and dollar loans from
respondent Planters Development Bank and executed several real estate
mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. They defaulted on the
payments so respondent bank foreclosed the mortgaged lots. The foreclosed
properties, in partial satisfaction of petitioners’ debt, were sold at a public auction
where the respondent bank was the winning bidder. On November 8, 2003,
petitioners filed against Planters Development Bank and its officers Elizabeth Umali,
Alice Perce and Jelen Mosca (private respondents), a Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge
of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of
Lipa City, Batangas. Petitioners alleged that only their peso loans were covered by
the mortgages and that these had already been fully paid, hence, the mortgages
should have been discharged. They challenged the validity of the foreclosure on
the alleged non-payment of their dollar loans as the mortgages did not cover
those loans.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue since the loan agreements restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila.
On May 15, 2003, the respondent judge dismissed the case for improper venue.
Petitioners sought reconsideration. They argued that the trial court in effect
prejudged the validity of the loan documents because the trial court based its
dismissal on a venue stipulation provided in the agreement. The motion for
reconsideration was denied and the lower court held that the previous order did
not touch upon the validity of the loan documents but merely ruled on the
procedural issue of venue.
Petitioners now come before us alleging that:
I
THE HONORABLE JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE VENUE STIPULATIONS IN THE "REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE" AND
"PROMISSORY NOTES" FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SECTION 4(B) OF RULE 4 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN THAT IT LIMITED THE VENUE OF ACTIONS TO A DEFINITE PLACE.
II
THE HONORABLE JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT THE MERE USE OF THE WORD "EXCLUSIVELY" DOES NOT, BY ITSELF,
MEAN THAT SUCH STIPULATIONS AUTOMATICALLY PROVIDE FOR AN "EXCLUSIVE VENUE", AS
CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 4(B) OF RULE 4 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SPECIALLY WHEN
THE TENOR OR LANGUAGE OF THE ENTIRE VENUE STIPULATION CLEARLY PROVIDES OTHERWISE.
III
THE HONORABLE JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT HEREIN PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT INVOLVES SEVERAL
CAUSES OF ACTION WHICH DO NOT ARISE SOLELY FROM THE "REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE" AND
"PROMISSORY NOTES" AND WHICH OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION MAY BE FILED IN OTHER VENUES UNDER
SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF RULE 4 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
IV
THE HONORABLE JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE RULE ON VENUE OF ACTIONS IS ESTABLISHED
FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS.3
The main issue in the present petition is whether respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the case for improper venue.
Petitioners contend that, since the validity of the loan documents were squarely
put in issue, necessarily this meant also that the validity of the venue stipulation also
was at issue. Moreover, according to the petitioners, the venue stipulation in the
loan documents is not an exclusive venue stipulation under Section 4(b) of Rule 4
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.4 The venue in the loan agreement was not
specified with particularity. Besides, petitioners posit, the rule on venue of action
was established for the convenience of the plaintiff, herein petitioners. Further,
petitioners also contend that since the complaint involves several causes of action
which did not arise solely from or connected with the loan documents, the cited
venue stipulation should not be made to apply.
Private respondents counter that, in their complaint, petitioners did not assail the
loan documents, and the issue of validity was merely petitioners’ afterthought to
avoid being bound by the venue stipulation. They also aver that the venue
stipulation was not contrary to the doctrine in Unimasters,5 which requires that a
venue stipulation employ categorical and suitably limiting language to the effect
that the parties agree that the venue of actions between them should be laid only
and exclusively at a definite place. According to private respondents, the also cover the dollar loans, arose out of the said loan documents, the stipulation
language of the stipulation is clearly exclusive. on venue is also applicable thereto.

At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where
the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not
enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must
be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.6 In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.7
The pertinent provisions of the several real estate mortgages and promissory notes
executed by the petitioner respectively read as follows:
Considering all the circumstances in this controversy, we find that the respondent
judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion, as the questioned orders were
evidently in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed orders dated May 15, 2003 and
September 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Batangas, in Civil Case
No. 2002-0555 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

18. In the event of suit arising out of or in connection with this mortgage and/or the
promissory note/s secured by this mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their
causes of auction (sic) exclusively in the proper court of Makati, Metro Manila or at
G.R. No. 183843 January 19, 2011
such other venue chosen by the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving for this
purpose any other venue.8 (Emphasis supplied.)
GOLDEN ARCHES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
I/We further submit that the venue of any legal action arising out of this note
ST. FRANCIS SQUARE HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.
shall exclusively be at the proper court of Metropolitan Manila, Philippines or any
other venue chosen by the BANK, waiving for this purpose any other venue
DECISION
provided by the Rules of Court.9 (Emphasis supplied.)

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue" are
restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirements.
Petitioners claim that effecting the exclusive venue stipulation would be
tantamount to a prejudgment on the validity of the loan documents. We note
however that in their complaint, petitioners never assailed the validity of the
mortgage contracts securing their peso loans. They only assailed the terms and
coverage of the mortgage contracts. What petitioners claimed is that their peso
loans had already been paid thus the mortgages should be discharged, and that
the mortgage contracts did not include their dollar loans. In our view, since the
issues of whether the mortgages should be properly discharged and whether these
In June 1991, Golden Arches Development Corporation (petitioner) entered into a
lease contract over a property owned by Prince City Realty, Inc. located at the
corner of Julia Vargas Avenue and Bank Drive, Ortigas Center, Mandaluyong City.
The lease contract commenced on June 27, 1991 and was to terminate on
February 27, 2008. On November 2, 2006, however, petitioner informed St. Francis
Square Holdings, Inc. (respondent), successor-in-interest of ASB Holdings, Inc. by
which Prince Realty, Inc. eventually became known, of its intention to discontinue
the lease.
Amicable negotiations between the parties having failed, respondent filed on May
4, 2007 an action for breach of contract and damages against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action and improper venue.
It claimed that respondent maintained its principal address in Makati as records of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2007 show, viz: Cover Sheet of
Amended Articles of Incorporation1 (wherein it is stated that the business address
of ASB Holdings Inc. is at Makati), Company Relationship Information Sheet, and
Director’s Certificate dated February 3, 2007 stating that ASB Holdings, Inc., with
principal address at Makati, had amended its Articles of Incorporation by renaming
it (ASB Holdings, Inc.) to St. Francis Square Holdings, Inc., respondent herein, hence,
the complaint should have been filed in Makati. By filing the complaint in
Mandaluyong, petitioner concluded that respondent violated Section 2, Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendant resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
(underscoring supplied)
Opposing the Motion to Dismiss, respondent claimed that it had closed down its
office in Makati effective December 31, 2005 as it now holds office in Mandaluyong
City of which petitioner is aware.
By Order of August 21, 2007,2 Branch 212 of the Mandaluyong RTC denied the
motion to dismiss in this wise:
. . . [P]laintiff’s[-herein respondent’s] Articles of Incorporation having stated [that]
its principal office is located in Metro Manila, this Court is of the opinion that venue
was properly laid considering that the instant case was filed in Mandaluyong Cty
which is part or a place within Metro Manila.
Basic is the rule regarding propriety of venue in actions involving private juridical
entities that the principal place of business of a corporation determines its
residence or domicile such that the place indicated in petitioner’s Articles of
Incorporation becomes controlling in determining the venue.3
Petitioner moved to reconsider the denial of the motion, pointing out that
respondent violated SEC Memorandum Circular No. 03 dated February 16, 2006,
the relevant portion of which reads:
In line with the "full disclosure" requirement of existing laws, all corporations and
partnerships applying for registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission
should state in their Articles of Incorporation or Articles of Partnership the (i) specific
address of their principal office, which shall include, if feasible, the street name,
barangay, city or municipality; and (ii) specific residence address of each
incorporator, stockholder, director, trustee, or partner.
"Metro Manila" shall no longer be allowed as address of the principal office.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Albeit in respondent’s Amended Articles of Incorporation which was filed in 2007,
after the above-stated SEC circular had been issued, it still indicated its principal
office address to be "Metro Manila," the trial court just the same denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration by Order of November 12, 2007.4
On petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July
22, 2008,5 affirmed the trial court’s order, hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.
The petition fails.
Venue, in essence, concerns a rule of procedure. In personal actions, it is fixed for
the greatest possible convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses, 6 and to
promote the ends of justice.
Respondent’s complaint, being one for enforcement of contractual provisions and
recovery of damages, is in the nature of a personal action which, under Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,7 shall be filed at the plaintiff’s residence. Specifically
with respect to a domestic corporation, it is "in a metaphysical sense a resident of
the place where its principal office is located as stated in the articles of G.R. No. 125383 July 2, 2002
incorporation."8
FORTUNATA N. DUQUE, petitioner,
The letters of petitioner itself to respondent dated November 2, 2006, December vs.
18, 2006 and January 2, 2007 indicate the address of respondent to be at St. Francis COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. ENRICO BONIFACIO and DRA. EDNA
Square Mall, Julia Vargas, Ortigas Center, just as the letters of respondent to BONIFACIO, respondents.
petitioner before the filing of the complaint on May 4, 2007 indicate its
(respondent’s) address to be at St. Francis Square Mall, Julia Vargas, Ortigas x--------------------x
Center. Petitioner was thus put on notice that at the respondent’s filing of the
complaint, the latter’s business address has been at Mandaluyong.1âwphi1 MARCOSA D. VALENZUELA, assisted by her husband, ABELARDO
VALENZUELA, petitioner,
IN FINE, although respondent’s Amended Articles of Incorporation of 2007 indicates vs.
that its principal business address is at "Metro Manila", venue was properly laid in COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES EDNA BONIFACIO and ENRICO
Mandaluyong since that is where it had actually been "residing" (or holding its BONIFACIO, respondents.
principal office) at the time it filed its complaint. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, quoted earlier, authorizes the plaintiff (respondent in this case) to make a AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
choice of venue for personal actions – whether to file the complaint in the place
where he resides or where defendant resides.9 Respondent’s choice must be
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
respected as "[t]he controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary
which seeks to reverse the Decision dated March 13, 1996 issued by the Court of
objective for which said cases are filed."10 Respondent’s purpose in filing the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 23991 and 23992, setting aside the Decision dated July
complaint in Mandaluyong where it holds its principal office is obviously for its
3, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and ordering the
convenience and for orderly administration of justice.
remand of the case to the said RTC for trial on the merits.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

The facts of this case are undisputed.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Duque filed a complaint1 before the RTC of Valenzuela alleging that:
respondents spouses Enrico and Edna Bonifacio negotiated with her certain
checks in exchange for cash in the total amount of Two Hundred Seventy
Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00); respondents represented themselves to be holders
in due course and for value and claimed that the checks were sufficiently funded;
upon presentation of the checks on their respective dates of maturity, the same
were dishonored; petitioner Duque gave notice of dishonor to the respondents;
and this notwithstanding and despite repeated demands, respondents refused
and continued to refuse to honor said checks or replace it with cash.2
Petitioner Valenzuela alleged the same circumstances in her complaint, 3 except
that with her, the total amount involved is Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos
(P432,000.00).4
In their Answers, the respondents spouses denied: having personally negotiated
with the plaintiffs any of the checks annexed to the complaints; representing to
both plaintiffs that they were holders in due course and for value of said checks;
representing that the same had sufficient funds; having drawn or issued all the
checks alluded to by plaintiffs; and refusing to honor the checks or replace it with
cash after being informed of the dishonor thereof.
Further, respondents contend that upon learning that the checks were returned to
the petitioners, they made arrangements for settlement but only for the checks
duly issued by them. Finally, respondents dispute the true amount of their total
liability to the respective petitioners as alleged in their separate complaints,
claiming that "they do not owe that much" to either of them.5
On June 28, 1988, the RTC issued a pre-trial order defining the principal issues, thus:
"whether or not the defendants owe the plaintiffs the amount of money as claimed
in the complaint, and whether or not defendants can be permitted to adduce
evidence which would contradict the genuineness and due execution of the
actionable documents attached to the complaint"; and setting the cases for trial
on the merits.6
On November 22, 1988, petitioners filed a Request for Admission and furnished to
counsel for private respondents, specifically requesting that they admit that:
1) they negotiated with plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks annexed to
the respective complaints;
2) defendant Edna M. Bonifacio signed separate promissory notes dated November
23, 1987, acknowledging that she is indebted to plaintiff Duque in the sum of Two
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and to plaintiff Valenzuela Four
Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00), respectively; and
3) the plaintiffs in the two cases sent letters of demand to the defendants both
dated November 28, 1987 which the latter received on December 5, 1987.7
For failure of the respondents spouses to respond to the aforementioned request,
the RTC, citing Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, issued an Order on
December 27, 1988, which reads in part:
"Defendants’ failure to deny under oath the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reason why he cannot truthfully admit/deny
those matters in accordance with the cited provisions of the Rules of Court is an
implied admission of the matters of which admission is requested."8
In the same Order, the RTC deemed the cases submitted for decision.9
On February 1, 1989, the RTC of Valenzuela rendered a decision against the private
respondents, pertinent portions of which read:
"For failure of the defendants to make/submit sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which admission is requested or the reasons why they
cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters as required in Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, upon motion of plaintiffs through counsel, the
matters of which admission is requested are considered admitted.
"Defendants deemed to have admitted that they negotiated with plaintiff
Fortunata N. Duque the certain checks enumerated in the request for admission
and which are the annexes in the complaint, that defendant Edna M. Bonifacio
signed a promissory note dated November 23, 1987 acknowledging her
indebtedness to plaintiff Fortunata N. Duque in the amount of P270,000.00 and have
received the letter of demand of said plaintiff on December 5, 1987. Defendants
were also considered to have admitted that they negotiated with plaintiff Marcosa
D. Valenzuela the certain checks as annexes to the complaint and enumerated in
the Request for Admission, that defendant Edna M. Bonifacio signed a promissory
note dated November 23, 1987 acknowledging her indebtedness to plaintiff
Marcosa D. Valenzuela in the amount of P432,000.00 and have received plaintiff’s
letter of demand on December 5, 1987. With the admissions, plaintiffs in both cases
are entitled to a favorable judgment.
xxx
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the
defendants Spouses Enrico and Dra. Edna M. Bonifacio.
 "Civil Case No. 2756-V-88
"Condemning defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff Fortunata N.
Duque the principal amount of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00)
with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint on January 12, 1988 until
fully paid;
"Civil Case No. 2757-V-88
"Sentencing defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff Marcosa D.
Valenzuela the principal amount of Four Hundred Thirty-Two Thousand Pesos
(P432,000.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint on January
12, 1988 until the amount is fully paid.
"SO ORDERED."10
Dissatisfied, the private respondents went to the Court of Appeals.
On March 13, 1996, the appellate court rendered a decision vacating and setting
aside the decision of the trial court, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and
these cases remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. The trial judge is
enjoined to resolve the cases with dispatch.
"No costs.
"SO ORDERED."11
It reasoned that: the matters of which admission by the appellants is being sought
in the appellees’ separate requests for admission are, or pertain to those already
denied by the former in their respective Answers to the two Complaints filed against
them; the lower court failed to appreciate the fact that the requests for admission
in question were filed in court and not served directly on the appellants, as required
in Section 1 of Rule 26; appellant’s counsel were served copies of said requests but
such is not compliance with the requirements of the rule as held by the Supreme
Court in Briboneria vs. Court of Appeals.12
Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration on April 2, 1996 13 but the same was
denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated May 21, 1996.14
Hence the petition for review, assigning the following errors:
A
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECS. 1 AND 2, RULE 26 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
B
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO SERVICE OF THE
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.15
Otherwise stated, the issues of this case are as follows: (1) whether or not the failure
of the private respondents to respond to the request for admission by the
petitioners is tantamount to an implied admission under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26
of the Rules of Court; and (2) whether or not there was personal service of the
request on private respondents.
As to the first issue, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it totally
disregarded Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 because the RTC correctly held that there
was an implied admission by the private respondents of the allegations in the
request for admission upon their failure to admit or deny the matters in the
request;16 that respondents cannot ignore their request for admission since it
contained relevant evidentiary matters of facts for the purpose of establishing their
cause of action or defense;"17 and that the answer of respondents did not deny
under oath the truth and genuineness of the actionable documents attached to
the complaint.18
Anent the second issue, petitioners allege that the appellate court erred in holding
that there was no service of the request for admission on private respondents; that
this allegation was never raised by private respondents because it is false; and that
granting arguendo that the request was served on the lawyer and not on private
respondents themselves, still this is sufficient and is equivalent to service on the
respondent according to PSFC Financial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.19
We find the petition devoid of merit.
The prevailing rule in 1988 at the time when the request for admission was made is
Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
"Sec. 1. Request for admission --- At any time after issues have been joined, a party
may serve upon any other party20 a written request for the admission by the latter
of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited with the
request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request. Copies
of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already
been furnished.
"Sec. 2. Implied admission --- Each of the matters of which an admission is requested
shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which
shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further time
as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is
directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth
in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
"Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested
shall be promptly submitted to the court for resolution."
This particular Rule seeks to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the
genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests
for admissions to enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse side
thereby facilitating an amicable settlement of the case or expediting the trial of
the same.21 However, if the request for admission only serves to delay the
proceeding by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for
the rule will certainly be defeated.22
In the present case, petitioners requested the admission of three things: first, that
respondents negotiated with the plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks
annexed to the respective complaints; second, that defendant Edna N. Bonifacio
signed separate promissory notes, both dated November 23, 1987 acknowledging
that she is indebted to plaintiff Fortunata Duque in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy
Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and to plaintiff Marcosa Valenzuela in the sum of
Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00); and third, that the plaintiffs
in the two (2) cases sent letters of demand commonly dated November 28, 1987
which the latter received on December 5, 1987.1âwphi1.nêt
The first matter sought to be admitted by the petitioners pertains to the checks
supposedly negotiated by the respondents to the plaintiffs. As correctly observed
by the appellate court, these are the same checks referred to and annexed in the
Complaint, to wit:
"III
"The defendants, conspiring, confederating, aiding and helping each other,
negotiated with the plaintiff certain checks in exchange for cash, as shown in the
schedule which is hereto attached xxx and the checks as Annexes ‘B’, ‘B-1’ to ‘B-
24’(in Civil Case No. 2756-V-88) and Annexes ‘B’, ‘B-1’ to ‘B-39’ (in Civil Case No.
2757-V-88) and made integral parts hereof, making representations that they were
holders in due course and for value and the checks were sufficiently funded." 23
The corresponding denial thereof by the respondents in their Answer reads:
"That paragraph 3 is specifically denied for being devoid of the truth as defendants
did not personally negotiate with plaintiff any of the checks marked as Annexes ‘B’
to ‘B-24’ (in Civil Case No. 2756) and Annexes ‘B’ to ‘B-39’ (in Civil Case No. 2757);
neither did defendants represent that they are holder in due course and for value
of said checks nor did they claim that the same have sufficient funds, moreover, not
all the checks alluded to by plaintiff(s) were drawn or issued by defendants."24
Clearly therefrom, to require an admission on this point even though it was already
denied in the Answer would be superfluous.
As expounded by this Court in Po vs. Court of Appeals:25
"A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his
pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, Terry
260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a second denial of
those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not
intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s
pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents
described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said
 party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, ‘pointless, useless’ and ‘a mere redundancy.’
On the second matter requested, petitioners sought the admission of respondents
that Edna Bonifacio executed promissory notes in favor of the petitioners
acknowledging therein her indebtedness to them in the amount of Two Hundred
Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos
(P432,000.00). The appellate court held that the allegation of the private
respondents in their Answers that "they do not owe that much" is sufficient and does
not necessitate a reply to the admission.26 To this we disagree. The request for
admission pertains to promissory notes while the allegation quoted by the
appellate court simply refers to the amount allegedly owed by the respondents,
not to the promissory notes which in the first place were not mentioned in the
Complaint of petitioners.
However, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the observations of the Court
of Appeals that the request for admission regarding the alleged promissory notes
is defective for failure of petitioners to attach copies of said notes to the request
for admission; and that private respondents were not previously furnished copies of
the same. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements under Section 1 of Rule
26 which provides that a party may serve upon any other party a written request
for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request; and that copies of the
documents should be delivered with the request unless copies have already been
furnished. Except for the bare allegation of the petitioners that they also furnished
private respondents said promissory notes, their requests do not show that there
was indeed such previous or simultaneous service of the said documents on the
petitioners.
Also improper is the admission sought with respect to plaintiffs’ demand letters
dated November 28, 1987 which the defendants allegedly received on December
5, 1987.
Paragraph V of the Complaint reads:
"Plaintiff gave notice of dishonor to the defendants, but this notwithstanding, and in
spite of repeated demands, the defendants refused and failed and continue to
refuse and fail to honor the said checks or replace them with cash.27
Paragraph 4 of the Answer reads:
That paragraph 5 is specifically denied for being devoid of the truth as defendants
after having obtained knowledge that their checks were turned-over to the
possession of plaintiff and were dishonored, made arrangement for the settlement
of the checks issued by them.28
Thus, a denial by the respondents would be a surplusage in the light of the
allegation in paragraph 5 of the respective Complaints which speak of such a
demand, and the denial of the same allegation in appellants’ separate Answers
to said complaints.
The second issue involves the question of sufficiency of service on a party of a
request for admission.
The petitioners claim that respondents were personally served requests for
admission as required by the Rules; and that granting that they were not, service
on the counsel would be sufficient.
Records show that only the counsel of the respondents, Atty. H.G. Domingo, Jr. was
furnished copies of the requests.29 This is not sufficient compliance with the Rules.
As elucidated by the Court in the Briboneria case:
"The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13)
of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon
the party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is
the one responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural aspects; hence,
notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain
a uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly
prosecution of a party’s case (Chainani vs. Judge Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb.
29, 1952; Capili v. Badelles, G.R. No. L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962). However, the general
rule cannot apply where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon
a definite person. In such cases, service must be made directly upon the person
mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice be valid."30
Consequently, the requests for admission made by the petitioners were not validly
served and therefore, private respondents cannot be deemed to have admitted
the truth of the matters upon which admissions were requested. Thus, the summary
judgment rendered by the RTC has no legal basis to support it.31

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals. No costs.

SO ORDERED.